#**
There is no knowledge of the mind of another in the Path of Seeing.
There is no knowledge of the mind of another in the Path of Seeing.
AbhidharmakosabhasyamVol-4VasubandhuPoussinPruden1991
The Names of the Four Arupyas 1226
2. The Parts of the Pure Dhyanas 1227 a. Happiness 1231 b. Faith 1236 ? Joy 1237
3. The Parts of Defiled Dhyana 1238 a. Disturbed Dhyuna 1239 b. Vedana in the Dhyanas 1239
? Eye Consciousness in the Dhyanas 1240
4. Acquisition of the Absorptions 1241
5. What Absorption Arises After
What Absorption? 1244 a. Reciprocal Generation of the Absorptions 1248 b. What Beings Manifest How
Many Absorptions 1250
6. The Objects of the Absorptions 1251
7. Which Absorptions Destroy
the Defilements? 1252
8. The Prefatory Absorptions 1253
a. Differences Between the Prefatory
Absorptions and the Intermediate Dhyana 1254
i. The Categories of
Intermediate Dhyana 1255
9. The Three Samadhis 1256
a. Their Moral Value 1258
10. The Four Cultivations of Absorption 1262
11. The Immeasurables 1264 a. Definition 1265
b. Their Objects 1265
? The Spheres in Which They
Are Produced 1267
i. How the Beginner Cultivates
Goodwill 1269
12. The Deliverances 1271
a. In Arapyadhatu 1271
b. The Absorption of Extinction 1273
? Their Objects 1274
? d The Deliverances and the
Third Dhyana 1275
13. The Dominent Ayatanas 1276
14. The All-Encompassing Ayatanas 1277
15. How an Absorption Arises 1279
II. (including Remarks 1281
A. The Nature of the Good Law 1281 1, Its Duration 1281
B. This Present Treatise 1282
? Concluding Stanzas 1282
Footnotes
1283
Chapter EX: Refutation of the pudgala
I. General Statements 1313
II. Refutation of the Vatslputrlya Theories 1314
A. Refutations from Reasoning 1314 1. The Provisional Existence of the Pudgala 1315
a. Discussion: The Relationship of
Fire and Fuel 1315
2. The Pudgala as the Totality of the Skandhas 1318
3. The Support of the Pudgala 1318
4. The Pudgala as Cognized by the Vijnuna 1318
B. Refutations from Scripture 1321 1, Synonyms 1324 2. Scriptural Quotations 1324
a. Discussion: The Authority of Texts 1324 ? Refutation of Vatslputrlya Arguments 1326 1. "In the past, I was. . . " 1327
a. Discussion: The Omniscience of
the Buddha 1327
2. The Bearer of the Burden 1328
3. Apparitional Beings 1330
4. A Single Self or Soul 1330
5. Unanswerable Questions 1332
? 6. A False Opinion 1336
7. A Subject that Transmigrates 1337
8. "Then I was. . . " 1337
9. Three Wrong Beliefs 1338
10. Memory and Recognition 1339
a. Definition of Memory 1339
b. To Whom Does Memory Belong? 1341
? . Refutation of the Soul Theory of the Grammarians 1342
A. General Arguments and their Refutation 1342
B. Specific Refutations 1342
1. What Does it Signify to Say "A Person
Walks"? 1342
2. How Consciousness Knows an Object 1343
3. The Non-determined Sequence of Consciousnesses 1344
4. Conclusion 1345
IV. Refutation of the Soul Theories of the Vaisesikas 1346 A. General Arguments and their Refutations 1346 B. Specific Refutations 1346
1. 2.
3. 4.
5. Preliminary Notes
Footnotes Index
A Substrate 1348 The Result of Action 1349 a. Cause of the Idea of "I" 1350 b. Definition of Pleasure and Pain 1350 ? Who Has Pain or Pleasure? 1350 d. The Agent of Action 1351 e. Past Causes and Future Results 1352
Cause and Result in Non-Human Life: A
Seed and Its Fruit 1352 A Retributive Result versus an
Out-flowing Result 1354
a. Discussion: Why a New
Retribution is not Generated
from the Retributive Result 1354
Concluding Statements 1355 1356
? ? 1381
? CHAPTER SEVEN
The Knowledges1
? m. Homage to the Buddha.
We have spoken of the ksantis or Patiences (vi. 25d) and of the
jndnas or Knowledges (vi. 26b), of samyagdrsti or Right Views (vi. 50c) and of samyagjndna or Right Knowledge (vi. 76c). Are the Patiences actually Knowledges, and isn't Right Knowledge identical to Right Views?
la. The pure Patiences are not a type of Knowledge. 2
The eight types of pure Patience which form part of the Path of Seeing (dbhisamaydntika, vi. 25d-26c) are not, by their nature, knowledge;3 for, at the moment of patience, the defilement of doubt, which each Patience abandons, is not already abandoned. But Knowledge is certain: it is produced when doubt is abandoned These eight types of Patience are Seeing, because, by their nature, they are examination. 4 In opposition to the pure Patiences which are Seeing and are not Knowledge,
lb. The prajnd of destruction and of non-arising is not seeing. 5
The knowledge of destruction (ksayajndna) and the knowledge of Non-Arising {anutpadajrlana, vi. 67a-b)--when they constitute Bodhi--are not Seeing, because they do not include examination, and because the intention of inquiry is not in them. 6
? 1088 Chapter Seven
lc. All other pure prajnd is both one and the other.
Besides the Patiences and the two Knowledges named above, pure prajnd is at one and the same time both seeing and knowledge, for it includes examination, and is therefore seeing; it is free from doubt, and is therefore knowledge. This refers to the eight abhtsamaya knowledges (duhkhe jridna, etc. , vi. 26) [and also to all prajnd of the pure Path of Meditation up to the Knowledge of Extinction].
Id. All other prajfid is knowledge.
All other prajnd which is not pure, but worldly or impure [i. e. , prajnd associated with the five sense consciousnesses,etc, and prajnd associated with the mental consciousness].
le. Six are also seeing.
Six impure prajnds are at one and the same time knowledge and seeing, namely the mental prajnd associated with the five defilements which are views by nature {satkayadrsti, etc. , v7) and, sixth, good prajnd, which is right worldly views (laukiki sam-
yagdrsti, i. 4l).
***
7
How many knowledges are there? There are ten; but, in short
there are only two:
2a. Knowledge is pure or impure.
All the Knowledges are subsumed into two types of knowledge,
? impure or worldly knowledge, and pure or supermundane knowledge. Of these two knowledges,
8 2b. The first is called conventional.
Impure Knowledge is called "knowledge conforming to worldly conventions. "
Why?
Because from usage it bears on (dlambate) things which exist 9
conventionally: a jug, clothing, male, female, etc. [We say "from usage," because it also bears on the real characteristics of things, unique characteristics and common characteristics, vii. 10b].
2c-d. Pure knowledge is of two types, a knowledge of 10
dharmas and inferential knowledge.
These two knowledges with the preceeding make three knowledges: worldly, conventional knowledge, a knowledge of dharmas, and inferential knowledge. Among these,
11 3a. Conventional knowledge bears on all.
All the conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are the object of conventional knowledge.
3b-c. The knowledge of dharmas has for its object the Suffering, etc. , of Kamadhatu.
The knowledge of dharmas has Suffering, the Arising of Suffering, the Extinction of Suffering, and the Path leading to the Extinction of Suffering of Kamadhatu for its object.
The Knowledges 1089
? 1090 Chapter Seven
? ? -d. Inferential knowledge bears on Suffering, etc. , of the higher spheres.
Inferential knowledge has the Suffering, the Origin of Suffering. . . of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu for its object.
4a-b. When one takes into consideration the distinction of the Truths, these two knowledges, make up four knowl- edges.
Namely: the knowledge of Suffering (which includes the knowledge of the dharmas of Suffering and the inferential knowledge of Suffering), the knowledge of Origin, the knowledge of Extinction, and the knowledge of the Path, because these two knowledges have Suffering, its Origin, etc. , for their object.
4b-c. These two knowledges, fourfold, are termed the knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Ari- sing. 12
The knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge, which are as we have just seen fourfold by reason of their objects, are, among the Arhats, when they are not of the nature of Seeing,13 called the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
4d-5a. At the moment when they arise, they are inferential knowledges of Suffering and Origin.
The Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Ar- ising, at the moment when they first arise are, by their nature, inferential knowledge of Suffering and of its Origin in the higher
? spheres, because they have for their object the skandhas of 14 15
Bhavagra under the aspects of Suffering and Origin. These two knowledges therefore have the same object.
The Knowledge of Destruction follows Vajropamasamadhi (vi. 44d); and the Knowledge of Non-Arising follows the Knowledge of Destruction.
Does Vajropamasamadhi have the same object as these two knowledges at the moment of their arising?
When it has Suffering and Origin for its object, yes; when it has Extinction and the Path for its object, no.
5b. The knowledge of the mind of another follows from four.
The knowledge of the mind of another follows four knowl-
edges, a knowledge of the dharmas, inferential knowledge, a 16
knowledge of the Path, and conventional knowledge.
5c-d. It does not know a mind in a higher sphere, faculties,
17 personalities, nor the past and future.
A mind is superior either from the point of view of its bhilmi, from the point of view of its indriyas, or from the point of view of its personality.
The knowledge of the mind of another of a lower sphere does not know a mind in a higher sphere.
The knowledge of the mind of another of a saint with weak faculties, namely a Sraddhadhimukta or a Samayavimukta (vi. 31c), does not know the mind of a saint of strong faculties, namely a Drstiprapta or a Asamayavimukta.
The knowledge of the mind of another of a lower saint does not know the mind of a higher saint: in order, Anagamin, Arhat,
The Knowledges 1091
? 1092 Chapter Seven
Pratyekabuddha, Samyaksambuddha.
When the mind of another is either past or future, the knowledge of a mind of another does not know it, for this knowledge has a present mind for its object.
Does the mind of another avoid being in the sphere of the knowledge of the mind of another in other cases as well?
6a-b. The knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowl- edges do not know one another.
The knowledge of the mind of another, when it is by its nature a knowledge of dharmas, is not capable of knowing the mind of another which is by nature inferential knowledge; when it is inferential by nature, it is not capable of knowing the mind of another which is by nature a series of dharmas.
Why?
Because these two knowledges have for their object the dharmas which are opposed to Kamadhatu and to the higher spheres respectfully.
#**
There is no knowledge of the mind of another in the Path of Seeing. That is to say, an ascetic, while he cultivates the Path of Seeing, is not endowed with the knowledge of the mind of another, because the duration of the Path of Seeing is much reduced, and because the Seeing of the Truths is rapid. But the mind of another which is found in the Path of Seeing can be the object of the knowledge of the mind of another.
When one desires to know, through the knowledge of the mind of another, the mind of another which is found in the Path of Seeing, one cultivates a preparatory exercise:
18
? 6b-d. The Sravaka knows two moment of Seeing; the Pratyekabuddha, three; the Buddha, without preparation, all.
When a Sravaka cultivates the knowledge of the mind of
another in the desire to see the mind of an ascetic in the Path of
Seeing, he obtains some knowing of the first two moments, the
Patience of the Knowledge of the dharmas of Suffering and the 19
knowledge of dharmas -- but not the following moments (the Patience of the Inferential Knowledge of Suffering. . . )--because the knowledge of the inferential part (Suffering in the higher spheres) of the Path of Seeing supposes a different preparatory exercise. Thus, if this Sravaka then begins a new exercise in order to obtain the knowledge of the inferential part, the ascetic whom he examines has already arrived at the fifteenth moment when this new preparatory exercise [which lasts thirteen moments] is finished. The whole interval between the twelfth and the sixteenth moment therefore is not in the sphere of the knowledge of the mind of another of the Sravaka (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 515c7).
In the same circumstances, the Pratyekabuddha knows three moments, namely the first two and the eighth; because the required preparatory exercise, after the consciousness of the first two moments, for the knowledge of the inferential part, is, among the Pratyekabuddhas, weak.
According to other masters, he knows the first two moments
20 and the fifteenth.
The Buddha, through simple desire, and without preparatory exercise, knows the mind of another in all the moments of the Path of Seeing.
***
What are the characteristics of the Knowledge of Destruction
The Knowledges 1093
? and of
the Knowledge of Non-Arising?
7. The knowledge of destruction is, with respect to the Truths, the certitude that they are known, abandoned, etc. ; the knowledge of non-arising is the certitude that they are
21 no longer to be known, to be abandoned, etc.
22
Chapter Seven
"What is the knowledge of extinction? When one knows within himself that 'Suffering is completely known by me, its Origin is abandoned by me, its Extinction has been actualized by me, the Path has been cultivated
According to the MulaSastra,
23
by me/ then the knowledge which results from this {tad updddya 24
yaj jndnam), the seeing, the knowing, the intuition, the 25
intelligence, the discernment, the clarity, the insight, is what is called the Knowledge of Destruction. " "What is the Knowledge of Non-Arising? When one knows within himself that 'Suffering is completely known by me and is no longer to be known. . . the Path is no longer to be cultivated', then this knowledge. . . is what is called the Knowledge of Non-Arising. " [See the definition vii. 12a-b. ]
###
But how can one, through a pure knowledge, have such a
26 knowledge?
The Masters of KaSmir explain: Two conventional knowledges
are consecutive to two pure knowledges: "Suffering is known by
me. . . ; Suffering is known by me and is no longer to be known. " It is
by reason of the characteristic of these two conventional knowl-
edges that the Sustra defines the two pure knowledges. [This is
27
why the Sastra says: tad updddya. . . ] 28
According to other masters, the ascetic knows, through a pure knowledge, that he knows Suffering, etc.
? But we have said that the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising are not seeing, or views. How can the Sustra define them as views?
29 The Sastra employs the term "view" through stylistic habit,
using again the formula employed in the definition of the other knowledges (the knowledge of Suffering,etc). Or rather, by reason of their characteristic of being directly perceived, these two knowledges are qualified as seeing. It is by reason of this
30 characteristic of being directly perceived that it says in the Sastra,
31 "Knowledge is seeing. "
***
There are ten knowledges: a knowledge of dharmas, inferential
knowledge, worldly, conventional knowledge, the knowledge of
the mind of another, the knowledge of Suffering, the knowledge of
Origin, the knowledge of Extinction, the knowledge of the Path,
the Knowledge of Destruction, and the Knowledge of Non-Ari-
32 sing.
33 How are they included in one another?
1. Conventional knowledge is made up of one knowledge,
namely the conventional knowledge, and one part of another
knowledge [namely the impure part of the knowledge of the mind
34 of another].
2. A knowledge of dharrnas is made up of one full knowledge and one part of seven other knowledges, namely the Kdmadhdtu part of the knowledge of suffering, of origin, of extinction, and of the Path, the knowledge of the mind of another, the Knowledge of Destruction, and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
3. So too inferential knowledge, by replacing "the Kumadhatu
The Knowledges 1095
? 1096 Chapter Seven
part" with "the part relating to the two higher spheres (=Rupad- hatu and Arupyadhatu). "
4. The knowledge of suffering is made up of one knowledge and one part of four other knowledges--that part of the knowl- edge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising which have the Truth of Suffering for their objects.
5-6. The knowledge of origin and of extinction are explained according to the same principle.
7. A knowledge of the Path is made up of one knowledge and one part of five knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the Knowledge of Destruction, the knowledge of Non-Arising, and the knowledge of the mind of another.
8. The knowledge of the mind of another is made up of one knowledge and one part of four knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, a knowledge of the Path, and conventional knowledge.
9. The Knowledge of Destruction is made up of one knowledge and one part of six knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the knowledge of suffering, of origin, of
35 extinction, and of the Path.
10. So too the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
How are the knowledges, which are twofold (pure and impure) distributed into ten knowledges?
8. The knowledges are ten in number; the distinction is established by reason of their nature, their opposition, their aspect, their aspect and their object, their preparatory exercises, the achievement of their task, and the extension of their cause.
1. By reason of its nature, there is conventional knowledge,
36 because it is not absolute knowledge.
? _ The Knowledges 1097 2. By reason of their opposition, there is knowledge of the
dharmas and inferential knowledge: the first is opposed to 37
Kamadhatu, and the second is opposed to the higher spheres.
3. By reason of their aspect (dkdratas, vii. 13), there is a
knowledge of Suffering and a knowledge of Origin: these two
knowledges have the same object (i. e. , the pancopdddnaskandhas, 38
vi. English trans, p. 898 and 908), but differ in their aspects.
4. By reason of their aspect and their object (dlambana), there is a knowledge of Extinction and a knowledge of the Path which differ in their aspects as well as in their objects.
5. By reason of their preparatory exercises, there is the knowledge of the mind of another. Without doubt this knowledge extends also to the mental states {caittas) of another, but the preparatory exercise bears on the mind {citta)\ also, even though it may know the caittas, it is termed paracittajnana (the knowledge of the mind of another) by reason of its preparatory exercise.
6. Because "that which should have been done has been done/' there is the Knowledge of Destruction: this knowledge is the first knowledge to arise in a series in which "that which should have been done has been done. " [The Knowledge of Non-Arising arises in a similar series, but later. ]
7. By reason of the extension of its causes, there is the Knowledge of Non-Arising, for it has for its causes (=sabhd- gahetu) all the pure knowledges, up to and including the Knowledge of Destruction.
***
We have said that the knowledge of the dharmas [that is to say: a. bearing on the Four Truths, b. in the Path of Seeing and in the Path of Meditation] is opposed to all of Kamadhatu [that is to say it "opposes" the five categories of defilements, those abandoned through the Seeing of the Four Truths and through Meditation, of Kamadhatu]. Furthermore
? 1098 Chapter Seven
9a-c. The knowledge of dharmas, in the Pathway of Meditation, when it bears on Extinction and the Path, is opposed to the three spheres.
A knowledge of dharmas with respect to Extinction and the Path, realized in the course of the Path of Meditation is opposed to the three spheres--that is to say, these two knowledges oppose the defilements of the higher spheres which are abandoned through Meditation. 39
9d. Inferential knowledge is not opposed to Kumadhatu. In none of its branches (Suffering, etc. ) is inferential knowl-
edge opposed ? the defilements of Kamadhatu. What are the aspects of the ten knowledges?
lOa-b. A knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge have sixteen aspects.
The sixteen aspects which will be explained later (vii. 13a).
lOb-c. Conventional knowledge is the same and otherwise.
Conventional knowledge has the sixteen aspects; it also takes up others, for it grasps unique characteristics, common characteris- tics, etc. 40
? ? -d. Four, because of the aspect of their Truth. 41
A knowledge of Suffering, Origin, Extinction, and the Path, bearing on the aspects of their Truths, each have four aspects.
lla-b. So too, when it is pure, the knowledge of the mind of another. 42
? The knowledge of the mind of another, in its impure part (vii. 5b-6, note 16), bears on the aspects of its Truth; it therefore has four aspects. This part of the knowledge of the mind of another is, in fact, made up of the knowledge of the Path.
llb-c. When it is impure, it has for its aspects the unique
43 characteristics of its object.
When the knowledge of the mind of another is impure, it grasps the unique characteristics of its object (jneya), namely the mind and the mental states of another. Its aspects are in conformity with these unique characteristics; therefore they are not included in the sixteen.
Pure or impure
44 Ud. It has for its sphere an individual object.
When it bears on a mind, it does not bear on a mental state (caitta); when it bears on a certain mental state (vedand for example), it does not bear on any other one (samjnd, for example).
If this is the case, why did the Blessed One say, "He knows in truth the mind which is sardga (possesses craving) as being
45
sardga", since the knowledge of the mind of another does not
know minds and mental states (craving, etc. ) at one and the same
time, in the same way that one does not grasp the cloth and its
46 stain at one and the same time?
The expression sardga, possessing craving, has two meanings. 47
A mind is sardga because it is "mixed" with craving, or because it 48
is "united" to craving.
The mind associated with craving (ii. 53c), that is to say, which is presently in the prey of craving, is sardga for two reasons; it is mixed with craving, and it is united to craving.
The Knowledges 1Q99
? 1100 Chapter Seven
49
Certain masters
sardgacitta solely designates a mind mixed with craving, that is to say, a mind associated with craving. As for the vigatardga mind, a mind without craving, this is, according to these masters, the mind opposed to craving. In fact, they say, if the mind not associated with craving were called vigataraga, the mind associated with the other defilements (hatred, etc. ) would be also termed vigataraga, for they are not associated with craving.
Objection: In this hypothesis a non-defiled, indeterminate mind (ii. 71b) is not sardga, since it is not associated with craving; it is not vigataraga, since it is not opposed to craving. As a consequence we must admit that what the other masters (the Abhidharmikas) say, that the mind is sardga through the fact of being united to craving, without it necessarily being mixed with craving. In this same way we must explain the other expressions of the Sutra up to "possessing delusion'' (samoha) and "not possessing delusion" (vigatamoha). [See above, note 45. ]
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] A good mind is called concentrated
51
because it is not turned away from its object. A defiled mind is
distracted, because it is associated with distraction.
The Westerners, or Masters of Gandhara, say: A mind
52
Any other impure mind united to craving.
50
is solely sardga to the extent that it is
associated with laziness is concentrated; other defiled mind.
a distracted mind is any
think that the Sutra, by the expression
[The Vaibhasikas] do not admit this definition. They say: In this system, the same mind, namely a defiled mind associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted. Further, this system contradicts the Mulasdstra (according to the Japanese editor, Jndnaprasthana, 15. 9), which
? says, "He knows in truth the concentrated (samksipta) mind, endowed with the four knowledges, a knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, worldly conventional knowledge, and a knowledge of the Path" (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 950c8). [See below, p. 1102 - 3. ]
###
A defiled mind is sunken down, because it is associated with
53 indolence.
A good mind is "well in hand", because it is associated with
54 correct effort.
A defiled mind is called small, because it is beloved by small
persons. A good mind is called large, because it is beloved by great
55 persons.
Or rather the two minds, a defiled mind and a good mind, are called small and great because their roots, their worth, their followings, their entourage, and their forces, are respectively, small or great.
In fact, 1. a defiled mind is of small roots, having two roots, delusion, plus anger or greed: a good mind is always associated with three roots of good; 2. a defiled mind is of small worth, being obtained without effort: a good mind is of great worth, being realized at the cost of great effort; 3. a defiled mind has a small following, for a defiled mind is not accompanied by the acquisition
56
of a future mind of the same type;
following, being accompanied by the acquisition of future mind
of the same type; 4. a defiled mind has a small following, being surrounded only by three skandhas, vedand, samjnd, and samskdras; a good mind has a great following, for it always includes rupa {dhydndndsmvasamvara, iv. 4a, 26); 5. a defiled mind is of small
a good mind has a great 57
? 1102 Chapter Seven .
force, for the roots of good, cut off, are reborn (ii, 36, English trans, p. 210 iv. 80c); a good mind is of great force, for the Patience of the Knowledge of the dharmas concerned with Suffering definitively cuts off ten latent defilements {anusayas vi. English trans, p. 943).
This is why a defiled mind is called small, and a good mind, great.
***
The defiled mind is sa-uttara, because it is associated with frivolity {auddhatya)\ the good mind is anuttara, because it is
58 opposed to frivolity.
Calm and not calm minds are explained in the same way.
***
A defiled mind is non-absorbed, because it is associated with distraction; a good mind is absorbed, because it is opposed to distraction.
A defiled mind is uncultivated, because the two cultivations (vii. 27) are absent. A good mind is cultivated, for the contrary reason.
A defiled mind is undelivered, not being delivered in and of
59 itself, nor delivered with regard to the series in which it arises. A
good mind can be delivered in and of itself and from the point of view of the series in which it arises.
Such is the explanation of the Vaibhasikas.
This explanation, [say the Sautrantikas,] does not conform to the Sutra and it does not take into account the meaning of the terms.
? i. How does it not conform to the Sutra?
The Sutra says, "What is a mind internally concentrated? A mind which is accompanied by torpor and laziness, or a mind internally accompanied by calm but not insight. "
"What is a mind externally distracted? A mind which is
dispersed towards the five objects of pleasure, or which is
60
externally accompanied by insight, but not by calm. " [It, results
from this text that a mind associated with laziness can be concentrated. ]
But, [the Vaibhasikas answer,] we have said (p. 1100, line 21) that if a mind associated with laziness is concentrated, a defiled (and consequently distracted) mind, when it is associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted.
Yes, you have said this, but it does not hold.
2. The Parts of the Pure Dhyanas 1227 a. Happiness 1231 b. Faith 1236 ? Joy 1237
3. The Parts of Defiled Dhyana 1238 a. Disturbed Dhyuna 1239 b. Vedana in the Dhyanas 1239
? Eye Consciousness in the Dhyanas 1240
4. Acquisition of the Absorptions 1241
5. What Absorption Arises After
What Absorption? 1244 a. Reciprocal Generation of the Absorptions 1248 b. What Beings Manifest How
Many Absorptions 1250
6. The Objects of the Absorptions 1251
7. Which Absorptions Destroy
the Defilements? 1252
8. The Prefatory Absorptions 1253
a. Differences Between the Prefatory
Absorptions and the Intermediate Dhyana 1254
i. The Categories of
Intermediate Dhyana 1255
9. The Three Samadhis 1256
a. Their Moral Value 1258
10. The Four Cultivations of Absorption 1262
11. The Immeasurables 1264 a. Definition 1265
b. Their Objects 1265
? The Spheres in Which They
Are Produced 1267
i. How the Beginner Cultivates
Goodwill 1269
12. The Deliverances 1271
a. In Arapyadhatu 1271
b. The Absorption of Extinction 1273
? Their Objects 1274
? d The Deliverances and the
Third Dhyana 1275
13. The Dominent Ayatanas 1276
14. The All-Encompassing Ayatanas 1277
15. How an Absorption Arises 1279
II. (including Remarks 1281
A. The Nature of the Good Law 1281 1, Its Duration 1281
B. This Present Treatise 1282
? Concluding Stanzas 1282
Footnotes
1283
Chapter EX: Refutation of the pudgala
I. General Statements 1313
II. Refutation of the Vatslputrlya Theories 1314
A. Refutations from Reasoning 1314 1. The Provisional Existence of the Pudgala 1315
a. Discussion: The Relationship of
Fire and Fuel 1315
2. The Pudgala as the Totality of the Skandhas 1318
3. The Support of the Pudgala 1318
4. The Pudgala as Cognized by the Vijnuna 1318
B. Refutations from Scripture 1321 1, Synonyms 1324 2. Scriptural Quotations 1324
a. Discussion: The Authority of Texts 1324 ? Refutation of Vatslputrlya Arguments 1326 1. "In the past, I was. . . " 1327
a. Discussion: The Omniscience of
the Buddha 1327
2. The Bearer of the Burden 1328
3. Apparitional Beings 1330
4. A Single Self or Soul 1330
5. Unanswerable Questions 1332
? 6. A False Opinion 1336
7. A Subject that Transmigrates 1337
8. "Then I was. . . " 1337
9. Three Wrong Beliefs 1338
10. Memory and Recognition 1339
a. Definition of Memory 1339
b. To Whom Does Memory Belong? 1341
? . Refutation of the Soul Theory of the Grammarians 1342
A. General Arguments and their Refutation 1342
B. Specific Refutations 1342
1. What Does it Signify to Say "A Person
Walks"? 1342
2. How Consciousness Knows an Object 1343
3. The Non-determined Sequence of Consciousnesses 1344
4. Conclusion 1345
IV. Refutation of the Soul Theories of the Vaisesikas 1346 A. General Arguments and their Refutations 1346 B. Specific Refutations 1346
1. 2.
3. 4.
5. Preliminary Notes
Footnotes Index
A Substrate 1348 The Result of Action 1349 a. Cause of the Idea of "I" 1350 b. Definition of Pleasure and Pain 1350 ? Who Has Pain or Pleasure? 1350 d. The Agent of Action 1351 e. Past Causes and Future Results 1352
Cause and Result in Non-Human Life: A
Seed and Its Fruit 1352 A Retributive Result versus an
Out-flowing Result 1354
a. Discussion: Why a New
Retribution is not Generated
from the Retributive Result 1354
Concluding Statements 1355 1356
? ? 1381
? CHAPTER SEVEN
The Knowledges1
? m. Homage to the Buddha.
We have spoken of the ksantis or Patiences (vi. 25d) and of the
jndnas or Knowledges (vi. 26b), of samyagdrsti or Right Views (vi. 50c) and of samyagjndna or Right Knowledge (vi. 76c). Are the Patiences actually Knowledges, and isn't Right Knowledge identical to Right Views?
la. The pure Patiences are not a type of Knowledge. 2
The eight types of pure Patience which form part of the Path of Seeing (dbhisamaydntika, vi. 25d-26c) are not, by their nature, knowledge;3 for, at the moment of patience, the defilement of doubt, which each Patience abandons, is not already abandoned. But Knowledge is certain: it is produced when doubt is abandoned These eight types of Patience are Seeing, because, by their nature, they are examination. 4 In opposition to the pure Patiences which are Seeing and are not Knowledge,
lb. The prajnd of destruction and of non-arising is not seeing. 5
The knowledge of destruction (ksayajndna) and the knowledge of Non-Arising {anutpadajrlana, vi. 67a-b)--when they constitute Bodhi--are not Seeing, because they do not include examination, and because the intention of inquiry is not in them. 6
? 1088 Chapter Seven
lc. All other pure prajnd is both one and the other.
Besides the Patiences and the two Knowledges named above, pure prajnd is at one and the same time both seeing and knowledge, for it includes examination, and is therefore seeing; it is free from doubt, and is therefore knowledge. This refers to the eight abhtsamaya knowledges (duhkhe jridna, etc. , vi. 26) [and also to all prajnd of the pure Path of Meditation up to the Knowledge of Extinction].
Id. All other prajfid is knowledge.
All other prajnd which is not pure, but worldly or impure [i. e. , prajnd associated with the five sense consciousnesses,etc, and prajnd associated with the mental consciousness].
le. Six are also seeing.
Six impure prajnds are at one and the same time knowledge and seeing, namely the mental prajnd associated with the five defilements which are views by nature {satkayadrsti, etc. , v7) and, sixth, good prajnd, which is right worldly views (laukiki sam-
yagdrsti, i. 4l).
***
7
How many knowledges are there? There are ten; but, in short
there are only two:
2a. Knowledge is pure or impure.
All the Knowledges are subsumed into two types of knowledge,
? impure or worldly knowledge, and pure or supermundane knowledge. Of these two knowledges,
8 2b. The first is called conventional.
Impure Knowledge is called "knowledge conforming to worldly conventions. "
Why?
Because from usage it bears on (dlambate) things which exist 9
conventionally: a jug, clothing, male, female, etc. [We say "from usage," because it also bears on the real characteristics of things, unique characteristics and common characteristics, vii. 10b].
2c-d. Pure knowledge is of two types, a knowledge of 10
dharmas and inferential knowledge.
These two knowledges with the preceeding make three knowledges: worldly, conventional knowledge, a knowledge of dharmas, and inferential knowledge. Among these,
11 3a. Conventional knowledge bears on all.
All the conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are the object of conventional knowledge.
3b-c. The knowledge of dharmas has for its object the Suffering, etc. , of Kamadhatu.
The knowledge of dharmas has Suffering, the Arising of Suffering, the Extinction of Suffering, and the Path leading to the Extinction of Suffering of Kamadhatu for its object.
The Knowledges 1089
? 1090 Chapter Seven
? ? -d. Inferential knowledge bears on Suffering, etc. , of the higher spheres.
Inferential knowledge has the Suffering, the Origin of Suffering. . . of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu for its object.
4a-b. When one takes into consideration the distinction of the Truths, these two knowledges, make up four knowl- edges.
Namely: the knowledge of Suffering (which includes the knowledge of the dharmas of Suffering and the inferential knowledge of Suffering), the knowledge of Origin, the knowledge of Extinction, and the knowledge of the Path, because these two knowledges have Suffering, its Origin, etc. , for their object.
4b-c. These two knowledges, fourfold, are termed the knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Ari- sing. 12
The knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge, which are as we have just seen fourfold by reason of their objects, are, among the Arhats, when they are not of the nature of Seeing,13 called the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
4d-5a. At the moment when they arise, they are inferential knowledges of Suffering and Origin.
The Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Ar- ising, at the moment when they first arise are, by their nature, inferential knowledge of Suffering and of its Origin in the higher
? spheres, because they have for their object the skandhas of 14 15
Bhavagra under the aspects of Suffering and Origin. These two knowledges therefore have the same object.
The Knowledge of Destruction follows Vajropamasamadhi (vi. 44d); and the Knowledge of Non-Arising follows the Knowledge of Destruction.
Does Vajropamasamadhi have the same object as these two knowledges at the moment of their arising?
When it has Suffering and Origin for its object, yes; when it has Extinction and the Path for its object, no.
5b. The knowledge of the mind of another follows from four.
The knowledge of the mind of another follows four knowl-
edges, a knowledge of the dharmas, inferential knowledge, a 16
knowledge of the Path, and conventional knowledge.
5c-d. It does not know a mind in a higher sphere, faculties,
17 personalities, nor the past and future.
A mind is superior either from the point of view of its bhilmi, from the point of view of its indriyas, or from the point of view of its personality.
The knowledge of the mind of another of a lower sphere does not know a mind in a higher sphere.
The knowledge of the mind of another of a saint with weak faculties, namely a Sraddhadhimukta or a Samayavimukta (vi. 31c), does not know the mind of a saint of strong faculties, namely a Drstiprapta or a Asamayavimukta.
The knowledge of the mind of another of a lower saint does not know the mind of a higher saint: in order, Anagamin, Arhat,
The Knowledges 1091
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Pratyekabuddha, Samyaksambuddha.
When the mind of another is either past or future, the knowledge of a mind of another does not know it, for this knowledge has a present mind for its object.
Does the mind of another avoid being in the sphere of the knowledge of the mind of another in other cases as well?
6a-b. The knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowl- edges do not know one another.
The knowledge of the mind of another, when it is by its nature a knowledge of dharmas, is not capable of knowing the mind of another which is by nature inferential knowledge; when it is inferential by nature, it is not capable of knowing the mind of another which is by nature a series of dharmas.
Why?
Because these two knowledges have for their object the dharmas which are opposed to Kamadhatu and to the higher spheres respectfully.
#**
There is no knowledge of the mind of another in the Path of Seeing. That is to say, an ascetic, while he cultivates the Path of Seeing, is not endowed with the knowledge of the mind of another, because the duration of the Path of Seeing is much reduced, and because the Seeing of the Truths is rapid. But the mind of another which is found in the Path of Seeing can be the object of the knowledge of the mind of another.
When one desires to know, through the knowledge of the mind of another, the mind of another which is found in the Path of Seeing, one cultivates a preparatory exercise:
18
? 6b-d. The Sravaka knows two moment of Seeing; the Pratyekabuddha, three; the Buddha, without preparation, all.
When a Sravaka cultivates the knowledge of the mind of
another in the desire to see the mind of an ascetic in the Path of
Seeing, he obtains some knowing of the first two moments, the
Patience of the Knowledge of the dharmas of Suffering and the 19
knowledge of dharmas -- but not the following moments (the Patience of the Inferential Knowledge of Suffering. . . )--because the knowledge of the inferential part (Suffering in the higher spheres) of the Path of Seeing supposes a different preparatory exercise. Thus, if this Sravaka then begins a new exercise in order to obtain the knowledge of the inferential part, the ascetic whom he examines has already arrived at the fifteenth moment when this new preparatory exercise [which lasts thirteen moments] is finished. The whole interval between the twelfth and the sixteenth moment therefore is not in the sphere of the knowledge of the mind of another of the Sravaka (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 515c7).
In the same circumstances, the Pratyekabuddha knows three moments, namely the first two and the eighth; because the required preparatory exercise, after the consciousness of the first two moments, for the knowledge of the inferential part, is, among the Pratyekabuddhas, weak.
According to other masters, he knows the first two moments
20 and the fifteenth.
The Buddha, through simple desire, and without preparatory exercise, knows the mind of another in all the moments of the Path of Seeing.
***
What are the characteristics of the Knowledge of Destruction
The Knowledges 1093
? and of
the Knowledge of Non-Arising?
7. The knowledge of destruction is, with respect to the Truths, the certitude that they are known, abandoned, etc. ; the knowledge of non-arising is the certitude that they are
21 no longer to be known, to be abandoned, etc.
22
Chapter Seven
"What is the knowledge of extinction? When one knows within himself that 'Suffering is completely known by me, its Origin is abandoned by me, its Extinction has been actualized by me, the Path has been cultivated
According to the MulaSastra,
23
by me/ then the knowledge which results from this {tad updddya 24
yaj jndnam), the seeing, the knowing, the intuition, the 25
intelligence, the discernment, the clarity, the insight, is what is called the Knowledge of Destruction. " "What is the Knowledge of Non-Arising? When one knows within himself that 'Suffering is completely known by me and is no longer to be known. . . the Path is no longer to be cultivated', then this knowledge. . . is what is called the Knowledge of Non-Arising. " [See the definition vii. 12a-b. ]
###
But how can one, through a pure knowledge, have such a
26 knowledge?
The Masters of KaSmir explain: Two conventional knowledges
are consecutive to two pure knowledges: "Suffering is known by
me. . . ; Suffering is known by me and is no longer to be known. " It is
by reason of the characteristic of these two conventional knowl-
edges that the Sustra defines the two pure knowledges. [This is
27
why the Sastra says: tad updddya. . . ] 28
According to other masters, the ascetic knows, through a pure knowledge, that he knows Suffering, etc.
? But we have said that the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising are not seeing, or views. How can the Sustra define them as views?
29 The Sastra employs the term "view" through stylistic habit,
using again the formula employed in the definition of the other knowledges (the knowledge of Suffering,etc). Or rather, by reason of their characteristic of being directly perceived, these two knowledges are qualified as seeing. It is by reason of this
30 characteristic of being directly perceived that it says in the Sastra,
31 "Knowledge is seeing. "
***
There are ten knowledges: a knowledge of dharmas, inferential
knowledge, worldly, conventional knowledge, the knowledge of
the mind of another, the knowledge of Suffering, the knowledge of
Origin, the knowledge of Extinction, the knowledge of the Path,
the Knowledge of Destruction, and the Knowledge of Non-Ari-
32 sing.
33 How are they included in one another?
1. Conventional knowledge is made up of one knowledge,
namely the conventional knowledge, and one part of another
knowledge [namely the impure part of the knowledge of the mind
34 of another].
2. A knowledge of dharrnas is made up of one full knowledge and one part of seven other knowledges, namely the Kdmadhdtu part of the knowledge of suffering, of origin, of extinction, and of the Path, the knowledge of the mind of another, the Knowledge of Destruction, and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
3. So too inferential knowledge, by replacing "the Kumadhatu
The Knowledges 1095
? 1096 Chapter Seven
part" with "the part relating to the two higher spheres (=Rupad- hatu and Arupyadhatu). "
4. The knowledge of suffering is made up of one knowledge and one part of four other knowledges--that part of the knowl- edge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising which have the Truth of Suffering for their objects.
5-6. The knowledge of origin and of extinction are explained according to the same principle.
7. A knowledge of the Path is made up of one knowledge and one part of five knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the Knowledge of Destruction, the knowledge of Non-Arising, and the knowledge of the mind of another.
8. The knowledge of the mind of another is made up of one knowledge and one part of four knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, a knowledge of the Path, and conventional knowledge.
9. The Knowledge of Destruction is made up of one knowledge and one part of six knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the knowledge of suffering, of origin, of
35 extinction, and of the Path.
10. So too the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
How are the knowledges, which are twofold (pure and impure) distributed into ten knowledges?
8. The knowledges are ten in number; the distinction is established by reason of their nature, their opposition, their aspect, their aspect and their object, their preparatory exercises, the achievement of their task, and the extension of their cause.
1. By reason of its nature, there is conventional knowledge,
36 because it is not absolute knowledge.
? _ The Knowledges 1097 2. By reason of their opposition, there is knowledge of the
dharmas and inferential knowledge: the first is opposed to 37
Kamadhatu, and the second is opposed to the higher spheres.
3. By reason of their aspect (dkdratas, vii. 13), there is a
knowledge of Suffering and a knowledge of Origin: these two
knowledges have the same object (i. e. , the pancopdddnaskandhas, 38
vi. English trans, p. 898 and 908), but differ in their aspects.
4. By reason of their aspect and their object (dlambana), there is a knowledge of Extinction and a knowledge of the Path which differ in their aspects as well as in their objects.
5. By reason of their preparatory exercises, there is the knowledge of the mind of another. Without doubt this knowledge extends also to the mental states {caittas) of another, but the preparatory exercise bears on the mind {citta)\ also, even though it may know the caittas, it is termed paracittajnana (the knowledge of the mind of another) by reason of its preparatory exercise.
6. Because "that which should have been done has been done/' there is the Knowledge of Destruction: this knowledge is the first knowledge to arise in a series in which "that which should have been done has been done. " [The Knowledge of Non-Arising arises in a similar series, but later. ]
7. By reason of the extension of its causes, there is the Knowledge of Non-Arising, for it has for its causes (=sabhd- gahetu) all the pure knowledges, up to and including the Knowledge of Destruction.
***
We have said that the knowledge of the dharmas [that is to say: a. bearing on the Four Truths, b. in the Path of Seeing and in the Path of Meditation] is opposed to all of Kamadhatu [that is to say it "opposes" the five categories of defilements, those abandoned through the Seeing of the Four Truths and through Meditation, of Kamadhatu]. Furthermore
? 1098 Chapter Seven
9a-c. The knowledge of dharmas, in the Pathway of Meditation, when it bears on Extinction and the Path, is opposed to the three spheres.
A knowledge of dharmas with respect to Extinction and the Path, realized in the course of the Path of Meditation is opposed to the three spheres--that is to say, these two knowledges oppose the defilements of the higher spheres which are abandoned through Meditation. 39
9d. Inferential knowledge is not opposed to Kumadhatu. In none of its branches (Suffering, etc. ) is inferential knowl-
edge opposed ? the defilements of Kamadhatu. What are the aspects of the ten knowledges?
lOa-b. A knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge have sixteen aspects.
The sixteen aspects which will be explained later (vii. 13a).
lOb-c. Conventional knowledge is the same and otherwise.
Conventional knowledge has the sixteen aspects; it also takes up others, for it grasps unique characteristics, common characteris- tics, etc. 40
? ? -d. Four, because of the aspect of their Truth. 41
A knowledge of Suffering, Origin, Extinction, and the Path, bearing on the aspects of their Truths, each have four aspects.
lla-b. So too, when it is pure, the knowledge of the mind of another. 42
? The knowledge of the mind of another, in its impure part (vii. 5b-6, note 16), bears on the aspects of its Truth; it therefore has four aspects. This part of the knowledge of the mind of another is, in fact, made up of the knowledge of the Path.
llb-c. When it is impure, it has for its aspects the unique
43 characteristics of its object.
When the knowledge of the mind of another is impure, it grasps the unique characteristics of its object (jneya), namely the mind and the mental states of another. Its aspects are in conformity with these unique characteristics; therefore they are not included in the sixteen.
Pure or impure
44 Ud. It has for its sphere an individual object.
When it bears on a mind, it does not bear on a mental state (caitta); when it bears on a certain mental state (vedand for example), it does not bear on any other one (samjnd, for example).
If this is the case, why did the Blessed One say, "He knows in truth the mind which is sardga (possesses craving) as being
45
sardga", since the knowledge of the mind of another does not
know minds and mental states (craving, etc. ) at one and the same
time, in the same way that one does not grasp the cloth and its
46 stain at one and the same time?
The expression sardga, possessing craving, has two meanings. 47
A mind is sardga because it is "mixed" with craving, or because it 48
is "united" to craving.
The mind associated with craving (ii. 53c), that is to say, which is presently in the prey of craving, is sardga for two reasons; it is mixed with craving, and it is united to craving.
The Knowledges 1Q99
? 1100 Chapter Seven
49
Certain masters
sardgacitta solely designates a mind mixed with craving, that is to say, a mind associated with craving. As for the vigatardga mind, a mind without craving, this is, according to these masters, the mind opposed to craving. In fact, they say, if the mind not associated with craving were called vigataraga, the mind associated with the other defilements (hatred, etc. ) would be also termed vigataraga, for they are not associated with craving.
Objection: In this hypothesis a non-defiled, indeterminate mind (ii. 71b) is not sardga, since it is not associated with craving; it is not vigataraga, since it is not opposed to craving. As a consequence we must admit that what the other masters (the Abhidharmikas) say, that the mind is sardga through the fact of being united to craving, without it necessarily being mixed with craving. In this same way we must explain the other expressions of the Sutra up to "possessing delusion'' (samoha) and "not possessing delusion" (vigatamoha). [See above, note 45. ]
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] A good mind is called concentrated
51
because it is not turned away from its object. A defiled mind is
distracted, because it is associated with distraction.
The Westerners, or Masters of Gandhara, say: A mind
52
Any other impure mind united to craving.
50
is solely sardga to the extent that it is
associated with laziness is concentrated; other defiled mind.
a distracted mind is any
think that the Sutra, by the expression
[The Vaibhasikas] do not admit this definition. They say: In this system, the same mind, namely a defiled mind associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted. Further, this system contradicts the Mulasdstra (according to the Japanese editor, Jndnaprasthana, 15. 9), which
? says, "He knows in truth the concentrated (samksipta) mind, endowed with the four knowledges, a knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, worldly conventional knowledge, and a knowledge of the Path" (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 950c8). [See below, p. 1102 - 3. ]
###
A defiled mind is sunken down, because it is associated with
53 indolence.
A good mind is "well in hand", because it is associated with
54 correct effort.
A defiled mind is called small, because it is beloved by small
persons. A good mind is called large, because it is beloved by great
55 persons.
Or rather the two minds, a defiled mind and a good mind, are called small and great because their roots, their worth, their followings, their entourage, and their forces, are respectively, small or great.
In fact, 1. a defiled mind is of small roots, having two roots, delusion, plus anger or greed: a good mind is always associated with three roots of good; 2. a defiled mind is of small worth, being obtained without effort: a good mind is of great worth, being realized at the cost of great effort; 3. a defiled mind has a small following, for a defiled mind is not accompanied by the acquisition
56
of a future mind of the same type;
following, being accompanied by the acquisition of future mind
of the same type; 4. a defiled mind has a small following, being surrounded only by three skandhas, vedand, samjnd, and samskdras; a good mind has a great following, for it always includes rupa {dhydndndsmvasamvara, iv. 4a, 26); 5. a defiled mind is of small
a good mind has a great 57
? 1102 Chapter Seven .
force, for the roots of good, cut off, are reborn (ii, 36, English trans, p. 210 iv. 80c); a good mind is of great force, for the Patience of the Knowledge of the dharmas concerned with Suffering definitively cuts off ten latent defilements {anusayas vi. English trans, p. 943).
This is why a defiled mind is called small, and a good mind, great.
***
The defiled mind is sa-uttara, because it is associated with frivolity {auddhatya)\ the good mind is anuttara, because it is
58 opposed to frivolity.
Calm and not calm minds are explained in the same way.
***
A defiled mind is non-absorbed, because it is associated with distraction; a good mind is absorbed, because it is opposed to distraction.
A defiled mind is uncultivated, because the two cultivations (vii. 27) are absent. A good mind is cultivated, for the contrary reason.
A defiled mind is undelivered, not being delivered in and of
59 itself, nor delivered with regard to the series in which it arises. A
good mind can be delivered in and of itself and from the point of view of the series in which it arises.
Such is the explanation of the Vaibhasikas.
This explanation, [say the Sautrantikas,] does not conform to the Sutra and it does not take into account the meaning of the terms.
? i. How does it not conform to the Sutra?
The Sutra says, "What is a mind internally concentrated? A mind which is accompanied by torpor and laziness, or a mind internally accompanied by calm but not insight. "
"What is a mind externally distracted? A mind which is
dispersed towards the five objects of pleasure, or which is
60
externally accompanied by insight, but not by calm. " [It, results
from this text that a mind associated with laziness can be concentrated. ]
But, [the Vaibhasikas answer,] we have said (p. 1100, line 21) that if a mind associated with laziness is concentrated, a defiled (and consequently distracted) mind, when it is associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted.
Yes, you have said this, but it does not hold.
