In
the first way the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be
blotted out by Penance, because their will is confirmed in evil, so
that sin cannot displease them as to its guilt, but only as to the
punishment which they suffer, by reason of which they have a kind of
repentance, which yet is fruitless, according to Wis.
the first way the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be
blotted out by Penance, because their will is confirmed in evil, so
that sin cannot displease them as to its guilt, but only as to the
punishment which they suffer, by reason of which they have a kind of
repentance, which yet is fruitless, according to Wis.
Summa Theologica
And this is observed in the penance of which we are speaking
now; since the penitent assumes a moderated grief for his past sins,
with the intention of removing them. Hence it is evident that the
penance of which we are speaking now, is either a virtue or the act of
a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[84], A[1], ad 1;
[4736]AA[2],3), in the sacrament of Penance, human acts take the place
of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and Confirmation.
Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of an act, penance is either a
virtue or accompanies a virtue, rather than Baptism or Confirmation.
Reply to Objection 2: Penance, considered as a passion, is not a
virtue, as stated above, and it is thus that it is accompanied by a
bodily alteration. On the other hand, it is a virtue, according as it
includes a right choice on the part of the will; which, however,
applies to penance rather than to shame. Because shame regards the evil
deed as present, whereas penance regards the evil deed as past. Now it
is contrary to the perfection of virtue that one should have an evil
deed actually present, of which one ought to be ashamed; whereas it is
not contrary to the perfection of virtue that we should have previously
committed evil deeds, of which it behooves us to repent, since a man
from being wicked becomes virtuous.
Reply to Objection 3: It would indeed be foolish to grieve for what has
already been done, with the intention of trying to make it not done.
But the penitent does not intend this: for his sorrow is displeasure or
disapproval with regard to the past deed, with the intention of
removing its result, viz. the anger of God and the debt of punishment:
and this is not foolish.
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Whether Penance is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a special virtue. For it
seems that to rejoice at the good one has done, and to grieve for the
evil one has done are acts of the same nature. But joy for the good one
has done is not a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy emotion
proceeding from charity, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,8,9):
wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity "rejoiceth not at
iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth. " Therefore, in like manner,
neither is penance, which is sorrow for past sins, a special virtue,
but an emotion resulting from charity.
Objection 2: Further, every special virtue has its special matter,
because habits are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their
objects. But penance has no special matter, because its matter is past
sins in any matter whatever. Therefore penance is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is removed except by its contrary. But
penance removes all sins. Therefore it is contrary to all sins, and
consequently is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, The Law has a special precept about penance, as stated
above ([4737]Q[84], AA[5],7).
I answer that, As stated in the [4738]FS, Q[54], A[1], ad 1, A[2],
habits are specifically distinguished according to the species of their
acts, so that whenever an act has a special reason for being
praiseworthy, there must needs be a special habit. Now it is evident
that there is a special reason for praising the act of penance, because
it aims at the destruction of past sin, considered as an offense
against God, which does not apply to any other virtue. We must
therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: An act springs from charity in two ways: first as
being elicited by charity, and a like virtuous act requires no other
virtue than charity, e. g. to love the good, to rejoice therein, and to
grieve for what is opposed to it. Secondly, an act springs from
charity, being, so to speak, commanded by charity; and thus, since
charity commands all the virtues, inasmuch as it directs them to its
own end, an act springing from charity may belong even to another
special virtue. Accordingly, if in the act of the penitent we consider
the mere displeasure in the past sin, it belongs to charity
immediately, in the same way as joy for past good acts; but the
intention to aim at the destruction of past sin requires a special
virtue subordinate to charity.
Reply to Objection 2: In point of fact, penance has indeed a general
matter, inasmuch as it regards all sins; but it does so under a special
aspect, inasmuch as they can be remedied by an act of man in
co-operating with God for his justification.
Reply to Objection 3: Every special virtue removes formally the habit
of the opposite vice, just as whiteness removes blackness from the same
subject: but penance removes every sin effectively, inasmuch as it
works for the destruction of sins, according as they are pardonable
through the grace of God if man co-operate therewith. Wherefore it does
not follow that it is a general virtue.
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Whether the virtue of penance is a species of justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtue of penance is not a species
of justice. For justice is not a theological but a moral virtue, as was
shown in the [4739]SS, Q[62], A[3]. But penance seems to be a
theological virtue, since God is its object, for it makes satisfaction
to God, to Whom, moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems
that penance is not a species of justice.
Objection 2: Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes the
mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to the
extreme, according to Jer. 6:26: "Make thee mourning as for an only
son, a bitter lamentation. " Therefore penance is not a species of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, there are two species of justice, as stated in
Ethic. v, 4, viz. "distributive" and "commutative. " But penance does
not seem to be contained under either of them. Therefore it seems that
penance is not a species of justice.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Lk. 6:21, "Blessed are ye that weep
now," says: "It is prudence that teaches us the unhappiness of earthly
things and the happiness of heavenly things. " But weeping is an act of
penance. Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of
justice.
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "Penance is the
vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry
for having done. " But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore
Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called
vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2) penance is a special virtue
not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would
suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he
has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and purposes
to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not
made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind
of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another,
just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the
offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the
part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the
matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it
is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice.
It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
v, 6) a thing is said to be just in two ways, simply and relatively. A
thing is just simply when it is between equals, since justice is a kind
of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil just, because all
citizens are equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler,
retaining their freedom. But a thing is just relatively when it is
between parties of whom one is subject to the other, as a servant under
his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband. It is
this kind of just that we consider in penance. Wherefore the penitent
has recourse to God with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his
master, according to Ps. 122:2: "Behold, as the eyes of servants are on
the hands of their masters . . . so are our eyes unto the Lord our God,
until He have mercy on us"; and as a son to his father, according to
Lk. 15:21: "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee"; and
as a wife to her husband, according to Jer. 3:1: "Thou hast prostituted
thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, saith the Lord. "
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. v, 1, justice is a virtue
towards another person, and the matter of justice is not so much the
person to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of
distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not God,
but human acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is as
one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is not
a theological virtue, because God is not its matter or object.
Reply to Objection 2: The mean of justice is the equality that is
established between those between whom justice is, as stated in Ethic.
v. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on
account of the excellence of one, as between father and son, God and
man, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), wherefore in such
cases, he that falls short of the other must do whatever he can. Yet
this will not be sufficient simply, but only according to the
acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing
excess to penance.
Reply to Objection 3: As there is a kind of commutation in favors,
when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is there
commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an offense
committed against another, a man is either punished against his will,
which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own
accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the
sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge.
Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative
justice.
Reply to Objection 4: Although penance is directly a species of
justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the
virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it must
have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the
object of which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in
Christ's Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon,
and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a
moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral
virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only something
belonging to justice, but also something belonging to temperance and
fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which
pertain to temperance, and those which cause terror, which fortitude
moderates, are objects of commutative justice. Accordingly it belongs
to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance,
and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude.
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Whether the will is properly the subject of penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of penance is not properly
the will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is in the
concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in the
concupiscible faculty.
Objection 2: Further, penance is a kind of vengeance, as Augustine
states in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship
of which is unknown]. But vengeance seems to regard the irascible
faculty, since anger is the desire for vengeance. Therefore it seems
that penance is in the irascible part.
Objection 3: Further, the past is the proper object of the memory,
according to the Philosopher (De Memoria i). Now penance regards the
past, as stated above (A[1], ad 2, ad 3). Therefore penance is
subjected in the memory.
Objection 4: Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance removes
sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance is in every
power of the soul, and not only in the will.
On the contrary, Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Ps.
50:19: "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit. " But to offer a
sacrifice is an act of the will, according to Ps. 53:8: "I will freely
sacrifice to Thee. " Therefore penance is in the will.
I answer that, We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so far as
it is a passion, and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is in the
concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it is a
virtue, and thus, as stated above [4740](A[3]), it is a species of
justice. Now justice, as stated in the [4741]FS, Q[56], A[6], is
subjected in the rational appetite which is the will. Therefore it is
evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue, is subjected in the
will, and its proper act is the purpose of amending what was committed
against God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers penance as a passion.
Reply to Objection 2: To desire vengeance on another, through passion,
belongs to the irascible appetite, but to desire or take vengeance on
oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will.
Reply to Objection 3: The memory is a power that apprehends the past.
But penance belongs not to the apprehensive but to the appetitive
power, which presupposes an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance
is not in the memory, but presupposes it.
Reply to Objection 4: The will, as stated above ([4742]FP, Q[82], A[4];
[4743]FS, Q[9], A[1] ), moves all the other powers of the soul; so that
it is not unreasonable for penance to be subjected in the will, and to
produce an effect in each power of the soul.
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Whether penance originates from fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance does not originate from fear.
For penance originates in displeasure at sin. But this belongs to
charity, as stated above [4744](A[3]). Therefore penance originates
from love rather than fear.
Objection 2: Further, men are induced to do penance, through the
expectation of the heavenly kingdom, according to Mat. 3:2 and Mat.
4:17: "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. " Now the
kingdom of heaven is the object of hope. Therefore penance results from
hope rather than from fear.
Objection 3: Further, fear is an internal act of man. But penance does
not seem to arise in us through any work of man, but through the
operation of God, according to Jer. 31:19: "After Thou didst convert me
I did penance. " Therefore penance does not result from fear.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:17): "As a woman with child,
when she draweth near the time of her delivery, is in pain, and crieth
out in her pangs, so ere we become," by penance, to wit; and according
to another [*The Septuagint] version the text continues: "Through fear
of Thee, O Lord, we have conceived, and been as it were in labor, and
have brought forth the spirit of salvation," i. e. of salutary penance,
as is clear from what precedes. Therefore penance results from fear.
I answer that, We may speak of penance in two ways: first, as to the
habit, and then it is infused by God immediately without our operating
as principal agents, but not without our co-operating dispositively by
certain acts. Secondly, we may speak of penance, with regard to the
acts whereby in penance we co-operate with God operating, the first
principle [*Cf. FS, Q[113]] of which acts is the operation of God in
turning the heart, according to Lam. 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to
Thee, and we shall be converted"; the second, an act of faith; the
third, a movement of servile fear, whereby a man is withdrawn from sin
through fear of punishment; the fourth, a movement of hope, whereby a
man makes a purpose of amendment, in the hope of obtaining pardon; the
fifth, a movement of charity, whereby sin is displeasing to man for its
own sake and no longer for the sake of the punishment; the sixth, a
movement of filial fear whereby a man, of his own accord, offers to
make amends to God through fear of Him.
Accordingly it is evident that the act of penance results from servile
fear as from the first movement of the appetite in this direction and
from filial fear as from its immediate and proper principle.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin begins to displease a man, especially a
sinner, on account of the punishments which servile fear regards,
before it displeases him on account of its being an offense against
God, or on account of its wickedness, which pertains to charity.
Reply to Objection 2: When the kingdom of heaven is said to be at hand,
we are to understand that the king is on his way, not only to reward
but also to punish. Wherefore John the Baptist said (Mat. 3:7): "Ye
brood of vipers, who hath showed you to flee from the wrath to come? "
Reply to Objection 3: Even the movement of fear proceeds from God's act
in turning the heart; wherefore it is written (Dt. 5:29): "Who shall
give them to have such a mind, to fear Me? " And so the fact that
penance results from fear does not hinder its resulting from the act of
God in turning the heart.
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Whether penance is the first of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is the first of the virtues.
Because, on Mat. 3:2, "Do penance," etc. , a gloss says: "The first
virtue is to destroy the old man, and hate sin by means of penance. "
Objection 2: Further, withdrawal from one extreme seems to precede
approach to the other. Now all the other virtues seem to regard
approach to a term, because they all direct man to do good; whereas
penance seems to direct him to withdraw from evil. Therefore it seems
that penance precedes all the other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, before penance, there is sin in the soul. Now no
virtue is compatible with sin in the soul. Therefore no virtue precedes
penance, which is itself the first of all and opens the door to the
others by expelling sin.
On the contrary, Penance results from faith, hope, and charity, as
already stated ([4745]AA[2],5). Therefore penance is not the first of
the virtues.
I answer that, In speaking of the virtues, we do not consider the order
of time with regard to the habits, because, since the virtues are
connected with one another, as stated in the [4746]FS, Q[65], A[1],
they all begin at the same time to be in the soul; but one is said to
precede the other in the order of nature, which order depends on the
order of their acts, in so far as the act of one virtue presupposes the
act of another. Accordingly, then, one must say that, even in the order
of time, certain praiseworthy acts can precede the act and the habit of
penance, e. g. acts of dead faith and hope, and an act of servile fear;
while the act and habit of charity are, in point of time, simultaneous
with the act and habit of penance, and with the habits of the other
virtues. For, as was stated in the [4747]FS, Q[113], AA[7],8, in the
justification of the ungodly, the movement of the free-will towards
God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and the movement of
the free-will towards sin, which is the act of penance, are
simultaneous. Yet of these two acts, the former naturally precedes the
latter, because the act of the virtue of penance is directed against
sin, through love of God; where the first-mentioned act is the reason
and cause of the second.
Consequently penance is not simply the first of the virtues, either in
the order of time, or in the order of nature, because, in the order of
nature, the theological virtues precede it simply. Nevertheless, in a
certain respect, it is the first of the other virtues in the order of
time, as regards its act, because this act is the first in the
justification of the ungodly; whereas in the order of nature, the other
virtues seem to precede, as that which is natural precedes that which
is accidental; because the other virtues seem to be necessary for man's
good, by reason of their very nature, whereas penance is only necessary
if something, viz. sin, be presupposed, as stated above ([4748]Q[55],
A[2]), when we spoke of the relation of the sacrament of penance to the
other sacraments aforesaid.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is to be taken as meaning that the act
of penance is the first in point of time, in comparison with the acts
of the other virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: In successive movements withdrawal from one
extreme precedes approach to the other, in point of time; and also in
the order of nature, if we consider the subject, i. e. the order of the
material cause; but if we consider the order of the efficient and final
causes, approach to the end is first, for it is this that the efficient
cause intends first of all: and it is this order which we consider
chiefly in the acts of the soul, as stated in Phys. ii.
Reply to Objection 3: Penance opens the door to the other virtues,
because it expels sin by the virtues of faith, hope and charity, which
precede it in the order of nature; yet it so opens the door to them
that they enter at the same time as it: because, in the justification
of the ungodly, at the same time as the free-will is moved towards God
and against sin, the sin is pardoned and grace infused, and with grace
all the virtues, as stated in the [4749]FS, Q[65], AA[3],5.
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OF THE EFFECT OF PENANCE, AS REGARDS THE PARDON OF MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effect of Penance; and (1) as regards the
pardon of mortal sins; (2) as regards the pardon of venial sins; (3) as
regards the return of sins which have been pardoned; (4) as regards the
recovery of the virtues.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all mortal sins are taken away by Penance?
(2) Whether they can be taken away without Penance?
(3) Whether one can be taken away without the other?
(4) Whether Penance takes away the guilt while the debt remains?
(5) Whether any remnants of sin remain?
(6) Whether the removal of sin is the effect of Penance as a virtue, or
as a sacrament?
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Whether all sins are taken away by Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all sins are taken away by Penance.
For the Apostle says (Heb. 12:17) that Esau "found no place of
repentance, although with tears he had sought it," which a gloss
explains as meaning that "he found no place of pardon and blessing
through Penance": and it is related (2 Macc. 9:13) of Antiochus, that
"this wicked man prayed to the Lord, of Whom he was not to obtain
mercy. " Therefore it does not seem that all sins are taken away by
Penance.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i) that
"so great is the stain of that sin (namely, when a man, after coming to
the knowledge of God through the grace of Christ, resists fraternal
charity, and by the brands of envy combats grace itself) that he is
unable to humble himself in prayer, although he is forced by his wicked
conscience to acknowledge and confess his sin. " Therefore not every sin
can be taken away by Penance.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 12:32): "He that shall speak
against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this
world nor in the world to come. " Therefore not every sin can be
pardoned through Penance.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:22): "I will not remember"
any more "all his iniquities that he hath done. "
I answer that, The fact that a sin cannot be taken away by Penance may
happen in two ways: first, because of the impossibility of repenting of
sin; secondly, because of Penance being unable to blot out a sin.
In
the first way the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be
blotted out by Penance, because their will is confirmed in evil, so
that sin cannot displease them as to its guilt, but only as to the
punishment which they suffer, by reason of which they have a kind of
repentance, which yet is fruitless, according to Wis. 5:3: "Repenting,
and groaning for anguish of spirit. " Consequently such Penance brings
no hope of pardon, but only despair. Nevertheless no sin of a wayfarer
can be such as that, because his will is flexible to good and evil.
Wherefore to say that in this life there is any sin of which one cannot
repent, is erroneous, first, because this would destroy free-will,
secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of grace,
whereby the heart of any sinner whatsoever can be moved to repent,
according to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the
Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it. "
It is also erroneous to say that any sin cannot be pardoned through
true Penance. First, because this is contrary to Divine mercy, of which
it is written (Joel 2:13) that God is "gracious and merciful, patient,
and rich in mercy, and ready to repent of the evil"; for, in a manner,
God would be overcome by man, if man wished a sin to be blotted out,
which God were unwilling to blot out. Secondly, because this would be
derogatory to the power of Christ's Passion, through which Penance
produces its effect, as do the other sacraments, since it is written (1
Jn. 2:2): "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only,
but also for those of the whole world. "
Therefore we must say simply that, in this life, every sin can be
blotted out by true Penance.
Reply to Objection 1: Esau did not truly repent. This is evident from
his saying (Gn. 27:41): "The days will come of the mourning of my
father, and I will kill my brother Jacob. " Likewise neither did
Antiochus repent truly; since he grieved for his past sin, not because
he had offended God thereby, but on account of the sickness which he
suffered in his body.
Reply to Objection 2: These words of Augustine should be understood
thus: "So great is the stain of that sin, that man is unable to humble
himself in prayer," i. e. it is not easy for him to do so; in which
sense we say that a man cannot be healed, when it is difficult to heal
him. Yet this is possible by the power of God's grace, which sometimes
turns men even "into the depths of the sea" (Ps. 67:23).
Reply to Objection 3: The word or blasphemy spoken against the Holy
Ghost is final impenitence, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xi),
which is altogether unpardonable, because after this life is ended,
there is no pardon of sins. or, if by the blasphemy against the Holy
Ghost, we understand sin committed through certain malice, this means
either that the blasphemy itself against the Holy Ghost is
unpardonable, i. e. not easily pardonable, or that such a sin does not
contain in itself any motive for pardon, or that for such a sin a man
is punished both in this and in the next world, as we explained in the
[4750]SS, Q[14], A[3].
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Whether sin can be pardoned without Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin can be pardoned without Penance.
For the power of God is no less with regard to adults than with regard
to children. But He pardons the sins of children without Penance.
Therefore He also pardons adults without penance.
Objection 2: Further, God did not bind His power to the sacraments. But
Penance is a sacrament. Therefore by God's power sin can be pardoned
without Penance.
Objection 3: Further, God's mercy is greater than man's. Now man
sometimes forgives another for offending him, without his repenting:
wherefore our Lord commanded us (Mat. 5:44): "Love your enemies, do
good to them that hate you. " Much more, therefore, does God pardon men
for offending him, without their repenting.
On the contrary, The Lord said (Jer. 18:8): "If that nation . . . shall
repent of their evil" which they have done, "I also will repent of the
evil that I have thought to do them," so that, on the other hand, if
man "do not penance," it seems that God will not pardon him his sin.
I answer that, It is impossible for a mortal actual sin to be pardoned
without penance, if we speak of penance as a virtue. For, as sin is an
offense against God, He pardons sin in the same way as he pardons an
offense committed against Him. Now an offense is directly opposed to
grace, since one man is said to be offended with another, because he
excludes him from his grace. Now, as stated in the [4751]FS, Q[110],
A[1], the difference between the grace of God and the grace of man, is
that the latter does not cause, but presupposes true or apparent
goodness in him who is graced, whereas the grace of God causes goodness
in the man who is graced, because the good-will of God, which is
denoted by the word "grace," is the cause of all created good. Hence it
is possible for a man to pardon an offense, for which he is offended
with someone, without any change in the latter's will; but it is
impossible that God pardon a man for an offense, without his will being
changed. Now the offense of mortal sin is due to man's will being
turned away from God, through being turned to some mutable good.
Consequently, for the pardon of this offense against God, it is
necessary for man's will to be so changed as to turn to God and to
renounce having turned to something else in the aforesaid manner,
together with a purpose of amendment; all of which belongs to the
nature of penance as a virtue. Therefore it is impossible for a sin to
be pardoned anyone without penance as a virtue.
But the sacrament of Penance, as stated above ([4752]Q[88], A[3]), is
perfected by the priestly office of binding and loosing, without which
God can forgive sins, even as Christ pardoned the adulterous woman, as
related in Jn. 8, and the woman that was a sinner, as related in Luke
vii, whose sins, however, He did not forgive without the virtue of
penance: for as Gregory states (Hom. xxxiii in Evang. ), "He drew
inwardly by grace," i. e. by penance, "her whom He received outwardly by
His mercy. "
Reply to Objection 1: In children there is none but original sin, which
consists, not in an actual disorder of the will, but in a habitual
disorder of nature, as explained in the [4753]FS, Q[82], A[1], and so
in them the forgiveness of sin is accompanied by a habitual change
resulting from the infusion of grace and virtues, but not by an actual
change. On the other hand, in the case of an adult, in whom there are
actual sins, which consist in an actual disorder of the will, there is
no remission of sins, even in Baptism, without an actual change of the
will, which is the effect of Penance.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes Penance as a sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: God's mercy is more powerful than man's, in that
it moves man's will to repent, which man's mercy cannot do.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether by Penance one sin can be pardoned without another?
Objection 1: It would seem that by Penance one sin can be pardoned
without another. For it is written (Amos 4:7): "I caused it to rain
upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece
was rained upon: and the piece whereupon I rained not, withered. " These
words are expounded by Gregory, who says (Hom. x super Ezech. ): "When a
man who hates his neighbor, breaks himself of other vices, rain falls
on one part of the city, leaving the other part withered, for there are
some men who, when they prune some vices, become much more rooted in
others. " Therefore one sin can be forgiven by Penance, without another.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose in commenting on Ps. 118, "Blessed are
the undefiled in the way," after expounding verse 136 ("My eyes have
sent forth springs of water"), says that "the first consolation is that
God is mindful to have mercy; and the second, that He punishes, for
although faith be wanting, punishment makes satisfaction and raises us
up. " Therefore a man can be raised up from one sin, while the sin of
unbelief remains.
Objection 3: Further, when several things are not necessarily together,
one can be removed without the other. Now it was stated in the
[4754]FS, Q[73], A[1] that sins are not connected together, so that one
sin can be without another. Therefore also one sin can be taken away by
Penance without another being taken away.
Objection 4: Further, sins are the debts, for which we pray for pardon
when we say in the Lord's Prayer: "Forgive us our trespasses," etc. Now
man sometimes forgives one debt without forgiving another. Therefore
God also, by Penance, forgives one sin without another.
Objection 5: Further, man's sins are forgiven him through the love of
God, according to Jer. 31:3: "I have loved thee with an everlasting
love, therefore have I drawn thee, taking pity on thee. " Now there is
nothing to hinder God from loving a man in one respect, while being
offended with him in another, even as He loves the sinner as regards
his nature, while hating him for his sin. Therefore it seems possible
for God, by Penance, to pardon one sin without another.
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "There are many who
repent having sinned, but not completely; for they except certain
things which give them pleasure, forgetting that our Lord delivered
from the devil the man who was both dumb and deaf, whereby He shows us
that we are never healed unless it be from all sins. "
I answer that, It is impossible for Penance to take one sin away
without another. First because sin is taken away by grace removing the
offense against God. Wherefore it was stated in the [4755]FS, Q[109],
A[7]; [4756]FS, Q[113], A[2] that without grace no sin can be forgiven.
Now every mortal sin is opposed to grace and excludes it. Therefore it
is impossible for one sin to be pardoned without another. Secondly,
because, as shown above [4757](A[2]) mortal sin cannot be forgiven
without true Penance, to which it belongs to renounce sin, by reason of
its being against God, which is common to all mortal sins: and where
the same reason applies, the result will be the same. Consequently a
man cannot be truly penitent, if he repent of one sin and not of
another. For if one particular sin were displeasing to him, because it
is against the love of God above all things (which motive is necessary
for true repentance), it follows that he would repent of all. Whence it
follows that it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned through
Penance, without another. Thirdly, because this would be contrary to
the perfection of God's mercy, since His works are perfect, as stated
in Dt. 32:4; wherefore whomsoever He pardons, He pardons altogether.
Hence Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of
which is unknown], that "it is irreverent and heretical to expect half
a pardon from Him Who is just and justice itself. "
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Gregory do not refer to the
forgiveness of the guilt, but to the cessation from act, because
sometimes a man who has been wont to commit several kinds of sin,
renounces one and not the other; which is indeed due to God's
assistance, but does not reach to the pardon of the sin.
Reply to Objection 2: In this saying of Ambrose "faith" cannot denote
the faith whereby we believe in Christ, because, as Augustine says on
Jn. 15:22, "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have
sin" (viz. unbelief): "for this is the sin which contains all others":
but it stands for consciousness, because sometimes a man receives
pardon for a sin of which he is not conscious, through the punishment
which he bears patiently.
Reply to Objection 3: Although sins are not connected in so far as they
turn towards a mutable good, yet they are connected in so far as they
turn away from the immutable Good, which applies to all mortal sins in
common. and it is thus that they have the character of an offense which
needs to be removed by Penance.
Reply to Objection 4: Debt as regards external things, e. g. money, is
not opposed to friendship through which the debt is pardoned. hence one
debt can be condoned without another. On the other hand, the debt of
sin is opposed to friendship, and so one sin or offense is not pardoned
without another; for it would seem absurd for anyone to ask even a man
to forgive him one offense and not another.
Reply to Objection 5: The love whereby God loves man's nature, does not
ordain man to the good of glory from which man is excluded by any
mortal sin. but the love of grace, whereby mortal sin is forgiven,
ordains man to eternal life, according to Rom. 6:23: "The grace of God
(is) life everlasting. " Hence there is no comparison.
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Whether the debt of punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven
through Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that no debt of punishment remains after the
guilt has been forgiven through Penance. For when the cause is removed,
the effect is removed. But the guilt is the cause of the debt of
punishment: since a man deserves to be punished because he has been
guilty of a sin. Therefore when the sin has been forgiven, no debt of
punishment can remain.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. 5) the gift of
Christ is more effective than the sin of Adam. Now, by sinning, man
incurs at the same time guilt and the debt of punishment. Much more
therefore, by the gift of grace, is the guilt forgiven and at the same
time the debt of punishment remitted.
Objection 3: Further, the forgiveness of sins is effected in Penance
through the power of Christ's Passion, according to Rom. 3:25: "Whom
God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His Blood . .
. for the remission of former sins. " Now Christ's Passion made
satisfaction sufficient for all sins, as stated above (QQ[48],49,79,
A[5]). Therefore after the guilt has been pardoned, no debt of
punishment remains.
On the contrary, It is related (2 Kings 12:13) that when David penitent
had said to Nathan: "I have sinned against the Lord," Nathan said to
him: "The Lord also hath taken away thy sin, thou shalt not die.
Nevertheless . . . the child that is born to thee shall surely die,"
which was to punish him for the sin he had committed, as stated in the
same place. Therefore a debt of some punishment remains after the guilt
has been forgiven.
I answer that, As stated in the [4758]FS, Q[87], A[4], in mortal sin
there are two things, namely, a turning from the immutable Good, and an
inordinate turning to mutable good. Accordingly, in so far as mortal
sin turns away from the immutable Good, it induces a debt of eternal
punishment, so that whosoever sins against the eternal Good should be
punished eternally. Again, in so far as mortal sin turns inordinately
to a mutable good, it gives rise to a debt of some punishment, because
the disorder of guilt is not brought back to the order of justice,
except by punishment: since it is just that he who has been too
indulgent to his will, should suffer something against his will, for
thus will equality be restored. Hence it is written (Apoc. 18:7): "As
much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much
torment and sorrow give ye to her. "
Since, however, the turning to mutable good is finite, sin does not, in
this respect, induce a debt of eternal punishment. Wherefore, if man
turns inordinately to a mutable good, without turning from God, as
happens in venial sins, he incurs a debt, not of eternal but of
temporal punishment. Consequently when guilt is pardoned through grace,
the soul ceases to be turned away from God, through being united to God
by grace: so that at the same time, the debt of punishment is taken
away, albeit a debt of some temporal punishment may yet remain.
Reply to Objection 1: Mortal sin both turns away from God and turns to
a created good. But, as stated in the [4759]FS, Q[71], A[6], the
turning away from God is as its form while the turning to created good
is as its matter. Now if the formal element of anything be removed, the
species is taken away: thus, if you take away rational, you take away
the human species. Consequently mortal sin is said to be pardoned from
the very fact that, by means of grace, the aversion of the mind from
God is taken away together with the debt of eternal punishment: and yet
the material element remains, viz. the inordinate turning to a created
good, for which a debt of temporal punishment is due.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the [4760]FS, Q[109], AA[7],8;
[4761]FS, Q[111], A[2], it belongs to grace to operate in man by
justifying him from sin, and to co-operate with man that his work may
be rightly done. Consequently the forgiveness of guilt and of the debt
of eternal punishment belongs to operating grace, while the remission
of the debt of temporal punishment belongs to co-operating grace, in so
far as man, by bearing punishment patiently with the help of Divine
grace, is released also from the debt of temporal punishment.
Consequently just as the effect of operating grace precedes the effect
of co-operating grace, so too, the remission of guilt and of eternal
punishment precedes the complete release from temporal punishment,
since both are from grace, but the former, from grace alone, the
latter, from grace and free-will.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion is of itself sufficient to
remove all debt of punishment, not only eternal, but also temporal; and
man is released from the debt of punishment according to the measure of
his share in the power of Christ's Passion. Now in Baptism man shares
the Power of Christ's Passion fully, since by water and the Spirit of
Christ, he dies with Him to sin, and is born again in Him to a new
life, so that, in Baptism, man receives the remission of all debt of
punishment. In Penance, on the other hand, man shares in the power of
Christ's Passion according to the measure of his own acts, which are
the matter of Penance, as water is of Baptism, as stated above
([4762]Q[84], AA[1],3). Wherefore the entire debt of punishment is not
remitted at once after the first act of Penance, by which act the guilt
is remitted, but only when all the acts of Penance have been completed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the remnants of sin are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the remnants of sin are removed
when a mortal sin is forgiven. For Augustine says in De Poenitentia
[*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]:
"Our Lord never healed anyone without delivering him wholly; for He
wholly healed the man on the Sabbath, since He delivered his body from
all disease, and his soul from all taint. " Now the remnants of sin
belong to the disease of sin. Therefore it does not seem possible for
any remnants of sin to remain when the guilt has been pardoned.
Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "good is
more efficacious than evil, since evil does not act save in virtue of
some good. " Now, by sinning, man incurs the taint of sin all at once.
Much more, therefore, by repenting, is he delivered also from all
remnants of sin.
Objection 3: Further, God's work is more efficacious than man's. Now by
the exercise of good human works the remnants of contrary sins are
removed. Much more, therefore, are they taken away by the remission of
guilt, which is a work of God.
On the contrary, We read (Mk. 8) that the blind man whom our Lord
enlightened, was restored first of all to imperfect sight, wherefore he
said (Mk. 8:24): "I see men, as it were trees, walking"; and afterwards
he was restored perfectly, "so that he saw all things clearly. " Now the
enlightenment of the blind man signifies the delivery of the sinner.
Therefore after the first remission of sin, whereby the sinner is
restored to spiritual sight, there still remain in him some remnants of
his past sin.
I answer that, Mortal sin, in so far as it turns inordinately to a
mutable good, produces in the soul a certain disposition, or even a
habit, if the acts be repeated frequently. Now it has been said above
[4763](A[4]) that the guilt of mortal sin is pardoned through grace
removing the aversion of the mind from God. Nevertheless when that
which is on the part of the aversion has been taken away by grace, that
which is on the part of the inordinate turning to a mutable good can
remain, since this may happen to be without the other, as stated above
[4764](A[4]). Consequently, there is no reason why, after the guilt has
been forgiven, the dispositions caused by preceding acts should not
remain, which are called the remnants of sin. Yet they remain weakened
and diminished, so as not to domineer over man, and they are after the
manner of dispositions rather than of habits, like the "fomes" which
remains after Baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: God heals the whole man perfectly; but sometimes
suddenly, as Peter's mother-in-law was restored at once to perfect
health, so that "rising she ministered to them" (Lk. 4:39), and
sometimes by degrees, as we said above ([4765]Q[44], A[3], ad 2) about
the blind man who was restored to sight (Mat. 8). And so too, He
sometimes turns the heart of man with such power, that it receives at
once perfect spiritual health, not only the guilt being pardoned, but
all remnants of sin being removed as was the case with Magdalen (Lk.
7); whereas at other times He sometimes first pardons the guilt by
operating grace, and afterwards, by co-operating grace, removes the
remnants of sin by degrees.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin too, sometimes induces at once a weak
disposition, such as is the result of one act, and sometimes a stronger
disposition, the result of many acts.
Reply to Objection 3: One human act does not remove all the remnants of
sin, because, as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. viii) "a vicious
man by doing good works will make but little progress so as to be any
better, but if he continue in good practice, he will end in being good
as to acquired virtue. " But God's grace does this much more
effectively, whether by one or by several acts.
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Whether the forgiveness of guilt is an effect of Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the forgiveness of guilt is not an
effect of penance as a virtue. For penance is said to be a virtue, in
so far as it is a principle of a human action. But human action does
nothing towards the remission of guilt, since this is an effect of
operating grace. Therefore the forgiveness of guilt is not an effect of
penance as a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, certain other virtues are more excellent than
penance. But the forgiveness of sin is not said to be the effect of any
other virtue. Neither, therefore, is it the effect of penance as a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is no forgiveness of sin except through the
power of Christ's Passion, according to Heb. 9:22: "Without shedding of
blood there is no remission. " Now Penance, as a sacrament, produces its
effect through the power of Christ's Passion, even as the other
sacraments do, as was shown above ([4766]Q[62], AA[4],5). Therefore the
forgiveness of sin is the effect of Penance, not as a virtue, but as a
sacrament.
On the contrary, Properly speaking, the cause of a thing is that
without which it cannot be, since every defect depends on its cause.
Now forgiveness of sin can come from God without the sacrament of
Penance, but not without the virtue of penance, as stated above
([4767]Q[84], A[5], ad 3;[4768] Q[85], A[2]); so that, even before the
sacraments of the New Law were instituted, God pardoned the sins of the
penitent. Therefore the forgiveness of sin is chiefly the effect of
penance as a virtue.
I answer that, Penance is a virtue in so far as it is a principle of
certain human acts. Now the human acts, which are performed by the
sinner, are the material element in the sacrament of Penance. Moreover
every sacrament produces its effect, in virtue not only of its form,
but also of its matter.
now; since the penitent assumes a moderated grief for his past sins,
with the intention of removing them. Hence it is evident that the
penance of which we are speaking now, is either a virtue or the act of
a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[84], A[1], ad 1;
[4736]AA[2],3), in the sacrament of Penance, human acts take the place
of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and Confirmation.
Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of an act, penance is either a
virtue or accompanies a virtue, rather than Baptism or Confirmation.
Reply to Objection 2: Penance, considered as a passion, is not a
virtue, as stated above, and it is thus that it is accompanied by a
bodily alteration. On the other hand, it is a virtue, according as it
includes a right choice on the part of the will; which, however,
applies to penance rather than to shame. Because shame regards the evil
deed as present, whereas penance regards the evil deed as past. Now it
is contrary to the perfection of virtue that one should have an evil
deed actually present, of which one ought to be ashamed; whereas it is
not contrary to the perfection of virtue that we should have previously
committed evil deeds, of which it behooves us to repent, since a man
from being wicked becomes virtuous.
Reply to Objection 3: It would indeed be foolish to grieve for what has
already been done, with the intention of trying to make it not done.
But the penitent does not intend this: for his sorrow is displeasure or
disapproval with regard to the past deed, with the intention of
removing its result, viz. the anger of God and the debt of punishment:
and this is not foolish.
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Whether Penance is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a special virtue. For it
seems that to rejoice at the good one has done, and to grieve for the
evil one has done are acts of the same nature. But joy for the good one
has done is not a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy emotion
proceeding from charity, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,8,9):
wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity "rejoiceth not at
iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth. " Therefore, in like manner,
neither is penance, which is sorrow for past sins, a special virtue,
but an emotion resulting from charity.
Objection 2: Further, every special virtue has its special matter,
because habits are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their
objects. But penance has no special matter, because its matter is past
sins in any matter whatever. Therefore penance is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is removed except by its contrary. But
penance removes all sins. Therefore it is contrary to all sins, and
consequently is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, The Law has a special precept about penance, as stated
above ([4737]Q[84], AA[5],7).
I answer that, As stated in the [4738]FS, Q[54], A[1], ad 1, A[2],
habits are specifically distinguished according to the species of their
acts, so that whenever an act has a special reason for being
praiseworthy, there must needs be a special habit. Now it is evident
that there is a special reason for praising the act of penance, because
it aims at the destruction of past sin, considered as an offense
against God, which does not apply to any other virtue. We must
therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: An act springs from charity in two ways: first as
being elicited by charity, and a like virtuous act requires no other
virtue than charity, e. g. to love the good, to rejoice therein, and to
grieve for what is opposed to it. Secondly, an act springs from
charity, being, so to speak, commanded by charity; and thus, since
charity commands all the virtues, inasmuch as it directs them to its
own end, an act springing from charity may belong even to another
special virtue. Accordingly, if in the act of the penitent we consider
the mere displeasure in the past sin, it belongs to charity
immediately, in the same way as joy for past good acts; but the
intention to aim at the destruction of past sin requires a special
virtue subordinate to charity.
Reply to Objection 2: In point of fact, penance has indeed a general
matter, inasmuch as it regards all sins; but it does so under a special
aspect, inasmuch as they can be remedied by an act of man in
co-operating with God for his justification.
Reply to Objection 3: Every special virtue removes formally the habit
of the opposite vice, just as whiteness removes blackness from the same
subject: but penance removes every sin effectively, inasmuch as it
works for the destruction of sins, according as they are pardonable
through the grace of God if man co-operate therewith. Wherefore it does
not follow that it is a general virtue.
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Whether the virtue of penance is a species of justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtue of penance is not a species
of justice. For justice is not a theological but a moral virtue, as was
shown in the [4739]SS, Q[62], A[3]. But penance seems to be a
theological virtue, since God is its object, for it makes satisfaction
to God, to Whom, moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems
that penance is not a species of justice.
Objection 2: Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes the
mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to the
extreme, according to Jer. 6:26: "Make thee mourning as for an only
son, a bitter lamentation. " Therefore penance is not a species of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, there are two species of justice, as stated in
Ethic. v, 4, viz. "distributive" and "commutative. " But penance does
not seem to be contained under either of them. Therefore it seems that
penance is not a species of justice.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Lk. 6:21, "Blessed are ye that weep
now," says: "It is prudence that teaches us the unhappiness of earthly
things and the happiness of heavenly things. " But weeping is an act of
penance. Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of
justice.
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "Penance is the
vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry
for having done. " But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore
Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called
vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2) penance is a special virtue
not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would
suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he
has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and purposes
to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not
made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind
of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another,
just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the
offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the
part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the
matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it
is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice.
It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
v, 6) a thing is said to be just in two ways, simply and relatively. A
thing is just simply when it is between equals, since justice is a kind
of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil just, because all
citizens are equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler,
retaining their freedom. But a thing is just relatively when it is
between parties of whom one is subject to the other, as a servant under
his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband. It is
this kind of just that we consider in penance. Wherefore the penitent
has recourse to God with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his
master, according to Ps. 122:2: "Behold, as the eyes of servants are on
the hands of their masters . . . so are our eyes unto the Lord our God,
until He have mercy on us"; and as a son to his father, according to
Lk. 15:21: "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee"; and
as a wife to her husband, according to Jer. 3:1: "Thou hast prostituted
thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, saith the Lord. "
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. v, 1, justice is a virtue
towards another person, and the matter of justice is not so much the
person to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of
distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not God,
but human acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is as
one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is not
a theological virtue, because God is not its matter or object.
Reply to Objection 2: The mean of justice is the equality that is
established between those between whom justice is, as stated in Ethic.
v. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on
account of the excellence of one, as between father and son, God and
man, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), wherefore in such
cases, he that falls short of the other must do whatever he can. Yet
this will not be sufficient simply, but only according to the
acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing
excess to penance.
Reply to Objection 3: As there is a kind of commutation in favors,
when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is there
commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an offense
committed against another, a man is either punished against his will,
which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own
accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the
sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge.
Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative
justice.
Reply to Objection 4: Although penance is directly a species of
justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the
virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it must
have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the
object of which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in
Christ's Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon,
and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a
moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral
virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only something
belonging to justice, but also something belonging to temperance and
fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which
pertain to temperance, and those which cause terror, which fortitude
moderates, are objects of commutative justice. Accordingly it belongs
to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance,
and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude.
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Whether the will is properly the subject of penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of penance is not properly
the will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is in the
concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in the
concupiscible faculty.
Objection 2: Further, penance is a kind of vengeance, as Augustine
states in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship
of which is unknown]. But vengeance seems to regard the irascible
faculty, since anger is the desire for vengeance. Therefore it seems
that penance is in the irascible part.
Objection 3: Further, the past is the proper object of the memory,
according to the Philosopher (De Memoria i). Now penance regards the
past, as stated above (A[1], ad 2, ad 3). Therefore penance is
subjected in the memory.
Objection 4: Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance removes
sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance is in every
power of the soul, and not only in the will.
On the contrary, Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Ps.
50:19: "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit. " But to offer a
sacrifice is an act of the will, according to Ps. 53:8: "I will freely
sacrifice to Thee. " Therefore penance is in the will.
I answer that, We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so far as
it is a passion, and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is in the
concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it is a
virtue, and thus, as stated above [4740](A[3]), it is a species of
justice. Now justice, as stated in the [4741]FS, Q[56], A[6], is
subjected in the rational appetite which is the will. Therefore it is
evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue, is subjected in the
will, and its proper act is the purpose of amending what was committed
against God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers penance as a passion.
Reply to Objection 2: To desire vengeance on another, through passion,
belongs to the irascible appetite, but to desire or take vengeance on
oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will.
Reply to Objection 3: The memory is a power that apprehends the past.
But penance belongs not to the apprehensive but to the appetitive
power, which presupposes an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance
is not in the memory, but presupposes it.
Reply to Objection 4: The will, as stated above ([4742]FP, Q[82], A[4];
[4743]FS, Q[9], A[1] ), moves all the other powers of the soul; so that
it is not unreasonable for penance to be subjected in the will, and to
produce an effect in each power of the soul.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether penance originates from fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance does not originate from fear.
For penance originates in displeasure at sin. But this belongs to
charity, as stated above [4744](A[3]). Therefore penance originates
from love rather than fear.
Objection 2: Further, men are induced to do penance, through the
expectation of the heavenly kingdom, according to Mat. 3:2 and Mat.
4:17: "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. " Now the
kingdom of heaven is the object of hope. Therefore penance results from
hope rather than from fear.
Objection 3: Further, fear is an internal act of man. But penance does
not seem to arise in us through any work of man, but through the
operation of God, according to Jer. 31:19: "After Thou didst convert me
I did penance. " Therefore penance does not result from fear.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:17): "As a woman with child,
when she draweth near the time of her delivery, is in pain, and crieth
out in her pangs, so ere we become," by penance, to wit; and according
to another [*The Septuagint] version the text continues: "Through fear
of Thee, O Lord, we have conceived, and been as it were in labor, and
have brought forth the spirit of salvation," i. e. of salutary penance,
as is clear from what precedes. Therefore penance results from fear.
I answer that, We may speak of penance in two ways: first, as to the
habit, and then it is infused by God immediately without our operating
as principal agents, but not without our co-operating dispositively by
certain acts. Secondly, we may speak of penance, with regard to the
acts whereby in penance we co-operate with God operating, the first
principle [*Cf. FS, Q[113]] of which acts is the operation of God in
turning the heart, according to Lam. 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to
Thee, and we shall be converted"; the second, an act of faith; the
third, a movement of servile fear, whereby a man is withdrawn from sin
through fear of punishment; the fourth, a movement of hope, whereby a
man makes a purpose of amendment, in the hope of obtaining pardon; the
fifth, a movement of charity, whereby sin is displeasing to man for its
own sake and no longer for the sake of the punishment; the sixth, a
movement of filial fear whereby a man, of his own accord, offers to
make amends to God through fear of Him.
Accordingly it is evident that the act of penance results from servile
fear as from the first movement of the appetite in this direction and
from filial fear as from its immediate and proper principle.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin begins to displease a man, especially a
sinner, on account of the punishments which servile fear regards,
before it displeases him on account of its being an offense against
God, or on account of its wickedness, which pertains to charity.
Reply to Objection 2: When the kingdom of heaven is said to be at hand,
we are to understand that the king is on his way, not only to reward
but also to punish. Wherefore John the Baptist said (Mat. 3:7): "Ye
brood of vipers, who hath showed you to flee from the wrath to come? "
Reply to Objection 3: Even the movement of fear proceeds from God's act
in turning the heart; wherefore it is written (Dt. 5:29): "Who shall
give them to have such a mind, to fear Me? " And so the fact that
penance results from fear does not hinder its resulting from the act of
God in turning the heart.
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Whether penance is the first of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is the first of the virtues.
Because, on Mat. 3:2, "Do penance," etc. , a gloss says: "The first
virtue is to destroy the old man, and hate sin by means of penance. "
Objection 2: Further, withdrawal from one extreme seems to precede
approach to the other. Now all the other virtues seem to regard
approach to a term, because they all direct man to do good; whereas
penance seems to direct him to withdraw from evil. Therefore it seems
that penance precedes all the other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, before penance, there is sin in the soul. Now no
virtue is compatible with sin in the soul. Therefore no virtue precedes
penance, which is itself the first of all and opens the door to the
others by expelling sin.
On the contrary, Penance results from faith, hope, and charity, as
already stated ([4745]AA[2],5). Therefore penance is not the first of
the virtues.
I answer that, In speaking of the virtues, we do not consider the order
of time with regard to the habits, because, since the virtues are
connected with one another, as stated in the [4746]FS, Q[65], A[1],
they all begin at the same time to be in the soul; but one is said to
precede the other in the order of nature, which order depends on the
order of their acts, in so far as the act of one virtue presupposes the
act of another. Accordingly, then, one must say that, even in the order
of time, certain praiseworthy acts can precede the act and the habit of
penance, e. g. acts of dead faith and hope, and an act of servile fear;
while the act and habit of charity are, in point of time, simultaneous
with the act and habit of penance, and with the habits of the other
virtues. For, as was stated in the [4747]FS, Q[113], AA[7],8, in the
justification of the ungodly, the movement of the free-will towards
God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and the movement of
the free-will towards sin, which is the act of penance, are
simultaneous. Yet of these two acts, the former naturally precedes the
latter, because the act of the virtue of penance is directed against
sin, through love of God; where the first-mentioned act is the reason
and cause of the second.
Consequently penance is not simply the first of the virtues, either in
the order of time, or in the order of nature, because, in the order of
nature, the theological virtues precede it simply. Nevertheless, in a
certain respect, it is the first of the other virtues in the order of
time, as regards its act, because this act is the first in the
justification of the ungodly; whereas in the order of nature, the other
virtues seem to precede, as that which is natural precedes that which
is accidental; because the other virtues seem to be necessary for man's
good, by reason of their very nature, whereas penance is only necessary
if something, viz. sin, be presupposed, as stated above ([4748]Q[55],
A[2]), when we spoke of the relation of the sacrament of penance to the
other sacraments aforesaid.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is to be taken as meaning that the act
of penance is the first in point of time, in comparison with the acts
of the other virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: In successive movements withdrawal from one
extreme precedes approach to the other, in point of time; and also in
the order of nature, if we consider the subject, i. e. the order of the
material cause; but if we consider the order of the efficient and final
causes, approach to the end is first, for it is this that the efficient
cause intends first of all: and it is this order which we consider
chiefly in the acts of the soul, as stated in Phys. ii.
Reply to Objection 3: Penance opens the door to the other virtues,
because it expels sin by the virtues of faith, hope and charity, which
precede it in the order of nature; yet it so opens the door to them
that they enter at the same time as it: because, in the justification
of the ungodly, at the same time as the free-will is moved towards God
and against sin, the sin is pardoned and grace infused, and with grace
all the virtues, as stated in the [4749]FS, Q[65], AA[3],5.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECT OF PENANCE, AS REGARDS THE PARDON OF MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effect of Penance; and (1) as regards the
pardon of mortal sins; (2) as regards the pardon of venial sins; (3) as
regards the return of sins which have been pardoned; (4) as regards the
recovery of the virtues.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all mortal sins are taken away by Penance?
(2) Whether they can be taken away without Penance?
(3) Whether one can be taken away without the other?
(4) Whether Penance takes away the guilt while the debt remains?
(5) Whether any remnants of sin remain?
(6) Whether the removal of sin is the effect of Penance as a virtue, or
as a sacrament?
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Whether all sins are taken away by Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all sins are taken away by Penance.
For the Apostle says (Heb. 12:17) that Esau "found no place of
repentance, although with tears he had sought it," which a gloss
explains as meaning that "he found no place of pardon and blessing
through Penance": and it is related (2 Macc. 9:13) of Antiochus, that
"this wicked man prayed to the Lord, of Whom he was not to obtain
mercy. " Therefore it does not seem that all sins are taken away by
Penance.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i) that
"so great is the stain of that sin (namely, when a man, after coming to
the knowledge of God through the grace of Christ, resists fraternal
charity, and by the brands of envy combats grace itself) that he is
unable to humble himself in prayer, although he is forced by his wicked
conscience to acknowledge and confess his sin. " Therefore not every sin
can be taken away by Penance.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 12:32): "He that shall speak
against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this
world nor in the world to come. " Therefore not every sin can be
pardoned through Penance.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:22): "I will not remember"
any more "all his iniquities that he hath done. "
I answer that, The fact that a sin cannot be taken away by Penance may
happen in two ways: first, because of the impossibility of repenting of
sin; secondly, because of Penance being unable to blot out a sin.
In
the first way the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be
blotted out by Penance, because their will is confirmed in evil, so
that sin cannot displease them as to its guilt, but only as to the
punishment which they suffer, by reason of which they have a kind of
repentance, which yet is fruitless, according to Wis. 5:3: "Repenting,
and groaning for anguish of spirit. " Consequently such Penance brings
no hope of pardon, but only despair. Nevertheless no sin of a wayfarer
can be such as that, because his will is flexible to good and evil.
Wherefore to say that in this life there is any sin of which one cannot
repent, is erroneous, first, because this would destroy free-will,
secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of grace,
whereby the heart of any sinner whatsoever can be moved to repent,
according to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the
Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it. "
It is also erroneous to say that any sin cannot be pardoned through
true Penance. First, because this is contrary to Divine mercy, of which
it is written (Joel 2:13) that God is "gracious and merciful, patient,
and rich in mercy, and ready to repent of the evil"; for, in a manner,
God would be overcome by man, if man wished a sin to be blotted out,
which God were unwilling to blot out. Secondly, because this would be
derogatory to the power of Christ's Passion, through which Penance
produces its effect, as do the other sacraments, since it is written (1
Jn. 2:2): "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only,
but also for those of the whole world. "
Therefore we must say simply that, in this life, every sin can be
blotted out by true Penance.
Reply to Objection 1: Esau did not truly repent. This is evident from
his saying (Gn. 27:41): "The days will come of the mourning of my
father, and I will kill my brother Jacob. " Likewise neither did
Antiochus repent truly; since he grieved for his past sin, not because
he had offended God thereby, but on account of the sickness which he
suffered in his body.
Reply to Objection 2: These words of Augustine should be understood
thus: "So great is the stain of that sin, that man is unable to humble
himself in prayer," i. e. it is not easy for him to do so; in which
sense we say that a man cannot be healed, when it is difficult to heal
him. Yet this is possible by the power of God's grace, which sometimes
turns men even "into the depths of the sea" (Ps. 67:23).
Reply to Objection 3: The word or blasphemy spoken against the Holy
Ghost is final impenitence, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xi),
which is altogether unpardonable, because after this life is ended,
there is no pardon of sins. or, if by the blasphemy against the Holy
Ghost, we understand sin committed through certain malice, this means
either that the blasphemy itself against the Holy Ghost is
unpardonable, i. e. not easily pardonable, or that such a sin does not
contain in itself any motive for pardon, or that for such a sin a man
is punished both in this and in the next world, as we explained in the
[4750]SS, Q[14], A[3].
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Whether sin can be pardoned without Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin can be pardoned without Penance.
For the power of God is no less with regard to adults than with regard
to children. But He pardons the sins of children without Penance.
Therefore He also pardons adults without penance.
Objection 2: Further, God did not bind His power to the sacraments. But
Penance is a sacrament. Therefore by God's power sin can be pardoned
without Penance.
Objection 3: Further, God's mercy is greater than man's. Now man
sometimes forgives another for offending him, without his repenting:
wherefore our Lord commanded us (Mat. 5:44): "Love your enemies, do
good to them that hate you. " Much more, therefore, does God pardon men
for offending him, without their repenting.
On the contrary, The Lord said (Jer. 18:8): "If that nation . . . shall
repent of their evil" which they have done, "I also will repent of the
evil that I have thought to do them," so that, on the other hand, if
man "do not penance," it seems that God will not pardon him his sin.
I answer that, It is impossible for a mortal actual sin to be pardoned
without penance, if we speak of penance as a virtue. For, as sin is an
offense against God, He pardons sin in the same way as he pardons an
offense committed against Him. Now an offense is directly opposed to
grace, since one man is said to be offended with another, because he
excludes him from his grace. Now, as stated in the [4751]FS, Q[110],
A[1], the difference between the grace of God and the grace of man, is
that the latter does not cause, but presupposes true or apparent
goodness in him who is graced, whereas the grace of God causes goodness
in the man who is graced, because the good-will of God, which is
denoted by the word "grace," is the cause of all created good. Hence it
is possible for a man to pardon an offense, for which he is offended
with someone, without any change in the latter's will; but it is
impossible that God pardon a man for an offense, without his will being
changed. Now the offense of mortal sin is due to man's will being
turned away from God, through being turned to some mutable good.
Consequently, for the pardon of this offense against God, it is
necessary for man's will to be so changed as to turn to God and to
renounce having turned to something else in the aforesaid manner,
together with a purpose of amendment; all of which belongs to the
nature of penance as a virtue. Therefore it is impossible for a sin to
be pardoned anyone without penance as a virtue.
But the sacrament of Penance, as stated above ([4752]Q[88], A[3]), is
perfected by the priestly office of binding and loosing, without which
God can forgive sins, even as Christ pardoned the adulterous woman, as
related in Jn. 8, and the woman that was a sinner, as related in Luke
vii, whose sins, however, He did not forgive without the virtue of
penance: for as Gregory states (Hom. xxxiii in Evang. ), "He drew
inwardly by grace," i. e. by penance, "her whom He received outwardly by
His mercy. "
Reply to Objection 1: In children there is none but original sin, which
consists, not in an actual disorder of the will, but in a habitual
disorder of nature, as explained in the [4753]FS, Q[82], A[1], and so
in them the forgiveness of sin is accompanied by a habitual change
resulting from the infusion of grace and virtues, but not by an actual
change. On the other hand, in the case of an adult, in whom there are
actual sins, which consist in an actual disorder of the will, there is
no remission of sins, even in Baptism, without an actual change of the
will, which is the effect of Penance.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes Penance as a sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: God's mercy is more powerful than man's, in that
it moves man's will to repent, which man's mercy cannot do.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether by Penance one sin can be pardoned without another?
Objection 1: It would seem that by Penance one sin can be pardoned
without another. For it is written (Amos 4:7): "I caused it to rain
upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece
was rained upon: and the piece whereupon I rained not, withered. " These
words are expounded by Gregory, who says (Hom. x super Ezech. ): "When a
man who hates his neighbor, breaks himself of other vices, rain falls
on one part of the city, leaving the other part withered, for there are
some men who, when they prune some vices, become much more rooted in
others. " Therefore one sin can be forgiven by Penance, without another.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose in commenting on Ps. 118, "Blessed are
the undefiled in the way," after expounding verse 136 ("My eyes have
sent forth springs of water"), says that "the first consolation is that
God is mindful to have mercy; and the second, that He punishes, for
although faith be wanting, punishment makes satisfaction and raises us
up. " Therefore a man can be raised up from one sin, while the sin of
unbelief remains.
Objection 3: Further, when several things are not necessarily together,
one can be removed without the other. Now it was stated in the
[4754]FS, Q[73], A[1] that sins are not connected together, so that one
sin can be without another. Therefore also one sin can be taken away by
Penance without another being taken away.
Objection 4: Further, sins are the debts, for which we pray for pardon
when we say in the Lord's Prayer: "Forgive us our trespasses," etc. Now
man sometimes forgives one debt without forgiving another. Therefore
God also, by Penance, forgives one sin without another.
Objection 5: Further, man's sins are forgiven him through the love of
God, according to Jer. 31:3: "I have loved thee with an everlasting
love, therefore have I drawn thee, taking pity on thee. " Now there is
nothing to hinder God from loving a man in one respect, while being
offended with him in another, even as He loves the sinner as regards
his nature, while hating him for his sin. Therefore it seems possible
for God, by Penance, to pardon one sin without another.
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "There are many who
repent having sinned, but not completely; for they except certain
things which give them pleasure, forgetting that our Lord delivered
from the devil the man who was both dumb and deaf, whereby He shows us
that we are never healed unless it be from all sins. "
I answer that, It is impossible for Penance to take one sin away
without another. First because sin is taken away by grace removing the
offense against God. Wherefore it was stated in the [4755]FS, Q[109],
A[7]; [4756]FS, Q[113], A[2] that without grace no sin can be forgiven.
Now every mortal sin is opposed to grace and excludes it. Therefore it
is impossible for one sin to be pardoned without another. Secondly,
because, as shown above [4757](A[2]) mortal sin cannot be forgiven
without true Penance, to which it belongs to renounce sin, by reason of
its being against God, which is common to all mortal sins: and where
the same reason applies, the result will be the same. Consequently a
man cannot be truly penitent, if he repent of one sin and not of
another. For if one particular sin were displeasing to him, because it
is against the love of God above all things (which motive is necessary
for true repentance), it follows that he would repent of all. Whence it
follows that it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned through
Penance, without another. Thirdly, because this would be contrary to
the perfection of God's mercy, since His works are perfect, as stated
in Dt. 32:4; wherefore whomsoever He pardons, He pardons altogether.
Hence Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of
which is unknown], that "it is irreverent and heretical to expect half
a pardon from Him Who is just and justice itself. "
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Gregory do not refer to the
forgiveness of the guilt, but to the cessation from act, because
sometimes a man who has been wont to commit several kinds of sin,
renounces one and not the other; which is indeed due to God's
assistance, but does not reach to the pardon of the sin.
Reply to Objection 2: In this saying of Ambrose "faith" cannot denote
the faith whereby we believe in Christ, because, as Augustine says on
Jn. 15:22, "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have
sin" (viz. unbelief): "for this is the sin which contains all others":
but it stands for consciousness, because sometimes a man receives
pardon for a sin of which he is not conscious, through the punishment
which he bears patiently.
Reply to Objection 3: Although sins are not connected in so far as they
turn towards a mutable good, yet they are connected in so far as they
turn away from the immutable Good, which applies to all mortal sins in
common. and it is thus that they have the character of an offense which
needs to be removed by Penance.
Reply to Objection 4: Debt as regards external things, e. g. money, is
not opposed to friendship through which the debt is pardoned. hence one
debt can be condoned without another. On the other hand, the debt of
sin is opposed to friendship, and so one sin or offense is not pardoned
without another; for it would seem absurd for anyone to ask even a man
to forgive him one offense and not another.
Reply to Objection 5: The love whereby God loves man's nature, does not
ordain man to the good of glory from which man is excluded by any
mortal sin. but the love of grace, whereby mortal sin is forgiven,
ordains man to eternal life, according to Rom. 6:23: "The grace of God
(is) life everlasting. " Hence there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the debt of punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven
through Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that no debt of punishment remains after the
guilt has been forgiven through Penance. For when the cause is removed,
the effect is removed. But the guilt is the cause of the debt of
punishment: since a man deserves to be punished because he has been
guilty of a sin. Therefore when the sin has been forgiven, no debt of
punishment can remain.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. 5) the gift of
Christ is more effective than the sin of Adam. Now, by sinning, man
incurs at the same time guilt and the debt of punishment. Much more
therefore, by the gift of grace, is the guilt forgiven and at the same
time the debt of punishment remitted.
Objection 3: Further, the forgiveness of sins is effected in Penance
through the power of Christ's Passion, according to Rom. 3:25: "Whom
God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His Blood . .
. for the remission of former sins. " Now Christ's Passion made
satisfaction sufficient for all sins, as stated above (QQ[48],49,79,
A[5]). Therefore after the guilt has been pardoned, no debt of
punishment remains.
On the contrary, It is related (2 Kings 12:13) that when David penitent
had said to Nathan: "I have sinned against the Lord," Nathan said to
him: "The Lord also hath taken away thy sin, thou shalt not die.
Nevertheless . . . the child that is born to thee shall surely die,"
which was to punish him for the sin he had committed, as stated in the
same place. Therefore a debt of some punishment remains after the guilt
has been forgiven.
I answer that, As stated in the [4758]FS, Q[87], A[4], in mortal sin
there are two things, namely, a turning from the immutable Good, and an
inordinate turning to mutable good. Accordingly, in so far as mortal
sin turns away from the immutable Good, it induces a debt of eternal
punishment, so that whosoever sins against the eternal Good should be
punished eternally. Again, in so far as mortal sin turns inordinately
to a mutable good, it gives rise to a debt of some punishment, because
the disorder of guilt is not brought back to the order of justice,
except by punishment: since it is just that he who has been too
indulgent to his will, should suffer something against his will, for
thus will equality be restored. Hence it is written (Apoc. 18:7): "As
much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much
torment and sorrow give ye to her. "
Since, however, the turning to mutable good is finite, sin does not, in
this respect, induce a debt of eternal punishment. Wherefore, if man
turns inordinately to a mutable good, without turning from God, as
happens in venial sins, he incurs a debt, not of eternal but of
temporal punishment. Consequently when guilt is pardoned through grace,
the soul ceases to be turned away from God, through being united to God
by grace: so that at the same time, the debt of punishment is taken
away, albeit a debt of some temporal punishment may yet remain.
Reply to Objection 1: Mortal sin both turns away from God and turns to
a created good. But, as stated in the [4759]FS, Q[71], A[6], the
turning away from God is as its form while the turning to created good
is as its matter. Now if the formal element of anything be removed, the
species is taken away: thus, if you take away rational, you take away
the human species. Consequently mortal sin is said to be pardoned from
the very fact that, by means of grace, the aversion of the mind from
God is taken away together with the debt of eternal punishment: and yet
the material element remains, viz. the inordinate turning to a created
good, for which a debt of temporal punishment is due.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the [4760]FS, Q[109], AA[7],8;
[4761]FS, Q[111], A[2], it belongs to grace to operate in man by
justifying him from sin, and to co-operate with man that his work may
be rightly done. Consequently the forgiveness of guilt and of the debt
of eternal punishment belongs to operating grace, while the remission
of the debt of temporal punishment belongs to co-operating grace, in so
far as man, by bearing punishment patiently with the help of Divine
grace, is released also from the debt of temporal punishment.
Consequently just as the effect of operating grace precedes the effect
of co-operating grace, so too, the remission of guilt and of eternal
punishment precedes the complete release from temporal punishment,
since both are from grace, but the former, from grace alone, the
latter, from grace and free-will.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion is of itself sufficient to
remove all debt of punishment, not only eternal, but also temporal; and
man is released from the debt of punishment according to the measure of
his share in the power of Christ's Passion. Now in Baptism man shares
the Power of Christ's Passion fully, since by water and the Spirit of
Christ, he dies with Him to sin, and is born again in Him to a new
life, so that, in Baptism, man receives the remission of all debt of
punishment. In Penance, on the other hand, man shares in the power of
Christ's Passion according to the measure of his own acts, which are
the matter of Penance, as water is of Baptism, as stated above
([4762]Q[84], AA[1],3). Wherefore the entire debt of punishment is not
remitted at once after the first act of Penance, by which act the guilt
is remitted, but only when all the acts of Penance have been completed.
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Whether the remnants of sin are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the remnants of sin are removed
when a mortal sin is forgiven. For Augustine says in De Poenitentia
[*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]:
"Our Lord never healed anyone without delivering him wholly; for He
wholly healed the man on the Sabbath, since He delivered his body from
all disease, and his soul from all taint. " Now the remnants of sin
belong to the disease of sin. Therefore it does not seem possible for
any remnants of sin to remain when the guilt has been pardoned.
Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "good is
more efficacious than evil, since evil does not act save in virtue of
some good. " Now, by sinning, man incurs the taint of sin all at once.
Much more, therefore, by repenting, is he delivered also from all
remnants of sin.
Objection 3: Further, God's work is more efficacious than man's. Now by
the exercise of good human works the remnants of contrary sins are
removed. Much more, therefore, are they taken away by the remission of
guilt, which is a work of God.
On the contrary, We read (Mk. 8) that the blind man whom our Lord
enlightened, was restored first of all to imperfect sight, wherefore he
said (Mk. 8:24): "I see men, as it were trees, walking"; and afterwards
he was restored perfectly, "so that he saw all things clearly. " Now the
enlightenment of the blind man signifies the delivery of the sinner.
Therefore after the first remission of sin, whereby the sinner is
restored to spiritual sight, there still remain in him some remnants of
his past sin.
I answer that, Mortal sin, in so far as it turns inordinately to a
mutable good, produces in the soul a certain disposition, or even a
habit, if the acts be repeated frequently. Now it has been said above
[4763](A[4]) that the guilt of mortal sin is pardoned through grace
removing the aversion of the mind from God. Nevertheless when that
which is on the part of the aversion has been taken away by grace, that
which is on the part of the inordinate turning to a mutable good can
remain, since this may happen to be without the other, as stated above
[4764](A[4]). Consequently, there is no reason why, after the guilt has
been forgiven, the dispositions caused by preceding acts should not
remain, which are called the remnants of sin. Yet they remain weakened
and diminished, so as not to domineer over man, and they are after the
manner of dispositions rather than of habits, like the "fomes" which
remains after Baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: God heals the whole man perfectly; but sometimes
suddenly, as Peter's mother-in-law was restored at once to perfect
health, so that "rising she ministered to them" (Lk. 4:39), and
sometimes by degrees, as we said above ([4765]Q[44], A[3], ad 2) about
the blind man who was restored to sight (Mat. 8). And so too, He
sometimes turns the heart of man with such power, that it receives at
once perfect spiritual health, not only the guilt being pardoned, but
all remnants of sin being removed as was the case with Magdalen (Lk.
7); whereas at other times He sometimes first pardons the guilt by
operating grace, and afterwards, by co-operating grace, removes the
remnants of sin by degrees.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin too, sometimes induces at once a weak
disposition, such as is the result of one act, and sometimes a stronger
disposition, the result of many acts.
Reply to Objection 3: One human act does not remove all the remnants of
sin, because, as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. viii) "a vicious
man by doing good works will make but little progress so as to be any
better, but if he continue in good practice, he will end in being good
as to acquired virtue. " But God's grace does this much more
effectively, whether by one or by several acts.
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Whether the forgiveness of guilt is an effect of Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the forgiveness of guilt is not an
effect of penance as a virtue. For penance is said to be a virtue, in
so far as it is a principle of a human action. But human action does
nothing towards the remission of guilt, since this is an effect of
operating grace. Therefore the forgiveness of guilt is not an effect of
penance as a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, certain other virtues are more excellent than
penance. But the forgiveness of sin is not said to be the effect of any
other virtue. Neither, therefore, is it the effect of penance as a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is no forgiveness of sin except through the
power of Christ's Passion, according to Heb. 9:22: "Without shedding of
blood there is no remission. " Now Penance, as a sacrament, produces its
effect through the power of Christ's Passion, even as the other
sacraments do, as was shown above ([4766]Q[62], AA[4],5). Therefore the
forgiveness of sin is the effect of Penance, not as a virtue, but as a
sacrament.
On the contrary, Properly speaking, the cause of a thing is that
without which it cannot be, since every defect depends on its cause.
Now forgiveness of sin can come from God without the sacrament of
Penance, but not without the virtue of penance, as stated above
([4767]Q[84], A[5], ad 3;[4768] Q[85], A[2]); so that, even before the
sacraments of the New Law were instituted, God pardoned the sins of the
penitent. Therefore the forgiveness of sin is chiefly the effect of
penance as a virtue.
I answer that, Penance is a virtue in so far as it is a principle of
certain human acts. Now the human acts, which are performed by the
sinner, are the material element in the sacrament of Penance. Moreover
every sacrament produces its effect, in virtue not only of its form,
but also of its matter.
