No More Learning

Cæsar, having announced this decision from the
summit of his prætorium (_pro suggestu pronuntiata_), started the same
day at the head of his legions, and advanced by forced marches towards
the country of the Senones.

At the news of his approach, Acco, the principal author of the revolt,
ordered the population to retire into the _oppida_; but, taken by
surprise by the arrival of the Romans, the Senones employed the Ædui,
once their patrons, to intercede in their favour. Cæsar pardoned them
without difficulty, preferring to employ the fine season in war than in
the search of those who were culpable. A hundred hostages exacted from
the Senones were entrusted to the Ædui. The Carnutes imitated the
example of the Senones, and, by the intermediation of the Remi, whose
clients they were, obtained their pardon. Cæsar pronounced the close of
the assembly of Gaul, and ordered the different states to furnish their
contingents of cavalry. [448]


[Sidenote: Submission of the Menapii. ]

III. Having pacified this part of the country, Cæsar turned all his
thoughts towards the war with the Treviri and with Ambiorix, the chief
of the Eburones. He was, above all, impatient to take a striking
vengeance for the humiliation inflicted on his arms at Aduatuca. Knowing
well that Ambiorix would not hazard a battle, he sought to penetrate his
designs. Two things were to be feared: the first, that Ambiorix, when
his territory was invaded, would take refuge among the Menapii, whose
country, adjoining that of the Eburones, was defended by woods and vast
marshes, and who, alone among the Gauls, had never made an act of
submission; the second, that he might join the Germans beyond the Rhine,
with whom, as was known, he had entered into friendly relations through
the intermediation of the Treviri. Cæsar conceived the plan of first
preventing these two eventualities, in order to isolate Ambiorix.
Wishing, above all, to reduce to submission the Menapii and Treviri, and
carry the war at the same time into the countries of these two peoples,
he undertook in person the expedition against the Menapii, and entrusted
that against the Treviri to Labienus, his best lieutenant, who had
operated against them on several occasions. Labienus, after his victory
over Indutiomarus, had continued in his winter quarters with his legions
at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe. [449] Cæsar sent him all the baggage of
the army and two legions. He marched in person towards the country of
the Menapii, at the head of five legions without baggage. He took with
him Cavarinus and the Senonese cavalry, fearing lest the resentment of
this king against his people, or the hatred which he had drawn upon
himself, might raise some disorders, and, following the general
direction of Sens, Soissons, Bavay, and Brussels, he reached the
frontier of the Menapii. The latter, trusting in the nature of the
ground, had assembled no forces, but took refuge in the woods and
marshes. Cæsar divided his troops with the lieutenant C. Fabius and the
questor M. Crassus, formed them into three columns, and, causing bridges
to be hastily constructed, to cross the marshy water-courses, penetrated
at three points into their territory, which he ravaged. The Menapii,
reduced to extremity, demanded peace: it was granted to them on the
express condition that they should refuse all shelter to Ambiorix or to
his lieutenants. Cæsar left Commius among them with part of the cavalry
to hold them under surveillance, and marched thence towards the country
of the Treviri. [450]


[Sidenote: Success of Labienus against the Treviri. ]

IV. On his part, Labienus had obtained brilliant successes; the Treviri
had marched with considerable forces against his winter quarters. They
were no more than two days’ march from him, when they learnt that he
had been joined by two other legions. Resolving then to wait the succour
of the Germans, they halted at a distance of fifteen miles from the camp
of Labienus. The latter, informed of the cause of their inaction, and
hoping that their imprudence would present an opportunity for giving
battle, left five cohorts to guard the greatest part of the baggage,
and, with the twenty-five others and a numerous cavalry, established his
camp within a mile of the enemy.

The two armies were separated by the river Ourthe, the passage of which
was rendered difficult by the steepness of the banks. Labienus had no
intention of crossing it, but he feared that the enemy might imitate his
prudence until the arrival of the Germans, who were expected
immediately. To draw them to him, he spread a rumour that he should
withdraw on the morrow at break of day, in order to avoid having to
combat the united forces of the Treviri and the Germans. He assembled
during the night the tribunes and centurions of the first class,
informed them of his design, and, contrary to Roman discipline, broke up
his camp with every appearance of disorder and a precipitate retreat.
The proximity of the camps allowed the enemy to obtain information of
this movement by his scouts before daybreak.

The rear-guard of Labienus had no sooner begun its march, than the
barbarians urge each other not to let a prey so long coveted escape
them. They imagine that the Romans are struck with terror, and, thinking
it disgraceful to wait any longer the succour of the Germans, they cross
the river and advance unhesitatingly upon unfavourable ground.
Labienus, seeing the success of his stratagem, continued slowly his
apparent retreat, in order to draw all the Gauls over the river. He had
sent forward, to an eminence, the baggage, guarded by a detachment of
cavalry. Suddenly he orders the ensigns to be turned towards the enemy,
forms his troops in order of battle, the cavalry on the wings, and
exhorts them to display the same valour as if Cæsar were present. Then
an immense cry rises in the ranks, and the _pila_ are thrown from all
sides. The Gauls, surprised at seeing an enemy they believed they were
pursuing turn against them, did not sustain even the first shock, but
fled precipitately into the neighbouring forests. Pressed by the
cavalry, they were slain or captured in great numbers.

Labienus employed those wise tactics to which the Romans owed their
greatest successes. Invincible in their fortified camps, they could, as
the Emperor Napoleon I. has so well remarked, either combat or wait for
the opportune moment. The Gauls, on the contrary, warlike peoples,
carried away by a fiery courage, not understanding the patience and
wiliness of their adversaries, fell always into the snare which was laid
for them. It was enough to feign terror, and inspire them with contempt
for the enemy’s forces, to make them engage instantly in disorderly
attacks, which the Romans, by sudden sorties, easily defeated. This was
the system followed by Sabinus when attacked by the Unelli, by Cæsar on
his way to the relief of Cicero, and by Labienus himself in the previous
year.

A few days afterwards the country submitted; for, on the news of the
defeat of the Treviri, the Germans returned home, followed by the
relatives of Indutiomarus, the author of the revolt. Cingetorix,
constant in his fidelity to the Romans, was replaced at the head of the
nation. The double object proposed by Cæsar was thus attained; for, on
one hand, since the submission of the Menapii, Ambiorix could no longer
dream of finding a refuge among them; and, on the other, the victory of
Labienus, followed by the retreat of the Germans, placed it out of his
power to league with these latter. Nevertheless, to assure this double
result, punish the Germans for their readiness to succour the Treviri,
and cut off Ambiorix from all retreat, Cæsar, after having effected his
junction with Labienus, resolved to pass the Rhine a second time. [451]


[Sidenote: Second Passage of the Rhine. ]

V. He had passed from the country of the Menapii into that of the
Treviri, and had arrived near the locality where now stands the town of
Bonn. He there caused a bridge to be built a little above the spot where
his army had crossed two years before. In consequence of the experience
gained by the processes employed on the former occasion, and of the
extreme zeal of the soldiers, the work was finished in a few days.
Having left for the protection of the bridge a strong detachment on the
bank belonging to the Treviri, for fear of some movement on their part,
Cæsar crossed the river with the legions and the cavalry. The Ubii, who
had long before made their submission, assured him that they had
neither sent assistance to the Treviri or violated their oath; that the
Suevi alone had furnished auxiliaries; and that thus he ought not to
confound them with the latter in his anger against the Germans. He
accepted their excuses, and obtained information on the roads and passes
which led to the country of the Suevi.

A few days afterwards, he learnt that the latter were concentrating on a
single point their troops and the contingents of the tribes under their
dependence. He provided for the supply of provisions, chose a favourable
position for his camp, and enjoined the Ubii to transport their cattle
and goods into their _oppida_, hoping to compel the barbarians by famine
to fight at disadvantage. The Ubii were similarly charged to watch the
enemy by means of numerous scouts. A few days later, they informed Cæsar
that the Suevi, at the approach of the Romans, had retired, with all
their troops and those of their allies, to the extremity of their
territory. There lay the forest Bacenis,[452] which advanced very far
into the country, and which, placed like a natural barrier between the
Suevi and the Cherusci, separated these two peoples and defended them
against their mutual excursions. It was at the entrance to this forest,
probably towards the mountains of Thuringia, that the Suevi had resolved
to await the Romans.

In this expedition, as in the one preceding, Cæsar feared to engage
himself too far in the middle of an uncultivated country, where
provisions might have failed him. He therefore repassed the Rhine. But
to keep the barbarians in fear of his return, and to prevent their
re-enforcements from reaching the Gauls, he did not destroy the whole
bridge, but only cut off 200 feet on the side of the Ubian bank; at the
extremity of the truncated part he built a tower of four stories, and
left on the left bank twelve cohorts in a retrenched post. Young C.
Volcatius Tullus had the command of it. Cæsar’s two expeditions to the
right bank of the Rhine led to no battle, and yet the moral effect was
so great, that after this period the Germans no longer supported the
insurrections in Gaul, and even became the auxiliaries of the
Romans. [453]


[Sidenote: War against Ambiorix. ]

VI. On the approach of harvest, Cæsar marched against Ambiorix, with his
ten legions, except the guard left at the bridge of the Rhine. He
started from Bonn, and advanced towards the country of the Eburones, by
way of Zulpich and Eupen (_see Plate 14_), across the forest of the
Ardennes, which extended, it will be remembered, from the banks of the
Rhine to the country of the Nervii. In the hope of surprising the enemy,
he sent forward M. Minucius Basilus, with all the cavalry, recommending
to him not to light fires, which would reveal his approach, and
informing him that he should follow him closely.

Basilus, faithful to his orders, fell by surprise on a great number of
Eburones, proceeded straight towards the locality to which Ambiorix was
said to have retired with a few cavalry, succeeded in penetrating to the
abode of this chieftain, and seized upon all his effects; but the
latter, protected by some of his followers, escaped on horseback
through the woods; his partisans dispersed. It was thus that fortune,
which plays so important a part in war, favoured at the same time the
enterprise against Ambiorix and his escape. The Eburon chief sent secret
messages in all directions, recommending the inhabitants to provide for
their own safety. Some concealed themselves in the forest of the
Ardennes, others in the midst of the marshes. Those who were nearest to
the ocean sought refuge in the islands which are formed at high tide;
others expatriated themselves, and settled in distant countries.
Catuvolcus, king of one-half of the country of the Eburones, crushed
with age and misfortunes, took poison, that he might not fall alive into
the power of the Romans.

During this time, Cæsar was approaching the country of the Segni and
Condrusi,[454] who came to implore him not to confound in the same cause
all the Germans beyond the Rhine, and protested their neutrality. The
fact having been satisfactorily proved, Cæsar assured them that, if they
would deliver up to him the Eburones who had sought refuge among them,
their territory should be respected. Having arrived at Visé, on the
Meuse, where a ford exists from time immemorial, he divided his troops
into three bodies, and sent the baggage of all the legions to Aduatuca
(_Tongres_): it was the place which had witnessed the recent disaster of
Sabinus. He gave preference to this position, because the retrenchments
of the preceding year, still standing, would spare the troops much
labour. He left, as a guard for the baggage, the 14th legion, and placed
it, with 200 cavalry, under the command of Quintus Cicero.

Of the nine legions remaining with Cæsar, three were sent with T.
Labienus to the north towards the ocean, into the part of the country of
the Eburones which touched on that of the Menapii; three to the south
with C. Trebonius, to ravage the districts neighbouring on the Aduatuci
(towards the south-west, between the Meuse and the Demer); lastly,
Cæsar, at the head of the three others, advanced towards the Scheldt,
the waters of which, at this period, mingled with those of the
Meuse. [455] (_See Plate 14. _) It was his intention to gain the extremity
of the Ardennes (between Brussels and Antwerp), whither it was said that
Ambiorix had retired with a few horsemen. He announced, on his
departure, that he should return to Aduatuca on the seventh day, the
period for the distribution of provisions to the legion which was left
at that place in charge of the baggage. Labienus and Trebonius were, if
they found it possible, to return at the same period, in order to
concert again on the measures to be taken after they had made themselves
acquainted with the designs of the enemy.

The Eburones had neither regular force, nor garrison, nor _oppidum_.
They formed a scattered multitude, always in ambush, attacking the
soldiers when isolated, and obliging the Romans to carry on a harassing
war, without any decisive result; for the nature of the country, covered
with thick forests, and intersected by marshes, protected the
barbarians, who could only be reached by small detachments. In the midst
of these difficulties, Cæsar preferred doing less injury to the enemy,
and sparing the lives of his own soldiers, by having recourse to the
Gauls. He accordingly sent messages to invite the neighbouring peoples
to come and ravage the territory of the Eburones, and assist him in
exterminating a race guilty of having slaughtered his soldiers. At his
call, numerous hordes rushed from all sides, and the entire territory of
the Eburones was soon given up to pillage. [456]


[Sidenote: The Sicambri attack Aduatuca. ]

VII. Meanwhile, the seventh day, the period fixed for Cæsar’s return,
approached. Chance, so common in war, brought about a remarkable
incident. The enemy, scattered, and struck with terror, could no longer
inspire the least fear. But rumour having spread beyond the Rhine, among
the Germans, that all peoples were invited to ravage the country of the
Eburones, the Sicambri, neighbours to the river, who had, as we have
seen, received the Usipetes and Tencteri after their defeat, collect
2,000 cavalry; they pass the Rhine on rafts and boats, thirty miles
below where Cæsar had built his bridge and left a guard (forty-five
kilomètres below Bonn. )[457] They invade the territory of the Eburones,
pick up a crowd of fugitives, and seize upon a great number of cattle.
The attraction of booty draws them on farther and farther; bred in the
midst of war and plundering, nothing stops them--neither marshes nor
woods. On their arrival at some distance from the Meuse, they learn from
prisoners the absence of Cæsar and the distance of the army, and that in
three hours they can reach Aduatuca, where the riches of the Romans are
deposited. They are made to believe that this fortress is defended by a
garrison too weak to line the walls or venture to issue from the
retrenchments. Trusting in this information, the Germans hide their
booty, and, guided by a prisoner, march against Aduatuca, crossing the
Meuse at Maestricht.

Hitherto, Cicero had scrupulously executed Cæsar’s order, and retained
the troops in the camp without even permitting a single valet to quit
it; but on the seventh day, reckoning no longer on the return of the
general at the term fixed, he yielded to the complaints of the soldiers,
who blamed his obstinacy in keeping them shut up as though they were
besieged. He believed, moreover, that the nine legions, and the numerous
cavalry which scoured the country, permitted him to venture without
danger to a distance of three miles from his camp, especially after the
dispersion of the enemy’s forces; he therefore sent five cohorts to cut
wheat in the nearest fields, situated to the north of Aduatuca, and
separated from the camp only by a hill. With them went, under the same
ensign, 300 men of different legions left sick, but then restored, and
a multitude of valets, taking with them a great number of beasts of
burden, which were in the camp.

Suddenly the German cavalry arrive; their march had been concealed by
the woods. Without halting, they rush toward the Decuman gate, and
attempt to enter the camp. (_See Plate 18. _) The attack is so sudden,
that the merchants established under the _vallum_ have not time to
enter. The soldiers, taken by surprise, are in confusion; the cohort on
guard struggles to prevent the enemy from entering the gate. The
Sicambri spread themselves round the camp, to discover another passage;
but, fortunately, the nature of the locality and the retrenchments
render access impossible everywhere but at the gates. They attempt to
force an entry there, and are prevented with difficulty. The alarm and
disorder are at their height. The soldiers are uncertain where to direct
their steps, or where to assemble; some pretend that the camp is taken,
others that the army and Cæsar have perished. A feeling of superstitious
anxiety recalls to their minds the disaster of Sabinus and Cotta, slain
at the same place. At the sight of such a general consternation, the
barbarians are confirmed in their opinion that the Romans are too few to
resist; they strive to force an entrance, and urge one another not to
let so rich a prey escape.

Among the sick left in the camp was the primipilus P. Sextius Baculus,
who had signalised himself in the preceding combats. For five days he
had taken no food. Uneasy for the safety of all, as well as his own, he
leaves his tent without arms, sees before him the enemy and the danger,
snatches a sword from the first man he meets, and takes his post at a
gate. The centurions of the cohort on guard follow him, and all together
sustain the attack for a few instants. Baculus, grievously wounded,
faints. He is passed from hand to hand, and only saved with difficulty.
This incident gives the others time to recover their courage. They
remain on the rampart, and present at least some appearance of defence.

At this moment the soldiers who had gone out to reap were on their way
back to the camp; they are struck with the cries they hear; the cavalry
press forward, perceive the imminence of the danger, and see, with
terror, that it is no longer possible to obtain refuge behind the
retrenchments. The newly-levied soldiers, inexperienced in war,
interrogate the tribune and centurions with their looks, and wait their
orders. There is no one so brave as not to be agitated by so unexpected
an event. The Sicambri, perceiving the ensigns at a distance, believe at
first that the legions were returning, and cease from the attack; but
soon, filled with contempt for such a handful of men, they rush upon
them on all sides.

The valets take refuge on a neighbouring hill, that on which now stands
the village of Berg. Driven from this post, they rush back into the
midst of the ensigns and manipuli, and increase the fear of the already
intimidated men. Among the soldiers, some propose to form in wedge, in
order to open themselves a way to the camp they see so near them: the
loss of a small number will be the safety of all. Others advise to
remain firm on the heights, and run the same chance together. This
latter opinion is not that of the old soldiers, united under the same
ensign. Led by C. Trebonius, a Roman knight, they fight their way
through the enemy, and re-enter the camp without the loss of a single
man. Under protection of this bold movement, the valets and cavalry
succeed in following them. As to the young soldiers who had posted
themselves on the heights, they were not able, in their inexperience,
either to maintain their resolution to defend themselves in their
position, or to imitate the successful energy of the veterans; they
engaged on disadvantageous ground in an attempt to regain the camp, and
their destruction would have been certain but for the devotedness of the
centurions. Some had been promoted from the lowest ranks of the army to
this grade, in reward for their courage; and for a moment they
intimidated the enemy, by sacrificing their lives in order to justify
their renown. This heroic act, contrary to all expectation, enabled
three cohorts to re-enter the camp; the two others perished.

During these combats, the defenders of the camp had recovered from their
first alarm. When they saw them stationed on the rampart, the Germans
despaired of being able to force the retrenchments; they withdrew, and
repassed the Rhine with their booty. The terror they had spread was such
that, even after their retreat, when, the following night, C. Volusenus
arrived at Aduatuca with the cavalry which preceded the legions, the
return of Cæsar and the safety of the army seemed hardly credible. Men’s
minds were affected to such a degree that they supposed the cavalry
alone had escaped from the disaster; for, they said, the Germans would
never have attacked the camp if the legions had not been defeated. The
arrival of Cæsar alone dissipated all their fears.

Accustomed to the various chances of war, and to events which must be
supported without complaining, he uttered no reproach;[458] he merely
reminded them that they should not have run the least risk by letting
the troops go out of the camp; that, moreover, if they might blame
fortune for the sudden attack of the enemy, they might, on the other
hand, congratulate themselves on having driven them back from the gates
of the camp. He was astonished, nevertheless, that the Germans, having
crossed the Rhine for the purpose of ravaging the territory of the
Eburones, should have acted so as to render the most signal service to
Ambiorix, by coming to attack the Romans.

Cæsar, to complete the ruin of the Eburones, marched again, collected a
great number of pillagers from the neighbouring states, and sent them in
different directions in pursuit of the enemy, to plunder and burn
everything. Their villages and habitations became, without exception, a
prey to the flames. The cavalry scoured the country in all directions,
in the hope of overtaking Ambiorix; the prospect of seizing him, and
gaining thereby the gratitude of the general, made them support infinite
fatigues, almost beyond human endurance. At every moment they believed
they were on the point of seizing the fugitive, and continually the
thick forests or deep retreats hid him from their pursuit. At last,
under protection of night, he reached other regions, escorted by four
horsemen, the only friends left to whom he dared trust his life.
Ambiorix escaped, but the massacre of the legion of Sabinus was cruelly
avenged by the devastation of the country of the Eburones!

After this expedition, Cæsar led back to Durocortorum (_Rheims_), the
chief town of the Remi, the army diminished by the two cohorts lost at
Aduatuca. He there convoked the assembly of Gaul, and caused judgment to
be passed on the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes. Acco, the chief
of the revolt, was condemned to death, and executed according to the old
Roman custom. Some others, fearing the same fate, took flight. They were
forbidden fire and water (that is, they were condemned to exile). Cæsar
sent two legions to winter quarters on the frontier of the Treviri, two
among the Lingones, and the six others among the Senones, at Agedincum
(_Sens_). After providing for the provisionment of the army, he
proceeded into Italy. [459]




CHAPTER X.

(Year of Rome 702. )

(BOOK VII. OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)

REVOLT OF GAUL--CAPTURE OF VELLAUNODUNUM, GENABUM, AND
NOVIODUNUM--SIEGES OF AVARICUM AND GERGOVIA--CAMPAIGN OF LABIENUS
AGAINST THE PARISII--SIEGE OF ALESIA.


[Sidenote: Revolt of Gaul. ]

I. The Roman arms had in six years subjugated, one after another, the
principal states of Gaul. Belgium, Aquitaine, and the countries on the
sea-coast, had been the theatre of the most desperate struggles. The
inhabitants of the isle of Britain, like the Germans, had become prudent
by the defeats they had suffered. Cæsar had just taken a signal
vengeance upon the revolted Eburones, and thought that he might without
danger leave his army and proceed into Italy, to hold the assemblies.
During his abode in this part of his command, the murder of P. Clodius
took place (the 13th of the Calends of February, 30th of December, 701),
which caused a great agitation, and gave rise to the Senatus-consultus,
which ordered all the youths of Italy to take the military oath; Cæsar
took advantage of it to make levies also in the Province. The rumours of
what was taking place at Rome soon passed the Alps, to revive the
resentments and hopes of the Gauls; they believed that the domestic
troubles would detain Cæsar in Italy, and would give rise to a
favourable opportunity for a new insurrection.

The principal chiefs meet in secluded spots; mutually excite each other
by the recital of their grievances, and by the remembrance of the death
of Acco; promise great rewards to those who, at the peril of their
lives, will commence the war; but decide that, before all, the return of
Cæsar to his army must be rendered impossible, a project the execution
of which was so much the easier, since the legions would not dare to
leave their winter quarters in the absence of their general, and since
the general himself could not join them without a sufficient escort.

The Carnutes are the first to offer to take arms: as the necessity of
acting secretly did not allow them to exchange hostages, they exact as
security an oath of alliance. This oath is taken by all the ensigns in a
meeting in which the moment for the rising is fixed.

On the day appointed, the Carnutes, led by two resolute men, Cotuatus
and Conetodunus, rush to Genabum (_Gien_), plunder and slaughter the
Roman merchants, amongst others the knight C. Fusius Cita, charged by
Cæsar with the victualling department. These news reached every state in
Gaul with an extreme celerity, according to the custom of the Gauls of
communicating remarkable events by cries transmitted from neighbour to
neighbour across the country. [460] Thus what had happened at Genabum at
sunrise, was known by the Arverni before the end of the first watch
(towards eight o’clock at night), at a distance of 160 miles.

Vercingetorix, a young Arvernan who possessed great influence in his
country,[461] and whose father, Celtillus, for a time chief of all Gaul,
had been put to death by his countrymen for having aspired to the
royalty, calls his clients together, and excites their zeal. Expelled
from Gergovia by those who were unwilling to tempt fortune with him, he
raises the country, and, with the help of a numerous band, retakes the
town, and causes himself to be proclaimed king. Soon he seduces the
Senones, the Parisii, the Pictones, the Cadurci, the Turones, the
Aulerci, the Lemovices of Armorica, the Andes, and the other peoples who
dwell on the shores of the ocean. The commandment is given to him by
unanimous consent. He exacts hostages from those peoples, orders a
prompt levy of soldiers, fixes the number of men and arms which each
country is to furnish in a given time, and occupies himself especially
with the raising of the cavalry. Active, daring, severe, and inflexible
even to cruelty, he subjects to the most atrocious tortures those who
hesitate, and by these means of terror soon forms an army.

He sent a part of it to the Ruteni, under the command of Cadurcus
Lucterius, a man full of daring; and to draw the Bituriges into the
insurrection, he invaded their territory.
By acting thus, he threatened
the Province, and protected his rear whilst he moved towards the north,
where the Roman occupation was concentrated. On his approach, the
Bituriges solicited the help of the Ædui, their allies. The last, by the
advice of Cæsar’s lieutenants, who had remained with the army, sent them
a body of cavalry and infantry to support them against Vercingetorix;
but, when they reached the Loire, which separated the territory of the
two peoples, these auxiliary troops halted for some days, and then
returned, without having dared to cross the river, pretending that they
had been betrayed by the Bituriges. Immediately after their departure,
the latter joined the Arverni. [462]


[Sidenote: Cæsar begins the Campaign. ]

II. Cæsar heard of these events in Italy, and, reassured on the troubles
in Rome, which had been appeased by the firmness of Pompey, he took his
departure from Transalpine Gaul. When he arrived on the other side of
the Alps (perhaps on the banks of the Rhone), he was struck with the
difficulties which lay in the way of his joining the army. If he sent
for the legions into the Roman province, they would be compelled, on
their way, to fight without him; if, on the other hand, he would go to
them, he was obliged to pass through populations to whom,
notwithstanding their apparent tranquillity, it would have been
imprudent to trust his person.

While Cæsar found so great difficulties before him, Lucterius,[463] who
had been sent by Vercingetorix to the Ruteni, brings them over to the
alliance with the Arverni, advances towards the Nitiobriges and the
Gabali, from whom he receives hostages, and, at the head of a numerous
army, threatens the Province in the direction of Narbonne. These events
made Cæsar resolve to proceed to that town. His arrival put an end to
people’s fears. He placed garrisons among the peoples who bordered on
the territory of the enemy, the Ruteni of the left bank of the Tarn
(_Ruteni provinciales_), the Volcæ Arecomici, the Tolosates, and near
Narbonne. At the same time, he ordered a part of the troops of the
province, and the re-enforcements which he had brought from Italy, to
unite on the territory of the Helvi, which bordered upon that of the
Arverni. [464] Intimidated by these dispositions, Lucterius did not
venture to engage himself in the midst of these garrisons, and retired.

This first danger averted, it was important for Cæsar to prevent
Vercingetorix from raising other peoples, who might perhaps be inclined
to follow the example of the Bituriges. By invading the country of the
Arverni, Cæsar might hope to draw the Gaulish chief into his own
country, and thus remove him from those where the legions were
wintering. He proceeded, therefore, to the country of the Helvi, where
he joined the troops who had just concentrated there. The mountains of
the Cévennes, which separated this people from the Arverni, were covered
with six feet of snow; the soldiers opened a passage by dint of labour.
Advancing by Aps and Saint-Cirgues, between the sources of the Loire and
the Allier (_see Plate 19_), Cæsar debouched on Le Puy and Brioude. The
Arverni, at this season, the most rigorous of the year, believed
themselves defended by the Cévennes, as by an insurmountable wall: he
fell upon them unexpectedly, and, in order to spread still greater
terror, he caused the cavalry to scour the country far around.

Quickly informed of this march, Vercingetorix, at the prayer of the
Arverni, who implored his succour, abandoned the country of the
Bituriges. Cæsar had foreseen this; so he only remains two days amongst
the Arverni, and, quitting them under the pretext of increasing his
forces, he leaves the command to young Brutus, whom he enjoins to throw
out his reconnoitring parties to as great a distance as possible, and
promises to return at the end of three days. Having by this diversion
drawn Vercingetorix southward, he proceeds in great haste to Vienne,
arrives there unexpectedly, takes the newly-raised cavalry which he had
sent thither, marches night and day, crosses the country of the Ædui,
and directs his march towards the Lingones, where two legions were in
winter quarters. By this extreme rapidity he seeks to prevent any evil
design on the part of the Ædui. Scarcely has he arrived amongst the
Lingones, when he sends orders to the other legions, two of which were
on the frontiers of the Treviri, and the six others in the country of
the Senones, to concentrate the whole army at Agedincum (_Sens_) before
his march is known to the Arverni. As soon as Vercingetorix was informed
of this movement, he returned with his army to the country of the
Bituriges, and thence started to lay siege to Gorgobina
(_Saint-Parize-le-Châtel_), an _oppidum_ of the Boii, who had settled,
after the defeat of the Helvetii, near the confluence of the Allier and
the Loire. [465]


[Sidenote: Taking of Vellaunodunum, Genabum, and Noviodunum. ]

III. Although Cæsar had succeeded in uniting his troops, and in placing
himself at their head, he found it still difficult to fix upon a
determined plan. If he opened the campaign too early, the army might run
short of provisions through the difficulty of transport. If, on the
other hand, during the rest of the winter,[466] his army, remaining
inactive, allowed Vercingetorix to take Gorgobina, a place tributary to
the Ædui, the example might discourage his allies and lead to the
defection of the whole of Gaul. Rather than undergo such an affront, he
resolved to brave all obstacles. He engaged the Ædui, therefore, to
furnish provisions, announced his speedy arrival to the Boii,
recommended them to remain faithful, and to offer an energetic
resistance; and then, leaving at Agedincum two legions and the baggage
of the whole army, he marched with the eight others towards the
territory of the Boii. On the second day[467] he arrived at
Vellaunodunum (_Triguères_), a town of the Senones, and prepared to lay
siege to it, in order to protect his rear and secure his supply of
provisions. (_See Plate 19. _) The countervallation was finished in two
days. On the third, the town offered to surrender: the capitulation was
only accepted on condition of delivering up the arms, the beasts of
burden, and 600 hostages. Cæsar left C. Trebonius, his lieutenant, to
see the convention executed, and marched in haste towards Genabum
(_Gien_), a town of the Carnutes. [468] He arrived there in two days,
and sufficiently early to surprise the inhabitants, who, thinking that
the siege of Vellaunodunum would last longer, had not yet assembled
sufficient troops for the defence of the place. The Roman army took its
position before the _oppidum_; but the approach of night made it
necessary to postpone the attack until the following morning. However,
as Genabum had a bridge on the Loire adjoining to the town, Cæsar kept
two legions under arms to watch it, in the fear that the besieged might
escape during the night. And, in fact, towards midnight they silently
issued from Genabum and began to pass the river. Cæsar, informed by his
scouts, set fire to the gates, introduced the legions he had kept in
reserve, and took possession of the place. The fugitives, who were
closely crowded together at the issues of the town, and at the entrance
of the bridge, which were too narrow to allow them to pass, fell nearly
all into the hands of the Romans. Genabum was plundered and burnt, and
the spoil abandoned to the soldiers. Then the army passed the Loire,
arrived on the territory of the Bituriges, and continued its march.

The town of Noviodunum (_Sancerre_), belonging to this latter people,
lay in Cæsar’s route; he undertook to lay siege to it. The inhabitants
were already hastening to make their submission, and a part of the
hostages had been delivered, when they saw in the distance the cavalry
of Vercingetorix, who, warned of the approach of the Romans, had raised
the siege of Gorgobina, and marched to meet them. At this sight, the
besieged, mustering courage again, seize their arms, shut their gates,
and man the wall. The Roman cavalry was immediately sent to meet the
enemy; staggered at the first shock, it was on the point of giving way;
but soon, supported by about 400 German cavalry, in Cæsar’s pay since
the commencement of the campaign, they entirely routed the Gauls. This
defeat having again spread terror in the town, the inhabitants delivered
up the instigators of the revolt, and surrendered. Cæsar marched thence,
through the fertile territory of the Biturges, towards Avaricum
(_Bourges_), the largest and strongest _oppidum_ of that people. The
taking of this town, he considered, would render him master of the whole
country. [469]


[Sidenote: Siege of Avaricum. ]

IV. Vercingetorix, after having experienced so many reverses
successively at Vellaunodunum, at Genabum, and at Noviodunum, convokes a
council, in which he explains the necessity of adopting a new system of
warfare. Above all, according to him, they must take advantage of the
season, and of the numerous Gaulish cavalry, to cut off the Romans from
provisions and forage, sacrifice private interest to the common welfare,
set fire to the habitations, burgs, and _oppida_ which they could not
defend, so as to spread desolation from the territory of the Boii as far
as the enemy could extend his incursions. If that be an extreme
sacrifice, it is nothing in comparison with death and slavery.

This advice having been unanimously approved, the Bituriges, in one
single day, set fire to more than twenty towns; the neighbouring
countries follow their example. The hope of a speedy victory made them
support this painful sight with resignation. They deliberated whether
Avaricum should not undergo the same fate; the Bituriges implored them
to spare one of the most beautiful towns in Gaul, the ornament and
bulwark of their country; “the defence of it will be easy,” they added,
“on account of its almost inaccessible position. ” Vercingetorix, at
first of a contrary opinion, ended by giving way to this general feeling
of compassion, entrusted the place to men capable of defending it, and,
following Cæsar by short marches, pitched his camp in a spot defended by
woods and marshes, sixteen miles from Avaricum[470] (two kilomètres to
the north of _Dun-le-Roy_, at the confluence of the Auron and the
Taisseau).

Avaricum was situated, as Bourges is at present, at the extremity of a
piece of ground surrounded, to the north and west, by several marshy
streams: the Yèvre, the Yévrette, and the Auron. (_See Plate 20. _) The
Gaulish town, adorned with public places, and enclosing 40,000 souls,
exceeded, no doubt, in extent the Gallo-Roman circuit. The aspect of the
locality is certainly no longer the same: the marshes have been dried,
and the courses of water reduced within regular limits; the ruins
accumulated so many centuries ago have raised the level of the ground on
many points. To the south of Bourges, at a distance of 700 mètres, the
ground forms a neck, which, in the time of Cæsar’s wars, was narrower
than at present; it inclined more towards the place, and presented, at
80 mètres from the walls, a sudden depression, resembling a vast fosse.
(_See the section along C D. _) The slopes, then, abrupt towards the
Yévrette and the Auron, defined more clearly the only and very narrow
avenue (_unum et perangustum aditum_) which gave access to the
town. [471]

Cæsar established his camp behind this tongue of land, to the south, and
at 700 mètres from Avaricum, between the Auron and the Yévrette. As the
nature of the locality prevented all countervallation, he took his
dispositions for a regular siege. The place was only open to attack
towards that part of the enclosure which faced the avenue, on a width of
from 300 to 400 Roman feet (about 100 mètres). In this place the summit
of the walls commanded by about 80 feet (twenty-four mètres) the ground
situated in advance. [472] Cæsar commanded a terrace to be commenced,
covered galleries to be pushed towards the _oppidum_, and two towers to
be constructed.

During the execution of these works, trusty messengers informed
Vercingetorix every moment of what was going on in Avaricum, and carried
back his orders. The besiegers were watched when they went to forage,
and, notwithstanding their precaution to choose every day different
hours and roads, they could not move any distance from the camp without
being attacked.

The Romans incessantly demanded provisions from the Ædui and the Boii;
but the first showed little haste to send them, and the latter, poor and
weak, had exhausted their resources; moreover, their country had just
been laid waste by fire. Although, during several days, the troops,
deprived of corn, lived only on cattle which had been brought from afar,
yet they uttered no complaint unworthy of the Roman name and of their
preceding victories. When, visiting the works, Cæsar addressed by turn
each of the legions, and offered to the soldiers to raise the siege if
they felt their privations too rigorous, they unanimously called upon
him to persevere: “they had learned,” they said, “after so many years
that they served under his command, never to suffer anything that was
humiliating, and to leave nothing unfinished. ” They renewed this protest
to the centurions and to the tribunes.

The towers already approached the walls, when prisoners informed Cæsar
that Vercingetorix, from want of forage, had quitted his camp, leaving
in it the mass of his army, and had advanced nearer to Avaricum with his
cavalry and light infantry, with the intention of laying an ambush on
the spot where he expected that the Romans would go to forage the
following day. [473] Upon this information, Cæsar, seeking to take
advantage of the absence of Vercingetorix, started silently in the
middle of the night, and came in the morning near the camp of the
enemies. As soon as they were acquainted with his march, they hid their
baggage and wagons in the forests, and drew up their troops on an open
height. Cæsar immediately ordered his soldiers to lay down their bundles
in one spot, and to keep their arms ready for combat.

The hill occupied by the Gauls rose with an easy slope above a marsh
which, surrounding it on nearly all sides, rendered it difficult of
access, although it was only fifty feet broad. They had broken the
bridges, and, full of confidence in their position, drawn up according
to tribes, and guarding all the fords and passages, they were ready to
fall upon the Romans, if the latter attempted to overcome this obstacle.
With the two armies thus in presence and so near to each other, one
would have believed them, by their attitude, animated with the same
courage, and offering the combat under equal conditions; but, when we
consider the defensive strength of the position of the Gauls, we are
soon convinced that the firmness of the latter was only one of
ostentation. The Romans, indignant at being thus braved, demanded the
order to fight; but Cæsar represented to them that the victory would
cost the lives of too many brave men, and that the more they were bent
upon daring everything for his glory, the more blamable would it be in
him to sacrifice them. These words calmed their impatience, and the same
day he led them back to the siege operations.

Vercingetorix, on his return to his army, was accused of treason, for
having placed his camp nearer to that of the Romans, taken away with him
all the cavalry, left his infantry without a head, and facilitated, by
his departure, the sudden and so well-calculated arrival of the enemy.
“All these incidents,” they said, “could not be the effect of chance;
evidently Vercingetorix preferred owing the empire of Gaul to Cæsar than
to his fellow-citizens. ” As the improvised chief of a popular movement,
Vercingetorix had to expect one of those fickle demonstrations of the
multitude, who are rendered fanatical by successes, and unjust by
reverses. But, strong in his patriotism and in his conduct, he justified
easily to his followers the dispositions he had taken. “The scarcity of
forage only has decided him, at their entreaties, to change the position
of his camp; he has chosen a new position, which is impregnable; he has
employed the cavalry, which is useless in a marshy place, to advantage.
He has transferred the command to nobody, for fear that a new chief, to
please bands without discipline, incapable of supporting the fatigues of
war, might let himself be persuaded to give battle. Whether it were
chance or treason which had brought the Romans before them, they ought
to thank Fortune for it, since they had retired with disgrace. He has no
desire to obtain the supreme authority from Cæsar at the price of a
guilty defection: victory will soon give it him. It is now no longer
doubtful. As to himself, he is ready to lay down an authority which
would be only a vain honour, and not a means of delivery;” and, to prove
the sincerity of his hopes, he brought forward slaves who had been made
prisoners, whom he represents as legionaries, and who, at his
instigation, declare that in three days the Romans will be obliged by
want of provisions to raise the siege. His discourse is received by the
acclamations of the army, and all signify their applause by the clang of
their arms, according to the Gaulish manner. It is agreed to send 10,000
men to Avaricum, taken among the different contingents, so that the
Bituriges alone should not have the glory of saving a town upon which
depended in a great measure the fate of the war.

The Gauls, endowed with the genius of imitation, struggled by all means
possible against the wonderful perseverance of the Roman soldiers. They
turned away the rams with pointed heads (_falces_)[474] by means of
nooses, and, when they had once caught hold of them, they dragged them
up by means of machines. [475] Accustomed to work in the iron mines, and
to the construction of subterranean galleries, they skilfully
countermined the terrace, and also provided their walls with towers of
several stories, covered with leather. Day and night they made sallies,
and set fire to the works of the besiegers. As the daily increase of the
terrace heightened the level of the towers, the besieged raised theirs
to the same height by means of scaffoldings; they stopped the progress
of the subterranean galleries, prevented them from being advanced to the
walls by trying to break them open with pointed stakes hardened in the
fire (_apertos cuniculos prœusta ac prœacuta materia . . .
morabantur_),[476] and by throwing molten pitch and blocks of stone.

The Gauls constructed their walls in this manner: beams were placed
horizontally on the ground, in a direction perpendicular to the line of
the enclosure,[477] at intervals of two feet from each other; they were
bound together on the side of the town; by cross-beams, usually of forty
feet in length, firmly fixed in the ground, and the whole covered with a
great quantity of earth, except on the exterior side, where the
intervals were furnished with large blocks of rock, and formed a facing.
After this first layer had been well fixed and rendered compact, they
raised upon it a second, absolutely similar, taking care that the beams
were not exactly above each other, but corresponded with the intervals
filled in with stones, in which they were, as it were, enchased. The
work was thus continued until the wall had attained the required height.
These successive layers, in which the beams and stones alternated
regularly, offered, by their very variety, an agreeable appearance to
the eye. This construction had great advantages for the defence of
places: the stone preserved it from fire, and the wood from the ram;
held together by the cross-beams, the beams could be neither torn down
nor driven in. (_See Plate 20. _)

Notwithstanding the obstinacy of the defence, and the cold and continual
rains, the Roman soldiers surmounted all obstacles, and raised in
twenty-five days a terrace 330 feet wide by 80 feet high. It already
nearly touched the town wall, when, towards the third watch (midnight),
clouds of smoke were seen issuing from it. It was the moment when Cæsar,
according to his custom, was inspecting the works, and encouraging the
soldiers at their labour; the Gauls had set the terrace on fire from the
gallery of a mine. At the same instant cries arose from the whole extent
of the rampart, and the besieged, rushing out by two gates, made a sally
on the two sides where the towers were; from the top of the walls some
threw dry wood and torches on the terrace, others pitch and various
inflammable materials; nobody knew whither to run nor where to give
help. As two legions, however, generally passed the night under arms in
front of the camp, whilst the others relieved each other alternately for
the work, they were soon able to face the enemy; meanwhile some drew
back the towers, and others cut the terrace to intercept the fire; the
whole army, in fact, hurried to put out the latter.

When day broke, they were still fighting on every point; the besieged
had the more hope of conquering, as the penthouses which protected the
approaches to the towers were burnt (_deustos pluteos turrium_),[478]
and as then the Romans, compelled to march without cover, could with
difficulty arrive at the burning works. Persuaded that the salvation of
Gaul depended on this critical moment, they replaced incessantly the
troops which were weary. Then happened a fact worthy of notice: before
the gate of the _oppidum_ there was a Gaul who threw balls of grease and
pitch into the fire opposite a Roman tower; a dart shot from a
_scorpion_[479] struck him in the right side and killed him. The next
man immediately takes his place, and perishes in the same manner; a
third succeeds him, then a fourth, and the post is only abandoned after
the extinction of the fire and the retreat of the assailants.

After so many fruitless efforts, the Gauls resolved next day to obey the
order of Vercingetorix, and evacuate the place. His camp not being far
off, they hoped, by favour of the night, to escape without great loss,
reckoning on a continuous marsh to protect their flight. But the women,
in despair, struggle to retain them, and, seeing that their
supplications had no effect, to such an extent does fear extinguish
pity, they give warning to the Romans by their cries, and thus compel
the Gauls to renounce their intended flight.

The day following Cæsar caused a tower to be advanced, and the works to
be prosecuted with vigour; an abundant rain, and the negligence of the
enemy in guarding the wall, engaged him to attempt an assault. He
thereupon ordered the work to be slackened without entirely stopping it,
in order not to awaken suspicions, assembled his legions under arms,
sheltered behind the covered galleries (_vineas_), and informed them
that they were going to reap the fruit of so many fatigues. He promised
rewards to those who should be first to scale the wall of the town, and
gave the signal. The Romans at once rushed forward from every side, and
reached the top of the ramparts.

The enemies, terrified by this unexpected attack, and thrown down from
the tops of the walls and towers, sought refuge in the public places,
and formed in wedges, so as to offer a resistance on all sides; but when
they saw that the Romans, instead of descending into the town, went
round it on the ramparts, they were afraid of being shut in, and threw
down their arms and fled towards the other extremity of the _oppidum_
(where are at present the faubourgs Taillegrain and Saint-Privé). (_See
Plate 20. _) Most of them were killed near the gates, the narrow passage
of which they blocked up; the others by the cavalry outside the town. No
one among the Roman soldiers thought of plunder. Irritated by the
remembrance of the massacre of Genabum, and by the fatigues of the
siege, they spared neither old men, women, nor children. Of about 40,000
combatants, scarcely 800 fugitives were able to join Vercingetorix. He,
fearing that their presence, if they came in a body, might excite a
mutiny, had, in the middle of the night, sent trusty men and the
principal chiefs a long way out, to distribute them in fractions among
the camps belonging to the different tribes.

The next day Vercingetorix sought, in a general assembly, to revive the
courage of his countrymen, by ascribing the success of the Romans to
their superiority in the art of sieges, which was unknown to the Gauls.
He told them that this reverse ought not to dishearten them; that his
advice, they well knew, had never been to defend Avaricum; that a signal
revenge would soon console them; that, through his care, the countries
separated from the common cause would enter into his alliance, animate
Gaul with the one thought, and cement a union capable of resisting the
whole world. Then this fearless defender of the national independence
shows his genius in taking advantage even of a misfortune to subject his
ill-disciplined troops to the rough labours of war, and succeeds in
convincing them of the necessity of retrenching their camp in the manner
of the Romans, so as to protect it from surprise.

The constancy of Vercingetorix, after so great a reverse, and the
foresight which he had shown in recommending, from the beginning of the
war, to burn, and afterwards to abandon Avaricum, increased his
influence. So the Gauls, for the first time, fortified their camp, and
their courage was so much confirmed, that they were ready to undergo all
trials.

Vercingetorix, true to his engagements, exerted himself to the utmost to
gain over to his cause the other states of Gaul, and to seduce the
chiefs by presents and promises; and, for this purpose, he sent to them
zealous and intelligent agents. He caused the men who had fled from
Avaricum to be clothed and armed anew, and, in order to repair his
losses, he required from the divers states a contingent at a stated
period, and archers, who were very numerous in Gaul. At the same time
Teutomatus, son of Ollovico, King of the Nitiobriges, whose father had
received from the Senate the title of friend, came to join him with a
numerous corps of cavalry, raised in his own country and in Aquitaine.
Cæsar remained some time in Avaricum, where he found great store of
provisions, and where the army recovered from its fatigues. [480]


[Sidenote: Arrival of Cæsar at Decetia, and March towards Auvergne. ]

V. The winter was drawing to a close, and the season was propitious for
the continuation of military operations. As Cæsar prepared to march
against the enemy, either in order to draw him from the woods and
marshes, or to shut him up in them, the _principes_ of the Ædui came to
request him to put an end to dissensions among them which threatened to
degenerate into civil war. “The situation was most critical. In fact,
according to ancient customs, the supreme authority was only granted to
a single magistrate, named for a year. At that moment, however, there
were two, each claiming to have been legally elected. The first was
Convictolitavis, a young man of illustrious birth; the second, Cotus,
sprung from a very ancient family, powerful also by his personal
influence, his alliances, and whose brother, Valetiacus, had the year
before filled the same office. The country was in arms, the Senate
divided like the people, each of the pretenders at the head of his
clients. The authority of Cæsar alone could prevent civil war. ”

The Roman general considered it essential to prevent troubles from
arising in an important state, closely attached to the Republic, and
where the weakest party would not fail to call in the aid of
Vercingetorix. Consequently, notwithstanding the inconvenience of
suspending the military operations and moving from the enemy, he
resolved to repair to the Ædui, whose first magistrate, according to the
laws, could not leave the territory. Having thus aimed at proving to
them the respect which he entertained for their institutions, he arrived
at Decetia (_Decize, in the Nivernais_), where he called before him the
Senate and the two pretenders. [481] Nearly the whole nation came
thither. Cæsar, having acquired the conviction that the nomination of
Cotus was the result of an intrigue of the minority, obliged him to
resign, and maintained Convictolitavis, who had been chosen by the
priests, according to the legal forms and customs of the country.

After this decision, he engaged the Ædui to forget their quarrels, and
to devote themselves entirely to the war; Gaul once subjected, he would
recompense them for their sacrifices. He exacted from them all their
cavalry and 10,000 infantry, intending to distribute them in such a
manner as to ensure the regularity of the victualling department. He
next divided his army into two bodies. Labienus, detached with two
legions and part of the cavalry, had instructions to take at Sens the
two other legions which Cæsar had left there, and to repair, at the head
of those four legions, to the country of the Parisii, who had been drawn
by Vercingetorix into the revolt.

On his part, Cæsar resolved, with the six other legions and the rest of
the cavalry, to invade the country of the Arverni themselves, the focus
of the insurrection. He started from Decetia, and directed his march
upon Gergovia, the principal _oppidum_ of that people.

After the capture of Avaricum, Vercingetorix, suspecting Cæsar’s
ulterior designs, had moved towards the Allier, which the Romans were
obliged to pass in order to reach Gergovia; and, on the news of their
march, he had caused all the bridges to be destroyed.

Cæsar, having arrived on the banks of the Allier, towards Moulins (_see
Plate 19_), followed its downward course, on the right bank.
Vercingetorix, on his part, marched along the opposite bank. The two
armies were within sight of each other, the camps nearly opposite, and
the Gaulish scouts, who watched the left bank, prevented the Romans from
establishing a bridge. The position of the latter was difficult, for the
Allier, which is fordable in the autumn only, might delay their passage
a long time. [482] In order to surmount this obstacle, Cæsar had recourse
to a stratagem: he fixed his camp in a place covered with wood, opposite
the remains of one of the bridges which Vercingetorix had caused to be
destroyed (probably at Varennes). There he remained hidden the following
day with two legions, and made the rest of the troops, as well as the
baggage, proceed in the usual order. But, that they might present to the
enemy the appearance of six legions, he had divided into six corps the
forty cohorts or four legions which he sent forward. [483] They received
the order to march as long as possible, in order to attract
Vercingetorix, and, at the time Cæsar presumed that they had arrived at
their camp, he caused the bridge to be rebuilt on the old piles, the
lower part of which remained untouched. The work being soon completed,
the legions which remained with him passed the river, and, after having
chosen a favourable position, he recalled the mass of his army, which
rejoined him during the night. [484] When Vercingetorix was informed of
this manœuvre, fearing lest he should be compelled to fight against
his will, he took the start and marched in great haste to occupy the
_oppidum_ of the Arverni.

From the place he occupied, which we believe to have been Varennes,[485]
Cæsar reached Gergovia in five days; on the very day of his arrival,
after a slight skirmish of cavalry, he reconnoitred the position of the
town. As it was built on a very high mountain of difficult access, he
considered it impossible to take it by assault; he therefore resolved to
blockade it, and not to begin investing it until he had assured his
provisions. (_See Plate 21. _)


[Sidenote: Blockade of Gergovia. ]

VI. The _oppidum_ of the Arverni was situated at a distance of six
kilomètres to the south of Clermont-Ferrand, on the mountain which has
preserved the name of Gergovia. Its summit, elevated about 740 mètres
above the level of the sea, and 380 above the plain, forms a plateau of
1,500 mètres in length by more than 500 mètres in breadth. The northern
and eastern slopes present such abrupt declivities that they defy the
escalade. The southern slope presents a very different character: it may
be compared to an immense staircase, the steps of which would be vast
terraces with very little inclination, and a breadth which in some
places extends to as much as 150 mètres.

On the western side, the mountain of Gergovia is attached by a narrow
defile of 120 mètres in width, called the _Goules_ (_see Plate 21, C_),
to the heights of Risolles, an irregular mass, the plateau of which is
at a mean depth of about 30 mètres beneath that of Gergovia. To the west
are the detached mountains of Montrognon and Le Puy-Giroux. This latter
is separated from that of Risolles by a rather deep gorge, in which the
village of Opme is built. Opposite the southern slope of Gergovia, at
the very foot of the mountain, rises a very steep hill, called the Roche
Blanche. Its culminating point is at about 108 mètres below the plateau.
Two brooks, the Auzon and the Artières,[486] tributaries of the Allier,
flow, one to the south, the other to the north of Gergovia. Lastly, a
low tract of ground, situated to the east, indicates the site of the
ancient marsh of Sarlièves, which has been dry since the seventeenth
century.

Cæsar established his camp near the Auzon, on the undulations of the
ground which extend to the north-west of the village of Orcet, and as
far as the ancient marsh of Sarlièves. These undulations form a natural
_glacis_ towards the plain, above which they rise about thirty mètres;
on the side of the stream of the Auzon they terminate in almost
imperceptible slopes. The camp occupied a part of the table-land and of
the northern slope. [487] (_See Plate 21.