No More Learning

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue is
about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special kind
of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous
deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the
act's very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object
of that act: secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long
in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence to persist
long in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special
virtue.

Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for
the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of
itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in
connection with dangers of death (which also is something difficult in
itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in
enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as
necessity requires.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as
it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to
endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And
evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured
for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not
on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among
other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures of touch,
because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the
lack of food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. Now
it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who
grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as
in the case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not
violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is strongly
affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that
moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this
sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something imperfect in the genus
of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long
persistence in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who
has even perfect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to
persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore such like
perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from
the aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty.

Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same
name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe
without seeing. " Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without
performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence
without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the
habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for
instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it.
Accordingly we must reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes
used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes
for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of
perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by
persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not
persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the
work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs
to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for
instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and the
magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are, however,
some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such
as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the
entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are the principal
virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of
life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as
denoting the consummate act of perseverance.

Reply to Objection 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue
in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to
that virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end,
belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this as
its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to
its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every
virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to change. "
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Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude.
For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance is
about pains of touch. " But these belong to temperance. Therefore
perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain
passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply
moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the
more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason.
Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue,
but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can
lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore
perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal
virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part
of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a
part of fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[2]; [3406]FS, Q[61],
AA[3],4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed
something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it
practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most
difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been stated
(Q[123], A[2]) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it
observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand
firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity
that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance of
something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to
principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay in
accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor
is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore
perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues
depends not only on the matter [*Cf. [3407] Q[136], A[4], ad 2], but
also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than
matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have
more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it
has more in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm
against the difficulty arising from length of time.

Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks
(Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely
in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered
as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or
failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is
in the irascible.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as
denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the
end, according to Mat. 24:13, "He that shall persevere to the end, he
shall be saved. " Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance
for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.
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Whether constancy pertains to perseverance?

Objection 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance.
For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q[137], A[5]): and
patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not
pertain to perseverance.

Objection 2: Further, "virtue is about the difficult and the good. " Now
it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in
great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy
pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.

Objection 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would
seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of
unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i)
condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance,
as stated above (Q[128] , A[6]). Therefore constancy does not pertain
to perseverance.

On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one stands to a
thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as
appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy
belongs to perseverance.

I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it
belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to
those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the
virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good,
against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the
act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against
difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence
perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude,
because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more
intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external
obstacles.

Reply to Objection 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are
especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as
stated above ([3408]Q[136], A[1]). Hence constancy agrees with
perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those
things which occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account:
wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.

Reply to Objection 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds:
yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any
length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which
magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which
perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.

Reply to Objection 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as
it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the
point of their difference, as stated in the Article.
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Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? [*Cf. FS, Q[109], A[10]]

Objection 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of
grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above [3409](A[1]). Now
according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner
of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for
perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.

Objection 2: Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the
harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now
"before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what
he had received," as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more
therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ,
persevere without the help of a further grace.

Objection 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than
deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis.
5:7): "We . . . have walked through hard ways. " Now some persevere in
sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also
persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i): "We hold that
perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in
Christ. "

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2], ad 3), perseverance
has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of
perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of
habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be
taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in
this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous
help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated
above ([3410]FS, Q[109], A[10]), when we were treating of grace.
Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which
changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed
in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit
repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its
power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to
accomplish.

Reply to Objection 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is
concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a
habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who
has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), "it
was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to
persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human
nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of
Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of
persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no
man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening
God, forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding
sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their constancy,
have persevered in faith. "

Reply to Objection 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he
cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by
falling into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be
persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the other
hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good,
because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs the help of
grace for that end.
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OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which
head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Of effeminacy;

(2) Of pertinacity.
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Whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance? [*Mollities, literally
'softness']

Objection 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.
For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9,10, "Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor
liers with mankind," expounds the text thus: "Effeminate---i. e.
obscene, given to unnatural vice. " But this is opposed to chastity.
Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that
"delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. " But to be delicate seems akin to
intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but
to temperance.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the
man who is fond of amusement is effeminate. " Now immoderate fondness of
amusement is opposed to {eutrapelia}, which is the virtue about
pleasures of play, as stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is
not opposed to perseverance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the
persevering man is opposed to the effeminate. "

I answer that, As stated above ([3411]Q[137], AA[1],2), perseverance is
deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on
account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is directly
opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on
account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we
understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be "soft" if it
readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared to be soft
through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram.
Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy
blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no
wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or
sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them. " Now it
is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of
pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading "True
magnanimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is
not cast down by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved
himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure. " Moreover, pleasure
itself is a stronger motive of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of
pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure
privation. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7),
properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on
account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a
weak motion.

Reply to Objection 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one
way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is
more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by
natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering
through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared
to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who
are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish
themselves, as it were.

Reply to Objection 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it
is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the
delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that
diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Dt. 28:56): "The tender and
delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her
foot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness']. " Thus delicacy is a kind
of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of
pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for
instance toil or the like.

Reply to Objection 3: In play two things may be considered. In the
first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play
is opposed to {eutrapelia}. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or
rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to
effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs
thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?

Objection 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance.
For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory.
But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as
stated above ([3412]Q[132], A[2]). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed
to perseverance.

Objection 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so
either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess:
because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow,
since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they rejoice when
they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected. " And if it
be opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is
clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance.

Objection 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists in good
against sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against
pleasures, the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But
pertinacity is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is
not opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity is
to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is
opposed to religion, as stated above ([3413]Q[92], A[1]). Therefore
pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be
pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious. "
"Pervicacious" has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man
"perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients
called 'vicia' what we call victory. " These the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 9) calls {ischyrognomones}, that is "head-strong," or
{idiognomones}, that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by their
opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less
than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is clear
that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while
pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for
falling short of it.

Reply to Objection 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own
opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own
excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now
it has been stated above ([3414]Q[127], A[2], ad 1;[3415] Q[133],
A[2]), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause,
but on their species.
Reply to Objection 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting
inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a
certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man.
Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too
much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or
effeminate man.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the other virtues persist against the
onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the
same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise
seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is
directly opposed to perseverance.
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OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is
the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fortitude is a gift?

(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether fortitude is a gift?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues
differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should
not be reckoned a gift.

Objection 2: Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated
above ([3416]FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of fortitude does not remain
in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the
fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from
heaven. " Therefore fortitude is not a gift.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is
a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures
of the passing show. " Now noisome pleasures and delights are the
concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that
fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.

On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the
Holy Ghost (Is. 11:2).

I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]; [3417]FS, Q[61], A[3]): and this firmness of mind
is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with
regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his
proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these
respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties,
whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil.
In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]).

Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he
may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may
threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a
man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or
dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy
Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is
the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain
confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who
expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is
reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above
([3418]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind
by the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the
endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give
confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude
that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on
the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the
end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from
toil and evil.

Reply to Objection 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of
fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also
inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore
the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems
to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the fourth beatitude: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after
justice," corresponds to the gift of fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift of
fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude
corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after
justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude
corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire
for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of
wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above
([3419]Q[45]). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of
fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.

Objection 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes,
since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8. Now
the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore
neither does any beatitude correspond to it.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Fortitude
becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true
goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must
toil. "

I answer that, As stated above ([3420]Q[121], A[2]), Augustine makes
the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which
they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness
between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning
the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely
fortitude.

Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A[1]
), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not
merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of
works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire,
which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.

Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth. ), we may
understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which
is related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein
whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a gift.

Reply to Objection 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts,
as stated above (Q[23], A[8], ad 3; [3421]FS, Q[68], A[4], ad 3). Hence
whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond
sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards
the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay
and accomplishment of goods.
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OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider the precepts of fortitude:

(1) The precepts of fortitude itself;

(2) The precepts of its parts.
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Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?

Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably
given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old
Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Dt. 20). Therefore
precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law also.

Objection 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than
negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but not
vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain
none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.

Objection 3: Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as
stated above (Q[123], A[2]; [3422]FS, Q[61], A[2]). Now the precepts
are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be
proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should have
been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief
precepts of the Law.

On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.

I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the
lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various
ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even
in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and
others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law
is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine Law contains
precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a view to
directing the mind to God. For this reason it is written (Dt. 20:3,4):
"Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of you,
and will fight for you against your enemies. "

As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among
them we find precepts of fortitude according to the requirements of
those goods.

Reply to Objection 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises,
while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal,
according to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there
was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily
contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New
Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of
eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Mat. 11:12, "The
kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away. "
Hence Peter commands (1 Pet. 5:8,9): "Your adversary the devil, as a
roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye,
strong in faith," as also James 4:7: "Resist the devil, and he will fly
from you. " Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be
withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to
be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely endure temporal
evils, according to Mat. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body. "

Reply to Objection 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts.
But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like
the things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the
precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3423]Q[122], A[1]), the
precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles,
which need to be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts
of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which
the notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude,
because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear
dangers of death.
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Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the
Divine Law?

Objection 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are
unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and
perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence,
magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above ([3424]Q[128]). Now we
find precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance.
Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and
magnanimity.

Objection 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is
the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
xxxv). Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore
patience should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind.

Objection 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude,
as stated above ([3425]Q[128];[3426] Q[136], A[4];[3427] Q[137], A[2]).
Now the precepts of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as
stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and
perseverance should have been negative and not affirmative.

The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by
Holy Writ.

I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things
as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man
needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and
annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only
about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the
secondary and annexed virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the
genus of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of
greatness which they regard in their respective matters. Now things
pertaining to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather
than under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of
counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity.
On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain
to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable
in them, but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the
need of precepts of patience and perseverance.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3428]Q[3], A[2]), although
affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not binding for
always, but according to place and time. Wherefore just as the
affirmative precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to
the preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to
fulfil them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be
understood in the same way.

Reply to Objection 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and
perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed
with caution; nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in
particular. On the other hand, patience and perseverance are about
minor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in
determining, especially in general, what is to be done in such cases.
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OF TEMPERANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself;
(2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must
consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?

(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?

(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind
of touch?

(6) What is the rule of temperance?

(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?

(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues ?
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Whether temperance is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue
goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a natural
aptitude for virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance
withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according to
Ethic. ii, 3,8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above ([3429]FS, Q[65], A[1]). But some people have temperance without
having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet
covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as
appears from what we have said above ([3430]FS, Q[68], A[4]). But
seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have
been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ[8],9,19,45,52, 71,139).
Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the
name of a virtue. "

I answer that, As stated above ([3431]FS, Q[55], A[3]), it is essential
to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in
accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human
virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with
reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very
name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes.
Therefore temperance is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is
becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are
becoming to him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it
follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in
accordance with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not
withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it
is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human
nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the
inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of
perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all
who are in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being
subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a
virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural
disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural
to man, as stated above ([3432]FS, Q[63], A[1]), or acquired by
habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected
by reason, as stated above ([3433]FS, Q[65], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely,
fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh,
according to Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear. " The
gift of fear has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids
offending, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as
stated above ([3434]Q[19], A[9], ad 1). But it may have for its
secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God.
Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun
those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of
temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.
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Whether temperance is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. For
Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to temperance to
preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake. "
But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a
special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we
observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul. " But this
is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special
virtue.

Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot
separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just
is beautiful. " Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance,
according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). Therefore
temperance is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a
special virtue.

I answer that, It is customary in human speech to employ a common term
in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things to
which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used
antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of
speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e. g.
The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word "temperance" has a
twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common
signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general
virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain temperateness
or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions:
and this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical
difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both
as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from things which
seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to
endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the
good of reason.

On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as
withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to
man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special
matter.

Reply to Objection 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those
things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine
law. Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can,
like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and
secondly in a sense of excellence.

Reply to Objection 2: The things about which temperance is concerned
have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are
natural to man, as we shall state further on ([3435]AA[4],5). Hence
tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence,
although it is a common property of all the virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it
is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons.
First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists
in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we
understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div.