No More Learning

Reply to Objection 3: The fire that will cleanse the face of the earth
will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of those that will
be found living, even as it will dissolve other mixed bodies into their
prejacent matter.

Reply to Objection 4: Movement does not take its species from its term
"wherefrom" but from its term "whereto. " Hence the resurrection of the
saints which will be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection
of the wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the term
"whereto," and not in respect of the term "wherefrom. " And it often
happens that the term "whereto" is not the same, whereas the term
"wherefrom" is the same---for instance, a thing may be moved from
blackness to whiteness and to pallor.
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Whether the ashes from which the human body will be restored have any
natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ashes from which the human body
will be restored will have a natural inclination towards the soul which
will be united to them. For if they had no inclination towards the
soul, they would stand in the same relation to that soul as other
ashes. Therefore it would make no difference whether the body that is
to be united to that soul were restored from those ashes or from
others: and this is false.

Objection 2: Further, the body is more dependent on the soul than the
soul on the body. Now the soul separated from the body is still
somewhat dependent on the body, wherefore its movement towards God is
retarded on account of its desire for the body, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. xii). Much more, therefore, has the body when separated from
the soul, a natural inclination towards that soul.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 20:11): "His bones shall be
filled with the vices of his youth, and they shall sleep with him in
the dust. " But vices are only in the soul. Therefore there will still
remain in those ashes a natural inclination towards the soul.

On the contrary, The human body can be dissolved into the very
elements, or changed into the flesh of other animals. But the elements
are homogeneous, and so is the flesh of a lion or other animal. Since
then in the other parts of the elements or animals there is no natural
inclination to that soul, neither will there be an inclination towards
the soul in those parts into which the human body has been changed. The
first proposition is made evident on the authority of Augustine
(Enchiridion lxxxviii): "The human body, although changed into the
substance of other bodies or even into the elements, although it has
become the food and flesh of any animals whatsoever, even of man, will
in an instant return to that soul which erstwhile animated it, making
it a living and growing man. "

Further, to every natural inclination there corresponds a natural
agent: else nature would fail in necessaries. Now the aforesaid ashes
cannot be reunited to the same soul by any natural agent. Therefore
there is not in them any natural inclination to the aforesaid reunion.

I answer that, Opinion is threefold on this point. For some say that
the human body is never dissolved into its very elements; and so there
always remains in the ashes a certain force besides the elements, which
gives a natural inclination to the same soul. But this assertion is in
contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as
with the senses and reason: since whatever is composed of contraries
can be dissolved into its component parts. Wherefore others say that
these parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved
retain more light, through having been united to the soul, and for this
reason have a

natural inclination to human souls. But this again is nonsensical,
since the parts of the elements are of the same nature and have an
equal share of light and darkness. Hence we must say differently that
in those ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but
only by the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that those
ashes should be reunited to the soul: it is on this account that those
parts of the elements shall be reunited and not others.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul separated from the body remains in the
same nature that it has when united to the body. It is not so with the
body, and consequently the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: These words of Job do not mean that the vices
actually remain in the ashes of the dead, but that they remain
according to the ordering of Divine justice, whereby those ashes are
destined to the restoration of the body which will suffer eternally for
the sins committed.
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OF THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN, AND FIRST OF THEIR IDENTITY (THREE
ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider the conditions of those who rise
again. Here we shall consider: (1) Those which concern the good and
wicked in common; (2) those which concern the good only; (3) those
which concern only the wicked. Three things concern the good and wicked
in common, namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality:
and we shall inquire (1) about their identity; (2) about their
integrity; (3) about their quality.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the body will rise again identically the same?

(2) Whether it will be the self-same man?

(3) Whether it is necessary that the same ashes should return to the
same parts in which they were before?
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Whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited to the same identical
body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul will not be reunited to the
same identical body at the resurrection, for "thou sowest not the body
that shall be, but bare grain" (1 Cor. 15:37). Now the Apostle is there
comparing death to sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore
the same body that is laid aside in death is not resumed at the
resurrection.

Objection 2: Further, to every form some matter is adapted according to
its condition, and likewise to every agent some instrument. Now the
body is compared to the soul as matter to form, and as instrument to
agent. Since then at the resurrection the soul will not be of the same
condition as now (for it will be either entirely borne away to the
heavenly life to which it adhered while living in the world, or will be
cast down into the life of the brutes if it lived as a brute in this
world) it would seem that it will not resume the same body, but either
a heavenly or a brutish body.

Objection 3: Further, after death, as stated above ([5066]Q[78], A[3]),
the human body is dissolved into the elements. Now these elemental
parts into which the human body has been dissolved do not agree with
the human body dissolved into them, except in primary matter, even as
any other elemental parts agree with that same body. But if the body
were to be formed from those other elemental parts, it would not be
described as identically the same. Therefore neither will it be the
self-same body if it be restored from these parts.

Objection 4: Further, there cannot be numerical identity where there is
numerical distinction of essential parts. Now the form of the mixed
body, which form is an essential part of the human body, as being its
form, cannot be resumed in numerical identity. Therefore the body will
not be identically the same. The minor is proved thus: That which
passes away into complete nonentity cannot be resumed in identity. This
is clear from the fact that there cannot be identity where there is
distinction of existence: and existence, which is the act of a being,
is differentiated by being interrupted, as is any interrupted act. Now
the form of a mixed body passes away into complete nonentity by death,
since it is a bodily form, and so also do the contrary qualities from
which the mixture results. Therefore the form of a mixed body does not
return in identity.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see
God my Saviour [Vulg. : 'my God']," where he is speaking of the vision
after the resurrection, as appears from the preceding words: "In the
last day I shall rise out of the earth. " Therefore the selfsame body
will rise again.

Further, the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 27): "Resurrection is
the second rising of that which has fallen. " But the body which we have
now fell by death. Therefore it will rise again the same identically.

I answer that, on this point the philosophers erred and certain modern
heretics err. For some of the philosophers allowed that souls separated
from bodies are reunited to bodies, yet they erred in this in two ways.
First, as to the mode of reunion, for some held the separated soul to
be naturally reunited to a body by the way of generation. Secondly, as
to the body to which it was reunited, for they held that this second
union was not with the selfsame body that was laid aside in death, but
with another, sometimes of the same, sometimes of a different species.
Of a different species when the soul while existing in the body had led
a life contrary to the ordering of reason: wherefore it passed after
death from the body of a man into the body of some other animal to
whose manner of living it had conformed in this life, for instance into
the body of a dog on account of lust, into the body of a lion on
account of robbery and violence, and so forth---and into a body of the
same species when the soul has led a good life in the body, and having
after death experienced some happiness, after some centuries began to
wish to return to the body; and thus it was reunited to a human body.

This opinion arises from two false sources. The first of these is that
they said that the soul is not united to the body essentially as form
to matter, but only accidentally, as mover to the thing moved, [*Cf.
[5067]FP, Q[76], A[1]] or as a man to his clothes. Hence it was
possible for them to maintain that the soul pre-existed before being
infused into the body begotten of natural generation, as also that it
is united to various bodies. The second is that they held intellect not
to differ from sense except accidentally, so that man would be said to
surpass other animals in intelligence, because the sensitive power is
more acute in him on account of the excellence of his bodily
complexion; and hence it was possible for them to assert that man's
soul passes into the soul of a brute animal, especially when the human
soul has been habituated to brutish actions. But these two sources are
refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), and in consequence of
these being refuted, it is clear that the above opinion is false.

In like manner the errors of certain heretics are refuted. Some of them
fell into the aforesaid opinions of the philosophers: while others held
that souls are reunited to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle
as the wind, as Gregory relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople,
in his exposition of Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see my God," etc.
Moreover these same errors of heretics may be refuted by the fact that
they are prejudicial to the truth of resurrection as witnessed to by
Holy Writ. For we cannot call it resurrection unless the soul return to
the same body, since resurrection is a second rising, and the same
thing rises that falls: wherefore resurrection regards the body which
after death falls rather than the soul which after death lives. And
consequently if it be not the same body which the soul resumes, it will
not be a resurrection, but rather the assuming of a new body.

Reply to Objection 1: A comparison does not apply to every particular,
but to some. For in the sowing of grain, the grain sown and the grain
that is born thereof are neither identical, nor of the same condition,
since it was first sown without a husk, yet is born with one: and the
body will rise again identically the same, but of a different
condition, since it was mortal and will rise in immortality.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul rising again and the soul living in this
world differ, not in essence but in respect of glory and misery, which
is an accidental difference. Hence it follows that the body in rising
again differs, not in identity, but in condition, so that a difference
of bodies corresponds proportionally to the difference of souls.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is understood as though it were in
matter before its form remains in matter after corruption, because when
that which comes afterwards is removed that which came before may yet
remain. Now, as the Commentator observes on the First Book of Physics
and in De Substantia Orbis, in the matter of things subject to
generation and corruption, we must presuppose undeterminate dimensions,
by reason of which matter is divisible, so as to be able to receive
various forms in its various parts. Wherefore after the separation of
the substantial form from matter, these dimensions still remain the
same: and consequently the matter existing under those dimensions,
whatever form it receive, is more identified with that which was
generated from it, than any other part of matter existing under any
form whatever. Thus the matter that will be brought back to restore the
human body will be the same as that body's previous matter.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as a simple quality is not the substantial
form of an element, but its proper accident, and the disposition
whereby its matter is rendered proper to such a form; so the form of a
mixed body, which form is a quality resulting from simple qualities
reduced to a mean, is not the substantial form of the mixed body, but
its proper accident, and the disposition whereby the matter is in need
of the form. Now the human body has no substantial form besides this
form of the mixed body, except the rational soul, for if it had any
previous substantial form, this would give it substantial being, and
would establish it in the genus of substance: so that the soul would be
united to a body already established in the genus of substance, and
thus the soul would be compared to the body as artificial forms are to
their matter, in respect of their being established in the genus of
substance by their matter. Hence the union of the soul to the body
would be accidental, which is the error of the ancient philosophers
refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2 [*Cf. [5068]FP, Q[76],
A[1]]). It would also follow that the human body and each of its parts
would not retain their former names in the same sense, which is
contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1). Therefore
since the rational soul remains, no substantial form of the human body
falls away into complete nonentity. And the variation of accidental
forms does not make a difference of identity. Therefore the selfsame
body will rise again, since the selfsame matter is resumed as stated in
a previous reply (ad 2).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it will be identically the same man that shall rise again?

Objection 1: It would seem that it will not be identically the same man
that shall rise again. For according to the Philosopher (De Gener. ii):
"Whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible substance are not
repeated identically. " Now such is man's substance in his present
state. Therefore after the change wrought by death the self-same man
cannot be repeated .

Objection 2: Further, where there is a distinction of human nature
there is not the same identical man: wherefore Socrates and Plato are
two men and not one man, since each has his own distinct human nature.
Now the human nature of one who rises again is distinct from that which
he has now. Therefore he is not the same identical man. The minor can
be proved in two ways. First, because human nature which is the form of
the whole is not both form and substance as the soul is, but is a form
only. Now such like forms pass away into complete nonentity, and
consequently they cannot be restored. Secondly, because human nature
results from union of parts. Now the same identical union as that which
was heretofore cannot be resumed, because repetition is opposed to
identity, since repetition implies number, whereas identity implies
unity, and these are incompatible with one another. But resurrection is
a repeated union: therefore the union is not the same, and consequently
there is not the same human nature nor the same man.

Objection 3: Further, one same man is not several animals: wherefore if
it is not the same animal it is not the same identical man. Now where
sense is not the same, there is not the same animal, since animal is
defined from the primary sense, namely touch. But sense, as it does not
remain in the separated soul (as some maintain), cannot be resumed in
identity. Therefore the man who rises again will not be the same
identical animal, and consequently he will not be the same man.

Objection 4: Further, the matter of a statue ranks higher in the statue
than the matter of a man does in man: because artificial things belong
to the genus of substance by reason of their matter, but natural things
by reason of their form, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 1),
and again from the Commentator (De Anima ii). But if a statue is remade
from the same brass, it will not be the same identically. Therefore
much less will it be identically the same man if he be reformed from
the same ashes.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:27): "Whom I myself shall see .
. . and not another," and he is speaking of the vision after the
resurrection. Therefore the same identical man will rise again.

Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 5) that "to rise again is
naught else but to live again. " Now unless the same identical man that
died return to life, he would not be said to live again. Therefore he
would not rise again, which is contrary to faith.

I answer that, The necessity of holding the resurrection arises from
this---that man may obtain the last end for which he was made; for this
cannot be accomplished in this life, nor in the life of the separated
soul, as stated above ([5069]Q[75], AA[1],2): otherwise man would have
been made in vain, if he were unable to obtain the end for which he was
made. And since it behooves the end to be obtained by the selfsame
thing that was made for that end, lest it appear to be made without
purpose, it is necessary for the selfsame man to rise again; and this
is effected by the selfsame soul being united to the selfsame body. For
otherwise there would be no resurrection properly speaking, if the same
man were not reformed. Hence to maintain that he who rises again is not
the selfsame man is heretical, since it is contrary to the truth of
Scripture which proclaims the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of repetition by
movement or natural change. For he shows the difference between the
recurrence that occurs in generation and corruption and that which is
observed in the movement of the heavens. Because the selfsame heaven by
local movement returns to the beginning of its movement, since it has a
moved incorruptible substance. On the other hand, things subject to
generation and corruption return by generation to specific but not
numerical identity, because from man blood is engendered, from blood
seed, and so on until a man is begotten, not the selfsame man, but the
man specifically. In like manner from fire comes air, from air water,
from water earth, whence fire is produced, not the selfsame fire, but
the same in species. Hence it is clear that the argument, so far as the
meaning of the Philosopher is concerned, is not to the point.

We may also reply that the form of other things subject to generation
and corruption is not subsistent of itself, so as to be able to remain
after the corruption of the composite, as it is with the rational soul.
For the soul, even after separation from the body, retains the being
which accrues to it when in the body, and the body is made to share
that being by the resurrection, since the being of the body and the
being of the soul in the body are not distinct from one another,
otherwise the union of soul and body would be accidental. Consequently
there has been no interruption in the substantial being of man, as
would make it impossible for the self-same man to return on account of
an interruption in his being, as is the case with other things that are
corrupted, the being of which is interrupted altogether, since their
form remains not, and their matter remains under another being.

Nevertheless neither does the self-same man recur by natural
generation, because the body of the man begotten is not composed of the
whole body of his begetter: hence his body is numerically distinct, and
consequently his soul and the whole man.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions about humanity and about
any form of a whole. For some say that the form of the whole and the
form of the part are really one and the same: but that it is called the
form of the part inasmuch as it perfects the matter, and the form of
the whole inasmuch as the whole specific nature results therefrom.
According to this opinion humanity is really nothing else than the
rational soul: and so, since the selfsame rational soul is resumed,
there will be the same identical humanity, which will remain even after
death, albeit not under the aspect of humanity, because the composite
does not derive the specific nature from a separated humanity.

The other opinion, which seems nearer the truth, is Avicenna's,
according to whom the form of the whole is not the form of a part only,
nor some other form besides the form of the part, but is the whole
resulting from the composition of form and matter, embracing both
within itself. This form of the whole is called the essence or
quiddity. Since then at the resurrection there will be the selfsame
body, and the selfsame rational soul, there will be, of necessity, the
same humanity.

The first argument proving that there will be a distinction of humanity
was based on the supposition that humanity is some distinct form
supervening form and matter; which is false.

The second reason does not disprove the identity of humanity, because
union implies action or passion, and though there be a different union,
this cannot prevent the identity of humanity, because the action and
passion from which humanity resulted are not of the essence of
humanity, wherefore a distinction on their part does not involve a
distinction of humanity: for it is clear that generation and
resurrection are not the self-same movement. Yet the identity of the
rising man with the begotten man is not hindered for this reason: and
in like manner neither is the identity of humanity prevented if we take
union for the relation itself: because this relation is not essential
to but concomitant with humanity, since humanity is not one of those
forms that are composition or order (Phys. ii, 1), as are the forms of
things produced by art, so that if there be another distinct
composition there is another distinct form of a house.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument affords a very good proof against
those who held a distinction between the sensitive and rational souls
in man: because in that case the sensitive soul in man would not be
incorruptible, as neither is it in other animals; and consequently in
the resurrection there would not be the same sensitive soul, and
consequently neither the same animal nor the same man.

But if we assert that in man the same soul is by its substance both
rational and sensitive, we shall encounter no difficulty in this
question, because animal is defined from sense, i. e. the sensitive soul
as from its essential form: whereas from sense, i. e. the sensitive
power, we know its definition as from an accidental form "that
contributes more than another to our knowledge of the quiddity" (De
Anima i, 1). Accordingly after death there remains the sensitive soul,
even as the rational soul, according to its substance: whereas the
sensitive powers, according to some, do not remain. And since these
powers are accidental properties, diversity on their part cannot
prevent the identity of the whole animal, not even of the animal's
parts: nor are powers to be called perfections or acts of organs unless
as principles of action, as heat in fire.

Reply to Objection 4: A statue may be considered in two ways, either as
a particular substance, or as something artificial. And since it is
placed in the genus of substance by reason of its matter, it follows
that if we consider it as a particular substance, it is the selfsame
statue that is remade from the same matter. On the other hand, it is
placed in the genus of artificial things inasmuch as it has an
accidental form which, if the statue be destroyed, passes away also.
Consequently it does not return identically the same, nor can the
statue be identically the same. But man's form, namely the soul,
remains after the body has perished: wherefore the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the ashes of the human body must needs, by the resurrection, return
to the same parts of the body that were dissolved into them?

Objection 1: It would seem necessary for the ashes of the human body to
return, by the resurrection, to the same parts that were dissolved into
them. For, according to the Philosopher, "as the whole soul is to the
whole body, so is a part of the soul to a part of the body, as sight to
the pupil" (De Anima ii, 1). Now it is necessary that after the
resurrection the body be resumed by the same soul. Therefore it is also
necessary for the same parts of the body to return to the same limbs,
in which they were perfected by the same parts of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, difference of matter causes difference of
identity. But if the ashes return not to the same parts, each part will
not be remade from the same matter of which it consisted before.
Therefore they will not be the same identically. Now if the parts are
different the whole will also be different, since parts are to the
whole as matter is to form (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore it will not be the
self-same man; which is contrary to the truth of the resurrection.

Objection 3: Further, the resurrection is directed to the end that man
may receive the meed of his works. Now different parts of the body are
employed in different works, whether of merit or of demerit. Therefore
at the resurrection each part must needs return to its former state
that it may be rewarded in due measure.

On the contrary, Artificial things are more dependent on their matter
than natural things. Now in artificial things, in order that the same
artificial thing be remade, from the same matter, there is no need for
the parts to be brought back to the same position. Neither therefore is
it necessary in man.

Further, change of an accident does not cause a change of identity. Now
the situation of parts is an accident. Therefore its change in a man
does not cause a change of identity.

I answer that, In this question it makes a difference whether we ask
what can be done without prejudice to identity, and what will be done
for the sake of congruity. As regards the first it must be observed
that in man we may speak of parts in two ways: first as of the various
parts of a homogeneous whole, for instance the various parts of flesh,
or the various parts of bone; secondly, as of various parts of various
species of a heterogeneous whole, for instance bone and flesh.
Accordingly if it be said that one part of matter will return to
another part of the same species, this causes no change except in the
position of the parts: and change of position of parts does not change
the species in homogeneous wholes: and so if the matter of one part
return to another part, this is nowise prejudicial to the identity of
the whole. Thus is it in the example given in the text (Sent. iv, D,
44), because a statue, after being remade, is identically the same, not
as to its form, but as to its matter, in respect of which it is a
particular substance, and in this way a statue is homogeneous, although
it is not according to its artificial form. But if it be said that the
matter of one part returns to another part of another species, it
follows of necessity that there is a change not only in the position of
parts, but also in their identity: yet so that the whole matter, or
something belonging to the truth of human nature in one is transferred
to another. but not if what was superfluous in one part is transferred
to another. Now the identity of parts being taken away, the identity of
the whole is removed, if we speak of essential parts, but not if we
speak of accidental parts, such as hair and nails, to which apparently
Augustine refers (De Civ. Dei xxii). It is thus clear how the
transference of matter from one part of another destroys the identity,
and how it does not.

But speaking of the congruity, it is more probable that even the parts
will retain their position at the resurrection, especially as regards
the essential and organic parts, although perhaps not as regards the
accidental parts, such as nails and hair.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers organic or heterogeneous
parts, but no homogeneous or like parts.

Reply to Objection 2: A change in the position of the parts of matter
does not cause a change of identity, although difference of matter
does.

Reply to Objection 3: Operation, properly speaking, is not ascribed to
the part but to the whole, wherefore the reward is due, not to the part
but to the whole.
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OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the integrity of the bodies in the resurrection.
Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all the members of the human body will rise again therein?

(2) Whether the hair and nails will?

(3) Whether the humors will?

(4) Whether whatever the body contained belonging to the truth of human
nature will rise again?

(5) Whether whatever it contained materially will rise again?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether all the members of the human body will rise again?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all the members of the human body
will rise again. For if the end be done away it is useless to repair
the means. Now the end of each member is its act. Since then nothing
useless is done in the Divine works, and since the use of certain
members is not fitting to man after the resurrection, especially the
use of the genital members, for then they "shall neither marry, nor be
married" (Mat. 22:30), it would seem that not all the members shall
rise again.

Objection 2: Further, the entrails are members: and yet they will not
rise again. For they can neither rise full, since thus they contain
impurities, nor empty, since nothing is empty in nature. Therefore the
members shall not all rise again.

Objection 3: Further, the body shall rise again that it may be rewarded
for the works which the soul did through it. Now the member of which a
thief has been deprived for theft, and who has afterwards done penance
and is saved, cannot be rewarded at the resurrection, neither for any
good deed, since it has not co-operated in any, nor for evil deeds,
since the punishment of the member would redound to the punishment of
man. Therefore the members will not all rise again.

On the contrary, The other members belong more to the truth of human
nature than hair and nails. Yet these will be restored to man at the
resurrection according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 4). Much more
therefore does this apply to the other members.

Further, "The works of God are perfect" (Dt. 32:4). But the
resurrection will be the work of God. Therefore man will be remade
perfect in all his members.

I answer that, As stated in De Anima ii, 4, "the soul stands in
relation to the body not only as its form and end, but also as
efficient cause. " For the soul is compared to the body as art to the
thing made by art, as the Philosopher says (De Anim. Gener. ii, 4), and
whatever is shown forth explicitly in the product of art is all
contained implicitly and originally in the art. In like manner whatever
appears in the parts of the body is all contained originally and, in a
way, implicitly in the soul. Thus just as the work of an art would not
be perfect, if its product lacked any of the things contained in the
art, so neither could man be perfect, unless the whole that is
contained enfolded in the soul be outwardly unfolded in the body, nor
would the body correspond in full proportion to the soul. Since then at
the resurrection it behooves man's body to correspond entirely to the
soul, for it will not rise again except according to the relation it
bears to the rational soul, it follows that man also must rise again
perfect, seeing that he is thereby repaired in order that he may obtain
his ultimate perfection. Consequently all the members that are now in
man's body must needs be restored at the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: The members may be considered in two ways in
relation to the soul: either according to the relation of matter to
form, or according to the relation of instrument to agent, since "the
whole body is compared to the whole soul in the same way as one part is
to another" (De Anima ii, 1). If then the members be considered in the
light of the first relationship, their end is not operation, but rather
the perfect being of the species, and this is also required after the
resurrection: but if they be considered in the light of the second
relationship, then their end is operation. And yet it does not follow
that when the operation fails the instrument is useless, because an
instrument serves not only to accomplish the operation of the agent,
but also to show its virtue. Hence it will be necessary for the virtue
of the soul's powers to be shown in their bodily instruments, even
though they never proceed to action, so that the wisdom of God be
thereby glorified.

Reply to Objection 2: The entrails will rise again in the body even as
the other members: and they will be filled not with vile superfluities
but with goodly humors.

Reply to Objection 3: The acts whereby we merit are not the acts,
properly speaking, of hand or foot but of the whole man; even as the
work of art is ascribed not to the instrument but to the craftsman.
Therefore though the member which was cut off before a man's repentance
did not co-operate with him in the state wherein he merits glory, yet
man himself merits that the whole man may be rewarded, who with his
whole being serves God.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the hair and nails will rise again in the human body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again
in the human body. For just as hair and nails result from the surplus
of food, so do urine, sweat and other superfluities or dregs. But these
will not rise again with the body. Neither therefore will hair and
nails.

Objection 2: Further, of all the superfluities that are produced from
food, seed comes nearest to the truth of human nature, since though
superfluous it is needed. Yet seed will not rise again in the human
body. Much less therefore will hair and nails.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is perfected by a rational soul that is
not perfected by a sensitive soul. But hair and nails are not perfected
by a sensitive soul, for "we do not feel with them" (De Anima i, 5;
iii, 13). Therefore since the human body rises not again except because
it is perfected by a rational soul, it would seem that the hair and
nails will not rise again.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:18): "A hair of your head shall
not perish. "

Further, hair and nails were given to man as an ornament. Now the
bodies of men, especially of the elect, ought to rise again with all
their adornment. Therefore they ought to rise again with the hair.

I answer that, The soul is to the animated body, as art is to the work
of art, and is to the parts of the body as art to its instruments:
wherefore an animated body is called an organic body. Now art employs
certain instruments for the accomplishment of the work intended, and
these instruments belong to the primary intention of art: and it also
uses other instruments for the safe-keeping of the principal
instruments, and these belong to the secondary intention of art: thus
the art of warfare employs a sword for fighting, and a sheath for the
safe-keeping of the sword. And so among the parts of an animated body,
some are directed to the accomplishment of the souls' operations, for
instance the heart, liver, hand, foot; while others are directed to the
safe-keeping of the other parts as leaves to cover fruit; and thus hair
and nails are in man for the protection of other parts. Consequently,
although they do not belong to the primary perfection of the human
body, they belong to the secondary perfection: and since man will rise
again with all the perfections of his nature, it follows that hair and
nails will rise again in him.

Reply to Objection 1: Those superfluities are voided by nature, as
being useful for nothing. Hence they do not belong to the perfection of
the human body. It is not so with the superfluities which nature
reserves for the production of hair and nails which she needs for the
protection of the members.

Reply to Objection 2: Seed is not required for the perfection of the
individual, as hair and nails are, but only for the protection of the
species.

Reply to Objection 3: Hair and nails are nourished and grow, and so it
is clear that they share in some operation, which would not be possible
unless they were parts in some way perfected by the soul. And since in
man there is but one soul, namely the rational soul, it is clear that
they are perfected by the rational soul, although not so far as to
share in the operation of sense, as neither do bones, and yet it is
certain that these will rise again and that they belong to the
integrity of the individual.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the humors will rise again in the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the humors will not rise again in the
body. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh and blood cannot possess
the kingdom of God. " Now blood is the chief humor. Therefore it will
not rise again in the blessed, who will possess the kingdom of God, and
much less in others.

Objection 2: Further, humors are intended to make up for the waste. Now
after the resurrection there will be no waste. Therefore the body will
not rise again with humors.

Objection 3: Further, that which is in process of generation in the
human body is not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the humors
are still in process of generation because they are potentially flesh
and bone. Therefore they are not yet perfected by the rational soul.
Now the human body is not directed to the resurrection except in so far
as it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore the humors will not
rise again.

On the contrary, Whatever enters into the constitution of the human
body will rise again with it. Now this applies to the humors, as
appears from the statement of Augustine (De Spir. et Anima xv) that
"the body consists of functional members; the functional members of
homogeneous parts; and the homogeneous parts of humors. " Therefore the
humors will rise again in the body.

Further, our resurrection will be conformed to the resurrection of
Christ. Now in Christ's resurrection His blood rose again, else the
wine would not now be changed into His blood in the Sacrament of the
altar. Therefore the blood will rise again in us also, and in like
manner the other humors.

I answer that, Whatever belongs to the integrity of human nature in
those who take part in the resurrection will rise again, as stated
above ([5070]AA[1],2). Hence whatever humidity of the body belongs to
the integrity of human nature must needs rise again in man. Now there
is a threefold humidity in man. There is one which occurs as receding
from the perfection of the individual---either because it is on the way
to corruption, and is voided by nature, for instance urine, sweat,
matter, and so forth---or because it is directed by nature to the
preservation of the species in some individual, either by the act of
the generative power, as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as
milk. None of these humidities will rise again, because they do not
belong to the perfection of the person rising again.

The second kind of humidity is one that has not yet reached its
ultimate perfection, which nature achieves in the individual, yet it is
directed thereto by nature: and this is of two kinds. For there is one
kind that has a definite form and is contained among the parts of the
body, for instance the blood and the other humors which nature has
directed to the members that are produced or nourished therefrom: and
yet they have certain definite forms like the other parts of the body,
and consequently will rise again with the other parts of the body:
while another kind of humidity is in transition from form to form,
namely from the form of humor to the form of member. Humidities of this
kind will not rise again, because after the resurrection each part of
the body will be established in its form, so that one will not pass
into another. Wherefore this humidity that is actually in transition
from one form to another will not rise again. Now this humidity may be
considered in a twofold state---either as being at the beginning of its
transformation, and thus it is called "ros," namely the humidity that
is found in the cavities of the smaller veins---or as in the course of
transformation and already beginning to undergo alteration, and thus it
is called "cambium": but in neither state will it rise again. The third
kind of humidity is that which has already reached its ultimate
perfection that nature intends in the body of the individual, and has
already undergone transformation and become incorporate with the
members. This is called "gluten," and since it belongs to the members
it will rise again just as the members will.

Reply to Objection 1: In these words of the Apostle flesh and blood do
not denote the substance of flesh and blood but deeds of flesh and
blood, which are either deeds of sin or the operations of the animal
life. Or we may say with Augustine in his letter to Consentius (Ep.
cxlvi) that "flesh and blood here signify the corruption which is now
predominant in flesh and blood"; wherefore the Apostle's words
continue: "Neither shall corruption possess incorruption. "

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the members that serve for generation
will be after the resurrection for the integrity of human nature, and
not for the operation accomplished now by them, so will the humors be
in the body not to make up for waste, but to restore the integrity of
human nature and to show forth its natural power.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the elements are in the course of
generation in relation to mixed bodies, because they are their matter,
yet not so as to be always in transition when in the mixed body, so too
are the humors in relation to the members. And for this reason as the
elements in the parts of the universe have definite forms, by reason of
which they, like mixed bodies, belong to the perfection of the
universe, so too the humors belong to the perfection of the human body,
just as the other parts do, although they do not reach its entire
perfection, as the other parts do, and although the elements have not
perfect forms as mixed bodies have. But as all the parts of the
universe receive their perfection from God, not equally, but each one
according to its mode, so too the humors are in some way perfected by
the rational soul, yet not in the same measure as the more perfect
parts.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether whatever in the body belonged to the truth of human nature will rise
again in it?

Objection 1: It would seem that what was in the body, belonging to the
truth of human nature, will not all rise again in it. For food is
changed into the truth of human nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the
ox or of other animals is taken as food. Therefore if whatever belonged
to the truth of human nature will rise again, the flesh of the ox or of
other animals will also rise again: which is inadmissible.

Objection 2: Further, Adam's rib belonged to the truth of human nature
in him, as ours does in us. But Adam's rib will rise again not in Adam
but in Eve, else Eve would not rise again at all since she was made
from that rib. Therefore whatever belonged in man to the truth of human
nature will not all rise again in him.

Objection 3: Further, it is impossible for the same thing from
different men to rise again. Yet it is possible for something in
different men to belong to the truth of human nature, for instance if a
man were to partake of human flesh which would be changed into his
substance. Therefore there will not rise again in man whatever belonged
in him to the truth of human nature.

Objection 4: Further, if it be said that not all the flesh partaken of
belongs to the truth of human nature and that consequently some of it
may possibly rise again in the one man and some in the other---on the
contrary: That which is derived from one's parents would especially
seem to belong to the truth of human nature. But if one who partook of
nothing but human flesh were to beget children that which his child
derives from him must needs be of the flesh of other men partaken of by
his father, since the seed is from the surplus of food, as the
Philosopher proves (De Gen. Animal. i). Therefore what belongs to the
truth of human nature in that child belonged also to the truth of human
nature in other men of whose flesh his father had partaken.

Objection 5: Further, if it be said that what was changed into seed was
not that which belong to the truth of human nature in the flesh of the
men eaten, but something not belonging to the truth of human
nature---on the contrary: Let us suppose that some one is fed entirely
on embryos in which seemingly there is nothing but what belongs to the
truth of human nature since whatever is in them is derived from the
parents. If then the surplus food be changed into seed, that which
belonged to the truth of human nature in the embryos---and after these
have received a rational soul, the resurrection applies to them---must
needs belong to the truth of human nature in the child begotten of that
seed. And thus, since the same cannot rise again in two subjects, it
will be impossible for whatever belonged to the truth of human nature
in both to rise again in both of them.

On the contrary, Whatever belonged to the truth of human nature was
perfected by the rational soul. Now it is through being perfected by
the rational soul that the human body is directed to the resurrection.
Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise
again in each one.

Further, if anything belonging to the truth of human nature in a man be
taken from his body, this will not be the perfect body of a man. Now
all imperfection of a man will be removed at the resurrection,
especially in the elect, to whom it was promised (Lk. 21:18) that not a
hair of their head should perish. Therefore whatever belonged to the
truth of human nature in a man will rise again in him.

I answer that, "Everything is related to truth in the same way as to
being" (Metaph. ii), because a thing is true when it is as it appears
to him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna (Metaph. ii)
says that "the truth of anything is a property of the being immutably
attached thereto. " Accordingly a thing is said to belong to the truth
of human nature, because it belongs properly to the being of human
nature, and this is what shares the form of human nature, just as true
gold is what has the true form of gold whence gold derives its proper
being. In order therefore to see what it is that belongs to the truth
of human nature, we must observe that there have been three opinions on
the question. For some have maintained that nothing begins anew to
belong to the truth of human nature and that whatever belongs to the
truth of human nature, all of it belonged to the truth of human nature
when this was created; and that this multiplies by itself, so that it
is possible for the seed whereof the child is begotten to be detached
therefrom by the begetter, and that again the detached part multiplies
in the child, so that he reaches perfect quantity by growth, and so on,
and that thus was the whole human race multiplied. Wherefore according
to this opinion, whatever is produced by nourishment. although it seem
to have the appearance of flesh and blood, does not belong to the truth
of human nature.

Others held that something new is added to the truth of human nature by
the natural transformation of the food into the human body, if we
consider the truth of human nature in the species to the preservation
of which the act of the generative power is directed: but that if we
consider the truth of human nature in the individual, to the
preservation and perfection of which the act of the nutritive power is
directed, that which is added by food belongs to the truth of the human
nature of the individual, not primarily but secondarily. For they
assert that the truth of human nature, first and foremost, consists in
the radical humor, that namely which is begotten of the seed of which
the human race was originally fashioned: and that what is changed from
food into true flesh and blood does not belong principally to the truth
of human nature in this particular individual, but secondarily: and
that nevertheless this can belong principally to the truth of human
nature in another individual who is begotten of the seed of the former.
For they assert that seed is the surplus from food, either mingled with
something belonging principally to the truth of human nature in the
begetter, according to some, or without any such admixture, as others
maintain. And thus the nutrimental humor in one becomes the radical
humor in another.

The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to
the truth of human nature even in this individual, because distinction
in the human body does not require that any signate material part must
needs remain throughout the whole lifetime; any signate part one may
take is indifferent to this, whereas it remains always as regards what
belongs to the species in it, albeit as regards what is material
therein it may ebb and flow. And thus the nutrimental humor is not
distinct from the radical on the part of its principle (so that it be
called radical when begotten of the seed, and nutrimental when produced
by the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that it be called
radical when it reaches the term of generation by the act of the
generative, or even nutritive power, but nutrimental, when it has not
yet reached this term, but is still on the way to give nourishment.

These three opinions have been more fully exposed and examined in the
Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30); wherefore there is no need for
repetition here, except in so far as the question at issue is
concerned. It must accordingly be observed that this question requires
different answers according to these opinions.

For the first opinion on account of its explanation of the process of
multiplication is able to admit perfection of the truth of human
nature, both as regards the number of individuals and as regards the
due quantity of each individual, without taking into account that which
is produced from food; for this is not added except for the purpose of
resisting the destruction that might result from the action of natural
heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting.
Wherefore since at the resurrection it behooves human nature to be
restored to its perfection, nor does the natural heat tend to destroy
the natural humor, there will be no need for anything resulting from
food to rise again in man, but that alone will rise again which
belonged to the truth of the human nature of the individual, and this
reaches the aforesaid perfection in number and quantity by being
detached and multiplied.

The second opinion, since it maintains that what is produced from food
is needed for the perfection of quantity in the individual and for the
multiplication that results from generation, must needs admit that
something of this product from food shall rise again: not all, however,
but only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of human
nature in all its individuals. Hence this opinion asserts that all that
was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this man who was
begotten of this seed; because this belongs chiefly to the truth of
human nature in him: while of that which afterwards he derives from
nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the
perfection of his quantity; and not all, because this does not belong
to the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature requires
it for the perfection of quantity. Since however this nutrimental humor
is subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this
order, that what first belonged to the substance of a man's body, will
all be restored, and of that which was added secondly, thirdly, and so
on, as much as is required to restore quantity. This is proved by two
reasons. First, because that which was added was intended to restore
what was wasted at first, and thus it does not belong principally to
the truth of human nature to the same extent as that which came first.
Secondly, because the addition of extraneous humor to the first radical
humors results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the
specific nature as perfectly as the first did: and the Philosopher
instances as an example (De Gener. i) the mixing of water with wine,
which always weakens the strength of the wine, so that in the end the
wine becomes watery: so that although the second water be drawn into
the species of wine, it does not share the species of wine as perfectly
as the first water added to the wine. Even so that which is secondly
changed from food into flesh does not so perfectly attain to the
species of flesh as that which was changed first, and consequently does
not belong in the same degree to the truth of human nature nor to the
resurrection. Accordingly it is clear that this opinion maintains that
the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature principally will
rise again, but not the whole of what belongs to the truth of human
nature secondarily.

The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and in some respects
agrees with it. It differs in that it maintains that whatever is under
the form of flesh and bone all belongs to the truth of human nature,
because this opinion does not distinguish as remaining in man during
his whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and
primarily to the truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and
flowing, that belongs. to the truth of human nature merely on account
of the perfection of quantity, and not on account of the primary being
of the species, as the second opinion asserted. But it states that all
the parts that are not beside the intention of the nature generated
belong to the truth of human nature, as regards what they have of the
species, since thus they remain; but not as regards what they have of
matter, since thus they are indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we are
to understand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man as in
the whole population of a city, for each individual is cut off from the
population by death, while others take their place: wherefore the parts
of the people flow back and forth materially, but remain formally,
since these others occupy the very same offices and positions from
which the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is said to
remain the selfsame. In like manner, while certain parts are on the ebb
and others are being restored to the same shape and position, all the
parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to their
species; and nevertheless the selfsame man remains.

On the other hand, The third opinion agrees with the second, because it
holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach the perfection of
the species so perfectly as those which come first: and consequently
the third opinion asserts that the same thing rises again in man as the
second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it
holds that the whole of what is produced from the seed will rise again,
not because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that
which comes after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more
perfectly: which same order the second opinion applied to those things
that are produced afterwards from food, in which point also these two
opinions agree.

Reply to Objection 1: A natural thing is what it is, not from its
matter but from its form; wherefore, although that part of matter which
at one time was under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man under
the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an ox
rises again, but the flesh of a man: else one might conclude that the
clay from which Adam's body was fashioned shall rise again. The second
opinion, however, grants this argument.

Reply to Objection 2: That rib did not belong to the perfection of the
individual in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the
species. Hence it will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, just as the
seed will rise again, not in the begetter, but in the begotten.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the first opinion it is easy to
reply to this argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged
to the truth of human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the
truth of human nature in him whose flesh was eaten: and thus it will
rise again in the latter but not in the former. according to the second
and third opinions, each one will rise again in that wherein he
approached nearest to the perfect participation of the virtue of the
species, and if he approached equally in both, he will rise again in
that wherein he was first, because in that he first was directed to the
resurrection by union with the rational soul of that man. Hence if
there were any surplus in the flesh eaten, not belonging to the truth
of human nature in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise
again in the second: otherwise what belonged to the resurrection in the
first will rise again in him and not in the second; but in the second
its place is taken either by something of that which was the product
from other food, or if he never partook of any other food than human
flesh, the substitution is made by Divine power so far as the
perfection of quantity requires, as it does in those who die before the
perfect age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity, as neither
does the ebb and flow of parts.

Reply to Objection 4: According to the first opinion this argument is
easily answered. For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from the
surplus food: so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed
whereof the child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions
we must reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to
be changed into seed, because it is after much separation that the seed
is distilled from the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of food.
That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the
truth of human nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one
of whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence according to the rule
already laid down (ad 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise
again in the person born of the seed; while the remaining matter will
rise again in him of whose flesh the seed was the product.

Reply to Objection 5: The embryo is not concerned with the resurrection
before it is animated by a rational soul, in which state much has been
added to the seminal substance from the substance of food, since the
child is nourished in the mother's womb. Consequently on the
supposition that a man partook of such food, and that some one were
begotten of the surplus thereof, that which was in the seminal
substance will indeed rise again in the one begotten of that seed;
unless it contain something that would have belonged to the seminal
substance in those from whose flesh being eaten the seed was produced,
for this would rise again in the first but not in the second. The
remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed into seed, will clearly
rise again in the first the Divine power supplying deficiencies in
both. The first opinion is not troubled by this objection, since it
does not hold the seed to be from the surplus food: but there are many
other reasons against it as may be seen in the Second Book (Sent. ii,
D, 30; [5071]FP, Q[119], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again?

Objection 1: It would seem that whatever was materially in a man's
members will all rise again. For the hair, seemingly, is less concerned
in the resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was in the
hair will all rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts
of the body, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) quoted in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 44). Much more therefore whatever was materially in the
other members will all rise again.

Objection 2: Further, just as the parts of the flesh are perfected as
to species by the rational soul, so are the parts as to matter. But the
human body is directed to the resurrection through being perfected by a
rational soul. Therefore not only the parts of species but also the
parts of matter will all rise again.

Objection 3: Further, the body derives its totality from the same cause
as it derives its divisibility into parts. But division into parts
belongs to a body in respect of matter the disposition of which is
quantity in respect of which it is divided. Therefore totality is
ascribed to the body in respect of its parts of matter. If then all the
parts of matter rise not again, neither will the whole body rise again:
which is inadmissible.