But good and better are so considered in
relation
to
what is best.
what is best.
Summa Theologica
Hence one good can coexist with the privation of another
good.
Reply to Objection 4: The prophet invokes woe to those who say that
good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above,
as is clear from the explanation given.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether evil corrupts the whole good?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one
contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are
contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts
inasmuch as it takes away good. " But good is all of a piece and
uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.
Objection 3: Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away
good. But that from which something is always being removed, is at some
time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any
created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot
wholly consume good. "
I answer that, Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must
consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed
by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly
destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is
neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good
which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air
is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished by
evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a
subject to some actuality.
The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered
by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of
remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise
of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity. For this
kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the
matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in
the subject the more is it fitted to receive its perfection and form;
and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary
dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the
more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as
regards the actuality.
Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and
intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the
aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the
active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and
humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is
diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the
contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid
aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless,
it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is
the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to
infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to light
would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly
removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is
transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude,
whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened;
and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and
God, according to Is. 59:2: "Our sins have divided between us and God. "
Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it
belongs to its very nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken
away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.
Reply to Objection 2: The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between
subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil;
but where it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore,
although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to
different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.
Reply to Objection 3: Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind
of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the
continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever
same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), so
is it in the present case. But this explanation does not avail here.
For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we continue to
subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half of the
whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above
mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance either
equally or more.
Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite
thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not "per se," but
accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased
infinitely, as explained above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether evil is adequately divided into pain* and fault?
[*Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification, being
derived from "poena. " In this sense we say "Pain of death, Pain of
loss, Pain of sense. "---Ed. ]
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into
pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all
creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own
existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore
evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.
Objection 2: Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault
nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are
evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.
Objection 3: Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for
"temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion
for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not is
it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows
afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and
fault.
Objection 4: On the contrary, It would seem that this division is
superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil
"because it hurts. " But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil
comes under pain.
I answer that, Evil, as was said above [425](A[3]) is the privation of
good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act,
however, is twofold; first, and second. The first act is the form and
integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil
also is twofold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form,
or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness is
an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the body.
In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation,
either because it does not exist, or because it has not its due mode
and order. But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil,
which is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational
creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which comes from the
withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has the nature of a
pain; and especially so on the supposition that all things are subject
to divine providence and justice, as was shown above ([426]Q[22],
A[2]); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will.
But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due operation in
voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for this is imputed to
anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect action, of which he is
master by the will. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be
looked upon as a pain or a fault.
Reply to Objection 1: Because evil is the privation of good, and not a
mere negation, as was said above [427](A[3]), therefore not every
defect of good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is
naturally due. For the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it
is an evil in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to
see. So, likewise, it is against the nature of a creature to be
preserved in existence by itself, because existence and conservation
come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an
evil as regards a creature.
Reply to Objection 2: Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely
considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.
Reply to Objection 3: Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is
always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is
not, properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some
change is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action of
the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the
tempter he falls into fault.
Reply to Objection 4: In answer to the opposite argument, it must be
said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the
agent in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury
to the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as
including the idea of injury.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For
fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good than
merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has.
Objection 2: Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the
greater good. But pain, as was said above [428](A[5]), is opposed to
the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the
action. Therefore, since the agent is better than the action, it seems
that pain is worse than fault.
Objection 3: Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in
forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation of
the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.
On the contrary, A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent
a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body. But
divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a
greater evil than pain.
I answer that, Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not
only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal
goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any
kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to
include privation of grace or glory.
There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil
by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to be
made worthy of punishment. " And this because, since good absolutely
considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate
act is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that
the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use of
something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will.
Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is
called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a
bad will can use ill even the good he has, as when a grammarian of his
own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself
consists in the disordered act of the will, and the pain consists in
the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in
it than pain has.
The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of
the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And this is because the
evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either
something created, as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something
uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature
forfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly opposed
to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine
will, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself,
and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it is plain that
fault has more evil in it than pain has.
Reply to Objection 1: Although fault results in pain, as merit in
reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is
for the reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so
that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain.
Reply to Objection 2: The order of action which is destroyed by fault
is the more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second
perfection, than the good taken away by pain, which is the first
perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and
order to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some
way, both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is
removed from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch
as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due
end.
__________________________________________________________________
THE CAUSE OF EVIL (THREE ARTICLES)
We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are three
points of inquire:
(1) Whether good can be the cause of evil?
(2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
(3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all
evils?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether good can be the cause of evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For
it is said (Mat. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit. "
Objection 2: Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But
evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of
evil.
Objection 3: Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a
deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause,
if it has one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil.
Therefore the cause of evil can only be evil.
Objection 4: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no
cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): "There is no
possible source of evil except good. "
I answer that, It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause.
For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a
thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can
come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. For
a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor
does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment. But only
good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as
it is a being, and every being, as such, is good.
And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the agent,
the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection which belongs to
the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to good, has the
nature of good. Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the
material cause was shown above ([429]Q[48], A[3]). For it was shown
that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather
is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final cause, but
rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the
end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which is ordered to
the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly,
but accidentally.
In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action
otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason of
the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the
instrumental agent; thus the defect in the movement of an animal may
happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of
children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in
the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not in the
proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent,
sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter.
It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when
there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the
privation of another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire
there follows the privation of the form of air or of water. Therefore,
as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly
does it impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it
corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and
water comes from the perfection of the fire: but this is accidental;
because fire does not aim at the privation of the form of water, but at
the bringing in of its own form, though by doing this it also
accidentally causes the other. But if there is a defect in the proper
effect of the fire---as, for instance, that it fails to heat---this
comes either by defect of the action, which implies the defect of some
principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the matter,
which does not receive the action of the fire, the agent. But this very
fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which of
itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any
but an accidental cause; and thus is good the cause of evil.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): "The Lord
calls an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree. " Now, a
good will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good
will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the
movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature,
which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Good does not cause that evil which is contrary
to itself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes
evil to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act
morally evil. And, as explained above ([430]Q[19], A[9]), this is by
accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes
another by accident: for instance, the exterior surrounding cold heats
(the body) through the concentration of the inward heat.
Reply to Objection 3: Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things
otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the
same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some
exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it. Hence
evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in
the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in voluntary things
the defect of the action comes from the will actually deficient,
inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule.
This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault follows upon it from
the fact that the will acts with this defect.
Reply to Objection 4: Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental
cause, as was said above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of
evil. For it is said (Is. 45:5, 7): "I am the Lord, and there is no
other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and
creating evil. " And Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, which the
Lord hath not done? "
Objection 2: Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to
the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above
[431](A[1]). Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was
shown above ([432]Q[2] , A[3]; [433]Q[6], AA[1],4), it follows that
also every evil is from God.
Objection 3: Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text
30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But
God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause
of all perdition and of all evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not the
author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being. "
I answer that, As appears from what was said [434](A[1]), the evil
which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect
of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest
perfection, as was shown above ([435]Q[4], A[1]). Hence, the evil which
consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the
agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause.
But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced
to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural things
and voluntary things. For it was said [436](A[1]) that some agent
inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption
and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is
manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is
the good of the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe
requires, as was said above ([437]Q[22], A[2], ad 2; [438]Q[48], A[2]),
that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And
thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe,
consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of
things, according to 1 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive. " But
when we read that "God hath not made death" (Wis. 1:13), the sense is
that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order
of justice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires that
penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the
evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of
what is said above.
Reply to Objection 1: These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and
not to the evil of fault.
Reply to Objection 2: The effect of the deficient secondary cause is
reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of
being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as
whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the
motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come
from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And,
likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is
reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not
caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.
Reply to Objection 3: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor
as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of
the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for
the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the
cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes. But
contrariety is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: "Good is
set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against
a just man. " Therefore there are many contrary principles, one of good,
the other of evil.
Objection 2: Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other.
But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as
was shown above ([439]Q[2], A[3]; [440]Q[6], AA[2],4). Therefore, also,
there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.
Objection 3: Further, as we find good and better things, so we find
evil and worse.
But good and better are so considered in relation to
what is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to
some supreme evil.
Objection 4: Further, everything participated is reduced to what is
essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially,
but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential
evil, which is the cause of every evil.
Objection 5: Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which
is "per se. " But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we
must suppose some supreme evil which is the "per se" cause of evils.
Nor can it be said that evil has no "per se" cause, but only an
accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in
the many, but only in the few.
Objection 6: Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of
the cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause,
as was said above ([441]AA[1],2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in
this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of
every evil.
On the contrary, The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was
shown above ([442]Q[2], A[3]; [443]Q[6], A[4]). Therefore there cannot
be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.
I answer that, It appears from what precedes that there is no one first
principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.
First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good,
as was shown above ([444]Q[6], AA[3],4). But nothing can be essentially
bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good
([445]Q[5], A[3]); and that evil can exist only in good as in its
subject ([446]Q[48], A[3]).
Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and
perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above
([447]Q[6], A[2]). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was
shown above ([448]Q[48], A[4]), although evil always lessens good, yet
it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing
can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the wholly evil could be, it would destroy
itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for
something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away, since
its subject is good.
Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first
principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown
above [449](A[1]), and because evil can be only an accidental cause,
and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is
subsequent to the direct cause.
Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other
evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also arose other
strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to
consider the universal cause of all being, and considered only the
particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they
found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature, they
thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for instance,
if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the
house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything
does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon
what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole universe, wherein
every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above
([450]Q[47], A[2], ad 1).
Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two
contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these
contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore
they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles.
But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to
search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper
causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the
power of a heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter
how, there exists one first principle of being, as was shown above
([451]Q[2], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also
agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have
contrary particular cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one
first common cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Privation and habit belong naturally to the same
subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as
was said above ([452]Q[48], A[3]). Hence, since evil is privation of
good, as appears from what was said above ([453]Q[48], AA[1], 2,3), it
is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the
supreme good, who is pure act.
Reply to Objection 3: Increase in intensity is in proportion to the
nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation
removes a perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is
intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by
receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and
worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it
is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.
Reply to Objection 4: No being is called evil by participation, but by
privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to
any essential evil.
Reply to Objection 5: Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was
shown above [454](A[1]). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil
is impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply
false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can
there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole universe. And
again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number.
In man alone does evil appear as in the greater number; because the
good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man---that
is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good in regard to the senses
than good according to reason.
Reply to Objection 6: In the causes of evil we do not proceed to
infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows
accidentally.
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ[50]-64)
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED (FIVE ARTICLES)
Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures:
firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is
called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the
composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.
Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their
substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what
belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.
Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal
things.
Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether
incorporeal?
(2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of
matter and form?
(3) We ask concerning their number.
(4) Of their difference from each other.
(5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal.
For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation
to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as
regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore
he is not simply incorporeal. "
Objection 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii) that "an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance. "
Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance.
Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every
creature is limited within its own nature. " But to be limited belongs
to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's
creatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His
angels"; and, farther on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were made;
He commanded, and they were created. " Therefore angels are corporeal.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 103:4): "Who makes His angels
spirits. "
I answer that, There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is
principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in
assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect
to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according
to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now,
God produces the creature by His intellect and will ([455]Q[14], A[8];
[456]Q[19], A[4] ). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that
there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the
action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is
limited to "here" and "now. " Hence the perfection of the universe
requires the existence of an incorporeal creature.
The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of
intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense
and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could
be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall
under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies,
as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57). Thence came the
error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts 23:8).
But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof
that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect
alone.
Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and
corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to
be the other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be
cold; and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material
and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it
is applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an
ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not
as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are.
Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.
Reply to Objection 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to
bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to
all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De
Spir. Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained in
corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their
substance. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and
form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of
the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the
species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from
the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a
genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of
substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.
Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is
matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand;
whence Boethius says (De Trin. ) that "a simple form cannot be a
subject": and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an
angel is composed of matter and form.
Objection 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act.
But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore
an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.
Objection 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter.
So the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of
an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the
form of an angel is in matter.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first creatures
are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal. "
I answer that, Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and
form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of
the Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are
distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards
incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which
distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in
common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal
from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is
subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common, is
its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and
corporeal things is the same; so that it must be understood that the
form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual
things, in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the
matter of corporeal things.
But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of
spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a
spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of
matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and
spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the
corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter,
however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity;
and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys.
i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of spiritual
things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it is
impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same
matter.
It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any
kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according to
the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether
immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act
receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according to
its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are
individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it
must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial.
But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily
distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend
things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence
material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in
a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on
the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect cannot
attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own
mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also
it apprehends God [457](Q[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: It is difference which constitutes the species.
Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is
determined to some special grade of being because "the species of
things are like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of
unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material
things there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that
is the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the
matter; and hence from the latter the "genus" is derived, and from the
former the "difference. " Whereas in immaterial things there is no
separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own self
holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them "genus" and
"difference" are not derived from different things, but from one and
the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of conception; for,
inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the
idea of their "genus"; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately,
it derives the idea of their "difference. "
Reply to Objection 2: This reason is given in the book on the Fount of
Life, and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the
intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. For
matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in some
species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the
intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise the
opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to the
effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the
intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of a
form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way of
receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance.
Reply to Objection 3: Although there is no composition of matter and
form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be
made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain
a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby
the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own
existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related
to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no
matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter,
there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very
existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is
understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an
angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence,"
and "what is," as Boethius says. For "what is," is the form itself
subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as
the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God "existence" and
"what is" are not different as was explained above ([458]Q[3], A[4]).
Hence God alone is pure act.
Reply to Objection 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its
existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature
to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being
considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the
part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the
matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are finite
in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms
are not received in anything else; as if we were to say, for example,
that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards the nature of
whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while
its "being" is finite as determined to some one special nature.
Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is finite
from above," as receiving its being from above itself, and is "infinite
from below," as not received in any matter.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels exist in any great number?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers.
For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a
continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are
incorporeal, as was shown above [459](A[1]). Therefore the angels
cannot exist in any great number.
Objection 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the
less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other
created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore
since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible
number in the angelic nature.
Objection 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances
seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of
the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we
can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the
movements of the heavenly bodies.
Objection 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and
intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine
goodness. " But a ray is only multiplied according to the different
things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is
receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are
immaterial, as was shown above [460](A[2]). Therefore it seems that the
multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the
requirements of the first bodies---that is, of the heavenly ones, so
that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be
terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as
before.
On the contrary, It is said (Dan. 7:10): "Thousands of thousands
ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood
before Him. "
I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the
number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate
substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to
maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and
according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number
of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible
things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31)
because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things.
Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar species of
these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are
higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held
(Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures bear relation to
these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he
strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to
the number of the first movements.
But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred
Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony,
held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial
substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly
movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he
contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are
styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which
manifest God's almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the
custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be
designated as angels.
Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are
immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all
material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv):
"There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences,
surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers. " The
reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the
universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more
perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created
by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their
magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their
multitude.
good.
Reply to Objection 4: The prophet invokes woe to those who say that
good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above,
as is clear from the explanation given.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether evil corrupts the whole good?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one
contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are
contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts
inasmuch as it takes away good. " But good is all of a piece and
uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.
Objection 3: Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away
good. But that from which something is always being removed, is at some
time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any
created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot
wholly consume good. "
I answer that, Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must
consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed
by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly
destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is
neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good
which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air
is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished by
evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a
subject to some actuality.
The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered
by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of
remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise
of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity. For this
kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the
matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in
the subject the more is it fitted to receive its perfection and form;
and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary
dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the
more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as
regards the actuality.
Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and
intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the
aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the
active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and
humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is
diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the
contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid
aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless,
it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is
the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to
infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to light
would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly
removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is
transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude,
whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened;
and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and
God, according to Is. 59:2: "Our sins have divided between us and God. "
Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it
belongs to its very nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken
away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.
Reply to Objection 2: The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between
subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil;
but where it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore,
although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to
different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.
Reply to Objection 3: Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind
of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the
continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever
same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), so
is it in the present case. But this explanation does not avail here.
For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we continue to
subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half of the
whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above
mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance either
equally or more.
Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite
thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not "per se," but
accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased
infinitely, as explained above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether evil is adequately divided into pain* and fault?
[*Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification, being
derived from "poena. " In this sense we say "Pain of death, Pain of
loss, Pain of sense. "---Ed. ]
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into
pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all
creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own
existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore
evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.
Objection 2: Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault
nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are
evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.
Objection 3: Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for
"temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion
for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not is
it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows
afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and
fault.
Objection 4: On the contrary, It would seem that this division is
superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil
"because it hurts. " But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil
comes under pain.
I answer that, Evil, as was said above [425](A[3]) is the privation of
good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act,
however, is twofold; first, and second. The first act is the form and
integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil
also is twofold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form,
or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness is
an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the body.
In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation,
either because it does not exist, or because it has not its due mode
and order. But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil,
which is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational
creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which comes from the
withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has the nature of a
pain; and especially so on the supposition that all things are subject
to divine providence and justice, as was shown above ([426]Q[22],
A[2]); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will.
But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due operation in
voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for this is imputed to
anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect action, of which he is
master by the will. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be
looked upon as a pain or a fault.
Reply to Objection 1: Because evil is the privation of good, and not a
mere negation, as was said above [427](A[3]), therefore not every
defect of good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is
naturally due. For the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it
is an evil in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to
see. So, likewise, it is against the nature of a creature to be
preserved in existence by itself, because existence and conservation
come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an
evil as regards a creature.
Reply to Objection 2: Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely
considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.
Reply to Objection 3: Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is
always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is
not, properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some
change is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action of
the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the
tempter he falls into fault.
Reply to Objection 4: In answer to the opposite argument, it must be
said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the
agent in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury
to the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as
including the idea of injury.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For
fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good than
merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has.
Objection 2: Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the
greater good. But pain, as was said above [428](A[5]), is opposed to
the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the
action. Therefore, since the agent is better than the action, it seems
that pain is worse than fault.
Objection 3: Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in
forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation of
the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.
On the contrary, A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent
a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body. But
divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a
greater evil than pain.
I answer that, Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not
only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal
goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any
kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to
include privation of grace or glory.
There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil
by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to be
made worthy of punishment. " And this because, since good absolutely
considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate
act is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that
the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use of
something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will.
Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is
called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a
bad will can use ill even the good he has, as when a grammarian of his
own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself
consists in the disordered act of the will, and the pain consists in
the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in
it than pain has.
The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of
the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And this is because the
evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either
something created, as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something
uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature
forfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly opposed
to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine
will, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself,
and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it is plain that
fault has more evil in it than pain has.
Reply to Objection 1: Although fault results in pain, as merit in
reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is
for the reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so
that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain.
Reply to Objection 2: The order of action which is destroyed by fault
is the more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second
perfection, than the good taken away by pain, which is the first
perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and
order to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some
way, both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is
removed from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch
as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due
end.
__________________________________________________________________
THE CAUSE OF EVIL (THREE ARTICLES)
We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are three
points of inquire:
(1) Whether good can be the cause of evil?
(2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
(3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all
evils?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether good can be the cause of evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For
it is said (Mat. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit. "
Objection 2: Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But
evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of
evil.
Objection 3: Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a
deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause,
if it has one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil.
Therefore the cause of evil can only be evil.
Objection 4: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no
cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): "There is no
possible source of evil except good. "
I answer that, It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause.
For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a
thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can
come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. For
a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor
does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment. But only
good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as
it is a being, and every being, as such, is good.
And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the agent,
the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection which belongs to
the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to good, has the
nature of good. Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the
material cause was shown above ([429]Q[48], A[3]). For it was shown
that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather
is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final cause, but
rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the
end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which is ordered to
the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly,
but accidentally.
In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action
otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason of
the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the
instrumental agent; thus the defect in the movement of an animal may
happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of
children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in
the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not in the
proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent,
sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter.
It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when
there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the
privation of another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire
there follows the privation of the form of air or of water. Therefore,
as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly
does it impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it
corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and
water comes from the perfection of the fire: but this is accidental;
because fire does not aim at the privation of the form of water, but at
the bringing in of its own form, though by doing this it also
accidentally causes the other. But if there is a defect in the proper
effect of the fire---as, for instance, that it fails to heat---this
comes either by defect of the action, which implies the defect of some
principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the matter,
which does not receive the action of the fire, the agent. But this very
fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which of
itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any
but an accidental cause; and thus is good the cause of evil.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): "The Lord
calls an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree. " Now, a
good will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good
will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the
movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature,
which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Good does not cause that evil which is contrary
to itself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes
evil to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act
morally evil. And, as explained above ([430]Q[19], A[9]), this is by
accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes
another by accident: for instance, the exterior surrounding cold heats
(the body) through the concentration of the inward heat.
Reply to Objection 3: Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things
otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the
same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some
exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it. Hence
evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in
the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in voluntary things
the defect of the action comes from the will actually deficient,
inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule.
This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault follows upon it from
the fact that the will acts with this defect.
Reply to Objection 4: Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental
cause, as was said above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of
evil. For it is said (Is. 45:5, 7): "I am the Lord, and there is no
other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and
creating evil. " And Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, which the
Lord hath not done? "
Objection 2: Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to
the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above
[431](A[1]). Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was
shown above ([432]Q[2] , A[3]; [433]Q[6], AA[1],4), it follows that
also every evil is from God.
Objection 3: Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text
30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But
God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause
of all perdition and of all evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not the
author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being. "
I answer that, As appears from what was said [434](A[1]), the evil
which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect
of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest
perfection, as was shown above ([435]Q[4], A[1]). Hence, the evil which
consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the
agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause.
But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced
to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural things
and voluntary things. For it was said [436](A[1]) that some agent
inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption
and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is
manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is
the good of the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe
requires, as was said above ([437]Q[22], A[2], ad 2; [438]Q[48], A[2]),
that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And
thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe,
consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of
things, according to 1 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive. " But
when we read that "God hath not made death" (Wis. 1:13), the sense is
that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order
of justice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires that
penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the
evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of
what is said above.
Reply to Objection 1: These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and
not to the evil of fault.
Reply to Objection 2: The effect of the deficient secondary cause is
reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of
being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as
whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the
motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come
from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And,
likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is
reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not
caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.
Reply to Objection 3: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor
as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of
the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for
the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the
cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes. But
contrariety is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: "Good is
set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against
a just man. " Therefore there are many contrary principles, one of good,
the other of evil.
Objection 2: Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other.
But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as
was shown above ([439]Q[2], A[3]; [440]Q[6], AA[2],4). Therefore, also,
there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.
Objection 3: Further, as we find good and better things, so we find
evil and worse.
But good and better are so considered in relation to
what is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to
some supreme evil.
Objection 4: Further, everything participated is reduced to what is
essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially,
but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential
evil, which is the cause of every evil.
Objection 5: Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which
is "per se. " But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we
must suppose some supreme evil which is the "per se" cause of evils.
Nor can it be said that evil has no "per se" cause, but only an
accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in
the many, but only in the few.
Objection 6: Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of
the cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause,
as was said above ([441]AA[1],2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in
this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of
every evil.
On the contrary, The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was
shown above ([442]Q[2], A[3]; [443]Q[6], A[4]). Therefore there cannot
be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.
I answer that, It appears from what precedes that there is no one first
principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.
First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good,
as was shown above ([444]Q[6], AA[3],4). But nothing can be essentially
bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good
([445]Q[5], A[3]); and that evil can exist only in good as in its
subject ([446]Q[48], A[3]).
Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and
perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above
([447]Q[6], A[2]). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was
shown above ([448]Q[48], A[4]), although evil always lessens good, yet
it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing
can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the wholly evil could be, it would destroy
itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for
something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away, since
its subject is good.
Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first
principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown
above [449](A[1]), and because evil can be only an accidental cause,
and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is
subsequent to the direct cause.
Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other
evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also arose other
strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to
consider the universal cause of all being, and considered only the
particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they
found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature, they
thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for instance,
if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the
house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything
does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon
what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole universe, wherein
every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above
([450]Q[47], A[2], ad 1).
Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two
contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these
contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore
they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles.
But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to
search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper
causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the
power of a heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter
how, there exists one first principle of being, as was shown above
([451]Q[2], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also
agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have
contrary particular cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one
first common cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Privation and habit belong naturally to the same
subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as
was said above ([452]Q[48], A[3]). Hence, since evil is privation of
good, as appears from what was said above ([453]Q[48], AA[1], 2,3), it
is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the
supreme good, who is pure act.
Reply to Objection 3: Increase in intensity is in proportion to the
nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation
removes a perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is
intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by
receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and
worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it
is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.
Reply to Objection 4: No being is called evil by participation, but by
privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to
any essential evil.
Reply to Objection 5: Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was
shown above [454](A[1]). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil
is impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply
false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can
there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole universe. And
again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number.
In man alone does evil appear as in the greater number; because the
good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man---that
is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good in regard to the senses
than good according to reason.
Reply to Objection 6: In the causes of evil we do not proceed to
infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows
accidentally.
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ[50]-64)
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED (FIVE ARTICLES)
Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures:
firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is
called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the
composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.
Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their
substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what
belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.
Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal
things.
Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether
incorporeal?
(2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of
matter and form?
(3) We ask concerning their number.
(4) Of their difference from each other.
(5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal.
For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation
to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as
regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore
he is not simply incorporeal. "
Objection 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii) that "an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance. "
Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance.
Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every
creature is limited within its own nature. " But to be limited belongs
to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's
creatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His
angels"; and, farther on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were made;
He commanded, and they were created. " Therefore angels are corporeal.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 103:4): "Who makes His angels
spirits. "
I answer that, There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is
principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in
assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect
to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according
to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now,
God produces the creature by His intellect and will ([455]Q[14], A[8];
[456]Q[19], A[4] ). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that
there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the
action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is
limited to "here" and "now. " Hence the perfection of the universe
requires the existence of an incorporeal creature.
The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of
intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense
and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could
be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall
under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies,
as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57). Thence came the
error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts 23:8).
But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof
that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect
alone.
Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and
corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to
be the other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be
cold; and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material
and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it
is applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an
ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not
as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are.
Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.
Reply to Objection 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to
bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to
all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De
Spir. Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained in
corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their
substance. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and
form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of
the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the
species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from
the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a
genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of
substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.
Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is
matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand;
whence Boethius says (De Trin. ) that "a simple form cannot be a
subject": and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an
angel is composed of matter and form.
Objection 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act.
But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore
an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.
Objection 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter.
So the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of
an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the
form of an angel is in matter.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first creatures
are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal. "
I answer that, Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and
form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of
the Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are
distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards
incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which
distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in
common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal
from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is
subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common, is
its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and
corporeal things is the same; so that it must be understood that the
form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual
things, in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the
matter of corporeal things.
But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of
spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a
spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of
matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and
spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the
corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter,
however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity;
and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys.
i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of spiritual
things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it is
impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same
matter.
It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any
kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according to
the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether
immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act
receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according to
its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are
individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it
must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial.
But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily
distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend
things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence
material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in
a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on
the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect cannot
attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own
mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also
it apprehends God [457](Q[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: It is difference which constitutes the species.
Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is
determined to some special grade of being because "the species of
things are like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of
unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material
things there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that
is the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the
matter; and hence from the latter the "genus" is derived, and from the
former the "difference. " Whereas in immaterial things there is no
separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own self
holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them "genus" and
"difference" are not derived from different things, but from one and
the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of conception; for,
inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the
idea of their "genus"; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately,
it derives the idea of their "difference. "
Reply to Objection 2: This reason is given in the book on the Fount of
Life, and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the
intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. For
matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in some
species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the
intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise the
opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to the
effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the
intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of a
form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way of
receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance.
Reply to Objection 3: Although there is no composition of matter and
form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be
made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain
a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby
the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own
existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related
to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no
matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter,
there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very
existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is
understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an
angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence,"
and "what is," as Boethius says. For "what is," is the form itself
subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as
the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God "existence" and
"what is" are not different as was explained above ([458]Q[3], A[4]).
Hence God alone is pure act.
Reply to Objection 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its
existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature
to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being
considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the
part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the
matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are finite
in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms
are not received in anything else; as if we were to say, for example,
that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards the nature of
whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while
its "being" is finite as determined to some one special nature.
Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is finite
from above," as receiving its being from above itself, and is "infinite
from below," as not received in any matter.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels exist in any great number?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers.
For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a
continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are
incorporeal, as was shown above [459](A[1]). Therefore the angels
cannot exist in any great number.
Objection 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the
less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other
created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore
since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible
number in the angelic nature.
Objection 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances
seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of
the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we
can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the
movements of the heavenly bodies.
Objection 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and
intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine
goodness. " But a ray is only multiplied according to the different
things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is
receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are
immaterial, as was shown above [460](A[2]). Therefore it seems that the
multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the
requirements of the first bodies---that is, of the heavenly ones, so
that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be
terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as
before.
On the contrary, It is said (Dan. 7:10): "Thousands of thousands
ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood
before Him. "
I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the
number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate
substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to
maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and
according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number
of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible
things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31)
because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things.
Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar species of
these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are
higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held
(Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures bear relation to
these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he
strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to
the number of the first movements.
But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred
Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony,
held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial
substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly
movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he
contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are
styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which
manifest God's almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the
custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be
designated as angels.
Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are
immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all
material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv):
"There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences,
surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers. " The
reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the
universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more
perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created
by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their
magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their
multitude.
