No More Learning

Unquestionably. It is just in this that the moral worth of the
character is brought out which is incomparably the highest of all,
namely, that he is beneficent, not from inclination, but from duty.

To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly; for
discontent with one's condition, under a pressure of many anxieties
and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation
to transgression of duty. But here again, without looking to duty,
all men have already the strongest and most intimate inclination to
happiness, because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are
combined in one total. But the precept of happiness is often of such
a sort that it greatly interferes with some inclinations, and yet a
man cannot form any definite and certain conception of the sum of
satisfaction of all of them which is called happiness. It is not
then to be wandered at that a single inclination, definite both as
to what it promises and as to the time within which it can be
gratified, is often able to overcome such a fluctuating idea, and
that a gouty patient, for instance, can choose to enjoy what he
likes, and to suffer what he may, since, according to his
calculation, on this occasion at least, he has [only] not sacrificed
the enjoyment of the present moment to a possibly mistaken
expectation of a happiness which is supposed to be found in health.
But even in this case, if the general desire for happiness did not
influence his will, and supposing that in his particular case health
was not a necessary element in this calculation, there yet remains
in this, sas in all other cases, this law, namely, that he should
promote his happiness not from inclination but from duty, land by
this would his conduct first acquire true moral worth.

It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those
passages of Scripture also in which we are commanded to love our
neighbour, even our enemy. For love, as an affection, cannot be
commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake may; even though we are
not impelled to it by any inclination--nay, are even repelled by a
natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practical love, and not
pathological--a love which is seated in the will, and not in the
propensions of sense--in principles of action and not of tender
sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded.

The second [Footnote: The first proposition was that to have moral
worth an action must be done from duty. ] proposition is: That an
action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose
which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is
determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the
object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by
which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of
desire. It is clear from what precedes that the purposes which we
may have in view in our actions, or their effects regarded as ends
and springs of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditional or
moral worth. In what, then, can their worth lie, if it is not to
consist in the will and in reference to its expected effect? It
cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of the will without regard
to the ends which can be attained by the action. For the will stands
between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a
posteriori spring, which is material, as between two roads, and as
it must be determined by something, it follows that it must be
determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is
done from duty, in which case every material principle has been
withdrawn from it.

The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding,
I would express thus: Duty is the necessity "of acting from respect
for the law. " I may have inclination for an object as the effect of
my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it, just for this
reason, that it is an effect and not an energy of will. Similarly, I
cannot have respect for inclination, whether my own or another's; I
can at most, if my own, approve it; if another's, sometimes even
love it; i. e. look on it as favourable to my own interest. It is
only what is connected with my will as a principle, by no means as
an effect--what does not subserve my inclination, but overpowers it,
or at least in case of choice excludes it from its calculation--in
other words, simply the law of itself, which can be an object of
respect, and hence a command. Now an action done from duty must
wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every
object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the
will except objectively the LAW, and subjectively PURE RESPECT for
this practical law, and consequently the maxim [Footnote: A MAXIM is
the subjective principle of volition. The objective principle (i. e.
that which would also serve subjectively as a practical principle to
all rational beings if reason had full power over the faculty of
desire) is the practical LAW. ] that I should follow this law even to
the thwarting of all my inclinations.

Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect
expected from it, nor in any principle of action which requires to
borrow its motive from this expected effeet. For all these effects--
agreeableness of one's condition, and even the promotion of the
happiness of others--could have been also brought about by other
causes, so that for this there would have been no need of the will
of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the supreme
and unconditional good can be found. The pre-eminent good which we
call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than THE CONCEPTION
OF LAW in itself, WHICH CERTAINLY IS ONLY POSSIBLE IN A RATIONAL
BEING, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect,
determines the will. This is a good which is already present in the
person who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to
appear first in the result. [Footnote: It might be here objected to
me that I take refuge behind the word RESPECT in an obscure feeling,
instead of giving a distinct solution of the question by a concept
of the reason. But although respect is a feeling, it is not a
feeling RECEIVED through influence, but is SELF-WROUGHT by a
rational concept, and, therefore, is specifically distinct from all
feelings of the former kind, which may be referred either to
inclination or fear, What I recognise immediately as a law for me, I
recognise with respect. This merely signifies the consciousness that
my will is SUBORDINATE to a law, without the intervention of other
influences on my sense. The immediate determination of the will by
the law, and the consciousness of this is called RESPECT, so that
this is regarded as an EFFECT of the law on the subject, and not as
the CAUSE of it. Respect is properly the conception of a worth which
thwarts my self-love. Accordingly it is something which is
considered neither as am object of inclination nor of fear, although
it has something analogous to both. The OBJECT of respect is the LAW
only, and that, the law which we impose on OURSELVES, and yet
recognise as necessary in itself. As a law, we are subjected to it
without consulting self-love; as imposed by us on ourselves, it is a
result of our will. In the former aspect it has an analogy to fear,
in the latter to inclination. Respect for a person is properly only
respect for the law (of honesty, &c. ), of which he gives us an
example. Since we also look on the improvement of our talents as a
duty, we consider that we see in a person of talents, as it were,
the EXAMPLE OF A LAW (viz. to become like him in this by exercise),
and this constitutes our respect. All so-called moral INTEREST
consists simply in RESPECT for the law. ]

But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must
determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect
expected from it, in order that this will may be called good
absolutely and without qualification? As I have deprived the will of
every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law,
there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to
law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.
e. I am never to act otherwise than so THAT _I_ COULD ALSO WILL THAT
MY MAXIM SHOULD BECOME A UNIVERSAL LAW. Here now, it is the simple
conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law
applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its
principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain
delusion and a chimerical notion. The common reason of men in its
practical judgments perfectly coincides with this, and always has in
view the principle here suggested. Let the question be, for example:
May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep
it? I readily distinguish here between the two significations which
the question may have. Whether it is prudent, or whether it is
right, to make a false promise. The former may undoubtedly often be
the case. I see clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate
myself from a present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it
must be well considered whether there may not hereafter spring from
this lie much greater inconvenience than that from which I now free
myself, and as, with all my supposed CUNNING, the consequences
cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be much
more injurious to me than any mischief which I seek to avoid at
present, it should be considered whether it would not be more
prudent to act herein according to a universal maxim, and to make it
a habit to promise nothing except with the intention of keeping it.
But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still only be
based on the fear of consequences. Now it is a wholly different
thing to be truthful from duty, and to be so from apprehension of
injurious consequences. In the first case, the very notion of the
action already implies a law for me; in the second case, I must
first look about elsewhere to see what results may be combined with
it which would affect myself. For to deviate from the principle of
duty is beyond all doubt wicked; but to be unfaithful to my maxim of
prudence may often be very advantageous to me, although to abide by
it is certainly safer. The shortest way, however, and an unerring
one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying promise
is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, Should I be content that
my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise)
should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for
others? and should I be able to say to myself, "Every one may make a
deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which
he cannot otherwise extricate himself"? Then I presently become
aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no means will that
lying should be a universal law. For with such a law there would be
no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my intention
in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this
allegation, or if they overhastily did so, would pay me back in my
own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal
law, would necessarily destroy itself.

I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern
what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good.
Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being
prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou
also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it
must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing
from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as
a principle into a possible universal legislation, and reason
extorts from me immediate respect for such legislation. I do not
indeed as yet discern on what this respect is based (this the
philosopher may inquire), but at least I understand this, that it is
an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all worth of what is
recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of acting from
pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to
which every other motive must give place, because it is the
condition of a will being good in itself, and the worth of such a
will is above everything.

Thus, then, without quitting the moral knowledge of common human
reason, we have arrived at its principle. And although, no doubt,
common men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal
form, yet they always have it really before their eyes, and use it
as the standard of their decision. Here it would be easy to show
how, with this compass in hand, men are well able to distinguish,
in every case that occurs, what is good, what bad, conformably to
duty or inconsistent with it, if, without in the least teaching
them anything new, we only, like Socrates, direct their attention
to the principle they themselves employ; and that therefore we do
not need science and philosophy to know what we should do to be
honest and good, yea, even wise and virtuous. Indeed we might well
have conjectured beforehand that the knowledge of what every man
is bound to do, and therefore also to know, would be within the
reach of every man, even the commonest. [Footnote: Compare the note
to the Preface to the Critique of the Practical Reason, p. 111. A
specimen of Kant's proposed application of the Socratic method may
be found in Mr. Semple'a translation of the Metaphysic of Ethics,
p. 290. ] Here we cannot forbear admiration when we see how great
an advantage the practical judgment has over the theoretical in
the common understanding of men. In the latter, if common reason
ventures to depart from the laws of experience and from the
perceptions of the senses it falls into mere inconceivabilities and
self-contradictions, at least into chaos of uncertainty, obscurity,
and instability. But in the practical sphere it is just when the
common understanding excludes all sensible springs from practical
laws that its power of judgment begins to show itself to advantage.
It then becomes even subtle, whether it be that it chicanes with
its own conscience or with other claims respecting what is to
be called right, or whether it desires for its own instruction to
determine honestly the worth of actions; and, in the latter case,
it may even have as good a hope of hitting the mark as any philosopher
whatever can promise himself. Nay, it is almost more sure of doing
so, because the philosopher cannot have any other principle, while
he may easily perplex his judgment by a multitude of considerations
foreign to the matter, and so turn aside from the right way. Would
it not therefore be wiser in moral concerns to acquiesce in the
judgment of common reason or at most only to call in philosophy
for the purpose of rendering the system of morals more complete
and intelligible, and its rules more convenient for use (especially
for disputation), but not so as to draw off the common understanding
from its happy simplicity, or to bring it by means of philosophy
into a new path of inquiry and instruction?

Innocence is indeed a glorious thing, only, on the other hand, it is
very sad that it cannot well maintain itself, and is easily seduced.
On this account even wisdom--which otherwise consists more in
conduct than in knowledge--yet has need of science, not in order to
learn from it, but to secure for its precepts admission and
permanence. Against all the commands of duty which reason represents
to man as so deserving of respect, he feels in himself a powerful
counterpoise in his wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction
of which he sums up under the name of happiness. Now reason issues
its commands unyieldingly, without promising anything to the
inclinations, and, as it were, with disregard and contempt for these
claims, which are so impetuous, and at the same time so plausible,
and which will not allow themselves to be suppressed by any command.
Hence there arises a natural dialectic, i. e. a disposition, to
argue against these strict laws of duty and to question their
validity, or at least their purity and strictness; and, if possible,
to make them more accordant with our wishes and inclinations, that
is to say, to corrupt them at their very source, and entirely to
destroy their worth--a thing which even common practical reason
cannot ultimately call good.

Thus is the common reason of man compelled to go out of its sphere,
and to take a step into the field of a practical philosophy, not to
satisfy any speculative want (which never occurs to it as long as it
is content to be mere sound reason), but even on practical grounds,
in order to attain in it information and clear instruction
respecting the source of its principle, and the correct
determination of it in opposition to the maxims which are based on
wants and inclinations, so that it may escape from the perplexity of
opposite claims, and not run the risk of losing all genuine moral
principles through the equivocation into which it easily falls.
Thus, when practical reason cultivates itself, there insensibly
arises in it a dialectic which forces it to seek aid in philosophy,
just as happens to it in its theoretic use; and in this case,
therefore, as well as in the other, it will find rest nowhere but in
a thorough critical examination of our reason.




SECOND SECTION

TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS


If we have hitherto drawn our notion of duty from the common use of
our practical reason, it is by no means to be inferred that we have
treated it as an empirical notion. On the contrary, if we attend to
the experience of men's conduct, we meet frequent and, as we
ourselves allow, just complaints that one cannot find a single
certain example of the disposition to act from pure duty. Although
many things are done in conformity with what duty prescribes, it is
nevertheless always doubtful whether they are done strictly from
duty, so as to have a moral worth. Hence there have, at all times,
been philosophers who have altogether denied that this disposition
actually exists at all in human actions, and have ascribed
everything to a more or less refined self-love. Not that they have
on that account questioned the soundness of the conception of
morality; on the contrary, they spoke with sincere regret of the
frailty and corruption of human nature, which thought noble enough
to take as its rule an idea so worthy of respect, is yet too weak to
follow it, and employs reason, which ought to give it the law only
for the purpose of providing for the interest of the inclinations,
whether singly or at the best in the greatest possible harmony with
one another.

In fact, it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience with
complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action,
however right in itself, rested simply on moral grounds and on the
conception of duty. Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest
self-examination we can find nothing beside the moral principle of
duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or
that action and to so great a sacrifice; yet we cannot from this
infer with certainty that it was not really some secret impulse of
self-love, under the false appearance of duty, that was the actual
determining cause of the will. We like then to flatter ourselves by
falsely taking credit for a more noble motive; whereas in fact we
can never, even by the strictest examination, get completely behind
the secret springs of action; since, when the question is of moral
worth, it is not with the actions which we see that we are
concerned, but with those inward principles of them which we do not
see.

Moreover, we cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule
all morality as a mere chimera of human imagination overstepping
itself from vanity, than by conceding to them that notions of duty
must be drawn only from experience (as from indolence, people are
ready to think is also the case with all other notions); for this is
to prepare for them a certain triumph. I am willing to admit out of
love of humanity that even most of our actions are correct, but if
we look closer at them we everywhere come upon the dear self which
is always prominent, and it is this they have in view, and not the
strict command of duty which would often require self-denial.
Without being an enemy of virtue, a cool observer, one that does not
mistake the wish for good, however lively, for its reality, may
sometimes doubt whether true virtue is actually found anywhere in
the world, and this especially as years increase and the judgment is
partly made wiser by experience, and partly also more acute in
observation. This being so, nothing can secure us from falling away
altogether from our ideas of duty, or maintain in the soul a well-
grounded respect for its law, but the clear conviction that although
there should never have been actions which really sprang from such
pure sources, yet whether this or that takes place is not at all the
question; but that reason of itself, independent on all experience,
ordains what ought to take place, that accordingly actions of which
perhaps the world has hitherto never given an example, the
feasibility even of which might be very much doubted by one who
founds everything on experience, are nevertheless inflexibly
commanded by reason; that, ex. gr. even though there might never yet
have been a sincere friend, yet not a whit the less is pure
sincerity in friendship required of every man, because, prior to all
experience, this duty is involved as duty in the idea of a reason
determining the will by a priori principles.

When we add further that, unless we deny that the notion of morality
has any truth or reference to any possible object, we must admit
that its law must be valid, not merely for men, but for all rational
creatures generally, not merely under certain contingent conditions
or with exceptions, but with absolute necessity, then it is clear
that no experience could enable us to infer even the possibility of
such apodictic laws. For with what right could we bring into
unbounded respect as a universal precept for every rational nature
that which perhaps holds only under the contingent conditions of
humanity? Or how could laws of the determination of OUR will be
regarded as laws of the determination of the will of rational beings
generally, and for us only as such, if they were merely empirical,
and did not take their origin wholly a priori from pure but
practical reason?

Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should
wish to derive it from examples. For every example of it that is set
before me must be first itself tested by principles of morality,
whether it is worthy to serve as an original example, i. e. , as a
pattern, but by no means can it authoritatively furnish the
conception of morality. Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first
be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can
recognise Him as such; and so He says of Himself, "Why call ye Me
(whom you see) good; none is good (the model of good) but God only
(whom ye do not see)? " But whence have we the conception of God as
the supreme good? Simply from the IDEA of moral perfection, which
reason frames a priori, and connects inseparably with the notion of
a free-will. Imitation finds no place at all in morality, and
examples serve only for encouragement, i. e. they put beyond doubt
the feasibility of what the law commands, they make visible that
which the practical rule expresses more generally, but they can
never authorise us to set aside the true original which lies in
reason, and to guide ourselves by examples.

If then there is no genuine supreme principle of morality but what
must rest simply on pure reason, independent on all experience, I
think it is not necessary even to put the question, whether it is
good to exhibit these concepts in their generality (in abstracto) as
they are established a priori along with the principles belonging to
them, if our knowledge is to be distinguished from the vulgar, and
to be called philosophical. In our times indeed this might perhaps
be necessary; for if we collected votes, whether pure rational
knowledge separated from everything empirical, that is to say,
metaphysic of morals, or whether popular practical philosophy is to
be preferred, it is easy to guess which side would preponderate.

This descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable, if
the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place
and been satisfactorily accomplished. This implies that we first
found Ethics on Metaphysics, and then, when it is firmly
established, procure a hearing for it by giving it a popular
character. But it is quite absurd to try to be popular in the first
inquiry, on which the soundness of the principles depends. It is not
only that this proceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit
of a true philosophical popularity, since there is no art in being
intelligible if one renounces all thoroughness of insight; but also
it produces a disgusting medley of compiled observations and half-
reasoned principles. Shallow pates enjoy this because it can be used
for every-day chat, but the sagacious find in it only confusion, and
being unsatisfied and unable to help themselves, they turn away
their eyes, while philosophers, who see quite well through this
delusion, are little listened to when they call men off for a time
from this pretended popularity, in order that they might be
rightfully popular after they have attained a definite insight.

We need only look at the attempts of moralists in that favourite
fashion, and we shall find at one time the Special constitution of
human nature (including, however, the idea of a rational nature
generally), at one time perfection, at another happiness, here moral
sense, there fear of God, a little of this, and a little of that, in
marvellous mixture, without its occurring to them to ask whether the
principles of morality are to be sought in the knowledge of human
nature at all (which we can have only from experience); and, if this
is not so, if these principles are to be found altogether a priori
free from everything empirical, in pure rational concepts only, and
nowhere else, not even in the smallest degree; then rather to adopt
the method of making this a separate inquiry, as pure practical
philosophy, or (if one may use a name so decried) as metaphysic of
morals, [Footnote: Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from
applied, pure logic from applied, so if we choose we may alse
distinguish pure philosophy of morals (metaphysic) from applied
(viz. applied to human nature). By this designation we are also at
once reminded that moral principles are not based on properties of
human nature, but must subsist a priori of themselves while from
such principles practical rules must be capable of being deduced for
every rational nature, and accordingly for that of man. ] to bring it
by itself to completeness, and to require the public, which wishes
for popular treatment, to await the issue of this undertaking.

Such a metaphysic of morals, completely isolated, not mixed with any
anthropology, theology, physics, or hyperphysics, and still less
with occult qualities (which we might call hypophysical), is not
only an indispensable substratum of all sound theoretical knowledge
of duties, but is at the same time a desideratum of the highest
importance to the actual fulfilment of their precepts. For the pure
conception of duty, unmixed with any foreign addition of empirical
attractions, and, in a word, the conception of the moral law,
exercises on the human heart, by way of reason alone (which first
becomes aware with this that it can of itself be practical), an
influence so much more powerful than all other springs [Footnote: I
have a letter from the late excellent Sulzer, in which he asks me
what can be the reason that moral instruction, although containing
much that is convincing for the reason, yet accomplishes so little?
My answer was postponed in order that I might make it complete. But
it is simply this, that the teachers themselves have not got their
own notions clear, and when they endeavour to make up for this by
raking up motives of moral goodness from every quarter, trying to
make their physic right strong, they spoil it. For the commonest
understanding shows that if we imagine, on the one hand, an act of
honesty done with steadfast mind, apart from every view to advantage
of any kind in this world or another, and even under the greatest
temptations of necessity or allurement, and, on the other hand, a
similar act which was affected, in however low a degree, by a
foreign motive, the former leaves far behind and eclipses the
second; it elevates the soul, and inspires the wish to be able to
act in like manner oneself. Even moderately young children feel this
impression, and one should never represent duties to them in any
other light. ] which may be derived from the field of experience,
that in the consciousness of its worth, despises the latter, and can by
degrees become their master; whereas a mixed ethics, compounded
partly of motives drawn from feelings and inclinations, and partly also of
conceptions of reason, must make the mind waver between motives
which cannot be brought under any principle, which lead to good only
by mere accident, and very often also to evil.

From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have
their seat and origin completely a priori in the reason, and that,
moreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is
in the highest degree speculative; that they cannot be obtained by
abstraction from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent
knowledge; that it is just this purity of their origin that makes
them worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle, and that
just in proportion as we add anything empirical, we detract from
their genuine influence, and from the absolute value of actions;
that it is not only of the greatest necessity, in a purely
speculative point of view, but is also of the greatest practical
importance to derive these notions and laws from pure reason, to
present them pure and unmixed, and even to determine the compass of
this practical or pure rational knowledge, i. e. to determine the
whole faculty of pure practical reason; and, in doing so, we must
not make its principles dependent on the particular nature of human
reason, though in speculative philosophy this may be permitted, or
may even at times be necessary; but since moral laws ought to hold
good for every rational creature, we must derive them from the
general concept of a rational being. In this way, although for its
application to man morality has need of anthropology, yet, in the
first instance, we must treat it independently as pure philosophy,
i. e. as metaphysic, complete in itself (a thing which in such
distinct branches of science is easily done); knowing well that
unless we are in possession of this, it would not only be vain to
determine the moral element of duty in right actions for purposes of
speculative criticism, but it would be impossible to base morals on
their genuine principles, even for common practical purposes,
especially of moral instruction, so as to produce pure moral dispositions,
and to engraft them on men's minds to the promotion of the greatest
possible good in the world.

But in order that in this study we may not merely advance by the
natural steps from the common moral judgment (in this case very
worthy of respect) to the philosophical, as has been already done,
but also from a popular philosophy, which goes no further than it
can reach by groping with the help of examples, to metaphysic (which
does not allow itself to be checked by anything empirical, and as it
must measure the whole extent of this kind of rational knowledge,
goes as far as ideal conceptions, where even examples fail us), we
must follow and clearly describe the practical faculty of reason,
from the general rules of its determination to the point where the
notion of duty springs from it.

Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone
have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that
is according to principles, i. e. , have a will. Since the deduction
of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but
practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the
actions of such a being which are recognised as objectively
necessary are subjectively necessary also, i. e. , the will is a
faculty to choose that only which reason independent on inclination
recognises as practically necessary, i. e. , as good. But if reason
of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is
subject also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which do
not always coincide with the objective conditions; in a word, if the
will does not in itself completely accord with reason (which is
actually the case with men), then the actions which objectively are
recognised as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the
determination of such a will according to objective laws is
obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a
will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination
of the will of a rational being by principles of reason, but which
the will from its nature does not of necessity follow.

The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is
obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason); and the
formula of the command is called an Imperative.

All imperatives are expressed by the word OUGHT [or SHALL], and
thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a
will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily
determined by it (an obligation). They say that something would be
good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not
always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That
is practically GOOD, however, which determines the will by means of
the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective
causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for
every rational being as such. It is distinguished from the PLEASANT,
as that which influences the will only by means of sensation from
merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that
one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for every one.
[Footnote 3: The dependence of the desires on sensations is called
inclination, and this accordingly always indicates a WANT. The
dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of
reason is called an INTEREST. This therefore is found only in the
case of a dependent will, which does not always of itself conform to
reason; in the Divine will we cannot conceive any interest. But the
human will can also TAKE AN INTEREST in a thing without therefore
acting FROM INTEREST. The former signifies the PRACTICAL interest in
the action, the latter the PATHOLOGICAL in the object of the action.
The former indicates only dependence of the will or principles of
reason in themselves; the second, dependence on principles of reason
for the sake of inclination, reason supplying only the practical
rules how the requirement of the inclination may he satisfied. In
the first case the action interests me; in the second the object of
the action (because it is pleasant to me), We have seen in the first
section that in an action done from duty we must look not to the
interest in the object, but only to that in the action itself, and
in its rational principle (viz. the law). ]

A perfectly good will would therefore be equally subject to
objective laws (viz. laws of good), but could not be conceived as
OBLIGED thereby to act lawfully, because of itself from its
subjective constitution it can only be determined by the conception
of good. Therefore no imperatives hold for the Divine will, or in
general for a HOLY will; OUGHT is here out of place, because the
volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law.
Therefore imperatives are only formulae to express the relation of
objective laws of all volition to the subjective imperfection of the
will of this or that rational being, e. g. the human will.

Now all IMPERATIVES command either HYPOTHETICALLY or CATEGORICALLY.
The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as
means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might
possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which
represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to
another end, i. e. , as objectively necessary.

Since every practical law represents a possible action as good, and
on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable by
reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulae determining an
action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good
in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means TO
SOMETHING ELSE, then the imperative is HYPOTHETICAL; if it is
conceived as good IN ITSELF and consequently as being necessarily
the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it
is CATEGORICAL.

Thus the imperative declares what action possible by me would be
good, and presents the practical rule in relation to a will which
does not forthwith perform an action simply because it is good,
whether because the subject does not always know that it is good, or
because, even if it know this, yet its maxims might be opposed to
the objective principles of practical reason.

Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is
good for some purpose, POSSIBLE or ACTUAL. In the first case it is a
Problematical, in the second an Assertorial practical principle. The
categorical imperative which declares an action to be objectively
necessary in itself without reference to any purpose, i. e. , without
any other end, is valid as an Apodictic (practical) principle.

Whatever is possible only by the power of some rational being may
also be conceived as a possible purpose of some will; and therefore
the principles of action as regards the means necessary to attain
some possible purpose are in fact infinitely numerous. All sciences
have a practical part, consisting of problems expressing that some
end is possible for us, and of imperatives directing how it may be
attained. These may, therefore, be called in general imperatives of
Skill. Here there is no question whether the end is rational and
good, but only what one must do in order to attain it. The precepts
for the physician to make his patient thoroughly healthy, and for a
poisoner to ensure certain death, are of equal value in this
respect, that each serves to effect its purpose perfectly. Since in
early youth it cannot be known what ends are likely to occur to us
in the course of life, parents seek to have their children taught a
great many things, and provide for their skill in the use of means
for all sorts of arbitrary ends, of none of which can they determine
whether it may not perhaps hereafter be an object to their pupil,
but which it is at all events possible that he might aim at; and
this anxiety is so great that they commonly neglect to form and
correct their judgment on the value of the things which may be
chosen as ends.

There is one end, however, which may be assumed to be actually such
to all rational beings (so far as imperatives apply to them, viz. as
dependent beings), and therefore, one purpose which they not merely
MAY have, but which we may with certainty assume that they all
actually HAVE by a natural necessity, and this is HAPPINESS. The
hypothetical imperative which expresses the practical necessity of
an action as means to the advancement of happiness is Assertorial.
We are not to present it as necessary for an uncertain and merely
possible purpose, but for a purpose which we may presuppose with
certainty and a priori in every man, because it belongs to his
being. Now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-
being may be called prudence [The word prudence is taken in two
senses; in the one it may bear the name of knowledge of the world,
in the other that of private prudence. The former is a man's ability
to influence others so as to use them for his own purposes.
The
latter is the sagacity to combine all these purposes for his own
lasting benefit. This latter is properly that to which the value
even of the former is reduced, and when a man is prudent in the
former sense, but not in the latter, we might better say of him that
he is clever and cunning, but, on the whole, imprudent. Compare on
the difference between klug and gescheu here alluded to,
Anthropologie, 45, ed. Schubert, p. no. ] in the narrowest sense. And
thus the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one's own
happiness, i. e. , the precept of prudence, is still always
hypothetical; the action is not commanded absolutely, but only as
means to another purpose.

Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct
immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be
attained by it. This imperative is Categorical. It concerns not the
matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the
principle of which it is itself a result, and what is essentially
good in it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence
be what it may. This imperative may be called that of Morality.

There is a marked distinction also between the volitions on these
three sorts of principles in the DISSIMILARITY of the obligation of
the will. In order to mark this difference more clearly, I think
they would be most suitably named in their order if we said they are
either RULES of skill, or COUNSELS of prudence, or COMMANDS (LAWS)
of morality. For it is LAW only that involves the conception of an
UNCONDITIONAL and objective necessity, which is consequently
universally valid; and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that
is, must be followed, even in opposition to inclination. COUNSELS,
indeed, involve necessity, but one which can only hold under a
contingent subjective condition, viz. they depend on whether this or
that man reckons this or that as part of his happiness; the
categorical imperative, on the contrary, is not limited by any
condition, and as being absolutely, although practically, necessary,
may be quite properly called a command. We might also call the first
kind of imperatives TECHNICAL (belonging to art), the second
PRAGMATIC (to welfare), [It seems to me that the proper
signification of the word pragmatic may be most accurately defined
in this way. For sanctions [see Cr. of Pract. Reas. , p. 271] are
called pragmatic which flow properly, not from the law of the states
as necessary enactments, but from precaution for the general
welfare. A history is composed pragmatically when it teaches
prudence, i. e. instructs the world how it can provide for its
interests better, or at least as well as the men of former time. ];
the third MORAL (belonging to free conduct generally, that is, to
morals).

Now arises the question, how are all these imperatives possible?
This question does not seek to know how we can conceive the
accomplishment of the action which the imperative ordains, but
merely how we can conceive the obligation of the will which the
imperative expresses. No special explanation is needed to show how
an imperative of skill is possible. Whoever wills the end, wills
also (so far as reason decides his conduct) the means in his power
which are indispensably necessary thereto. This proposition is, as
regards the volition, analytical; for, in willing an object as my
effect, there is already thought the causality of myself as an
acting cause, that is to say, the use of the means; and the
imperative educes from the conception of volition of an end the
conception of actions necessary to this end. Synthetical
propositions must no doubt be employed in denning the means to a
proposed end; but they do not concern the principle, the act of the
will, but the object and its realization. Ex. gr. , that in order to
bisect a line on an unerring principle I must draw from its
extremities two intersecting arcs; this no doubt is taught by
mathematics only in synthetical propositions; but if I know that it
is only by this process that the intended operation can be
performed, then to say that if I fully will the operation, I also
will the action required for it, is an analytical proposition; for
it is one and the same thing to conceive something as an effect
which I can produce in a certain way, and to conceive myself as
acting in this way.

If it were only equally easy to give a definite conception of
happiness, the imperatives of prudence would correspond exactly with
those of skill, and would likewise be analytical. For in this case
as in that, it could be said, whoever wills the end, wills also
(according to the dictate of reason necessarily) the indispensable
means thereto which are in his power. But, unfortunately, the notion
of happiness is so indefinite that although every man wishes to
attain it, yet he never can say definitely and consistently what it
is that he really wishes and wills. The reason of this is that all
the elements which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether
empirical, i. e. they must be borrowed from experience, and
nevertheless the idea of happiness requires an absolute whole, a
maximum of welfare in my present and all future circumstances. Now
it is impossible that the most clear-sighted, and at the same time
most powerful being (supposed finite), should frame to himself a
definite conception of what he really wills in this. Does he will
riches, how much anxiety, envy, and snares might he not thereby draw
upon his shoulders? Does he will knowledge and discernment, perhaps
it might prove to be only an eye so much the sharper to show him so
much the more fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him,
and that cannot be avoided, or to impose more wants on his desires,
which already give him concern enough. Would he have long life, who
guarantees to him that it would not be a long misery? would he at
least have health? how often has uneasiness of the body restrained
from excesses into which perfect health would have allowed one to
fall? and so on. In short he is unable, on any principle, to
determine with certainty what would make him truly happy; because to
do so he would need to be omniscient. We cannot therefore act on any
definite principles to secure happiness, but only on empirical
counsels, ex. gr. of regimen, frugality, courtesy, reserve, &c. ,
which experience teaches do, on the average, most promote well-
being. Hence it follows that the imperatives of prudence do not,
strictly speaking, command at all, that is, they cannot present
actions objectively as practically necessary; that they are rather
to be regarded as counsels (consilia) than precepts (praecepta) of
reason, that the problem to determine certainly and universally what
action would promote the happiness of a rational being is completely
insoluble, and consequently no imperative respecting it is possible
which should, in the strict sense, command to do what makes happy;
because happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination,
resting solely on empirical grounds, and it is vain to expect that
these should define an action by which one could attain the totality
of a series of consequences which is really endless. This imperative
of prudence would however be an analytical proposition if we assume
that the means to happiness could be certainly assigned; for it is
distinguished from the imperative of skill only by this, that in the
latter the end is merely possible, in the former it is given; as
however both only ordain the means to that which we suppose to be
willed as an end, it follows that the imperative which ordains the
willing of the means to him who wills the end is in both cases
analytical. Thus there is no difficulty in regard to the possibility
of an imperative of this kind either.

On the other hand the question, how the imperative of morality is
possible, is undoubtedly one, the only one? demanding a solution, as
this is not at all hypothetical, and the objective necessity which
it presents cannot rest on any hypothesis, as is the case with the
hypothetical imperatives. Only here we must never leave out of
consideration that we cannot make out by any example, in other words
empirically, whether there is such an imperative at all; but it is
rather to be feared that all those which seem to be categorical may
yet be at bottom hypothetical. For instance, when the precept is:
Thou shalt not promise deceitfully; and it is assumed that the
necessity of this is not a mere counsel to avoid some other evil, so
that it should mean: thou shalt not make a lying promise, lest if it
become known thou shouldst destroy thy credit, but that an action of
this kind must be regarded as evil in itself, so that the imperative
of the prohibition is categorical; then we cannot show with
certainty in any example that the will was determined merely by the
law, without any other spring of action, although it may appear to
be so. For it is always possible that fear of disgrace, perhaps also
obscure dread of other dangers, may have a secret influence on the
will. Who can prove by experience the non-existence of a cause when
all that experience tells us is that we do not perceive it? But in
such a case the so-called moral imperative, which as such appears to
be categorical and unconditional, would in reality be only a
pragmatic precept, drawing our attention to our own interests, and
merely teaching us to take these into consideration.

We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the possibility of a
categorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of
its reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of]
its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation, not
for its establishment. In the mean-time it may be discerned
beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of
a practical law: all the rest may indeed be called principles of the
will but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the
attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself
contingent, and we can at any time be free from the precept if we
give up the purpose: on the contrary, the unconditional command
leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite; consequently it
alone carries with it that necessity which we require in a law.

Secondly, in the case of this categorical imperative or law of
morality, the difficulty (of discerning its possibility) is a very
profound one. It is an a priori synthetical practical proposition;
[Footnote: I connect the act with the will without presupposing any
condition resulting from any inclination, but d priori, and
therefore necessarily (though only objectively, i. e. assuming the
idea of a reason possessing full power over all subjective motives).
This is accordingly a practical proposition which does not deduce
the willing of an action by mere analysis from another already
presupposed (for we have not such a perfect will), but connects it
immediately with the conception of the will of a rational being, as
something not contained in it. ] and as there is so much difficulty
in discerning the possibility of speculative propositions of this
kind, it may readily be supposed that the difficulty will be no less
with the practical.

In this problem we will first inquire whether the mere conception of
a categorical imperative may not perhaps supply us also with the
formula of it, containing the proposition which alone can be a
categorical imperative; for even if we know the tenor of such
absolute command, yet how it is possible will require further
special and laborious study, which we postpone to the last section.

When I conceive a hypothetical imperative in general I do not know
beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But
when I conceive a categorical imperative I know at once what it
contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the
necessity that the maxims [Footnote: A MAXIM is a subjective
principle of action, and must be distinguished from the objective
principle, namely, practical law. The former contains the practical
rule set by reason according to the conditions of the subject (often
its ignorance or its inclinations), so that it is the principle on
which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle valid
for every rational being, and is the principle on which it ought to
act that is an imperative. ] shall conform to this law, while the law
contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the
general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a
universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative
properly represents as necessary. [Footnote: I have no doubt that
"den" in the original before "Imperativ" is a misprint for "der,"
and have translated accordingly. Mr. Semple has done the same. The
editions that I have seen agree in reading "den," and M. Barni so
translates. With this reading, it is the conformity that presents
the imperative as necessary. ]

There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act
only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it
should become a universal law.

Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one
imperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain
undecided whether what is called duty is not merely a vain notion,
yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and
what this notion means.

Since the universality of the law according to which effects are
produced constiutes what is properly called nature in the most
general sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far
as it is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be
expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by
thy will a Universal Law of Nature.

We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of
them into duties to ourselves and to others, and into perfect and
imperfect duties. [Footnote: It must be noted here that I reserve
the division of duties for a future metaphysic of morals; so that I
give it here only as an arbitrary one (in order to arrange my
examples). For the rest, I understand by a perfect duty one that
admits no exception in favour of inclination, and then I have not
merely external, but also internal perfect duties. This is contrary
to the use of the word adopted in the schools; but I do not intend
to justify it here, as it is all one for my purpose whether it is
admitted or not. [Perfect duties are usually understood to be those
which can be enforced by external law; imperfect, those which cannot
be enforced. They are also called respectively determinate and
indeterminate, officia juris and officia virtutis. ]]

I. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied
of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can
ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself
to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his
action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: From
self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its
longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction. It
is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can
become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system
of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of
the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the
improvement of life would contradict itself, and therefore could not
exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist
as a universal law of nature, and consequently would be wholly
inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty. [Footnote: On
suicide cf. further Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 274. ]

2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He
knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that
nothing will be lent to him, unless he promises stoutly to repay it
in a definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has
still so much conscience as to ask himself: Is it not unlawful and
inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?
Suppose, however, that he resolves to do so, then the maxim of his
action would be expressed thus: When I think myself in want of
money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know
that I never can do so. Now this principle of self-love or of one's
own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future
welfare; but the question now is, Is it right? I change then the
suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question
thus: How would it be if my maxim were a universal law? Then I see
at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature, but
would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a
universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty
should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of
not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible,
as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one
would consider that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule
all such statements as vain pretences.

3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some
culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds
himself in comfortable circumstances, and prefers to indulge in
pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his
happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of
neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination
to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then
that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal
law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their
talents rust, and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness,
amusement, and propagation of their species--in a word, to
enjoyment; but he cannot possibly WILL that this should be a
universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural
instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his
faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have been given
him, for all sorts of possible purposes.

4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to
contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks:
What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as heaven
pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor
even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his
welfare or to his assistance in distress! Now no doubt if such a
mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very
well subsist, and doubtless even better than in a state in which
everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care
occasionally to put it into practice, but on the other side, also
cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates
them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature
might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to WILL
that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of
nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself,
inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of
the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of
nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all
hope of the aid he desires.

These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we
regard as such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one
principle that we have laid down. We must be ABLE TO WILL that a
maxim of our action should be a universal law. This is the canon of
the moral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions are of
such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be
even CONCEIVED as a universal law of nature, far from it being
possible that we should WILL that it SHOULD be so. In others this
intrinsic impossibility is not found, but still it is impossible to
WILL THAT their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law
of nature, since such a will would contradict itself. It is easily
seen that the former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) duty;
the latter only laxer (meritorious) duty. Thus it has been
completely shown by these examples how all duties depend as regards
the nature of the obligation (not the object of the action) on the
same principle.

If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of
duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim
should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us; on the
contrary we will that the opposite should remain a universal law,
only we assume the liberty of making an EXCEPTION in our own favour
or (just for this time only) in favour of our inclination.
Consequently if we considered all cases from one and the same point
of view, namely, that of reason, we should find a contradiction in
our own will, namely, that a certain principle should be objectively
necessary as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be
universal, but admit of exceptions. As however we at one moment
regard our action from the point of view of a will wholly conformed
to reason, and then again look at the same action from the point of
view of a will affected by inclination, there is not really any
contradiction, but an antagonism of inclination to the precept of
reason, whereby the universality of the principle is changed into a
mere generality, so that the practical principle of reason shall
meet the maxim half way. Now, although this cannot be justified in
our own impartial judgment, yet it proves that we do really
recognise the validity of the categorical imperative and (with all
respect for it) only allow ourselves a few exceptions, which we
think unimportant and forced from us.

We have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a
conception which is to have any import and real legislative
authority for our actions, it can only be expressed in categorical,
and not at all in hypothetical imperatives. We have also, which is
of great importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every
practical application the content of the categorical imperative,
which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a
thing at all. We have not yet, however, advanced so far as to prove
a priori that there actually is such an imperative, that there is a
practical law which commands absolutely of itself, and without any
other impulse, and that the following of this law is duty.

With the view of attaining to this it is of extreme importance to
remember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the
reality of this principle from the particular attributes of human
nature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of
action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom an
imperative can apply at all) and for this reason only be also a law
for all human wills. On the contrary, whatever is deduced from the
particular natural characteristics of humanity, from certain
feelings and propensions, [Footnote: Kant distinguishes "Hang
(propensio)" from "Neigung (inclinatio)" as follows:--"Hang" is a
predisposition to the desire of some enjoyment; in other words, it
is the subjective possibility of excitement of a certain desire,
which precedes the conception of its object. When the enjoyment has
been experienced, it produces a "Neigung" (inclination) to it, which
accordingly is defined "habitual sensible desire. "--Anthropologie,
72, 79; Religion, p. 31. ] nay even, if possible, from any particular
tendency proper to human reason, and which need not necessarily hold
for the will of every rational being; this may indeed supply us with
a maxim, but not with a law; with a subjective principle on which we
may have a propension and inclination to act, but not with an
objective principle on which we should be enjoined to act, even
though all our propensions, inclinations, and natural dispositions
were opposed to it. In fact the sublimity and intrinsic dignity of
the command in duty are so much the more evident, the less the
subjective impulses favour it and the more they oppose it, without
being able in the slightest degree to weaken the obligation of the
law or to distinguish its validity.

Here then we see philosophy brought to a critical position, since it
has to be firmly fixed, notwithstanding that it has nothing to
support it either in heaven or earth. Here it must show its purity
as absolute dictator of its own laws, not the herald of those which
are whispered to it by an implanted sense or who knows what tutelary
nature. Although these may be better than nothing, yet they can
never afford principles dictated by reason, which must have their
source wholly a priori and thence their commanding authority,
expecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due
respect for it, nothing from inclination, or else condemning the man
to self-contempt and inward abhorrence.

Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an
aid to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to
the purity of morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an
absolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of
action is free, from all influence of contingent grounds, which
alone experience can furnish. We cannot too much or too often repeat
our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which
seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for
human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in
a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a
cloud) it substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs
of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see
in it; only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her
true form. [Footnote: To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing
else but to contemplate morality stripped of all admixture of
sensible things and of every spurious ornament of reward or self-
love. How much she then eclipses everything else that appears
charming to the affections, every one may readily perceive with the
least exertion of his reason, if it be not wholly spoiled for
abstraction. ]

The question then is this: Is it a necessary law for all rational
beings that they should always judge of their actions by maxims of
which they can themselves will that they should serve as universal
laws? If it is so, then it must be connected (altogether a priori)
with the very conception of the will of a rational being generally.
But in order to discover this connexion we must, however
reluctantly, take a step into metaphysic, although into a domain of
it which is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely, the
metaphysic of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not the
reasons of what happens that we have to ascertain, but the laws of
what ought to happen, even although it never does, i. e. , objective
practical laws, there it is not necessary to inquire into the
reasons why anything pleases or displeases, how the pleasure of mere
sensation differs from taste, and whether the latter is distinct
from a general satisfaction of reason; on what the feeling of
pleasure or pain rests, and how from it desires and inclinations
arise, and from these again maxims by the co-operation of reason:
for all this belongs to an empirical psychology, which would
constitute the second part of physics, if we regard physics as the
philosophy of nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws. But
here we are concerned with objective practical laws, and
consequently with the relation of the will to itself so far as it is
determined by reason alone, in which case whatever has reference to
anything empirical is necessarily excluded; since if reason of
itself alone determines the conduct (and it is the possibility of
this that we are now investigating), it must necessarily do so a
priori.

The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action
in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a
faculty can be found only in rational beings. Now that which serves
the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the
end, and if this is assigned by reason alone, it must hold for all
rational beings. On the other hand, that which merely contains the
ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end,
this is called the means. The subjective ground of the desire is the
spring, the objective ground of the volition is the motive; hence
the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs and
objective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational
being. Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all
subjective ends, they are material when they assume these, and
therefore particular springs of action. The ends which a rational
being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of his actions
(material ends) are all only relative, for it is only their relation
to the particular desires of the subject that gives them their
worth, which therefore cannot furnish principles universal and
necessary for all rational beings and for every volition, that is to
say practical laws. Hence all these relative ends can give rise only
to hypothetical imperatives.

Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in
itself an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself,
could be a source of definite laws, then in this and this alone
would He the source of a possible categorical imperative, i. e. , a
practical law.

Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in
himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or
that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or
other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as
an end. All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional
worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not
exist, then their object would be without value. But the
inclinations themselves being sources of want, are so far from
having an absolute worth for which they should be desired, that on
the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being
to be wholly free from them. Thus the worth of any object which is
to be acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings whose
existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have
nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value
as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the
contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them
out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be
used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of
action (and is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not
merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an
effect of our action but objective ends, that is things whose
existence is an end in itself: an end moreover for which no other
can be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for
otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all
worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be
no supreme practical principle of reason whatever.

If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the
human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being
drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for
every one because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective
principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical
law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as
an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as
being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human
actions. But every other rational being regards its existence
similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me:
[Footnote: This proposition is here stated as a postulate. The
grounds of it will be found in the concluding section. ] so that it
is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme
practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced.
Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as
to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any
other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only. We will
now inquire whether this can be practically carried out.

To abide by the previous examples:

Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who
contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be
consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he
destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he
uses a person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up
to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say,
something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his
actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot,
therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to
mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to
define this principle more precisely so as to avoid all
misunderstanding, e. g. , as to the amputation of the limbs in order
to preserve myself; as to exposing my life to danger with a view to
preserve it, &c. This question is therefore omitted here. )

Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict
obligation, towards others; he who is thinking of making a lying
promise to others will see at once that he would be using another
man merely as a mean, without the latter containing at the same time
the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use
for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting
towards him, and therefore cannot himself contain the end of this
action. This violation of the principle of humanity in other men is
more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and
property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses
the rights of men, intends to use the person of others merely as
means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always
to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable
of containing in themselves the end of the very same action.
[Footnote: Let it not be thought that the common: quod tibi non vis
fieri, &c. , could serve here as the rule or principle. For it is
only a deduction from the former, though with several limitations;
it cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the principle
of duties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevolence to others
(for many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit
him, provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence
to them), nor finally that of duties of strict obligation to one
another, for on this principle the criminal might argue against the
judge who punishes him, and so on. ]

Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself; it
is not enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own
person as an end in itself, it must also harmonise with it.