He was succeeded by
Sir Charles Metcalfe, who soon proved that Durjan Sal was, in fact,
plotting against us with the neighbouring Rajput and Maratha states,
and he pointed out the impolicy of allowing a small unimportant
state to flout the paramount power.
Sir Charles Metcalfe, who soon proved that Durjan Sal was, in fact,
plotting against us with the neighbouring Rajput and Maratha states,
and he pointed out the impolicy of allowing a small unimportant
state to flout the paramount power.
Cambridge History of India - v5 - British India
Barely half the fellings
were extracted, yet the annual teak export was 12,000 tons. Dr.
## p. 567 (#595) ############################################
THE FORESTS
567
Wallich in 1827 was the first to visit the forests and urge the need of
conservation, yet no teak was planted, no check imposed on waste.
There was indeed a Superintendent of Forests, 1841-8, but when he
asked for power to prevent felling of unselected trees, the court of
directors replied that such power was not for local officers. Logs
reaching Moulmein were taxed 15 per cent. ad valorem; through fraud
and neglect, three-quarters of them escaped payment in 1834-44, and
even subsequently timber provided only 18 per cent. of the total
revenue. The timber traders—discharged warrant officers and ship's
mates-never visited the forests but sent out Burmans who made the
jungle-folk, timid Karens, extract timber for little or nothing; the
Karens burned several forests to discourage such visitations. In 1842
better firms appeared but as these had the ear of government the
result was to accelerate exploitation-Durand's removal placated
Calcutta firms whose leases he had cancelled. By 1850 the forests
were ruined.
In 1827, immediately on the evacuation, the Burmese, despite the
Treaty of Yandabo, executed eleven circle headmen between
Yandabo and Rangoon, searched out every woman who had lived
with the English and every man who had served them, and wreaked
vengeance. The Talaings rose, failed, and fled, 30,000 of them, into
the Amherst district. Otherwise, apart from seasonal labour, there
was little immigration, as for long taxation was not lighter, or pro-
perty more secure, than in Pegu, where criminal administration was
effective and governors, wishing to retain their subjects, now requisi-
tioned less forced labour. The Talaing Corps, which lasted from
1838 to 1848, was intended to raise the Talaings against the Burmese,
but failed because its commandant was not a whole-time officer, and,
in Broadfoot's words, Talaings as well as Burmans could rise to the
highest offices in Ava, whereas in Tenasserim both were on low pay
only augmented by bribes.
Until 1842 the village revenue demand, distributed by elders, was
paid in kind; government had no information regarding tenures or
crop yields. By 1845 money payment was substituted, and assessment
was on each villager's field, surveyed by the village headman; reduc-
tions by 72 per cent. in 1843-8 left the rates at four annas to two and
a quarter rupees per acre; thereafter cultivation increased and yielded
37
per
cent. of the total revenue :
Cultivation
(acres)
Total
revenue
(rupees)
Population
1826
1835
1845
1852
?
'?
97,515
144,405
240,131
339,370
517,034
570,639
? 66,000
84,917
127,455
191,476
## p. 568 (#596) ############################################
568
BURMA, 1782-1852
Attempts to attract European planters by large grants of land
failed. The difficulty was lack of population, for immigration, some-
times amounting to thousands annually, from the Coromandel Coast,
was usually confined to the towns; it began in 1838 with imported
commissariat labour, and increased in 1843 when debtor slavery ceased
and convicts were withdrawn from private employment. Cattle were
imported from the Shan states, but the visits of Dr Richardson in
1830, 1834, 1835, 1837 to Chiengmai and Mong Nai and of Major
McLeod in 1837 to Kenghung, failed to open up general trade because,
though the people were friendly, jealousy between the overlords,
Ava and Bangkok, stifled intercourse.
The terrible system of frontier raids ceased in 1826-7 when Major
Burney visited Bangkok and obtained the return of 2000 persons
whom the Siamese had enslaved. Internal slavery, abolished by the
great Act V of 1. 843, was usually of the same mild type, debtor and
domestic, as in Arakan. But in Tavoy, noted for the comeliness of
its women, Muhammadans, exploiting ignorance and poverty, bought
girls for the Moulmein brothels and these debtor-bonds were enforced
in English courts; under Blundell's rules, abolished by Broadfoot in
1844, brothels were recognised, paying revenue in proportion to their
size. Liquor and opium licenses which, in spite of Chinese rings,
yielded 16 per cent of the revenue, were introduced in the towns
with Madras and European garrisons; Maingy, after seeing the effect
on Burmans and Talaings, regretted their introduction. Gambling,
also prohibited under native rule, was licensed until 1834 when the
protests of the Buddhist clergy prevailed.
Crime was rare save on the Burmese frontier. Burmese governors
were unpaid, they suppressed crime because brigandage was the per-
quisite of their retinue, and the daily sight of prosperous Moulmein
was too much for the governor of Martaban. Warnings having failed,
the commissioner burned Martaban in 1829, and gained several years
respite. But in 1847-50, of thirty-three traced dacoities in the
Amherst district, twenty-five were traced to Martaban; dacoits came
in racing canoes, posted pickets in Moulmein high street, looted
houses within two furlongs of the garrison, and vanished into the
darkness. Until 1844 most assistants never left their headquarters,
revenue accounts for the whole year covered only a single sheet, and
statistics of cultivation and population were rare. Criminal law was
the Muhammadan law of Bengal, but no copy of it existed; civil law
was Burmese, but until Dr Richardson, assistant, translated and
printed it in 1847, nobody knew what it was. Gaols were inefficient,
and in 1847 Sleeman protested against thugs being transported to
Moulmein, where they escaped at the rate of one a month.
Irregularities were of a type unknown in Arakan. In 1843 Corbin,
district assistant, Mergui, misappropriated grain revenue received in
kind, and his native mistress purchased girl slavus to weave cloth for
sale. In 1844 De la Condamine, district assistant, Amherst, drew the
## p. 569 (#597) ############################################
TENASSERIM ADMINISTRATION
569
pay of vacant clerkships, and kept no account of timber revenue
received in kind, while his clerks traded in timber and usury with
capital attributed to himself and Maingy. In 1848 the adjutant,
Talaing Corps, recovered from his sepoys money lent them by his
native mistress. Captain Impey, district assistant, Amherst, submitted
no treasury accounts for nine months, misappropriated 21,880 rupees,
refunded two-thirds on detection in 1850, and disappeared into the
Shan states.
Control from Calcutta was so slight that the commissioner might
have evolved a system of indirect government which allowed nativo
institutions proper scope. But even had that functionary been creative
such native institutions as survived Burmese misrule and Siamese
devastation showed little vitality. Freedom from Calcutta thus ended
simply in an undeveloped copy of the non-regulation model.
## p. 570 (#598) ############################################
CHAPTER XXXI
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
THE period 1818 to 1857 is important as that in which our relations
with the Indian states were finally placed upon practically that basis
on which they still rest. This policy, initiated by Lord Wellesley, but
abandoned by his successors, Cornwallis, Barlow and Minto, was
revived by Lord Hastings who carried it on to its logical conclusion.
When Lord Wellesley left India in 1805 our military superiority had
been pro:red beyond question; the huge state armies, led in great
measure by European officers, had melted away; while a series of
treaties defined our relationship with all the important rulers in
India. The foundations of the system which obtains to this day had
thus been laid, and Wellesley himself wrote in 1804 :
A general bond of connexion is now established between the British Gov.
ernment and the principal states of India on principles which render it the
interest of every state to maintain its alliance with the British Government. . .
and which secure to every state the unmolested exercise of its separate autho-
rity within the limits of its established dominion, under the general protection
of the British power. 1
The earlier system, of treating the states as if they stood on an equal
footing with us, was finally abandoned; and our political, as well as
our military supremacy, was specifically recognised. It is, of course,
unquestionable that this supremacy would ultimately have been
attained, probably only after conflict, but it is also beyond doubt,
that the policy followed by Lord Wellesley during the seven years
of his office simplified its establishment, and shortened the period
required for its attainment.
Lord Moira, afterwards Marquess of Hastings, landed in India in
1813, in avowed opposition to the policy pursued by Lord Wellesley,
but, as he himself remarks, he soon changed his views. Writing in
1815 he says: “It was by preponderance of power that those mines of
wealth had been acquired for the Company's treasury, and by
preponderance of power alone would they be retained”. The policy
of non-interference with the Indian states was, he saw, a futile policy;
for no highly civilised state, placed in the midst of less civilised or less
developed states, can ever hope to pursue it without disastrous results.
In 1817, four years after his assumption of the governor-generalship,
the Maratha confederacy was again intriguing actively against us,
and Central India was overrun by hordes of plunderers. By May,
1818, however, Sindhia had been forced to make terms, these hordes
had been dispersed, and Holkar defeated, while the Peshwa's power
1 Dispatch of 13 July, 1804, Despatches, IV, 177.
## p. 571 (#599) ############################################
SETTLEMENT OF 1818
571
had been extinguished. Other important Indian states, though in
no sense enthusiastic on our behalf, had welcomed our change of
policy and signed treaties of friendship and subordinate alliance with
the Company. The British Government thus became the acknow-
ledged suzerain, though the Moghul emperor still sat upon the throne
of Delhi. A period of reconstruction now commenced, directed by
Lord Hastings and carried out by a group of men whose names are
still household words in the areas in which they worked; Malcolm
in Central India, Elphinstone in the Deccan, Munro in Madras, and
Metcalfe, Tod and Ochterlony in Rajputana.
The chief centre of disturbance had been in Malwa, the high level
tract comprising the group of states which now forms the "Central
India Agency”, with the addition of the Gwalior state. To under-
stand the process of reconstruction initiated by Sir John Malcolm,
in Central India, it is essential to grasp the conditions prevailing in
this tract. The territories of the Indian states and estates in this area
were then, and are indeed to this day, mixed in inextricable confusion
as regards their boundaries, while they are at the same time linked
together by political agreements which enormously complicate
administrative procedure. The settlement of the great Maratha
generals in Malwa at the close of the eighteenth century led to the
subjection of the Rajput landholders, who were ousted from the
greater part of their possessions, by the formation of the Maratha
states of Gwalior, Indore, Dhar and Dewas, such lands as they were
alicwed to retain being held on a tributary or feudatory basis. These
tributaries included the more important Rajput states such as Ratlam,
as well as a large number of small estate-holders belonging to the
same class. This subjection to Maratha overlords had always been
strongly . resented and in early days tribute was never paid except
under compulsion. Disputes, moreover, were continuous and bound-
aries were constantly changing, as one or other party temporarily
predominated. During the Pindari War the Rajputs tried to make
all they could out of the disturbed conditions prevailing. Then came
our intervention, the rapid sweeping aside of the marauding hordes
and the sudden imposition of peace, which resulted in the crystalli-
sation of the territorial distribution as it chanced to be at that
moment. The effect of this sudden termination of hostilities was to
leave the whole of Malwa parcelled out, in a very haphazard way,
among the various owners, and the territorial patchwork thus created
persists, in spite of some adjustments, to this day. The territories of
the various landowners appear, indeed, to have been shaken out of
a pepper-box, so that, when travelling in this region, it is difficult to
say whose property you are traversing.
When Sir John Malcolm took up the task of settling Malwa he
found that, besides the payment of tribute demanded by the great
Maratha overlords, the Rajput thakurs, as the smaller landholders
are termed, claimed certain payments, called tankha, from these same
## p. 572 (#600) ############################################
572
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
overlords, payments which were in origin a form of blackmail, paid
in order to induce them to abstain from raiding and pilfering. Those
who received such payments were called grasias, or those receiving
a gras or "mouthful". Owing to the distracted condition of their
own administrations, after the late struggle, the Maratha rulers were
quite incapable of maintaining order or enforcing payment of their
demands and, in consequence, welcomed the assistance offered by us
in asserting their claims, and "unfeignedly resorted to us for aid". 1
Malcolm at once took up the task of adjusting these claims and
while securing to the Maratha rulers the tribute due to them also
secured to their tributaries the tankha they demanded, at the same
time guaranteeing them in the permanent possession of the land they
then held, so long as they kept the peace and carried out the con-
ditions in their sanads, or deeds of possession. These agreements were
mediated by Sir John between the Maratha overlord and the Rajput
ruler or thakur. They were drawn up in the names of the Maratha
suzerain and his Rajput feudatory and bore the overlord's seal, but
carried in addition an endorsement, signed by Sir John or one of his
assistants, usually over the words "Confirmed and guaranteed by the
British Government”.
The basis on which these agreements were drawn up is thus
enunciated by Lord Hastings. It was, he says, therefore,
easy, when no acknowledged usages stood in the way, to establish principles
between the sovereign and the subject advantageous to both, giving these
principles a defined line of practical application, a departure from which would
afford to either party a right of claiming the intervention of our paramount
power. While the Sovereign had his legitimate authority and his due revenue
insured to him, the subject was protected against exaction and tyrannical
outrage. 2
The effect of these agreements was immediate and the most
distracted population in India became in a few months a compara-
tively law-abiding community. It may be of interest, however, to
mention briefly the subsequent history of the "guarantee" system.
As has been pointed out above, the agreements thus "guaranteed"
were made out as between the Maratha ruler and his feudatory, the
British Government merely undertaking to see that each side carried
out its part, intervening only if the conditions were disregarded.
Actually, however, the confusion which existed for many years after
peace was introduced prevented the Maratha overlords from exer-
cising any real supervision and, in consequence, the Rajput feudatories
fell directly under the control of the British residents and political
agents in a way never contemplated by Lord Hastings, or in any
sense warranted by the terms of the sanads. They, in fact, were
treated by these officers as if in all respects under their direct charge,
and not simply as regarded adherence to the conditions laid down in
i Hastings, Summary, p. 48.
2 Idem.
## p. 573 (#601) ############################################
CENTRAL INDIA
573
the agreements. A form of political practice thus grew up which
became very galling to the Maratha overlords, and especially to the
Gwalior durbar, in which state by far the greater number of "guaran-
teed thakurs" held their estates. Remonstrances were continually
made and a good deal of irritation was displayed until finally in 1921
the government of India admitted the correctness of the Gwalior
durbar's contentions. The thakurs were then officially informed by
the viceroy, in a special durbar held at Delhi on 14 March, 1921, that
they would in future be wholly under the control of the Gwalior
state, which would exercise full suzerainty over them, the government
of India, however, reserving the right to intervene should the condi-
tions of the “guarantee” be in any way disregarded by either side.
Two Musulman states exist in the same area, Bhopal and Jaora.
The former, which had loyally supported us since 1778, was rewarded
with a grant of territory, while Jaora was created a separate entity
by the twelfth article of the Treaty of Mandasor 1 made with Holkar,
certain lands in that state being granted on service conditions to
Ghafur Khan, son-in-law of Amir Khan, nawab of Tonk, in return
for assistance rendered to Sir John Malcolm.
Of the two important Maratha states, Gwalior and Indore,
Sindhia had very reluctantly come to terms in 1817, while Holkar,
defeated in the battle of Mahidpur (December, 1817), had been
obliged to accept the terms offered to him.
In Rajputana the process of settlement was far simpler, as the
Marathas, though claiming tribute from the rajas, had never settleci
in that area which, being mainly arid and uninviting in comparison
with Malwa and the Deccan, did not attract them as a place of
residence. Moreover, the states were fewer, larger and more compact
in form and more homogeneous in character.
The conditions obtaining in each state were carefully examined.
and arrangements made in accordance with those conditions. Consi-
derable objections were raised at the time to our assuming this
responsibility, the freeing of the Rajput lands from marauding bands
being considered the utmost we should engage to do for them, while
our undertaking to see that the tribute claimed by the Marathas was
punctuaily paid was held to be inconsistent with our general policy
and indefensible in principle, in view of the fact that this tribute was
nothing but blackmail levied by force, without any real overlordship
to support the claim. The alternative would have been to leave these
states to settle their own disputes on the Utopian theory of non-
interference, which had invariably plunged them in disaster. The
pages of Tod but too clearly show that hereditary jealousies, family
feuds, not to mention ordinary motives of ambition and avarice, would
have made a peaceful settlement impossible except under the aegis
" Aitchison. Treaties. rv199.
## p. 574 (#602) ############################################
574
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
of our strong controlling authority. The result of Lord Hastings's
policy fully justified its adoption.
This payment of tribute to the Marathas was continued on the
grounds that we accepted the status quo at the time when we first
entered Rajputana and Central India, as we could have no concern
with conditions obtaining before the war. Adherence to this principle
had also insured the co-operation of the Marathas and facilitated
arrangements at the outset of the campaign. Payment of tribute was
in future made through the British authorities. Secondly the pay-
ment of the tribute was a recognised mark of fealty, exacted by all
suzerains, including the Moghul emperor, whose place we had taken,
while it was also a fair return for the obligations we had assumed in
protecting the states from aggression : the amount, moreover, was
henceforth fixed in perpetuity and this, together with the financial
advantages of peace, rendered these payments in no way burdensome.
At the same time each state was recognised as a separate unit,
independent internally but prohibited from forming any relations
with another state in India or any outside power. The settlement
was effected without difficulty except in Jaipur where internal
dissensions were rife.
Ap rt from these two great groups of states in Rajputana and
Central India there remained the Peshwa, the nominal head of the
Maratha confederacy, and the more important states of Nagpur,
Satara, Mysore, Oudh, Hyderabad, Baroda, Travancore and Cochin.
After very careful consideration Lord Hastings decided
in favour of the total expulsion of Baji Rao from the Dekhan, the perpetual
exclusion of the family from any share of influence or dominion and the anni-
hilation of the Peshwa's name and authority for ever.
This was an important step, as it removed even the nominal head of
the Maratha confederacy. It was, moreover, thoroughly justified by
Baji Rao's conduct. By nature timid, indolent, suspicious, and fond
of low companions, Baji Rao had proved himself uniformly untrust-
worthy. He had never adhered to the Treaty of Bassein (1802),
sending out his agents to intrigue against us in every state that would
receive them. The lesson was sharp but salutary.
In Nagpur the crimes and perfidy of Appa Sahib met with their
just reward in his deposition and the confiscation of the Sagar and
Narbada districts of his state. Later on, in 1853, when Lord Dalhousie
was governor-general, Nagpur was finally extinguished, for lack of
direct heirs, and became the nucleus of the present Central Provinces.
The effete descendant of Sivaji at Satara was, as a concession to
Maratha sentiment, given a small estate round his hereditary capital.
In 1848, however, Lord Dalhousie abolished the arrangement.
The Mysore state, restored to its Hindu rulers in 1799, on the
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1847-8, XLVIII, 327-31.
## p. 575 (#603) ############################################
OUDH
676
defeat of Tipu Sultan, supported us with troops in the Pindari War.
But the raja was a spendthrift and destitute of ability.
The state of Oudh calls for more detailed notice. Lord Hastings,
whose experience in England with the prince regent had, as it was
said, inclined him to “sympathise with royalty in distress,” treated
the nawab wazir with unusual consideration. Nawab Sa'adat 'Ali,
who, by severe exactions and parsimonious expenditure, had amassed
a hoard of thirteen millions sterling in eleven years, was averse to
all reforms, badly as his administration needed them, but Lord
Hastings abstained from pressing him. In July, 1814, Sa'adat 'Ali
died and was succeeded by his son Haidar-ud-din Ghazi. The new
wazir interviewed the governor-general at Cawnpore in October,
1814, and, in consideration of the sympathetic attitude of Lord
Hastings, and his own anxiety regarding a Gurkha invasion across his
northern border, was induced to lend the British Government a crore
(£1,000,000) of rupees, for the prosecution of the war against Nepal.
When this was expended by the governor-general's council on other
objects a second crore was lent, but only under great pressure.
Differences arose between the Resident and the n'awab on the
subject of administrative abuses, but Lord Hastings recalled his
officer and left the nawab to his own devices. The inevitable result
of non-interference followed, the administration rapidly going from
bad to worse. In 1818, however, Lord Hastings, somewhat incon-
sistently, urged the nawab to assume the title of king, and so formally
break his allegiance to the emperor of Delhi, to whom his family owed
its elevation. In the governor-general's opinion this act would
benefit the British Government by causing a division between these
important leaders of the Muhammadan community. The change
was, however, regarded with the greatest contempt and aversion by
the Indian princes and unfavourably contrasted with the conduct of
the Nizam of Hyderabad who had refused to accede to a similar
suggestion made to him, as being an act of rebellion against the
emperor. It also met with the disapproval of all experienced British
officials, Sir John Malcolm freely expressing the opinion that it was
most impolitic and a deliberate reversal of our previous well-con
sidered treatment of the imperial house of Taimur, and very likely
to nullify the sentiments of gratitude entertained for us by the princes
of this family, owing to our generous assistance in their distress. From
his subsequent behaviour it is clear that our support of his assumption
of this new honour evoked no sense of gratitude in the newly-created
king
The Baroda state, which had benefited materially by the Treaty
of Poona (1817) and gained certain acquisitions of territory in 1818,
lost its minister, Fateh Singh, who had long managed its affairs
during the lifetime of the imbecile Anand Rao Gaekwad. A new
treaty was made in 1820, and no difficulty was experienced in
connection with this state.
## p. 576 (#604) ############################################
576
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
Serious trouble soon arose in Hyderabad. The Nizam and his
minister Munir-ul-mulk took no interest in the administration, which
was left in the hands of a Hindu, Chandu Lal. He was capable but
extravagant, his extravagance being left unchecked by the Resident.
The Nizam's sons, moreover, were entirely out of hand and committed
many atrocities. Chandu Lal was at length forced to borrow and
contracted a heavy debt with Palmer and Co. , a British firm in
Hyderabad. By the act of 17961 no European could enter into,
financial transactions with an Indian prince without the express
sanction of the governor-general. It was understood that Palmer and
Co. were prepared to lend money at a lower rate of interest than
Indian bankers and, therefore, in 1816, Lord Hastings sanctioned the
transaction on the understanding that his government would not be
responsible for the repayment of any sums lent. In 1820, when sanc-
tion for a further sum was asked for, the directors demurred, became
suspicious of these loans and cancelled permission for them. ". Sir
Charles Metcalfe, who had succeeded Mr Russel as Resident, went
very carefully into the matter and found that nearly a million sterling
had been lent and then wasted in highly irregular expenditure,
including even the grant of pensions to members of the firm, while
as much as 24 per cent. was being charged as interest. Lord Hastings,
who had relied on the former Resident's recommendation and was
entirely ignorant of the details of the transactions, no sooner learned
the truth than he condemned the whole arrangement. Unfortunately
an entirely unjustifiable colour was placed on the affair because one
of the partners in Palmer and Co. was married to Lord Hastings's
ward, for whom he had a great affection. The correspondence on the
subject with the directors shows that, though they condemned the
policy followed, they exonerated the governor-general. But Lord
Hastings, disgusted with the implied censure, resigned in January,
1823.
Except in Cutch, where we had to intervene on account of a
dispute over the succession, no other state gave cause for interference.
To summarise Lord Hastings's work. His greatest claim rests upon
the pacification and opening out of all India (except the Panjab) to
British access, for Central India, Rajputana and the Deccan had, to
all intents and purposes, remained hitherto sealed areas to us, the
Marathas interposing a compact barrier between the three presiden-
cies. To Lord Hastings must be assigned, therefore, credit for the
consolidation of our empire, which completed the work of Lord
i Act 37, Geo. III, Cap. 142, S. 28.
2 Letter to Bengal, 24 May, 1820, Hyderabad Papers, p. 6.
3 Letter of governor-general to Resident, 13 September, 1822, Hyderabad
Papers, p. 186.
4 Letter from Palmer and Co. , 19 May, 1820, to Resident, and letters from
directors, 24 May and 16 December, 1820, Hyderabad Papers, pp. 42 ani!
70. Mill and Wilson, History, VTII, 344-57.
## p. 577 (#605) ############################################
BHARATPUR
577
Wellesley. This policy he had pursued indomitably in spite of great
opposition from the directors. Arriving in India to find marauding
bands sweeping across Central India, Nepal arrogant, the Marathas
conspirnig against us and the Rajput states divided by internal feuds
and depressed under the Maratha yoke, he left India, with Nepal
an ally, and one that has never since receded from that position, the
Maratha power broken, Central India pacified and self-respect restored
to the states of Rajputana. Above all it is to Lord Hastings that
we cwe the founding of that policy of partnership and friendly
co-operation which now determines the relations of the government
of India with the Indian states.
Lord Amherst (1823-8), who succeeded Hastings, initiated no
new policy and most of his time was occupied by the war with Burma.
This war did, however, react on the states, the view that our downfall
was near being freely circulated. As a result of this some disturbances
took place in Alwar, in the Sondhwada tract of Central India, and
at Bharatpur.
The Bharatpur disturbance alone was important. In 1823 Sir
David Ochterlony had sanctioned the succession to the Bharatpur
gaddi of Raja Baldeo Singh, a minor. His cousin, Durjan Sal, opposed
him and Sir David ordered troops to move from Delhi to support his
nominee. But Lord Amherst, who was very nervous about the effect
of a Burmese War, countermanded these orders, denouncing the
Resident's action as premature and enunciating the principle that the
mere fact of recognising Baldeo Singh during his father's lifetime
imposed no obligation on our government to support him against the
wishes of his subjects. Ochterlony considering this as a censure on
his conduct, resigned, dying not long after.
He was succeeded by
Sir Charles Metcalfe, who soon proved that Durjan Sal was, in fact,
plotting against us with the neighbouring Rajput and Maratha states,
and he pointed out the impolicy of allowing a small unimportant
state to flout the paramount power. On this, troops were sent up
under the commander-in-chief, Lord Combermere, and after a des-
perate resistance the Bharatpur fort was captured cn 18 January,
1826. Durjan Sal was deported.
When, in July, 1828, Lord William Cavendish-Bentinck succeeded
Lord Amherst, the inevitable reaction had set in in England, and
Bentinck came out with instructions to revert to the fatal non-
interference policy of Cornwallis and Barlow, a policy already, in
the last thirty years, conclusively proved to be disastrous in its results.
Once more, the fallacy of adhering to this policy was proved and the
governor-ger'eral was driven to interfere far more drastically than
he would have had to do had steps been taken in time.
The administration in Hyderabad and Oudh continued to dete-
riorate. In Indore the death of Tantia Jogh, the minister who hac
1 Kaye, Life of Metcalfe, 11, 140.
37
## p. 578 (#606) ############################################
878
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
1
introduced a regular administration into that state, left its control
in the weak hands of Maharaja Malhar Rao, and disturbances at
once commenced. In Gwalior the death of Daulat Rao Sindhia in
1827, and the succession of the youthful Jankoji Rao, led to the for-
mation of antagonistic parties and the fomentation of endless intri-
gues. Bentinck visited the states and announced his support of the
young maharaja, but his remonstrances had no effect in the face of
the regent maharani Baiza Bai's ill-advised policy, and troubles
continued to augment till they led to the dénouement of 1843. The
Supreme Government, however, contented itself with enunciating the
policy that it was immaterial to it who held the reins of power in a
state, provided that hostilities did not break out.
The Gaekwad of Baroda had become openly hostile, while the
Rajputana states, left wholly to their own devices, were in a condition
of ferment, the good work done by Tod and his colleagues being
rapidly undone. Finally, attention was forcibly drawn to the condi-
tions obtaining in this tract by an attack at Jaipur on the Resident
and his assistant, in which the former was wounded and the latter
killed. This actually took place just after Bentinck had embarked
for England in 1835. In Mysore the governor-general was obliged
to take over the administration owing to the incompetence and
extravagance of Raja Krishna Udaiyar and the consequent outbreak
of disturbances. The administration remained in our hands until 1881.
Some absorption of state territory also took place. The raja of
Jaintia in Assam sacrificed three British Indian subjects to the goddess
Kali, for which act his lands were annexed, while those of the raja
of Cachar, in the same province, were taken over for gross malad-
ministration. Coorg, near Mysore, where the raja openly declared
his hostility towards us and plotted to seize the station of Bangalore,
while at the same time murdering his relatives wholesale, was also
annexed.
Bentinck handed over temporary charge to Sir Charles Metcalfe,
who acted as governor-general until the arrival of Lord Auckland in
March, 1836.
Most of Lord Auckland's energies were taken up by the Afghan
War and he devoted little attention to the states.
However, when the debauchee king of Oudh died in 1837, advan-
tage of this was taken to conclude a new treaty, further mention of
which is made below.
The raja of Satara, to whom Lord Hastings had given a small
area in 1816, was deposed for intriguing, his brother being elevated
to the gaddi in his place. The territory of the nawab of Karnul, in
Madras, was annexed for attempting to make war.
Lord Ellenborough succeeded as governor-general in 1842. Only
one case of importance arose in connection with an Indian state, but
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1844, XXXVI, 351-453.
## p. 579 (#607) ############################################
GWALIOR
579
that was of the first importance. The troubles in the Gwalior state,
referred to in Bentinck's time, had continued to increase and now
came to a head. Jankoji Rao Sindhia died in 1843, to be succeeded
by an adopted son, a minor, Jayaji Rao. Intrigues multiplied and
the army, some 40,000 strong, became all powerful. The minority
was in the hands of Krishna Rao Kadam, the Mama Sahib, or materna
uncle of the late ruler. He was opposed to Dada Khasgi-wala (the
administrator of the family estates of the maharani), who succeeded
in engineering his downfall. Dada was, indeed, expelled from the
state on the demand of the governor-general, but this step failed to
put an end to the intrigues.
Lord Ellenborough's remonstrance fell mainly on deaf ears, while
the few sardars who were prepared to assist us in restoring order
were powerless in the face of the army, which had complete control
of affairs. The governor-general, therefore, decided to act and accom-
panied by the commander-in-chief, Sir Hugh Gough, crossed the
Chambal and advanced on Gwalior. To their surprise (for no proper
reconnaissance had been made) the British troops suddenly found
themselves face to face with the state forces, and after two simul-
taneous battles at Maharajpur and Panniar, the state army was
broken up. A fresh treaty was made and a council of regency
appointed to conduct affairs during the minority of the maharaja,
then nine years old. Lord Ellenborough's action in the Gwalior case
was the object of much criticism, and the main reason for his recail.
But whatever criticism may be levelled at his methods, there can be
no doubt as to the correctness of the policy pursued. When he landed
in India, Lord Ellenborough inherited, as a legacy from his prede-
cessor, the Afghan War. In addition, the assembly of a menacing
army of Sikhs, some 70,000 strong, just across the Satlej river, made
him nervous, and he felt that it would be courting disaster to leave
a hostile, undisciplined force in his rear, close to the important town
of Agra, especially in view of the weakness of our own army. The
best reply to the strictures levelled at him is to be found in his own
letter to Lord Ripon, written on receiving the news of his recall. "
He refers to the criticism passed on him by the court of directors in
which his conduct was stigmatised as "wanting in decision and
inconsistent with itself", and says in reply, that he is unable to
controvert this opinion because he has not the remotest idea to what
supposed facts it can possibly refer”. He then turns to the two
objections raised by the court, firstly that he should have supported
the regent, who was appointed with our approval, and secondly that
he should not have crossed the Chambal river against the expressed
wishes of the maharani and the sardars of the states. The Mama Sahib
(the regent), he points out, was offered military support but refuseci
1 Calcutta Review, 1844, I, 535.
2 Parliamentary Papers, loc. cit. pp. 143-344.
3 Law, India under Lord Ellenborough, p. 28.
## p. 580 (#608) ############################################
580
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
it, and, when his fall came, it was so sudden as to preclude any
possibility of such assistance reaching him. On 19 May (1843) he
was in full control of the administration, on the 21st he was removed
from the regency and by 5 June had left Gwalior, a fugitive. It
would, moreover, have been impossible to carry out military opera-
tions at the end of May, with the rains imminent and many stream:
to cross, including the great Chambal river.
With regard to the second point, the crossing of the Chambal in
December against the wishes of the durbar, he remarks that at that
season the winter rains were expected which would have made the
river difficult, if not impossible, to cross; provisions were not obtain-
able for the troops at his encampment; while the deep ravines which
surrounded his position made it dangerous. To have withdrawn the
troops would have led to an immediate cessation of all negotiations,
as the Gwalior army, which was de facto ruler of the state, woula
never have submitted quietly to disbandment, even if the durbar had
really intended to assist us. The court's view was, he notes, ton
limited, in regarding
the movement as an insulated transaction, which with an army in the field
the Governor-General could deal with at his leisure. . . . It should rather be
considered as a movement upon a field of battle extending from Scinde through
the Punjab even to the frontiers of Nepaul.
Delay in dealing with the situation would have induced the Sikhs to
advance, and to have left a hostile force of 40,000 men within a few
marches of Agra would have been the height of folly. He concludes
by saying that no negotiations would ever have been effected without
the presence of a force and it had always been apprehended that its
use would be necessary.
The weak point in Lord Ellenborough's procedure was his reliance
on the Treaty of Burhanpur, of 1804, which, though never denounced,
had been objected to by Lord Cornwallis, and treated as a dead
letter when new compacts were made with Gwalior in 1805 and 1817.
By article 6 of this treaty we undertook to support the maharaja
should necessity arise, with a subsidiary force; and the governor-
general, in view of the maharaja's youth, construed the disturbances
of 1843 as falling under the spirit of this article.
In July, 1844, Lord Ellenborough was recalled and Sir Henry
Hardinge succeeded him. The Sikh War engaged most of the governor-
general's attention but he visited the king of Oudh in a fruitless
endeavour to induce him to overhaul his administration, informing
him that unless reforms were introduced at an early date, the British
Government would be obliged to take over the state. The warning,
however, fell on deaf ears. Hardinge also urged the abolition of sati
in the Indian states, following the lines of Lord W. Bentinck's
enactment in British India.
1 Aitchison, op. cit. IV, 53; Parliamentary Papers, loc. cit. p. 146.
## p. 581 (#609) ############################################
SATARA
581
In January, 1848, Lord Dalhousie assumed the governor-general-
ship. His name is, even now, apt to be invidiously coupled with the
so-called "annexation policy" in connection with the Indian states.
But, indeed, in all probability, no criticism' would have been roused
by his action had not the Mutiny, following so closely on his retire-
ment, called for a scapegoat.
The cases on which this adverse criticism is mainly based are the
absorption of Satara (1848); Nagpur (1853); Jhansi (1854) and
Oudh (1856). There were also some other but less important in-
stances. Of all these only that of Oudh was strictly speaking a case
of deliberate annexation; in every other case Lord Dalhousie based
his decisions on the fact that no direct heir existed to inherit the state,
which was, moreover, "dependent”, that is created by ourselves or
held on a subordinate tenure. In each case, also, a decision was only
arrived at after infinite pains had been taken to ascertain the facts,
and was invariably carried out with the full approbation of the court
of directors.
The Satara state was created by Lord Hastings in 1818, the treaty
on which it rested (1819) containing no clause conferring the righĩ
of adoption, while Sir James Rivett-Carnac in installing the raja
had warned him that, being childless and no longer young, the state
would lapse at his death, unless as a mark of special favour he was
permitted to adopt a successor. Lord Dalhousie left no stone unturned
to arrive at a just decision; no argument for or against adoption
escaped his scrutiny. His policy was based on the well-established
Hindu doctrine, still followed by the ruling princes of India, which
denies the right of succession by adoption in a subordinate state or
estate unless the previous sanction of the suzerain has been obtained,
a rule applying equally to old-established or recently-created holdings.
Thus in Central India, it is followed by the big Maratha durbars
with respect of Rajput feudatories, who were established much
earlier than their masters. This permission to adopt must in every
case be given by the suzerain before the ceremony of adoption is
carried out, otherwise the adoption is not legal. On the other hand
it is not, in Indian states, customary to enforce an escheat, so that
the actual absorption of an entire holding is very rare, although the
terms of the tenure are often modified by the area being reduced,
the tributę raised or some new conditions imposed. A succession
fee called nazarana is invariably levied, amounting often to one
year's revenue or even more.
This well-known principle was disregarded by the raja of Satara,
who, just before he died, in 1848, adopted a son without informing
the British Resident or obtaining the permission of the governor-
general. Hence Lord Dalhousie would have been fully within his
rights in ordering escheat, simply on the basis of this omission,
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1849,-. XXIX, 267.
## p. 582 (#610) ############################################
582
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
3
especially as the court of directors had, in 1841, enunciated the
principle, that the right to political succession was an indulgenee
which should be the exception and not the rule, and be granted only
as a mark of special favour and approbation, adding that the Com-
pany should “persevere in the one clear and direct course of aban-
doning no just and honourable accession of territory or revenue,
while all existing claims of right are at the same time scrupulously
respected"
Lord Dalhousie consulted all his most experienced colleagues and
found that he was supported by the majority of them in refusing to
recognise the adoption. But before passing orders he referred the
case to the court, which agreed with his view, as "being in accordance
with the general law and custom of India". "
The Nagpur case was in many ways similar. The raja died heirless
in 1853. He had not adopted any one and no lineal descendant in
the male line survived. In a long, careful minute? Lord Dalhousie
pointed out that the original state was of recent creation and was
founded on usurpation and conquest; its ruler had always been
hostile to us, and after the campaign which ended in his defeat it had
lain entirely with us to deal with this territory as we thought fit.
Lord Hastings had then, as a concession to Maratha sentiment,
recreated the state from the conquered territory, after deducting a
considerable portion of it. Nagpur, like Satara, was thus a state of
our own making. In this minute Lord Dalhousie classed the Indian
states as being tributary and subordinate, of our own creation, or
independent. In the first case he considered that our assent was
necessary to an adoption, in the second case that adoption should not
be allowed, while in the third case we had no right to interfere.
Lord Dalhousie found, however, that in the Nagpur case many of
his advisers were against him, especially Colonel Low,5 who quoted
the views of Lord Hastings, Elphinstone, Munro, and Metcalfe, all of
whom considered that the adoption of heirs to states by Indian
princes should be recognised by us. The main grounds of dissent were,
that our rule was generally unpopular; that the absorption of a state
invariably meant that the aristocracy ceased to find employment and
became a discontented body; that the rigorous enforcement of the
doctrine of lapse would only lead to misgovernment, as every childless
raja, feeling that his state must come to an end, would oppress his
subjects, extorting the last penny from them for his own use. The
case was referred to the court, which upheld the escheat.
The Jhansi case (1854) stood on quite a different footing. The
subhedar of Jhansi had originally been a provincial governor under
1 Minute of 30 August, 1848, Parliamentary Papers, loc. cit. pp. 224-8.
2 Parliamentary Papers, loc. cit. pp. 272-98.
3 Parliamentary Papers, 1854, XLVIII, 317 sqq.
4 Minute of 28 January, 1854, idem, pp. 337-53.
5. Minute of 10 February, 1854, idem, pp. 355-67.
## p. 583 (#611) ############################################
OUDH
583
the Peshwa, and was in no sense a ruling chief. When in 1818 all the
Peshwa's lands fell to us the province of Bundelkhand passed with
them, and the subhadar with it. In submitting the case to the court
the governor-general laid stress on this aspect of the affair. 1
One case which Lord Dalhousie took up cannot well be brought
into the same category as the three just mentioned, and that is the
case of Karauli. This state lies in Rajputana and was founded in the
eleventh century. Sir Frederick Currie in his minute on the case
points out how Karauli, an old Rajput state, differed entirely from
"Satara the offspring of our gratuitous benevolence". Lord Dalhousie,
however, recommended the escheat, but the directors decided that
iheir policy was inapplicable to Karauli, which was not a dependent
state but a “protected ally”. It may be remarked here that the
absorption of Satara, Nagpur and Jhansi caused no real alarm amongst
the Indian princes.
The crowning act of Lord Dalhousie's administration was the
annexation of Oudh, a genuine case of annexation, and undoubtedly
one which did stir the hearts of the princes of India. It is only fair to
the governor-general to show how averse he was to the procedure
he was ordered to follow.
Our relations with the state of Oudh were governed by the treaty
of 1801 which required the nawab to reform his administration and
follow the advice of the Company's officers. Succeeding governors-
general had warned him that unless he reformed his administration
we should be obliged to interfere, but, though abuse increased year
by year, we took no steps to enforce our admonitions. Wellesley,
when granting the treaty of 1801, had remarked prophetically that
our support of the nawab only protected the vile and that no effective
security could be provided against the ruin of the province of Oudh
until we took over the administration. In 1837 Lord Auckland made
a new treaty with the nawab by which we were empowered to
intervene in case of misrule and put our own officers in charge. The
king accepted, but the directors refused to ratify it. Lord Auckland,
however, never informed the king that the treaty was a dead letter,
though he did report to the directors that he had not done so. * Lord
Hardinge, nevertheless, when he warned the king, in 1847, that he
must reform, cited this treaty in his memorandum as if it was still
in force and confirmatory of the treaty of 1801. 5
Convinced by the reports of Sleeman and Outram of the need for
immediate action, Dalhousie, although his term of office was just
expiring, and he might well have left this unpleasant duty to Lord
Canning, investigated the case with his usual minute care. He was
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1854-5, XL, 87-103.
2 Idem.
:> Wellesley, Despatches, , 426-Despatch of 22 January, 1801.
4 Parliamentary Papers, 1857-8, XLIN, 307-65.
* Idem, p. 368, para. 8.
## p. 584 (#612) ############################################
584
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
3
informed by Mr Dorin and General Low, members of council, that
though the treaty of 1837 was a dead letter, this fact was unknown
to the king of Oudh. Mr Grant, another member, urged that the
king should be informed of this fact. Dalhousie referred the point to
the directors who replied that the best course to take was to leave
things as they were until circumstances arose necessitating the dis-
closure, 1
Long afterwards, writing to Sir George Couper on 6 January,
1858,” Dalhousie refers to this question. He remarks that it was
really a matter of indifference to the king and the people of Oudh,
when we actually took over the state, whether it was done under the
treaty of 1837 or by the strong hand: “for every human being knew
the assumption would be permanent”, and so the degree of their
knowledge could not have affected the result. But he held that the
authorities had no right, at the time, to withhold the information.
In a long and careful minute 3 the governor-general discussed
the whole case. He put the treaty of 1837 aside as being a dead letter,
and pointed out that "for tolerating so long this total disregard of
the obligation of a solemn Treaty [of 1801]. . . the British Government
is heavily responsible”. We had warned and counselled but never
acted, abuses had grown, while. our own troops in Oudh protected
the king from justifiable revolt on the part of his subjects. He then
suggested four courses :
(a) that the king should abdicate, Oudh being incorporated in
British India;
(b) that the king should be allowed to retain his titles but should
vest the administration in us in perpetuity;
(c) that the administration should be made over to us for a time;
(d) that the Resident should take over general control of the
state administration.
Lord Dalhousie declared that he believed the first course would
lead to the happiest issue, but added :
yet I do not counsel the adoption of this measure. The reform of the adminis-
tration may be wrought and the prospects of the people secured without resort-
ing to so extreme a measure as the annexation of the territory and the abolition
of the throne and I for my part do not advocate the advice that the province
of Oudh be declared British territory.
He held that in spite of maladministration the consistent loyalty to
us of successive nawabs of Oudh precluded annexation. So he urged
the second course that the king should vest control in us but retain
his titles and rank, as this course would be "perpetual in duration
as well as ample in extent”; but the king must himself do this, not
be forced to do it. Different views were held by the members of his
i Parliamentary Papers, 1857-8, XLIII, 307-65.
Dalhousie, Letters, p. 393.
3 Minute of 18 June, 1855, Parliamentary Papers, loc. cit.
## p. 585 (#613) ############################################
OUDH
585
council but the general opinion was against Lord Dalhousie and in
favour of the king's abdication. The case was sent to the court, and
the directors rejected Dalhousie's proposal, ordering annexation and
the abolition of the throne. 1
Dalhousie undertook to carry out this thankless task, although
Lord Canning had just arrived in India to succeed him as governor-
general. Outram, the Resident, was asked to induce the king to sign
a document voluntarily transferring the kingdom to us. Outram was
confident that he could do so, but the king refused in tears, and the
prcclamation annexing Oudh was at once issued. No disturbance
arose. Minute directions were also given to Outram as to disarming
the province but these were, at his suggestion, not carried out, owing
to the approach of the hot season, and the order was later on cancelled
by Lord Canning. Had it been carried out, Oudh with an unarmed
population would have been a less formidable factor in the distur-
bance of 1857. Lord Dalhousie refers to this in a private letter to
Sir George Couper of 5 February, 1852;2 he says: "Lord Canning's
Government made a fatal blunder in not disarming Oude in 1856,
when it might have been done easily and completely”. He adds that
no official record exists of his determination to carry this out because
it was a task for his successor, and hence it only appears in his
confidential demi-official correspondence with Outram, in these
words :
It is my intention that not a single fortified place should be left in Oude,
with the exception of those that belong to Government. It is further my
intention that the whole population should be disarmed. . . . as was done with
such excellent effect in the Punjaub in 1849.
It is thus clear that Lord Dalhousie, while he deprecated half-
measures, was strongly opposed to the policy of annexation, though
he was convinced that, so far as the people of Oudh were concerned,
it would be far the best course to take.
In a letter to Sir George Couper written on 15 December, 1855,3
before the orders of the court had arrived, he says:
I understand that they (the Directors] mean to force the King to form a
new treaty or to assume the government of his country. This is all very well
for the home authorities but it was not for me to suggest it. . . . The course
proposed by the Court is not warranted by international law. It would be
either conquest or usurpation of the power of government by force of arms.
This argument of international law would not in these days be raised
in connection with the Indian states.
were extracted, yet the annual teak export was 12,000 tons. Dr.
## p. 567 (#595) ############################################
THE FORESTS
567
Wallich in 1827 was the first to visit the forests and urge the need of
conservation, yet no teak was planted, no check imposed on waste.
There was indeed a Superintendent of Forests, 1841-8, but when he
asked for power to prevent felling of unselected trees, the court of
directors replied that such power was not for local officers. Logs
reaching Moulmein were taxed 15 per cent. ad valorem; through fraud
and neglect, three-quarters of them escaped payment in 1834-44, and
even subsequently timber provided only 18 per cent. of the total
revenue. The timber traders—discharged warrant officers and ship's
mates-never visited the forests but sent out Burmans who made the
jungle-folk, timid Karens, extract timber for little or nothing; the
Karens burned several forests to discourage such visitations. In 1842
better firms appeared but as these had the ear of government the
result was to accelerate exploitation-Durand's removal placated
Calcutta firms whose leases he had cancelled. By 1850 the forests
were ruined.
In 1827, immediately on the evacuation, the Burmese, despite the
Treaty of Yandabo, executed eleven circle headmen between
Yandabo and Rangoon, searched out every woman who had lived
with the English and every man who had served them, and wreaked
vengeance. The Talaings rose, failed, and fled, 30,000 of them, into
the Amherst district. Otherwise, apart from seasonal labour, there
was little immigration, as for long taxation was not lighter, or pro-
perty more secure, than in Pegu, where criminal administration was
effective and governors, wishing to retain their subjects, now requisi-
tioned less forced labour. The Talaing Corps, which lasted from
1838 to 1848, was intended to raise the Talaings against the Burmese,
but failed because its commandant was not a whole-time officer, and,
in Broadfoot's words, Talaings as well as Burmans could rise to the
highest offices in Ava, whereas in Tenasserim both were on low pay
only augmented by bribes.
Until 1842 the village revenue demand, distributed by elders, was
paid in kind; government had no information regarding tenures or
crop yields. By 1845 money payment was substituted, and assessment
was on each villager's field, surveyed by the village headman; reduc-
tions by 72 per cent. in 1843-8 left the rates at four annas to two and
a quarter rupees per acre; thereafter cultivation increased and yielded
37
per
cent. of the total revenue :
Cultivation
(acres)
Total
revenue
(rupees)
Population
1826
1835
1845
1852
?
'?
97,515
144,405
240,131
339,370
517,034
570,639
? 66,000
84,917
127,455
191,476
## p. 568 (#596) ############################################
568
BURMA, 1782-1852
Attempts to attract European planters by large grants of land
failed. The difficulty was lack of population, for immigration, some-
times amounting to thousands annually, from the Coromandel Coast,
was usually confined to the towns; it began in 1838 with imported
commissariat labour, and increased in 1843 when debtor slavery ceased
and convicts were withdrawn from private employment. Cattle were
imported from the Shan states, but the visits of Dr Richardson in
1830, 1834, 1835, 1837 to Chiengmai and Mong Nai and of Major
McLeod in 1837 to Kenghung, failed to open up general trade because,
though the people were friendly, jealousy between the overlords,
Ava and Bangkok, stifled intercourse.
The terrible system of frontier raids ceased in 1826-7 when Major
Burney visited Bangkok and obtained the return of 2000 persons
whom the Siamese had enslaved. Internal slavery, abolished by the
great Act V of 1. 843, was usually of the same mild type, debtor and
domestic, as in Arakan. But in Tavoy, noted for the comeliness of
its women, Muhammadans, exploiting ignorance and poverty, bought
girls for the Moulmein brothels and these debtor-bonds were enforced
in English courts; under Blundell's rules, abolished by Broadfoot in
1844, brothels were recognised, paying revenue in proportion to their
size. Liquor and opium licenses which, in spite of Chinese rings,
yielded 16 per cent of the revenue, were introduced in the towns
with Madras and European garrisons; Maingy, after seeing the effect
on Burmans and Talaings, regretted their introduction. Gambling,
also prohibited under native rule, was licensed until 1834 when the
protests of the Buddhist clergy prevailed.
Crime was rare save on the Burmese frontier. Burmese governors
were unpaid, they suppressed crime because brigandage was the per-
quisite of their retinue, and the daily sight of prosperous Moulmein
was too much for the governor of Martaban. Warnings having failed,
the commissioner burned Martaban in 1829, and gained several years
respite. But in 1847-50, of thirty-three traced dacoities in the
Amherst district, twenty-five were traced to Martaban; dacoits came
in racing canoes, posted pickets in Moulmein high street, looted
houses within two furlongs of the garrison, and vanished into the
darkness. Until 1844 most assistants never left their headquarters,
revenue accounts for the whole year covered only a single sheet, and
statistics of cultivation and population were rare. Criminal law was
the Muhammadan law of Bengal, but no copy of it existed; civil law
was Burmese, but until Dr Richardson, assistant, translated and
printed it in 1847, nobody knew what it was. Gaols were inefficient,
and in 1847 Sleeman protested against thugs being transported to
Moulmein, where they escaped at the rate of one a month.
Irregularities were of a type unknown in Arakan. In 1843 Corbin,
district assistant, Mergui, misappropriated grain revenue received in
kind, and his native mistress purchased girl slavus to weave cloth for
sale. In 1844 De la Condamine, district assistant, Amherst, drew the
## p. 569 (#597) ############################################
TENASSERIM ADMINISTRATION
569
pay of vacant clerkships, and kept no account of timber revenue
received in kind, while his clerks traded in timber and usury with
capital attributed to himself and Maingy. In 1848 the adjutant,
Talaing Corps, recovered from his sepoys money lent them by his
native mistress. Captain Impey, district assistant, Amherst, submitted
no treasury accounts for nine months, misappropriated 21,880 rupees,
refunded two-thirds on detection in 1850, and disappeared into the
Shan states.
Control from Calcutta was so slight that the commissioner might
have evolved a system of indirect government which allowed nativo
institutions proper scope. But even had that functionary been creative
such native institutions as survived Burmese misrule and Siamese
devastation showed little vitality. Freedom from Calcutta thus ended
simply in an undeveloped copy of the non-regulation model.
## p. 570 (#598) ############################################
CHAPTER XXXI
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
THE period 1818 to 1857 is important as that in which our relations
with the Indian states were finally placed upon practically that basis
on which they still rest. This policy, initiated by Lord Wellesley, but
abandoned by his successors, Cornwallis, Barlow and Minto, was
revived by Lord Hastings who carried it on to its logical conclusion.
When Lord Wellesley left India in 1805 our military superiority had
been pro:red beyond question; the huge state armies, led in great
measure by European officers, had melted away; while a series of
treaties defined our relationship with all the important rulers in
India. The foundations of the system which obtains to this day had
thus been laid, and Wellesley himself wrote in 1804 :
A general bond of connexion is now established between the British Gov.
ernment and the principal states of India on principles which render it the
interest of every state to maintain its alliance with the British Government. . .
and which secure to every state the unmolested exercise of its separate autho-
rity within the limits of its established dominion, under the general protection
of the British power. 1
The earlier system, of treating the states as if they stood on an equal
footing with us, was finally abandoned; and our political, as well as
our military supremacy, was specifically recognised. It is, of course,
unquestionable that this supremacy would ultimately have been
attained, probably only after conflict, but it is also beyond doubt,
that the policy followed by Lord Wellesley during the seven years
of his office simplified its establishment, and shortened the period
required for its attainment.
Lord Moira, afterwards Marquess of Hastings, landed in India in
1813, in avowed opposition to the policy pursued by Lord Wellesley,
but, as he himself remarks, he soon changed his views. Writing in
1815 he says: “It was by preponderance of power that those mines of
wealth had been acquired for the Company's treasury, and by
preponderance of power alone would they be retained”. The policy
of non-interference with the Indian states was, he saw, a futile policy;
for no highly civilised state, placed in the midst of less civilised or less
developed states, can ever hope to pursue it without disastrous results.
In 1817, four years after his assumption of the governor-generalship,
the Maratha confederacy was again intriguing actively against us,
and Central India was overrun by hordes of plunderers. By May,
1818, however, Sindhia had been forced to make terms, these hordes
had been dispersed, and Holkar defeated, while the Peshwa's power
1 Dispatch of 13 July, 1804, Despatches, IV, 177.
## p. 571 (#599) ############################################
SETTLEMENT OF 1818
571
had been extinguished. Other important Indian states, though in
no sense enthusiastic on our behalf, had welcomed our change of
policy and signed treaties of friendship and subordinate alliance with
the Company. The British Government thus became the acknow-
ledged suzerain, though the Moghul emperor still sat upon the throne
of Delhi. A period of reconstruction now commenced, directed by
Lord Hastings and carried out by a group of men whose names are
still household words in the areas in which they worked; Malcolm
in Central India, Elphinstone in the Deccan, Munro in Madras, and
Metcalfe, Tod and Ochterlony in Rajputana.
The chief centre of disturbance had been in Malwa, the high level
tract comprising the group of states which now forms the "Central
India Agency”, with the addition of the Gwalior state. To under-
stand the process of reconstruction initiated by Sir John Malcolm,
in Central India, it is essential to grasp the conditions prevailing in
this tract. The territories of the Indian states and estates in this area
were then, and are indeed to this day, mixed in inextricable confusion
as regards their boundaries, while they are at the same time linked
together by political agreements which enormously complicate
administrative procedure. The settlement of the great Maratha
generals in Malwa at the close of the eighteenth century led to the
subjection of the Rajput landholders, who were ousted from the
greater part of their possessions, by the formation of the Maratha
states of Gwalior, Indore, Dhar and Dewas, such lands as they were
alicwed to retain being held on a tributary or feudatory basis. These
tributaries included the more important Rajput states such as Ratlam,
as well as a large number of small estate-holders belonging to the
same class. This subjection to Maratha overlords had always been
strongly . resented and in early days tribute was never paid except
under compulsion. Disputes, moreover, were continuous and bound-
aries were constantly changing, as one or other party temporarily
predominated. During the Pindari War the Rajputs tried to make
all they could out of the disturbed conditions prevailing. Then came
our intervention, the rapid sweeping aside of the marauding hordes
and the sudden imposition of peace, which resulted in the crystalli-
sation of the territorial distribution as it chanced to be at that
moment. The effect of this sudden termination of hostilities was to
leave the whole of Malwa parcelled out, in a very haphazard way,
among the various owners, and the territorial patchwork thus created
persists, in spite of some adjustments, to this day. The territories of
the various landowners appear, indeed, to have been shaken out of
a pepper-box, so that, when travelling in this region, it is difficult to
say whose property you are traversing.
When Sir John Malcolm took up the task of settling Malwa he
found that, besides the payment of tribute demanded by the great
Maratha overlords, the Rajput thakurs, as the smaller landholders
are termed, claimed certain payments, called tankha, from these same
## p. 572 (#600) ############################################
572
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
overlords, payments which were in origin a form of blackmail, paid
in order to induce them to abstain from raiding and pilfering. Those
who received such payments were called grasias, or those receiving
a gras or "mouthful". Owing to the distracted condition of their
own administrations, after the late struggle, the Maratha rulers were
quite incapable of maintaining order or enforcing payment of their
demands and, in consequence, welcomed the assistance offered by us
in asserting their claims, and "unfeignedly resorted to us for aid". 1
Malcolm at once took up the task of adjusting these claims and
while securing to the Maratha rulers the tribute due to them also
secured to their tributaries the tankha they demanded, at the same
time guaranteeing them in the permanent possession of the land they
then held, so long as they kept the peace and carried out the con-
ditions in their sanads, or deeds of possession. These agreements were
mediated by Sir John between the Maratha overlord and the Rajput
ruler or thakur. They were drawn up in the names of the Maratha
suzerain and his Rajput feudatory and bore the overlord's seal, but
carried in addition an endorsement, signed by Sir John or one of his
assistants, usually over the words "Confirmed and guaranteed by the
British Government”.
The basis on which these agreements were drawn up is thus
enunciated by Lord Hastings. It was, he says, therefore,
easy, when no acknowledged usages stood in the way, to establish principles
between the sovereign and the subject advantageous to both, giving these
principles a defined line of practical application, a departure from which would
afford to either party a right of claiming the intervention of our paramount
power. While the Sovereign had his legitimate authority and his due revenue
insured to him, the subject was protected against exaction and tyrannical
outrage. 2
The effect of these agreements was immediate and the most
distracted population in India became in a few months a compara-
tively law-abiding community. It may be of interest, however, to
mention briefly the subsequent history of the "guarantee" system.
As has been pointed out above, the agreements thus "guaranteed"
were made out as between the Maratha ruler and his feudatory, the
British Government merely undertaking to see that each side carried
out its part, intervening only if the conditions were disregarded.
Actually, however, the confusion which existed for many years after
peace was introduced prevented the Maratha overlords from exer-
cising any real supervision and, in consequence, the Rajput feudatories
fell directly under the control of the British residents and political
agents in a way never contemplated by Lord Hastings, or in any
sense warranted by the terms of the sanads. They, in fact, were
treated by these officers as if in all respects under their direct charge,
and not simply as regarded adherence to the conditions laid down in
i Hastings, Summary, p. 48.
2 Idem.
## p. 573 (#601) ############################################
CENTRAL INDIA
573
the agreements. A form of political practice thus grew up which
became very galling to the Maratha overlords, and especially to the
Gwalior durbar, in which state by far the greater number of "guaran-
teed thakurs" held their estates. Remonstrances were continually
made and a good deal of irritation was displayed until finally in 1921
the government of India admitted the correctness of the Gwalior
durbar's contentions. The thakurs were then officially informed by
the viceroy, in a special durbar held at Delhi on 14 March, 1921, that
they would in future be wholly under the control of the Gwalior
state, which would exercise full suzerainty over them, the government
of India, however, reserving the right to intervene should the condi-
tions of the “guarantee” be in any way disregarded by either side.
Two Musulman states exist in the same area, Bhopal and Jaora.
The former, which had loyally supported us since 1778, was rewarded
with a grant of territory, while Jaora was created a separate entity
by the twelfth article of the Treaty of Mandasor 1 made with Holkar,
certain lands in that state being granted on service conditions to
Ghafur Khan, son-in-law of Amir Khan, nawab of Tonk, in return
for assistance rendered to Sir John Malcolm.
Of the two important Maratha states, Gwalior and Indore,
Sindhia had very reluctantly come to terms in 1817, while Holkar,
defeated in the battle of Mahidpur (December, 1817), had been
obliged to accept the terms offered to him.
In Rajputana the process of settlement was far simpler, as the
Marathas, though claiming tribute from the rajas, had never settleci
in that area which, being mainly arid and uninviting in comparison
with Malwa and the Deccan, did not attract them as a place of
residence. Moreover, the states were fewer, larger and more compact
in form and more homogeneous in character.
The conditions obtaining in each state were carefully examined.
and arrangements made in accordance with those conditions. Consi-
derable objections were raised at the time to our assuming this
responsibility, the freeing of the Rajput lands from marauding bands
being considered the utmost we should engage to do for them, while
our undertaking to see that the tribute claimed by the Marathas was
punctuaily paid was held to be inconsistent with our general policy
and indefensible in principle, in view of the fact that this tribute was
nothing but blackmail levied by force, without any real overlordship
to support the claim. The alternative would have been to leave these
states to settle their own disputes on the Utopian theory of non-
interference, which had invariably plunged them in disaster. The
pages of Tod but too clearly show that hereditary jealousies, family
feuds, not to mention ordinary motives of ambition and avarice, would
have made a peaceful settlement impossible except under the aegis
" Aitchison. Treaties. rv199.
## p. 574 (#602) ############################################
574
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
of our strong controlling authority. The result of Lord Hastings's
policy fully justified its adoption.
This payment of tribute to the Marathas was continued on the
grounds that we accepted the status quo at the time when we first
entered Rajputana and Central India, as we could have no concern
with conditions obtaining before the war. Adherence to this principle
had also insured the co-operation of the Marathas and facilitated
arrangements at the outset of the campaign. Payment of tribute was
in future made through the British authorities. Secondly the pay-
ment of the tribute was a recognised mark of fealty, exacted by all
suzerains, including the Moghul emperor, whose place we had taken,
while it was also a fair return for the obligations we had assumed in
protecting the states from aggression : the amount, moreover, was
henceforth fixed in perpetuity and this, together with the financial
advantages of peace, rendered these payments in no way burdensome.
At the same time each state was recognised as a separate unit,
independent internally but prohibited from forming any relations
with another state in India or any outside power. The settlement
was effected without difficulty except in Jaipur where internal
dissensions were rife.
Ap rt from these two great groups of states in Rajputana and
Central India there remained the Peshwa, the nominal head of the
Maratha confederacy, and the more important states of Nagpur,
Satara, Mysore, Oudh, Hyderabad, Baroda, Travancore and Cochin.
After very careful consideration Lord Hastings decided
in favour of the total expulsion of Baji Rao from the Dekhan, the perpetual
exclusion of the family from any share of influence or dominion and the anni-
hilation of the Peshwa's name and authority for ever.
This was an important step, as it removed even the nominal head of
the Maratha confederacy. It was, moreover, thoroughly justified by
Baji Rao's conduct. By nature timid, indolent, suspicious, and fond
of low companions, Baji Rao had proved himself uniformly untrust-
worthy. He had never adhered to the Treaty of Bassein (1802),
sending out his agents to intrigue against us in every state that would
receive them. The lesson was sharp but salutary.
In Nagpur the crimes and perfidy of Appa Sahib met with their
just reward in his deposition and the confiscation of the Sagar and
Narbada districts of his state. Later on, in 1853, when Lord Dalhousie
was governor-general, Nagpur was finally extinguished, for lack of
direct heirs, and became the nucleus of the present Central Provinces.
The effete descendant of Sivaji at Satara was, as a concession to
Maratha sentiment, given a small estate round his hereditary capital.
In 1848, however, Lord Dalhousie abolished the arrangement.
The Mysore state, restored to its Hindu rulers in 1799, on the
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1847-8, XLVIII, 327-31.
## p. 575 (#603) ############################################
OUDH
676
defeat of Tipu Sultan, supported us with troops in the Pindari War.
But the raja was a spendthrift and destitute of ability.
The state of Oudh calls for more detailed notice. Lord Hastings,
whose experience in England with the prince regent had, as it was
said, inclined him to “sympathise with royalty in distress,” treated
the nawab wazir with unusual consideration. Nawab Sa'adat 'Ali,
who, by severe exactions and parsimonious expenditure, had amassed
a hoard of thirteen millions sterling in eleven years, was averse to
all reforms, badly as his administration needed them, but Lord
Hastings abstained from pressing him. In July, 1814, Sa'adat 'Ali
died and was succeeded by his son Haidar-ud-din Ghazi. The new
wazir interviewed the governor-general at Cawnpore in October,
1814, and, in consideration of the sympathetic attitude of Lord
Hastings, and his own anxiety regarding a Gurkha invasion across his
northern border, was induced to lend the British Government a crore
(£1,000,000) of rupees, for the prosecution of the war against Nepal.
When this was expended by the governor-general's council on other
objects a second crore was lent, but only under great pressure.
Differences arose between the Resident and the n'awab on the
subject of administrative abuses, but Lord Hastings recalled his
officer and left the nawab to his own devices. The inevitable result
of non-interference followed, the administration rapidly going from
bad to worse. In 1818, however, Lord Hastings, somewhat incon-
sistently, urged the nawab to assume the title of king, and so formally
break his allegiance to the emperor of Delhi, to whom his family owed
its elevation. In the governor-general's opinion this act would
benefit the British Government by causing a division between these
important leaders of the Muhammadan community. The change
was, however, regarded with the greatest contempt and aversion by
the Indian princes and unfavourably contrasted with the conduct of
the Nizam of Hyderabad who had refused to accede to a similar
suggestion made to him, as being an act of rebellion against the
emperor. It also met with the disapproval of all experienced British
officials, Sir John Malcolm freely expressing the opinion that it was
most impolitic and a deliberate reversal of our previous well-con
sidered treatment of the imperial house of Taimur, and very likely
to nullify the sentiments of gratitude entertained for us by the princes
of this family, owing to our generous assistance in their distress. From
his subsequent behaviour it is clear that our support of his assumption
of this new honour evoked no sense of gratitude in the newly-created
king
The Baroda state, which had benefited materially by the Treaty
of Poona (1817) and gained certain acquisitions of territory in 1818,
lost its minister, Fateh Singh, who had long managed its affairs
during the lifetime of the imbecile Anand Rao Gaekwad. A new
treaty was made in 1820, and no difficulty was experienced in
connection with this state.
## p. 576 (#604) ############################################
576
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
Serious trouble soon arose in Hyderabad. The Nizam and his
minister Munir-ul-mulk took no interest in the administration, which
was left in the hands of a Hindu, Chandu Lal. He was capable but
extravagant, his extravagance being left unchecked by the Resident.
The Nizam's sons, moreover, were entirely out of hand and committed
many atrocities. Chandu Lal was at length forced to borrow and
contracted a heavy debt with Palmer and Co. , a British firm in
Hyderabad. By the act of 17961 no European could enter into,
financial transactions with an Indian prince without the express
sanction of the governor-general. It was understood that Palmer and
Co. were prepared to lend money at a lower rate of interest than
Indian bankers and, therefore, in 1816, Lord Hastings sanctioned the
transaction on the understanding that his government would not be
responsible for the repayment of any sums lent. In 1820, when sanc-
tion for a further sum was asked for, the directors demurred, became
suspicious of these loans and cancelled permission for them. ". Sir
Charles Metcalfe, who had succeeded Mr Russel as Resident, went
very carefully into the matter and found that nearly a million sterling
had been lent and then wasted in highly irregular expenditure,
including even the grant of pensions to members of the firm, while
as much as 24 per cent. was being charged as interest. Lord Hastings,
who had relied on the former Resident's recommendation and was
entirely ignorant of the details of the transactions, no sooner learned
the truth than he condemned the whole arrangement. Unfortunately
an entirely unjustifiable colour was placed on the affair because one
of the partners in Palmer and Co. was married to Lord Hastings's
ward, for whom he had a great affection. The correspondence on the
subject with the directors shows that, though they condemned the
policy followed, they exonerated the governor-general. But Lord
Hastings, disgusted with the implied censure, resigned in January,
1823.
Except in Cutch, where we had to intervene on account of a
dispute over the succession, no other state gave cause for interference.
To summarise Lord Hastings's work. His greatest claim rests upon
the pacification and opening out of all India (except the Panjab) to
British access, for Central India, Rajputana and the Deccan had, to
all intents and purposes, remained hitherto sealed areas to us, the
Marathas interposing a compact barrier between the three presiden-
cies. To Lord Hastings must be assigned, therefore, credit for the
consolidation of our empire, which completed the work of Lord
i Act 37, Geo. III, Cap. 142, S. 28.
2 Letter to Bengal, 24 May, 1820, Hyderabad Papers, p. 6.
3 Letter of governor-general to Resident, 13 September, 1822, Hyderabad
Papers, p. 186.
4 Letter from Palmer and Co. , 19 May, 1820, to Resident, and letters from
directors, 24 May and 16 December, 1820, Hyderabad Papers, pp. 42 ani!
70. Mill and Wilson, History, VTII, 344-57.
## p. 577 (#605) ############################################
BHARATPUR
577
Wellesley. This policy he had pursued indomitably in spite of great
opposition from the directors. Arriving in India to find marauding
bands sweeping across Central India, Nepal arrogant, the Marathas
conspirnig against us and the Rajput states divided by internal feuds
and depressed under the Maratha yoke, he left India, with Nepal
an ally, and one that has never since receded from that position, the
Maratha power broken, Central India pacified and self-respect restored
to the states of Rajputana. Above all it is to Lord Hastings that
we cwe the founding of that policy of partnership and friendly
co-operation which now determines the relations of the government
of India with the Indian states.
Lord Amherst (1823-8), who succeeded Hastings, initiated no
new policy and most of his time was occupied by the war with Burma.
This war did, however, react on the states, the view that our downfall
was near being freely circulated. As a result of this some disturbances
took place in Alwar, in the Sondhwada tract of Central India, and
at Bharatpur.
The Bharatpur disturbance alone was important. In 1823 Sir
David Ochterlony had sanctioned the succession to the Bharatpur
gaddi of Raja Baldeo Singh, a minor. His cousin, Durjan Sal, opposed
him and Sir David ordered troops to move from Delhi to support his
nominee. But Lord Amherst, who was very nervous about the effect
of a Burmese War, countermanded these orders, denouncing the
Resident's action as premature and enunciating the principle that the
mere fact of recognising Baldeo Singh during his father's lifetime
imposed no obligation on our government to support him against the
wishes of his subjects. Ochterlony considering this as a censure on
his conduct, resigned, dying not long after.
He was succeeded by
Sir Charles Metcalfe, who soon proved that Durjan Sal was, in fact,
plotting against us with the neighbouring Rajput and Maratha states,
and he pointed out the impolicy of allowing a small unimportant
state to flout the paramount power. On this, troops were sent up
under the commander-in-chief, Lord Combermere, and after a des-
perate resistance the Bharatpur fort was captured cn 18 January,
1826. Durjan Sal was deported.
When, in July, 1828, Lord William Cavendish-Bentinck succeeded
Lord Amherst, the inevitable reaction had set in in England, and
Bentinck came out with instructions to revert to the fatal non-
interference policy of Cornwallis and Barlow, a policy already, in
the last thirty years, conclusively proved to be disastrous in its results.
Once more, the fallacy of adhering to this policy was proved and the
governor-ger'eral was driven to interfere far more drastically than
he would have had to do had steps been taken in time.
The administration in Hyderabad and Oudh continued to dete-
riorate. In Indore the death of Tantia Jogh, the minister who hac
1 Kaye, Life of Metcalfe, 11, 140.
37
## p. 578 (#606) ############################################
878
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
1
introduced a regular administration into that state, left its control
in the weak hands of Maharaja Malhar Rao, and disturbances at
once commenced. In Gwalior the death of Daulat Rao Sindhia in
1827, and the succession of the youthful Jankoji Rao, led to the for-
mation of antagonistic parties and the fomentation of endless intri-
gues. Bentinck visited the states and announced his support of the
young maharaja, but his remonstrances had no effect in the face of
the regent maharani Baiza Bai's ill-advised policy, and troubles
continued to augment till they led to the dénouement of 1843. The
Supreme Government, however, contented itself with enunciating the
policy that it was immaterial to it who held the reins of power in a
state, provided that hostilities did not break out.
The Gaekwad of Baroda had become openly hostile, while the
Rajputana states, left wholly to their own devices, were in a condition
of ferment, the good work done by Tod and his colleagues being
rapidly undone. Finally, attention was forcibly drawn to the condi-
tions obtaining in this tract by an attack at Jaipur on the Resident
and his assistant, in which the former was wounded and the latter
killed. This actually took place just after Bentinck had embarked
for England in 1835. In Mysore the governor-general was obliged
to take over the administration owing to the incompetence and
extravagance of Raja Krishna Udaiyar and the consequent outbreak
of disturbances. The administration remained in our hands until 1881.
Some absorption of state territory also took place. The raja of
Jaintia in Assam sacrificed three British Indian subjects to the goddess
Kali, for which act his lands were annexed, while those of the raja
of Cachar, in the same province, were taken over for gross malad-
ministration. Coorg, near Mysore, where the raja openly declared
his hostility towards us and plotted to seize the station of Bangalore,
while at the same time murdering his relatives wholesale, was also
annexed.
Bentinck handed over temporary charge to Sir Charles Metcalfe,
who acted as governor-general until the arrival of Lord Auckland in
March, 1836.
Most of Lord Auckland's energies were taken up by the Afghan
War and he devoted little attention to the states.
However, when the debauchee king of Oudh died in 1837, advan-
tage of this was taken to conclude a new treaty, further mention of
which is made below.
The raja of Satara, to whom Lord Hastings had given a small
area in 1816, was deposed for intriguing, his brother being elevated
to the gaddi in his place. The territory of the nawab of Karnul, in
Madras, was annexed for attempting to make war.
Lord Ellenborough succeeded as governor-general in 1842. Only
one case of importance arose in connection with an Indian state, but
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1844, XXXVI, 351-453.
## p. 579 (#607) ############################################
GWALIOR
579
that was of the first importance. The troubles in the Gwalior state,
referred to in Bentinck's time, had continued to increase and now
came to a head. Jankoji Rao Sindhia died in 1843, to be succeeded
by an adopted son, a minor, Jayaji Rao. Intrigues multiplied and
the army, some 40,000 strong, became all powerful. The minority
was in the hands of Krishna Rao Kadam, the Mama Sahib, or materna
uncle of the late ruler. He was opposed to Dada Khasgi-wala (the
administrator of the family estates of the maharani), who succeeded
in engineering his downfall. Dada was, indeed, expelled from the
state on the demand of the governor-general, but this step failed to
put an end to the intrigues.
Lord Ellenborough's remonstrance fell mainly on deaf ears, while
the few sardars who were prepared to assist us in restoring order
were powerless in the face of the army, which had complete control
of affairs. The governor-general, therefore, decided to act and accom-
panied by the commander-in-chief, Sir Hugh Gough, crossed the
Chambal and advanced on Gwalior. To their surprise (for no proper
reconnaissance had been made) the British troops suddenly found
themselves face to face with the state forces, and after two simul-
taneous battles at Maharajpur and Panniar, the state army was
broken up. A fresh treaty was made and a council of regency
appointed to conduct affairs during the minority of the maharaja,
then nine years old. Lord Ellenborough's action in the Gwalior case
was the object of much criticism, and the main reason for his recail.
But whatever criticism may be levelled at his methods, there can be
no doubt as to the correctness of the policy pursued. When he landed
in India, Lord Ellenborough inherited, as a legacy from his prede-
cessor, the Afghan War. In addition, the assembly of a menacing
army of Sikhs, some 70,000 strong, just across the Satlej river, made
him nervous, and he felt that it would be courting disaster to leave
a hostile, undisciplined force in his rear, close to the important town
of Agra, especially in view of the weakness of our own army. The
best reply to the strictures levelled at him is to be found in his own
letter to Lord Ripon, written on receiving the news of his recall. "
He refers to the criticism passed on him by the court of directors in
which his conduct was stigmatised as "wanting in decision and
inconsistent with itself", and says in reply, that he is unable to
controvert this opinion because he has not the remotest idea to what
supposed facts it can possibly refer”. He then turns to the two
objections raised by the court, firstly that he should have supported
the regent, who was appointed with our approval, and secondly that
he should not have crossed the Chambal river against the expressed
wishes of the maharani and the sardars of the states. The Mama Sahib
(the regent), he points out, was offered military support but refuseci
1 Calcutta Review, 1844, I, 535.
2 Parliamentary Papers, loc. cit. pp. 143-344.
3 Law, India under Lord Ellenborough, p. 28.
## p. 580 (#608) ############################################
580
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
it, and, when his fall came, it was so sudden as to preclude any
possibility of such assistance reaching him. On 19 May (1843) he
was in full control of the administration, on the 21st he was removed
from the regency and by 5 June had left Gwalior, a fugitive. It
would, moreover, have been impossible to carry out military opera-
tions at the end of May, with the rains imminent and many stream:
to cross, including the great Chambal river.
With regard to the second point, the crossing of the Chambal in
December against the wishes of the durbar, he remarks that at that
season the winter rains were expected which would have made the
river difficult, if not impossible, to cross; provisions were not obtain-
able for the troops at his encampment; while the deep ravines which
surrounded his position made it dangerous. To have withdrawn the
troops would have led to an immediate cessation of all negotiations,
as the Gwalior army, which was de facto ruler of the state, woula
never have submitted quietly to disbandment, even if the durbar had
really intended to assist us. The court's view was, he notes, ton
limited, in regarding
the movement as an insulated transaction, which with an army in the field
the Governor-General could deal with at his leisure. . . . It should rather be
considered as a movement upon a field of battle extending from Scinde through
the Punjab even to the frontiers of Nepaul.
Delay in dealing with the situation would have induced the Sikhs to
advance, and to have left a hostile force of 40,000 men within a few
marches of Agra would have been the height of folly. He concludes
by saying that no negotiations would ever have been effected without
the presence of a force and it had always been apprehended that its
use would be necessary.
The weak point in Lord Ellenborough's procedure was his reliance
on the Treaty of Burhanpur, of 1804, which, though never denounced,
had been objected to by Lord Cornwallis, and treated as a dead
letter when new compacts were made with Gwalior in 1805 and 1817.
By article 6 of this treaty we undertook to support the maharaja
should necessity arise, with a subsidiary force; and the governor-
general, in view of the maharaja's youth, construed the disturbances
of 1843 as falling under the spirit of this article.
In July, 1844, Lord Ellenborough was recalled and Sir Henry
Hardinge succeeded him. The Sikh War engaged most of the governor-
general's attention but he visited the king of Oudh in a fruitless
endeavour to induce him to overhaul his administration, informing
him that unless reforms were introduced at an early date, the British
Government would be obliged to take over the state. The warning,
however, fell on deaf ears. Hardinge also urged the abolition of sati
in the Indian states, following the lines of Lord W. Bentinck's
enactment in British India.
1 Aitchison, op. cit. IV, 53; Parliamentary Papers, loc. cit. p. 146.
## p. 581 (#609) ############################################
SATARA
581
In January, 1848, Lord Dalhousie assumed the governor-general-
ship. His name is, even now, apt to be invidiously coupled with the
so-called "annexation policy" in connection with the Indian states.
But, indeed, in all probability, no criticism' would have been roused
by his action had not the Mutiny, following so closely on his retire-
ment, called for a scapegoat.
The cases on which this adverse criticism is mainly based are the
absorption of Satara (1848); Nagpur (1853); Jhansi (1854) and
Oudh (1856). There were also some other but less important in-
stances. Of all these only that of Oudh was strictly speaking a case
of deliberate annexation; in every other case Lord Dalhousie based
his decisions on the fact that no direct heir existed to inherit the state,
which was, moreover, "dependent”, that is created by ourselves or
held on a subordinate tenure. In each case, also, a decision was only
arrived at after infinite pains had been taken to ascertain the facts,
and was invariably carried out with the full approbation of the court
of directors.
The Satara state was created by Lord Hastings in 1818, the treaty
on which it rested (1819) containing no clause conferring the righĩ
of adoption, while Sir James Rivett-Carnac in installing the raja
had warned him that, being childless and no longer young, the state
would lapse at his death, unless as a mark of special favour he was
permitted to adopt a successor. Lord Dalhousie left no stone unturned
to arrive at a just decision; no argument for or against adoption
escaped his scrutiny. His policy was based on the well-established
Hindu doctrine, still followed by the ruling princes of India, which
denies the right of succession by adoption in a subordinate state or
estate unless the previous sanction of the suzerain has been obtained,
a rule applying equally to old-established or recently-created holdings.
Thus in Central India, it is followed by the big Maratha durbars
with respect of Rajput feudatories, who were established much
earlier than their masters. This permission to adopt must in every
case be given by the suzerain before the ceremony of adoption is
carried out, otherwise the adoption is not legal. On the other hand
it is not, in Indian states, customary to enforce an escheat, so that
the actual absorption of an entire holding is very rare, although the
terms of the tenure are often modified by the area being reduced,
the tributę raised or some new conditions imposed. A succession
fee called nazarana is invariably levied, amounting often to one
year's revenue or even more.
This well-known principle was disregarded by the raja of Satara,
who, just before he died, in 1848, adopted a son without informing
the British Resident or obtaining the permission of the governor-
general. Hence Lord Dalhousie would have been fully within his
rights in ordering escheat, simply on the basis of this omission,
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1849,-. XXIX, 267.
## p. 582 (#610) ############################################
582
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
3
especially as the court of directors had, in 1841, enunciated the
principle, that the right to political succession was an indulgenee
which should be the exception and not the rule, and be granted only
as a mark of special favour and approbation, adding that the Com-
pany should “persevere in the one clear and direct course of aban-
doning no just and honourable accession of territory or revenue,
while all existing claims of right are at the same time scrupulously
respected"
Lord Dalhousie consulted all his most experienced colleagues and
found that he was supported by the majority of them in refusing to
recognise the adoption. But before passing orders he referred the
case to the court, which agreed with his view, as "being in accordance
with the general law and custom of India". "
The Nagpur case was in many ways similar. The raja died heirless
in 1853. He had not adopted any one and no lineal descendant in
the male line survived. In a long, careful minute? Lord Dalhousie
pointed out that the original state was of recent creation and was
founded on usurpation and conquest; its ruler had always been
hostile to us, and after the campaign which ended in his defeat it had
lain entirely with us to deal with this territory as we thought fit.
Lord Hastings had then, as a concession to Maratha sentiment,
recreated the state from the conquered territory, after deducting a
considerable portion of it. Nagpur, like Satara, was thus a state of
our own making. In this minute Lord Dalhousie classed the Indian
states as being tributary and subordinate, of our own creation, or
independent. In the first case he considered that our assent was
necessary to an adoption, in the second case that adoption should not
be allowed, while in the third case we had no right to interfere.
Lord Dalhousie found, however, that in the Nagpur case many of
his advisers were against him, especially Colonel Low,5 who quoted
the views of Lord Hastings, Elphinstone, Munro, and Metcalfe, all of
whom considered that the adoption of heirs to states by Indian
princes should be recognised by us. The main grounds of dissent were,
that our rule was generally unpopular; that the absorption of a state
invariably meant that the aristocracy ceased to find employment and
became a discontented body; that the rigorous enforcement of the
doctrine of lapse would only lead to misgovernment, as every childless
raja, feeling that his state must come to an end, would oppress his
subjects, extorting the last penny from them for his own use. The
case was referred to the court, which upheld the escheat.
The Jhansi case (1854) stood on quite a different footing. The
subhedar of Jhansi had originally been a provincial governor under
1 Minute of 30 August, 1848, Parliamentary Papers, loc. cit. pp. 224-8.
2 Parliamentary Papers, loc. cit. pp. 272-98.
3 Parliamentary Papers, 1854, XLVIII, 317 sqq.
4 Minute of 28 January, 1854, idem, pp. 337-53.
5. Minute of 10 February, 1854, idem, pp. 355-67.
## p. 583 (#611) ############################################
OUDH
583
the Peshwa, and was in no sense a ruling chief. When in 1818 all the
Peshwa's lands fell to us the province of Bundelkhand passed with
them, and the subhadar with it. In submitting the case to the court
the governor-general laid stress on this aspect of the affair. 1
One case which Lord Dalhousie took up cannot well be brought
into the same category as the three just mentioned, and that is the
case of Karauli. This state lies in Rajputana and was founded in the
eleventh century. Sir Frederick Currie in his minute on the case
points out how Karauli, an old Rajput state, differed entirely from
"Satara the offspring of our gratuitous benevolence". Lord Dalhousie,
however, recommended the escheat, but the directors decided that
iheir policy was inapplicable to Karauli, which was not a dependent
state but a “protected ally”. It may be remarked here that the
absorption of Satara, Nagpur and Jhansi caused no real alarm amongst
the Indian princes.
The crowning act of Lord Dalhousie's administration was the
annexation of Oudh, a genuine case of annexation, and undoubtedly
one which did stir the hearts of the princes of India. It is only fair to
the governor-general to show how averse he was to the procedure
he was ordered to follow.
Our relations with the state of Oudh were governed by the treaty
of 1801 which required the nawab to reform his administration and
follow the advice of the Company's officers. Succeeding governors-
general had warned him that unless he reformed his administration
we should be obliged to interfere, but, though abuse increased year
by year, we took no steps to enforce our admonitions. Wellesley,
when granting the treaty of 1801, had remarked prophetically that
our support of the nawab only protected the vile and that no effective
security could be provided against the ruin of the province of Oudh
until we took over the administration. In 1837 Lord Auckland made
a new treaty with the nawab by which we were empowered to
intervene in case of misrule and put our own officers in charge. The
king accepted, but the directors refused to ratify it. Lord Auckland,
however, never informed the king that the treaty was a dead letter,
though he did report to the directors that he had not done so. * Lord
Hardinge, nevertheless, when he warned the king, in 1847, that he
must reform, cited this treaty in his memorandum as if it was still
in force and confirmatory of the treaty of 1801. 5
Convinced by the reports of Sleeman and Outram of the need for
immediate action, Dalhousie, although his term of office was just
expiring, and he might well have left this unpleasant duty to Lord
Canning, investigated the case with his usual minute care. He was
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1854-5, XL, 87-103.
2 Idem.
:> Wellesley, Despatches, , 426-Despatch of 22 January, 1801.
4 Parliamentary Papers, 1857-8, XLIN, 307-65.
* Idem, p. 368, para. 8.
## p. 584 (#612) ############################################
584
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
3
informed by Mr Dorin and General Low, members of council, that
though the treaty of 1837 was a dead letter, this fact was unknown
to the king of Oudh. Mr Grant, another member, urged that the
king should be informed of this fact. Dalhousie referred the point to
the directors who replied that the best course to take was to leave
things as they were until circumstances arose necessitating the dis-
closure, 1
Long afterwards, writing to Sir George Couper on 6 January,
1858,” Dalhousie refers to this question. He remarks that it was
really a matter of indifference to the king and the people of Oudh,
when we actually took over the state, whether it was done under the
treaty of 1837 or by the strong hand: “for every human being knew
the assumption would be permanent”, and so the degree of their
knowledge could not have affected the result. But he held that the
authorities had no right, at the time, to withhold the information.
In a long and careful minute 3 the governor-general discussed
the whole case. He put the treaty of 1837 aside as being a dead letter,
and pointed out that "for tolerating so long this total disregard of
the obligation of a solemn Treaty [of 1801]. . . the British Government
is heavily responsible”. We had warned and counselled but never
acted, abuses had grown, while. our own troops in Oudh protected
the king from justifiable revolt on the part of his subjects. He then
suggested four courses :
(a) that the king should abdicate, Oudh being incorporated in
British India;
(b) that the king should be allowed to retain his titles but should
vest the administration in us in perpetuity;
(c) that the administration should be made over to us for a time;
(d) that the Resident should take over general control of the
state administration.
Lord Dalhousie declared that he believed the first course would
lead to the happiest issue, but added :
yet I do not counsel the adoption of this measure. The reform of the adminis-
tration may be wrought and the prospects of the people secured without resort-
ing to so extreme a measure as the annexation of the territory and the abolition
of the throne and I for my part do not advocate the advice that the province
of Oudh be declared British territory.
He held that in spite of maladministration the consistent loyalty to
us of successive nawabs of Oudh precluded annexation. So he urged
the second course that the king should vest control in us but retain
his titles and rank, as this course would be "perpetual in duration
as well as ample in extent”; but the king must himself do this, not
be forced to do it. Different views were held by the members of his
i Parliamentary Papers, 1857-8, XLIII, 307-65.
Dalhousie, Letters, p. 393.
3 Minute of 18 June, 1855, Parliamentary Papers, loc. cit.
## p. 585 (#613) ############################################
OUDH
585
council but the general opinion was against Lord Dalhousie and in
favour of the king's abdication. The case was sent to the court, and
the directors rejected Dalhousie's proposal, ordering annexation and
the abolition of the throne. 1
Dalhousie undertook to carry out this thankless task, although
Lord Canning had just arrived in India to succeed him as governor-
general. Outram, the Resident, was asked to induce the king to sign
a document voluntarily transferring the kingdom to us. Outram was
confident that he could do so, but the king refused in tears, and the
prcclamation annexing Oudh was at once issued. No disturbance
arose. Minute directions were also given to Outram as to disarming
the province but these were, at his suggestion, not carried out, owing
to the approach of the hot season, and the order was later on cancelled
by Lord Canning. Had it been carried out, Oudh with an unarmed
population would have been a less formidable factor in the distur-
bance of 1857. Lord Dalhousie refers to this in a private letter to
Sir George Couper of 5 February, 1852;2 he says: "Lord Canning's
Government made a fatal blunder in not disarming Oude in 1856,
when it might have been done easily and completely”. He adds that
no official record exists of his determination to carry this out because
it was a task for his successor, and hence it only appears in his
confidential demi-official correspondence with Outram, in these
words :
It is my intention that not a single fortified place should be left in Oude,
with the exception of those that belong to Government. It is further my
intention that the whole population should be disarmed. . . . as was done with
such excellent effect in the Punjaub in 1849.
It is thus clear that Lord Dalhousie, while he deprecated half-
measures, was strongly opposed to the policy of annexation, though
he was convinced that, so far as the people of Oudh were concerned,
it would be far the best course to take.
In a letter to Sir George Couper written on 15 December, 1855,3
before the orders of the court had arrived, he says:
I understand that they (the Directors] mean to force the King to form a
new treaty or to assume the government of his country. This is all very well
for the home authorities but it was not for me to suggest it. . . . The course
proposed by the Court is not warranted by international law. It would be
either conquest or usurpation of the power of government by force of arms.
This argument of international law would not in these days be raised
in connection with the Indian states.
