lacking good fire,
since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose.
since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose.
Summa Theologica
Therefore it is an act rather than
a virtue.
On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But
magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Divine power, according to Ps.
47:35: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds. " Therefore
magnificence is a virtue.
I answer that, According to De Coelo i, 16, "we speak of virtue in
relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards the
limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very
nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something
great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very
notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards
his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent
deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence,
either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as
explained above (Q[129], A[3], ad 2), as also ([3385]FS, Q[65], A[1])
when we were treating of the connection of virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that magnificence observes the
extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes
the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls
short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity
([3386]Q[129], A[3], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great.
But that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that
which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at
large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to be
lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but
because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything regarding
himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man accomplishes it
magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a
wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it
belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable
dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there
must needs be a virtue of act," i. e. a moral virtue, whereby the
appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is
what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.
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Whether magnificence is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For
magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it may
belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as
in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a
great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special
virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same
as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to
something great, as stated above ([3387]Q[129], AA[1],2). Therefore it
belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore
magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it
is written (Ex. 15:11): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness,"
and (Ps. 95:6): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His
sanctuary. " Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above
([3388]Q[81], A[8]). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as
religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the
others.
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues
(Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).
I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do [facere] something
great, as its name implies [magnificence= magna facere---i. e. to make
great things]. Now "facere" may be taken in two ways, in a strict
sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly "facere" means to work something
in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the
kind; in a broad sense "facere" is employed to denote any action,
whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in
the agent, as to understand or will.
Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something
great, the doing [factio] being understood in the strict sense, it is
then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use
of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness,
namely that the work produced [factum] by the act is something great,
namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence
does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.
If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something
great, the doing [facere] being understood in a broad sense, it is not
a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do
something great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" [facere] be
taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is
proper to magnificence.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to
something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either
by making [faciendo], or by any kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv,
3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of
great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something
great, direct their principal intention, not to something great, but to
that which is proper to each virtue: and the greatness of the thing
done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue.
On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something
great, "doing" [facere] being taken in the strict sense, but also to
tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De
Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing and
administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and
noble purpose of mind, discussion" referring to the inward intention,
and "administration" to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as
magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that
magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in
external matter [factibili].
Reply to Objection 3: The intention of magnificence is the production
of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no
end of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore
magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine
honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most
commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine
sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this
reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect
is directed to religion or holiness.
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Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure?
Objection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great
expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But
liberality is about expenditure, as stated above ([3389]Q[117], A[2]).
Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.
Objection 2: Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv,
2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.
Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about
gifts.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external
work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing
an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending
presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of
magnificence.
Objection 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure.
But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues do
not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for
themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore
magnificence is not about great expenditure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "magnificence
does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but
only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale. "
Therefore it is only about great expenditure.
I answer that, As stated above [3390](A[2]), it belongs to magnificence
to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work,
proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be
produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to
spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in
becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a
magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal," i. e.
proportionate, "expenditure. " Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of
money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he love
money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both
this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a
great work, and also the very money which he employs in going to great
expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent
man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3391]Q[129], A[2]), those
virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty
arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is
concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of
that same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money
and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in
general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use
of money.
Reply to Objection 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one
way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man,
inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money;
wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the
obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to
liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in
relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is
impossible without expenditure or outlay.
Reply to Objection 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents,
as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather
under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some
work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do
something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he
brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.
Reply to Objection 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and
a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man
may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments
to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot
accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great
simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are
great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in
itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its
genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says
(De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid. ).
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Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For
magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above
[3392](A[3]). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of
justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But
magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with
expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to
pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the
magnificent man is like the man of science. " Now science has more in
common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should
not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn.
Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.
I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue,
cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not
agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a
part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.
In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things
are necessary, as stated above ([3393]Q[80]). The one is that the
secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in
some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with
fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and
difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated,
like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of
fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives
its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the
arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from
the dispossession of one's property, which is of much less account than
danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of
fortitude.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as
viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and
magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of
the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure
in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the
concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving
and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other
hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by
attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a
determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like
magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.
Reply to Objection 2: Although magnificence does not agree with
fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter:
since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure,
even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something
great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the
reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason
by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This
is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those
things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the
risk of a great loss.
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OF MEANNESS* (TWO ARTICLES) [*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just as
"magnificentia" is doing great things. ]
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which
head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether meanness is a vice?
(2) Of the vice opposed to it.
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Whether meanness is a vice?
Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice
moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore
both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence
is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a
vice.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful
reckoning is mean. " But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy,
since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean
man is loth to spend money. " But this belongs to covetousness or
illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the
others.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a
special vice opposed to magnificence.
I answer that, As stated above ([3394]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3395]FS, Q[18],
A[6]), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many
cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to
be mean [parvificus] because he intends to do something little
[parvum]. Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad
aliquid. ) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a
mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in
relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in
two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another
as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends
principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the
greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may
produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4)
that "the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more
magnificent result. " On the other hand, the mean man intends
principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
2) that "he seeks how he may spend least. " As a result of this he
intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink from
producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the
Philosopher says that "the mean man after going to great expense
forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he is
unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to
observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and
work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what
is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a
vice.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the
rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the
Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but
for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little
things: hence meanness is a vice.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear
makes us take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his
reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods,
even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy,
but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his
affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his
reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common
with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with
pleasure, so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous
man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that
illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great
expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore
meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 2) that "although meanness and its contrary vice are
sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm
one's neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness?
Objection 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For
great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a
virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
Objection 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated
above [3396](A[1]), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness,
it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend
much, where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought
to spend much, according to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have something
of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.
Objection 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as
stated above [3397](A[1]). Now those who spend excessively, do so in
order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But
this belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated
above (Q[131], A[2] ). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic.
ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices.
I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are
relative terms, as stated above [3398](A[1]). Now just as expenditure
may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in
comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason
requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest
that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his
work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion between his
expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man
exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to
his work. This vice is called in Greek {banausia}, so called from the
Greek {baunos}, because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes
everything. It is also called {apyrokalia}, i. e.
lacking good fire,
since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in
Latin it may be called "consumptio" [waste].
Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence is so called from the great work
done, but not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for
this belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness.
Reply to Objection 2: To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue
which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the
vice of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure
the value of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend
little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great
work, which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far as when
it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.
Reply to Objection 3: Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very
species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas
meanness falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being
directed to the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other.
__________________________________________________________________
OF PATIENCE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether patience is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?
(3) Whether it can be had without grace?
(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?
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Whether patience is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues
are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet
patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according
to Is. 49:10 and Apoc. 7:16, "They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither
shall the heat nor the sun strike them. " Therefore patience is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since
virtue it is "that makes its possessor good. " Yet patience is sometimes
found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils
patiently that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16, "All
the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in
misery and in sorrow. " Therefore patience is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated
above ([3399]FS, Q[70], A[1], ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the
fruits (Gal. 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i): "The virtue of the
soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even
preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3400]Q[123], A[1]), the moral virtues
are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason
against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions sorrow is
strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. 7:10, "The
sorrow of the world worketh death," and Ecclus. 30:25, "Sadness hath
killed many, and there is no profit in it. " Hence the necessity for a
virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give
way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Patientia ii): "A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an
equal mind," i. e. without being disturbed by sorrow, "lest he abandon
with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better
things. " It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as
regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to
the goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but
they will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven.
Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling
and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in
the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of patience,
in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the
goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv) that "patience itself will not be in heaven, since there
is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet that which
we shall obtain by patience will be eternal. "
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) "properly
speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without
inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those
who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither
marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel
at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them patient. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3401]FS, Q[11], A[1]), the very
notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure
in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues
are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is
a virtue. but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned
a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from
being overcome by sorrow.
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Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For
in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now "patience
hath a perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of
the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the
soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written
(Lk. 21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls. " Therefore
patience is the greatest of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause
of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory
(Hom. xxxv in Evang. ) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the
virtues. " Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which
Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call
principal.
I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For
it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's
work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority
and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it
inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues
which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than
those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good:
and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that
which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity
/are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a
check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the
one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of
death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which
temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of
hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not
the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the
theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly
establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which
withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.
Reply to Objection 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in
bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is
moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by
meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to
unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the
principle is the most perfect.
Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect,
that it is more perfect simply.
Reply to Objection 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership;
wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it
removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and
disturb the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of
all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly,
but merely because it removes their obstacles.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?
Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without
grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it
possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more
reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of
evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and
without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that
"men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love
sinfully. " Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the
help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be
truly patient.
Objection 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more
abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens
are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their
country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient.
Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the
help of grace.
Objection 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much
trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health
of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like
manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the
health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i. e. from God,
"is my patience. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength of
desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly
undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which
gives pleasure. " The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of
themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to
suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence
it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure
evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which
causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man
prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may
cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all
things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by
charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient. "
But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through
grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in
our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us. " Therefore it is
clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human
nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination
of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is
more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the
concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake
of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet
it is this that pertains to true patience.
Reply to Objection 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. [3402]FS,
Q[61], A[5]] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the
human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet
not without the help of God's grace [*Cf. [3403]FS, Q[109], A[2]]. On
the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot
tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man
bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man
naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between
this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.
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Whether patience is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a
thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as
fortitude: because, as stated above ([3404]Q[123], A[6]), the proper
act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For
it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from
St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang. ] that "patience consists in enduring
evils inflicted by others. " Therefore patience is not a part of
fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated
above ([3405]Q[123], A[3]), and thus it is in the irascible. But
patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in
the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore
if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without
patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently,
but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience
is not a part of fortitude.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
fortitude.
I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because
it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs
to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by
others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang. ). Now of those
evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to
endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about
these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this
matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to
that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed
to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper
calls patience brave (Sent. 811).
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything
indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of
death: whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding
fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not
failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is
in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude
is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude
avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be
patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a
praiseworthy manner by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here
and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them.
Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the
concupiscible faculty.
Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because
the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the
matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part
of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because
temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of
touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex:
whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons.
Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides
their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man
forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however
great they be.
Reply to Objection 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain
respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a
man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it
is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it
inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up
against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily v.
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says
on Mat. 4:10, "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient
under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most
wicked": and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii)
that "the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the
commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our
enemies. " But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is
annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.
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Whether patience is the same as longanimity? [*Longsuffering. It is
necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with
magnanimity. ]
Objection 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For
Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God, not
as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked,
that they may be converted. " Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:4):
"The Most High is a patient rewarder. " Therefore it seems that patience
is the same as longanimity.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But
impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for
one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it
seems that patience is the same as longanimity.
Objection 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured,
so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of
place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time,
in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from
patience.
Objection 4: On the contrary, a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom.
ii] on Rom. 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and
patience, and longsuffering? " says: "It seems that longanimity differs
from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of
set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take
a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently. "
I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great
things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long
way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good,
rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object,
so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with
magnanimity than with patience.
Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two
reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils
for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is
easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult.
Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a
nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, "Hope that is
deferred afflicteth the soul. " Hence there may be patience in bearing
this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity
and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so far as both the
delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil
which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which
regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous
evil.
For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says
that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and
difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit. " By saying "arduous"
he refers to constancy in good; when he says "difficult" he refers to
the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and
by adding "continued" or "long lasting," he refers to longanimity, in
so far as it has something in common with patience.
This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though
distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that
which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails.
Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the
point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time
coming to us.
We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason
for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear
with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long
time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with
longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be
unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to
be borne with patience.
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OF PERSEVERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under
the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(3) Of its relation to constancy;
(4) Whether it needs the help of grace?
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Whether perseverance is a virtue?
a virtue.
On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But
magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Divine power, according to Ps.
47:35: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds. " Therefore
magnificence is a virtue.
I answer that, According to De Coelo i, 16, "we speak of virtue in
relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards the
limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very
nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something
great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very
notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards
his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent
deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence,
either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as
explained above (Q[129], A[3], ad 2), as also ([3385]FS, Q[65], A[1])
when we were treating of the connection of virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that magnificence observes the
extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes
the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls
short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity
([3386]Q[129], A[3], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great.
But that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that
which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at
large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to be
lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but
because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything regarding
himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man accomplishes it
magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a
wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it
belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable
dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there
must needs be a virtue of act," i. e. a moral virtue, whereby the
appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is
what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.
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Whether magnificence is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For
magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it may
belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as
in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a
great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special
virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same
as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to
something great, as stated above ([3387]Q[129], AA[1],2). Therefore it
belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore
magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it
is written (Ex. 15:11): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness,"
and (Ps. 95:6): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His
sanctuary. " Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above
([3388]Q[81], A[8]). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as
religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the
others.
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues
(Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).
I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do [facere] something
great, as its name implies [magnificence= magna facere---i. e. to make
great things]. Now "facere" may be taken in two ways, in a strict
sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly "facere" means to work something
in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the
kind; in a broad sense "facere" is employed to denote any action,
whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in
the agent, as to understand or will.
Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something
great, the doing [factio] being understood in the strict sense, it is
then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use
of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness,
namely that the work produced [factum] by the act is something great,
namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence
does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.
If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something
great, the doing [facere] being understood in a broad sense, it is not
a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do
something great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" [facere] be
taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is
proper to magnificence.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to
something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either
by making [faciendo], or by any kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv,
3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of
great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something
great, direct their principal intention, not to something great, but to
that which is proper to each virtue: and the greatness of the thing
done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue.
On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something
great, "doing" [facere] being taken in the strict sense, but also to
tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De
Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing and
administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and
noble purpose of mind, discussion" referring to the inward intention,
and "administration" to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as
magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that
magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in
external matter [factibili].
Reply to Objection 3: The intention of magnificence is the production
of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no
end of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore
magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine
honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most
commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine
sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this
reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect
is directed to religion or holiness.
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Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure?
Objection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great
expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But
liberality is about expenditure, as stated above ([3389]Q[117], A[2]).
Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.
Objection 2: Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv,
2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.
Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about
gifts.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external
work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing
an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending
presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of
magnificence.
Objection 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure.
But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues do
not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for
themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore
magnificence is not about great expenditure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "magnificence
does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but
only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale. "
Therefore it is only about great expenditure.
I answer that, As stated above [3390](A[2]), it belongs to magnificence
to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work,
proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be
produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to
spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in
becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a
magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal," i. e.
proportionate, "expenditure. " Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of
money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he love
money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both
this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a
great work, and also the very money which he employs in going to great
expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent
man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3391]Q[129], A[2]), those
virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty
arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is
concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of
that same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money
and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in
general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use
of money.
Reply to Objection 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one
way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man,
inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money;
wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the
obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to
liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in
relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is
impossible without expenditure or outlay.
Reply to Objection 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents,
as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather
under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some
work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do
something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he
brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.
Reply to Objection 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and
a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man
may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments
to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot
accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great
simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are
great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in
itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its
genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says
(De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid. ).
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Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For
magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above
[3392](A[3]). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of
justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But
magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with
expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to
pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the
magnificent man is like the man of science. " Now science has more in
common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should
not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn.
Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.
I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue,
cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not
agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a
part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.
In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things
are necessary, as stated above ([3393]Q[80]). The one is that the
secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in
some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with
fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and
difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated,
like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of
fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives
its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the
arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from
the dispossession of one's property, which is of much less account than
danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of
fortitude.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as
viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and
magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of
the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure
in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the
concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving
and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other
hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by
attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a
determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like
magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.
Reply to Objection 2: Although magnificence does not agree with
fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter:
since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure,
even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something
great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the
reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason
by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This
is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those
things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the
risk of a great loss.
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OF MEANNESS* (TWO ARTICLES) [*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just as
"magnificentia" is doing great things. ]
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which
head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether meanness is a vice?
(2) Of the vice opposed to it.
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Whether meanness is a vice?
Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice
moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore
both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence
is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a
vice.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful
reckoning is mean. " But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy,
since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean
man is loth to spend money. " But this belongs to covetousness or
illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the
others.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a
special vice opposed to magnificence.
I answer that, As stated above ([3394]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3395]FS, Q[18],
A[6]), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many
cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to
be mean [parvificus] because he intends to do something little
[parvum]. Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad
aliquid. ) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a
mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in
relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in
two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another
as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends
principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the
greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may
produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4)
that "the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more
magnificent result. " On the other hand, the mean man intends
principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
2) that "he seeks how he may spend least. " As a result of this he
intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink from
producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the
Philosopher says that "the mean man after going to great expense
forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he is
unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to
observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and
work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what
is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a
vice.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the
rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the
Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but
for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little
things: hence meanness is a vice.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear
makes us take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his
reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods,
even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy,
but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his
affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his
reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common
with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with
pleasure, so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous
man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that
illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great
expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore
meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 2) that "although meanness and its contrary vice are
sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm
one's neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful. "
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Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness?
Objection 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For
great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a
virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
Objection 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated
above [3396](A[1]), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness,
it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend
much, where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought
to spend much, according to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have something
of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.
Objection 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as
stated above [3397](A[1]). Now those who spend excessively, do so in
order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But
this belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated
above (Q[131], A[2] ). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic.
ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices.
I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are
relative terms, as stated above [3398](A[1]). Now just as expenditure
may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in
comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason
requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest
that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his
work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion between his
expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man
exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to
his work. This vice is called in Greek {banausia}, so called from the
Greek {baunos}, because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes
everything. It is also called {apyrokalia}, i. e.
lacking good fire,
since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in
Latin it may be called "consumptio" [waste].
Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence is so called from the great work
done, but not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for
this belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness.
Reply to Objection 2: To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue
which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the
vice of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure
the value of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend
little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great
work, which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far as when
it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.
Reply to Objection 3: Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very
species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas
meanness falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being
directed to the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other.
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OF PATIENCE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether patience is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?
(3) Whether it can be had without grace?
(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?
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Whether patience is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues
are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet
patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according
to Is. 49:10 and Apoc. 7:16, "They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither
shall the heat nor the sun strike them. " Therefore patience is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since
virtue it is "that makes its possessor good. " Yet patience is sometimes
found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils
patiently that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16, "All
the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in
misery and in sorrow. " Therefore patience is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated
above ([3399]FS, Q[70], A[1], ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the
fruits (Gal. 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i): "The virtue of the
soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even
preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3400]Q[123], A[1]), the moral virtues
are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason
against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions sorrow is
strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. 7:10, "The
sorrow of the world worketh death," and Ecclus. 30:25, "Sadness hath
killed many, and there is no profit in it. " Hence the necessity for a
virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give
way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Patientia ii): "A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an
equal mind," i. e. without being disturbed by sorrow, "lest he abandon
with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better
things. " It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as
regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to
the goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but
they will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven.
Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling
and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in
the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of patience,
in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the
goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv) that "patience itself will not be in heaven, since there
is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet that which
we shall obtain by patience will be eternal. "
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) "properly
speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without
inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those
who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither
marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel
at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them patient. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3401]FS, Q[11], A[1]), the very
notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure
in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues
are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is
a virtue. but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned
a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from
being overcome by sorrow.
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Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For
in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now "patience
hath a perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of
the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the
soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written
(Lk. 21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls. " Therefore
patience is the greatest of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause
of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory
(Hom. xxxv in Evang. ) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the
virtues. " Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which
Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call
principal.
I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For
it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's
work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority
and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it
inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues
which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than
those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good:
and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that
which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity
/are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a
check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the
one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of
death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which
temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of
hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not
the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the
theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly
establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which
withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.
Reply to Objection 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in
bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is
moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by
meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to
unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the
principle is the most perfect.
Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect,
that it is more perfect simply.
Reply to Objection 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership;
wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it
removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and
disturb the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of
all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly,
but merely because it removes their obstacles.
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Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?
Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without
grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it
possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more
reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of
evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and
without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that
"men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love
sinfully. " Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the
help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be
truly patient.
Objection 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more
abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens
are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their
country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient.
Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the
help of grace.
Objection 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much
trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health
of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like
manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the
health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i. e. from God,
"is my patience. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength of
desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly
undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which
gives pleasure. " The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of
themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to
suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence
it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure
evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which
causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man
prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may
cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all
things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by
charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient. "
But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through
grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in
our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us. " Therefore it is
clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human
nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination
of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is
more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the
concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake
of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet
it is this that pertains to true patience.
Reply to Objection 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. [3402]FS,
Q[61], A[5]] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the
human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet
not without the help of God's grace [*Cf. [3403]FS, Q[109], A[2]]. On
the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot
tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man
bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man
naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between
this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.
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Whether patience is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a
thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as
fortitude: because, as stated above ([3404]Q[123], A[6]), the proper
act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For
it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from
St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang. ] that "patience consists in enduring
evils inflicted by others. " Therefore patience is not a part of
fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated
above ([3405]Q[123], A[3]), and thus it is in the irascible. But
patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in
the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore
if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without
patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently,
but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience
is not a part of fortitude.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
fortitude.
I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because
it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs
to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by
others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang. ). Now of those
evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to
endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about
these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this
matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to
that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed
to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper
calls patience brave (Sent. 811).
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything
indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of
death: whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding
fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not
failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is
in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude
is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude
avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be
patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a
praiseworthy manner by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here
and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them.
Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the
concupiscible faculty.
Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because
the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the
matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part
of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because
temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of
touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex:
whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons.
Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides
their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man
forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however
great they be.
Reply to Objection 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain
respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a
man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it
is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it
inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up
against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily v.
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says
on Mat. 4:10, "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient
under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most
wicked": and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii)
that "the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the
commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our
enemies. " But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is
annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.
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Whether patience is the same as longanimity? [*Longsuffering. It is
necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with
magnanimity. ]
Objection 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For
Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God, not
as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked,
that they may be converted. " Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:4):
"The Most High is a patient rewarder. " Therefore it seems that patience
is the same as longanimity.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But
impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for
one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it
seems that patience is the same as longanimity.
Objection 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured,
so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of
place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time,
in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from
patience.
Objection 4: On the contrary, a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom.
ii] on Rom. 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and
patience, and longsuffering? " says: "It seems that longanimity differs
from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of
set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take
a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently. "
I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great
things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long
way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good,
rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object,
so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with
magnanimity than with patience.
Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two
reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils
for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is
easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult.
Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a
nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, "Hope that is
deferred afflicteth the soul. " Hence there may be patience in bearing
this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity
and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so far as both the
delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil
which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which
regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous
evil.
For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says
that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and
difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit. " By saying "arduous"
he refers to constancy in good; when he says "difficult" he refers to
the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and
by adding "continued" or "long lasting," he refers to longanimity, in
so far as it has something in common with patience.
This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though
distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that
which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails.
Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the
point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time
coming to us.
We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason
for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear
with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long
time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with
longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be
unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to
be borne with patience.
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OF PERSEVERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under
the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(3) Of its relation to constancy;
(4) Whether it needs the help of grace?
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Whether perseverance is a virtue?
