No More Learning

Relevant also to the overall argument of this work is the close link that exists between agoraphobia and depression. First, symptoms of agoraphobia and of depression tend to change simultaneously and in the same direction, either both getting worse or both getting better (Roth 1959; Snaith 1968). Second, agoraphobic patients stand a higher risk of developing depressive illnesses than do other people (Schapira, Kerr & Roth 1970). In the third volume it is hoped to explore these relationships and their implications in greater detail.
A note on response to treatment
In a thoughtful review, Andrews ( 1966) has pointed out that, in their ways of treating agoraphobic patients, therapists of quite different schools often have more in common than they suppose. In both the behaviour therapy tradition and in some psychoanalytic traditions (e. g. Freud 1919; Fenichel 1945: Alexander & French 1946), it is believed desirable for the patient's relationship with the therapist to develop through two phases. During the first the patient comes to look to the therapist for support. During the second the therapist uses this
-310-
relationship to urge the patient to confront the situations he most fears. 1 Since the technique of confrontation has been carried furthest by behaviour therapists, who claim some measure of success with it, it may be useful to consider what implications for theory that may have. During recent years a series of trials of the efficacy of different forms of psychological treatment has been conducted by Marks and Gelder at the Maudsley Hospital, London. Behaviour therapy has been given in two forms: (a) graded retraining together with systematic desensitization in imagination; and (b) flooding, a technique in which a patient is encouraged to visualize his most frightening phobic images continuously and without relief for a fifty- minute session, while the therapist talks constantly about the phobias and endeavours to maintain anxiety at maximum pitch. After the fifth and sixth sessions, moreover, the patient, accompanied by the therapist, spends a further hour exposing himself to all the situations that he believes frighten him most. In a recent report of the results of a crossover trial of the two treatments (Marks, Boulougouris & Marset 1971), improvements in the patients' condition, seen immediately after treatment and maintained twelve months later, are described. In the case of nine agoraphobic patients a combination of both treatments reduced symptom level from severe or very severe to moderate or mild. Of the two techniques flooding proved the more effective. A question that can properly be raised is whether these results are compatible with the hypotheses advanced in this chapter or incompatible with them. When treatment started the patients were of an average age of thirty-three years and had had their symptoms for about twelve years. They were all highly motivated towards treatment. Many of them regarded the flooding method as a challenge to prove that they could face the phobic situation, and for some it was the first time in years that they had exposed themselves to it. That they benefited from the experience might be attributable, on the basis of the present theory, to two circumstances:
236
a. The phobic situations, e. g. being out alone or travelling by public transport, were not the core situations of which
____________________
1 In a paper on technique, Freud ( 1919) expressly advises that in the treatment of
agoraphobic patients an analyst should 'induce them by the influence of the analysis . . . to go into the street and to struggle with their anxiety while they make the attempt' ( SE 17: 166).
-311-
the patients were or had been afraid but complementary. situations on which a patient's attention, with that of his family, had become focused. Thus although the patient was genuinely afraid of these situations, once he confronted them he found that they were not so frightening after all.
The agoraphobic symptoms in these cases had developed an average of twelve years earlier when the patients were in their early twenties. Whatever the family situation to which a patient was responding may have been then, it is likely to have changed materially during the interval. Thus for some of the patients, and perhaps for all, the family situation that it is postulated had produced the symptoms may have ceased to exist. Once resolutely tackled, therefore, many of the symptoms might be expected to diminish.
Were the latter explanation to prove valid, it would imply that phobic symptoms, once fully developed, may in some cases persist long after the situation that has produced them has changed. That contingency is in keeping with the present theory. Nevertheless, because the theory posits that childhood models of attachment figures persist, it would predict that these patients would continue to be especially sensitive both to loss of an attachment figure and to any situation that they construed as presaging loss. They would thus remain prone to develop anxiety symptoms. Whether this is so is unclear.
The conclusion appears to be, therefore, that there is little in the results of treatment reported so far that is incompatible with the theory advanced. At the same time no claim is made that the results support the theory. In any case to argue from results of treatment to theories of aetiology is notoriously dangerous.
-312-
237
Chapter 20
Omission, Suppression, and Falsification of Family Context
Suppressio veri suggestio falsi
THOSE who support the view advanced here, that school refusal, agoraphobia, and some forms of animal phobia are best understood in terms of anxious attachment arising from disturbed family interaction, have an obligation to answer two questions that their theory poses. First, how comes it that a phobic patient is afraid, or at least is thought to be afraid, of so many situations, such as schools, crowds, or animals, that have nothing to do with his relationships with parents? Second, and conversely, if the basic problem of a phobic patient lies in his relationships with parents, how comes it that that fact so often goes unrecognized and that his problem is thought to lie elsewhere?
Answers to these questions are not difficult to sketch. Several processes seem to be at work through which the situations truly responsible become obscured and distorted and other situations are picked upon instead.
When an insecure individual, uncertain whether his attachment figures are going to be accessible and responsive, or even alive, is faced with a potentially fear-arousing situation, he is more likely to respond to it with fear, and also more likely to respond with intense fear, than is an individual who feels secure and confident in his attachment figures. Thus the increased propensity of an insecure individual to fear any and all of the myriad of potentially fear-arousing situations present in his life outside his family is readily explained. What then remains unexplained is why concern is commonly so narrowly focused on his fear of those extra-familial situations while his fear of what may be happening to his attachment figures is overlooked.
In Chapter 11 it is noted that, in any one instance, it may be far from easy to identify the nature of the stimulus situations
-313-
that are arousing fear in a person. Several reasons for the difficulty are discussed. One stems from the properties of compound situations. Whenever fear is aroused by a compound situation, there is a marked tendency to single out one of its components as the one that is arousing fear and to ignore the other(s). An example given there is of a person who is afraid when, alone and in the dark, he hears strange noises. Whereas the intensity of fear aroused in such a situation is likely to be a result of the fact that all three conditions are present simultaneously, there is a strong likelihood that attention will be focused on only one of them, while the other two are regarded as merely incidental or else are overlooked entirely. Which of the components is singled out and which are ignored is likely to be determined by the various biases of the person himself and of those around him.
238
In Western cultures, at least, there is a bias to give attention to that component in the situation that is most readily taken to spell real danger, in the example given the strange noises, and to disregard the others. By contrast, little weight is given to the component 'being alone'. Indeed in our culture for someone to confess himself afraid when alone is often regarded as shameful or merely silly. Hence there exists a pervasive bias to overlook the very component of fear- arousing situations that a study of anxious patients suggests is usually the most important.
Nevertheless, it is most unlikely that cultural biases alone account for the strong tendency, not only for patients and their relatives but for clinicians also, to misidentify the situations that are giving rise to a patient's fears. In many cases other far more specific factors are at work as well. Those that require attention include: omission of the family context in which a patient's symptoms have developed and are being exhibited; suppression of the family context; and falsification of the family context.
Much emphasis has already been placed on the marked tendency of the parents of patients (both young and old) to keep silent about the part they themselves are or have been playing. Information about their quarrels, or about their threats to separate, to abandon or eject their children, or to commit suicide, is very rarely volunteered to clinicians trying to help. Sometimes such information is not given because a parent genuinely fails to recognize its relevance, or because the clinician seems uninterested. At other times, it is clear, omission is motivated. For example, during the practice of family
-314-
psychiatry it happens frequently that, when the confidence of parents has been gained, they admit frankly that in the account of events they gave during initial interviews they either suppressed or deliberately falsified key information. Often they did so, they say, because of fear of being criticized; and this is certainly true in many cases. But in a number of others suppression and falsification have much deeper roots.
In certain families it becomes plain, as work proceeds, that the parents are concerned, sometimes at almost any cost, to present the patient's behaviour as unreasonable and incomprehensible and themselves as reasonable people who have done all in their power to help. A perceptive clinician can see how acutely sensitive such parents often are to any sign of criticism of themselves, especially when it comes from the patient, and with what determination they seek to clear themselves of having played any part in creating the problem. The patient's behaviour, they claim, is to be understood solely in terms of the patient: he is emotionally disturbed, ill, mad, or bad. 1
Alternatively, whenever the patient's problems can plausibly be ascribed to some extra- familial situation, the parents seize eagerly upon it. Unsympathetic teachers, bullying boys, barking dogs, the risk of a traffic accident--each is caught at hopefully in order to explain the patient's condition. Thus are phobias born: and, because so often they provide a convenient family scapegoat, they grow to have a life of their own.
If this analysis is correct, we conclude that both in determining the birth of a condition plausibly diagnosed as phobic and in fostering it parental influence is likely to be dominant. 2 Yet there are two other parties active on the scene, the patient himself and the clinician. Both, it is evident, often play strongly supportive roles.
239
Patients, it seems, vary enormously in the degree to which they accept their parents' definition of their situation. Not a few rebut it, either wholly or in part. Thus, as described in the preceding chapters, only a minority of children diagnosed as
____________________
1 Scott presents evidence that in some cases a parent adopts this attitude because he is
alarmed lest he be regarded as mentally ill himself ( Scott, Ashworth & Casson 1970). In other cases a parent's perception of, and behaviour towards, the patient is shot through with fear lest he (the patient) should take after a relative who became psychotic during the parent's childhood ( Scott & Ashworth 1969).
2 To this generalization certain restricted animal phobias may be exceptions.
-315-
school phobic are likely to make any complaint about either teacher or schoolmates. Similarly, studies of agoraphobic patients show repeatedly that the principal fear of which many complain is of leaving home and not of what will happen outside it. Given understanding and encouragement, and sometimes without it, many of these patients, whether child or adult, will describe accurately the situations that they really most fear. All too often, unfortunately, a clinician does not grasp the import of what the patient is saying and his story is dismissed or ignored.
Nevertheless, it must be recognized, there are many other patients who seem genuinely to believe that the root of their trouble lies in an unreasonable fear of some extra-familial situation, and who may even go to great lengths to discredit any suggestion that there may be difficulties at home. How, we may ask, does that come about? Here again several potentially interacting processes seem to be at work.
In the first place, no child cares to admit that his parent is gravely at fault. To recognize frankly that a mother is exploiting you for her own ends, or that a father is unjust and tyrannical, or that neither parent ever wanted you, is intensely painful. Moreover it is very frightening. Given any loophole, therefore, most children will seek to see their parents' behaviour in some more favourable light. This natural bias of children is easy to exploit.
Not only are most children unwilling to see their parents in too bad a light but there are parents who themselves do all in their power to ensure that their child does not do so or at least that he does not communicate an adverse picture to others. When Mrs Qwas a girl, it will be remembered, her mother was adamant that on no account should she reveal the appalling quarrels that raged between her parents. As a result Mrs Q. told nothing to friendly neighbours, to teachers, or to schoolfriends; and she also had the greatest difficulty in revealing anything to the therapist who treated her after she was grown up; for to disobey a dominant and ruthless parent, even for an adult, is by no means easy.
Thus, threatened by sanctions against telling the truth as he sees it, a patient may habitually connive to present the family scene in a falsely favourable light. Yet in his heart he may know well enough what is true and, given support, may pluck up courage to describe it.
Such a state of mind is very different from another and related -316-
240
one, in which a patient gives a misleading picture of the family because he hardly knows where truth lies. The latter condition develops, it seems likely, when a person is plied from childhood onwards with systematically false information about family figures, their motives and relationships. This requires expansion.
In Chapter 14 an account is given of how during the course of development a child constructs for himself working models of his attachment figures and of himself in relation to them. The data used for model construction are derived from multiple sources: from his day-to-day experiences, from statements made to him by his parents, and from information coming from others. Usually the data reaching him from these diverse sources are reasonably compatible. For example, not only may a child experience his parents as accessible, considerate, and responsive but information coming from other sources may amply endorse that view. Others tell him how lucky he is to have loving parents; and his parents tell him how much they love him and how lovable they find him. Alternatively, both the experience a child has of his parents and the information he receives from them and from others about them may point consistently to their being unloving. Many more complex relationships can be imagined; but, provided in each case the information reaching the child from the different sources is reasonably compatible, the working models that he builds of parents and of self will be internally consistent in themselves and also complementary to one another. As such the models are able to reflect with a fair degree of accuracy the sort of people the child's parents are, how they see him and how they are likely to treat him. Thus, whether relationships are happy or the reverse, the child is able to make firm and accurate predictions and, on that basis, to construct plans of action likely to prove effective.
For a minority of children, by contrast, the data reaching them from the different sources may be regularly and persistently incompatible. To take a real, though by no means extreme, example: a child may experience his mother as unresponsive to him and unloving and he may infer, correctly, that she had never wanted him and never loved him. Yet this mother may insist, in season and out, that she does love him. Furthermore, if there is friction between them, as there inevitably is, she may claim that it results from his having been born with a contrary temperament. When he seeks her attention, she dubs him insufferably demanding; when he interrupts
-317-
her, he is intolerably selfish; when he becomes angry at her neglect, he is held possessed of a bad temper or even an evil spirit. In some way, she claims, he was born bad. Nevertheless, thanks to a good fortune he does not deserve, he has been blessed with a loving mother who, despite all, cares devotedly for him.
In such a case, the information reaching the child from his parent not only is systematically distorted but is in sharp conflict with what he infers from his first-hand experience. If he were to accept his mother's view as correct, the model he would build of her, reflecting her behaviour and motives, and the model he would build of himself, reflecting his own behaviour and motives, would be such-and-such; whereas, if he were to accept the view he derives from his own experience as correct, the models he would build would be just the opposite. In such a situation the child is faced with a most grave dilemma. Is he to accept the picture as he sees it himself? Or is he to accept the one his parent insists is true?
241
To this dilemma there are several possible outcomes. One is that the child adheres to his own viewpoint, even at the risk of breaking with his parent(s). That is far from easy, especially if the parent should back the demand that the child accept the parental version by threatening to abandon or eject him, or else to become ill or commit suicide. Whenever a child or a young adult does take that course the rupture between him and his parent(s) is bound to be serious and may well prove unbridgeable. A second and opposite outcome is complete compliance with the parent's version at the cost of disowning his own. Both parties will then construe his behaviour and how he feels as due to his disturbed condition and as being altogether unintelligible in terms of the family context as they see it and present it. A third, and perhaps common, outcome is an uneasy compromise whereby a child tries to give credence to both viewpoints and oscillates uneasily between them. A fourth is when he attempts desperately to integrate the two pictures, an attempt that, because they are inherently incompatible, is doomed to failure and may lead to cognitive breakdown. If Schatzman's formulation of the case of Schreber is correct (see Chapter 11), Schreber's condition would be an example of the fourth outcome.
There are many psychiatrists today, including the present writer, who believe that a number of very serious disorders can be understood as developing from cognitive conflict of this
-318-
kind. 1 Here, however, only two of the possible outcomes need be considered. These are the second and third, in which the maturing child continues to accept his parent's version of the family scene, either without apparent reservations or else with them. When this is so, the child, even though fully adult, is still accepting his mother's picture of herself as a devoted and selfsacrificing woman when to an outsider she may appear demanding and possessive, and is still accepting her picture of himself as selfish and given to unreasonable tempers when to an outsider he may appear pathetically compliant. Should he at any time show signs of questioning her version of their relationship, moreover, she may use threats to insist he maintains it. Should he then be frightened that she will carry out her threats, she may disclaim ever having made them. And should it then be plausible to attribute his anxiety to some extra- familial situation, she will be quick to seize on it. Exposed to all these pressures, it is not surprising that he despairs of establishing his own construction of events and instead complies weakly with his mother's, or even assertively endorses it.
For parents systematically to suppress or falsify the roles they are playing in family life is, of course, gravely pathological. Yet the way in which they tell their story may be so convincing that anyone not alive to the possibility of systematic distortion may be deceived; and this is especially likely whenever the patient endorses the parents' account. Many a clinician, unfortunately, imbued with irrelevant theory and untrained in the field of family psychiatry, finds himself sadly ill equipped to see what is happening. In consequence the family's phobic scapegoat attains the status of psychiatric diagnosis.
Not only are most clinicians untrained in these matters but all too often they show bias. Sometimes the bias is pro-children
____________________
1 Most of the research stemming from this viewpoint deals with interaction in the families of
schizophrenic patients. In this tradition are the works of Batesonet al. ( 1956), Lidzet al. ( 1958), Wynneet al. ( 1958), Laing & Esterson ( 1964), and Scott, Ashworth & Casson (
242
1970). The conclusions to which the findings of these and other studies point are, first, that the pathogenic potential of suppression and falsification as they occur within a family is fully as great as the pathogenic potential of repression and splitting as they occur within an individual, and, second, that processes of the two types interact. This is a field to which we shall return in the third volume. Well-planned research designed to explore this interaction is likely to yield insights of the greatest value to psychopathology.
-319-
and anti-parents. More often it is the other way about. Clinicians are often themselves parents, and so are likely unwittingly to identify over-readily with another parent's viewpoint. Parents may be thought of as experienced and sensible; the patients, by contrast, are young, and seen, perhaps, as inclined to exaggerate or even fabricate. In telling their stories parents may seem more lucid and coherent than their children. Furthermore, parents may be respected citizens, perhaps acquaintances or even friends whose account the clinician is reluctant to question. It may be no coincidence that Little Hans's parents were among Freud's 'closest adherents' ( SE 10: 6). Pervading the scene, moreover, and influencing all parties is the timehonoured commandment 'Honour thy father and thy mother'.
Yet another factor tipping the balance in the same direction is the tendency, as notable in clinicians as it is in laymen, to reify emotions, especially the more uncomfortable ones. Instead of describing the situation in which a person experiences fear, the person is said to 'have' a fear. Instead of describing the situation in which a person becomes angry, he is said to 'have' a bad temper. Similarly, someone 'has' a phobia, or is 'filled with' anxiety or aggression. 1 Once emotions are reified the speaker is spared the task of tracing what is making the person in question afraid or angry, and will hardly notice when family context is omitted or suppressed. Thus any clinician who thinks in these ways is all too apt to fall in with a parent's claim that the behaviour of a child is altogether baffling and unintelligible, and thence to attribute it to some psychological or physiological anomaly inherent in the child. Preoccupation with nosological entities or biochemical anomalies has the same effect. Much present-day theorizing, both psychoanalytic and non-analytic, is of these kinds.
As a result of all these influences, which, as Scott ( 1973a and b) argues, converge to form the cultural image of mental illness as it is today, the dominant bias in psychoanalysis and psychiatry is to give credence to a parent's constructions and to throw doubt on a child's. Discrepancies are attributed with great readiness to the distorting effects of a child's feelings and phantasies, and only reluctantly to the distorting effects of those of a parent.
Nevertheless in certain quarters the boot is put firmly on the other foot. By those espousing anti-psychiatry the patient is
____________________
1 The tendency to reify emotions is discussed further in Appendix III.
-320-
deemed right and well and the parent is wrong or ill. Unfortunately, so strident and condemnatory of parents have some of these claims been that a family perspective becomes discredited and valid points are lost to sight.
243
The position adopted here is that, while parents are held to play a major role in causing a child to develop a heightened susceptibility to fear, their behaviour is seen not in terms of moral condemnation but as having been determined by the experiences they themselves had as children. Once that perspective is attained and rigorously adhered to, parental behaviour that has the gravest consequences for children can be understood and treated without moral censure. That way lies hope of breaking the generational succession.
-321-
Chapter 21
Secure Attachment and the Growth of Self-reliance
People are much greater and much stronger than we imagine, and when unexpected tragedy comes . . . we see them so often grow to a stature that is far beyond anything we imagined. We must remember that people are capable of greatness, of courage, but not in isolation. . . . They need the conditions of a solidly linked human unit in which everyone is prepared to bear the burden of others.
ARCHBISHOP ANTHONY BLOOM 1
Personality development and family experience
Throughout the last half-dozen chapters attention is concentrated on conditions within a family that lead a developing child to grow up more than usually prone to be anxious and fearful. Here, in the penultimate chapter, we examine conditions that lead to an opposite and happier outcome. And just as we found that there is a strong case for believing that gnawing uncertainty about the accessibility and responsiveness of attachment figures is a principal condition for the development of unstable and anxious personality so is there a strong case for believing that an unthinking confidence in the unfailing accessibility and support of attachment figures is the bedrock on which stable and self-reliant personality is built.
Naturally any simple statement of that kind needs elaboration. Thus the family experience of those who grow up anxious and fearful is found to be characterized not only by uncertainty about parental support but often also by covert yet strongly distorting parental pressures: pressure on the child, for example, to act as caretaker for a parent; or to adopt, and thereby to confirm, a parent's false models--of self, of child, and of their relationship. Similarly, the family experience of those who grow up to become relatively stable and self-reliant
____________________
1 The David Kissen Memorial Lecture, 26 March 1969.
-322-
is characterized not only by unfailing parental support when called upon but also by a steady yet timely encouragement towards increasing autonomy, and by the frank communication by parents of working models--of themselves, of child, and of others--that are not only tolerably valid but are open to be questioned and revised.
244
Because in all these respects children tend unwittingly to identify with parents and therefore to adopt, when they become parents, the same patterns of behaviour towards children that they themselves have experienced during their own childhood, patterns of interaction are transmitted, more or less faithfully, from one generation to another.
Thus the inheritance of mental health and of mental ill health through the medium of family microculture is certainly no less important, and may well be far more important, than is their inheritance through the medium of genes.
Evidence to support these propositions fully is, inevitably, insufficient. In the studies available the criteria adopted for deciding who are and who are not stable and self-reliant individuals can be challenged; the adequacy of methods used in collecting information about parental behaviour can be faulted; the assumptions made regarding continuity of personality organization over time can be questioned: and the restriction of samples to Western cultures casts doubt on how far findings can be generalized. Even so, the consistency of findings so far reported remains impressive. This means that those who are inclined to challenge either the evidence or the conclusions to which it leads have a case to answer. Only if they present such data as in their judgement point in a different direction can their objections be taken seriously.
In what follows the results of about a dozen studies, all reported since 1960, are drawn upon. It is not an exhaustive list and is, unfortunately, confined to studies undertaken in the United States. So far as is known, however, the findings are not contradicted by the results of any other study. Certainly, such knowledge of how personality development is related to family experience as has been acquired by those who work professionally with families in the United Kingdom does nothing to call in question the American findings.
Sector Studies of the Life-cycle
Since with present facilities it is not possible to study human beings in the course of their development from the cradle to the
-323-
grave, it is necessary to consider sectors of the life-cycle piecemeal. Once a sufficient number of such studies is recorded it is reasonable to hope that, by fitting their findings together as a mosaic, a picture will emerge of a range of personality patterns, each of which will be seen developing along its own typical pathway within that version of family environment that, for good or ill, tends inexorably to promote it. In this chapter a sketch map of such a mosaic is attempted.
The sector of the life-cycle most studied is that lying between ten years of age and the early twenties. Typically the sample chosen is representative either of children in certain specified schools or of students in a specified college. Whereas in most studies, e. g. those of Bronfenbrenner ( 1961), Grinker ( 1962), Rosenberg ( 1965), Coopersmith ( 1967), Megargee, Parker & Levine ( 1971), information regarding personality and family is obtained at a single point in the individual's life-history, in a few the subjects are followed during a number of years. Examples of such studies are one by Peck & Havighurst ( 1960) in which subjects were followed from the age of ten to seventeen, one by Offer ( 1969) in which they were followed from fourteen to eighteen, and one by Murpheyet al. ( 1963) in which they were followed from their last year at high school through their first year at college. Samples range in size from a few dozen to several hundred, with an occasional sample running into thousands. The
245
amount of information available on each individual differs enormously and, as might be expected, varies inversely with size of sample. Whereas most samples include both boys and girls, a few are confined to males.
The findings of the batch of studies that focus on the sector running from pre-adolescence to early adult life provide us with an invaluable vantage-point from which to look both at earlier and at later sectors of the life-cycle. Looking in one direction we can consider the results of three studies of personality development and family experience that cover, respectively, the preschool years ( Baumrind 1967; Heinickeet al. , in press) and the first year of life ( Ainsworth, Bell & Stayton 1971). Looking in the other we can consider the findings of a study of unusually effective and self-reliant men in their early and middle thirties ( Korchin & Ruff 1964). Finally, we can consider the results of a study of almost a hundred adults in their early thirties who, since early childhood, have been the subjects of a longitudinal survey ( Siegelmanet al. 1970).
Among the varied aims of these many studies one that all
-324-
have in common is to relate different degrees and forms of healthy personality organization, and/or of effective performance, to different types of experience within the family. Since in most studies interest focuses mainly on the nature of and conditions for favourable development, many of the samples are deliberately biased so that individuals who are emotionally disturbed or delinquent are under-represented or even excluded. In this way the far more common bias, typical of clinical studies, which leads a sample to be composed mainly or wholly of disturbed or delinquent subjects, is counterbalanced.
Sources of Information
In regard to personality development and its present organization and performance, information can be obtained from at least four main sources:
--from the subject himself, either during interview or in reply to questionnaires and self- rating scales
--from informants who know the subject well, notably parents, teachers, and peers
--from inferences derived from the subject's responses given either during interview or during projective testing
--from first-hand observation of behaviour either in a natural setting, e. g. at home or in
school, or in a laboratory.
Similarly, in regard to family experience, information can be obtained from at least four main sources:
--from the subject's parents, or siblings, either during the course of interview or in reply to questionnaires or self-rating scales
--from the subject himself
--from inferences derived from the parents' responses given either during interview or during projective testing
--from first-hand observation of families in interaction, either at home or in a clinical or laboratory setting.
For their information in regard to either or both of these fields, a few researchers rely on only a single source, and by so doing are able to study a large sample. A majority of researchers, however, draw on information derived from several sources but by so doing are limited to
246
studying only a small sample. That findings from these two very different types of study confirm one another gives added confidence to the findings of each.
-325-
Criteria of Evaluation
A difficulty intrinsic to every study of the kind we are concerned with is that of deciding the criteria to be used in evaluating personality structure. By what criteria, it may be asked, are we categorizing certain persons as well integrated, secure, and mentally healthy, and others as not so? How valid are these criteria? Are we, perhaps, in judging certain personality characteristics favourably doing no more than apply middle-class standards in an area in which they have no relevance? Is there danger therefore that our results are at the best of no more than limited application and at the worst positively misleading? Since criticisms of this type are often voiced (e. g. Spiegel 1958; Miller 1970; Bronfenbrenner 1970), an answer is necessary.
In the first place the criteria used are far from uniform. In some studies the principal criterion is competent performance in the social setting of home, or school, or college, or work. Examples are those by Bronfenbrenner ( 1961) of high-school students rated by their teachers, by Megargeeet al. ( 1971) of college students rated by the researchers on the basis of information given by the students themselves, and by Korchin & Ruff ( 1964) of astronauts in training. In other studies the principal criterion is the subject's self-esteem, measured mainly in terms of how he says he feels about himself in relation to others. Examples are that by Coopersmith ( 1967) of schoolboys aged ten to twelve, and that by Rosenberg ( 1965) of high- school children aged sixteen to eighteen. In other studies, for example of college students by Grinker ( 1962), the criteria applied are complex and derive from psychiatric experience. In several studies, moreover, including those of Grinker ( 1962), Peck & Havighurst ( 1960), and Offer ( 1969), criteria of several sorts are used together. In the multiplicity of criteria used by the different researchers lies some safeguard against unwitting prejudice.
A second reason for having confidence in the criteria is that in several studies evidence is given that the criteria used for healthy development correlate negatively with independent measures of mental ill health. For example, Rosenberg ( 1965) shows that his measure of self- esteem is negatively correlated with a tendency to depression, with a tendency to feel isolated and lonely, and with proneness to psychosomatic symptoms. Similarly, a rather similar measure of self-esteem used by Coopersmith ( 1967) is shown to be negatively correlated with anxiety, as measured by clinical tests, and also with emotional
-326-
problems and destructive behaviour, as reported by the sub. ject's mother.
A third reason for having confidence in the criteria is that, when they are applied to a sample of subjects, the grading of personalities that results is only weakly correlated with the social class from which the subjects come, e. g. Peck & Havighurst ( 1960), Rosenberg ( 1965), Coopersmith ( 1967). This means that, because certain values in respect of personality and family relationships have come to be associated especially with the middle classes, it is mistaken to assume that they are not held also by members of the working classes, though admittedly by a rather smaller proportion of them. Nor, conversely, can it be assumed, as
247
seems often to be done, that these so-called middle-class values are unrelated to mental health. On the contrary, it is very plausible to suppose that certain, though not all, of the psychosocial values and practices of a family that make for a modest degree of educational, social, and economic success in a child are the same as some of those that make for his better than average mental health. The plausibility of this view is much strengthened when it is expressed in its complementary form, namely that certain of the psychosocial values and practices of a family that make for below average mental health in a child are the same as some of those that make for his educational, social, and economic failure. Indeed, those studying the causes of intractable poverty no less than those studying the causes of mental ill health find themselves confronted by certain adverse and self-perpetuating patterns of family microculture that there is reason to believe are causal agents common to both conditions.
These are complex and difficult questions some of which are referred to again later in the chapter. Meanwhile enough has been said to show why in what follows the objection that the findings presented are invalidated because suffused with unwitting middle-class prejudice is not accepted.
All the criteria used in these studies, it is believed, are closely related to each other and all are measures, albeit crude, of a characteristic that might be termed 'adaptability'. By this is meant the capacity to adapt successfully to, and therefore to survive for long periods in, any and all of a wide range of physical and social environments, especially when survival turns on cooperation with others. Although this capacity could in principle be subjected to empirical test, in practice it would be far from easy to do. To illustrate the concept, however, an
-327-
imaginary experiment can be described. In it the experimenter would select several groups of individuals, unfamiliar with each other, and transport each group to a succession of strange and difficult environments--some strange and difficult for reasons of social structure and custom, and others so because of geographical features. The prediction would then be that a group of individuals rated highly on a measure of adaptability would be more likely to succeed and survive over a long period in each one of these environments than would a group of individuals matched in other relevant respects, but rated lower on adaptability.
Thus the criterion of adaptability is distinct from a criterion such as 'adjustment to the status quo', to the use of which in this context there would be strong objection. It is distinct also from the criterion of whether a person tends to accept, to criticize, or to reject the status quo. Indeed, the ways in which personalities rated highly on the criterion of adaptability may contribute, positively or negatively, to the political life of the societies in which they live are little known; and to elucidate them is a task for which psychiatrists are not qualified.
It is thus clearly recognized that the interrelated criteria with which this chapter is concerned are a few only of the many that are applicable to personality. Some of the others, for example, degree of originality, of creative spirit, or of capacity for innovation, are certainly distinct from criteria of mental health and adaptability, and may, perhaps, be correlated with them in only slight degree. It must therefore be strongly emphasized that, in concentrating on the one set of criteria to the exclusion of others, no claim is made that the criteria selected are the only ones of importance. The reason for so concentrating is that in the practice of psychiatry the issues that must be our first concern are those of mental health and ill health. In so far as in
248
our actions we may apply other criteria we are doing so simply as adherents of a professional ethic or as private persons.
The reader interested in considering problems of criteria further is referred to discussions by Grinker ( 1962), Heath ( 1965), and Douvan & Adelson ( 1966), and to a comprehensive review by Offer & Sabshin ( 1966).
Studies of adolescents and young adults The Peck & Havighurst Study
Because clinicians are traditionally sceptical of the results of large samples studied by what they believe to be inadequate
-328-
methods, we start with an extremely detailed and careful study of thirty-four children, seventeen boys and seventeen girls, growing up in a small town of the American mid-west, code-named Prairie City. This study by Peck & Havighurst, published in 1960, is part of a more extensive study begun during the 1940s of social and psychological life in the town. When selected for study the town had a population of about 10,000, 90 per cent of whom were native born and mainly of Norwegian and Polish extraction. The men were engaged either in agriculture or in local industry. Areas of residence were little segregated by social class and there was no socially disorganized area.
The sample of children studied was a sub-sample of all those born in the town during 1933. All children in the cohort, which numbered 120, were first examined in 1943 when they were ten years old. At that time they were given a number of tests of intelligence and personality and were also rated in regard to personality characteristics both by their teachers and by their peers. As a result of this preliminary screening a sub-sample of thirty-four children was chosen as representative (a) of all ranges of moral character and (b) of the social-class structure of the town. Thenceforward the development of these thirtyfour children and of the families in which they lived became the subject of intensive study until 1950 when the children had all turned seventeen.
Since both the criteria used, namely 'moral character' and 'social class', can, as we have seen, give rise to controversy, a word about the place that each holds in this study is necessary.
Although in selecting the sub-sample Peck & Havighurst used a criterion defined in terms of moral character, a reading of their case material makes it plain that there is a high correlation between judgements based on that criterion and judgements based on the degree to which an individual is a wellorganized personality, capable of effective performance in fields both of work and of human relationships, and in good standing with peers. In effect, therefore, the scale used is almost equivalent to scales that might be designed to measure, say, 'integration of personality', or 'ego strength', or 'emotional security', or 'mental health', or adaptability as defined here. 1
____________________
1 Fairly early in their study Peck & Havighurst, in fact, replace the criterion 'moral character'
by that of 'maturity of character'. Reasons why in the present work the latter concept is not employed are already mentioned briefly at the end of Chapter 14, and they are elaborated
249
further in the final one. -329-
As regards the issue of class, it is of advantage that in this study, in contrast to many others, the sample selected is roughly representative of the whole Prairie City population and, as such, comes mainly from the lower half of the socio-economic scale. This is shown in the table below. The criticism that findings are misleading because tangled with middle-class values would, therefore, be of little relevance in this context.
Sample studied
Boys Girls No. No.
All Population
Children Of city % All ages
%
Socio-economic Class
Upper Upper-middle Lower-middle Upper-lower Lower-lower
On each of the thirty-four children in the study a great quantity of data were amassed. Many data came from the child himself, for example, from interviews with him, from standardized tests and questionnaires, and from projection tests. Other data came from sociometric measures given to the whole cohort of 120 children and from teachers' ratings. Data were analysed and evaluated in several steps. First, data from each source were analysed separately. Next, a clinical conference was called in which data from all sources were drawn upon to arrive at a picture of personality structure. A third step was for each research worker in the project to rate each personality on a series of scales aimed at measuring different aspects of character structure; as a result each child became designated by a personality profile. Finally, on the basis of these profiles the children were grouped into what proved empirically to be eight categories arranged according to their degree of maturity, a dimension equivalent to what in this work is termed adaptability. Brief descriptions of these eight character types are quoted below, starting with the 'least mature', and indicating the number of children assigned to each.
-330-
I. The amoral: These five children were characterized by inaccurate perception of social situations, of other people, and of self; poor ability to set clear, realistic, attainable goals of any kind, behavior which is ill-adapted to achieve whatever ends the person does have in
0 0
1 0
4 5
9 10
3 2
1717 100100
0 3 3 11 26 31 56 41 15 14
250
mind; and poor control over impulses which will interfere with successful adaptation to the social world, even in the sense of achieving purely personal, selfish gratification.
They show hostile, immature emotionality. There is, moreover, a pattern of childishly inappropriate emotional lability which mobilizes excessive energy and imposes a severe strain on the individual's already weak self-control. The usual nature of these emotions is that of negativism and hostility. These subjects are unwilling to accept the self-restraints and positive precepts their society suggests. . . .
They suffer from punitive but ineffectual guilt feelings, which are of little use in controlling their behavior. This in itself indicates sharp inner conflict and lack of positive, healthy self- regard or self-respect. . . .
The consequence is that they are no more at peace with themselves than they are with the world, though they might defiantly deny it to any representative of the culture they so strongly reject.
II. A type intermediate between the amoral and the expedient: Three children (not described in detail).
III. The expedient: These four children were characterized by 'taking the easy way out':
Their almost exclusive expediency is . . . not so much an active attempt to manipulate the people and events around them for personal gain as it is an effort to get as much personal gratification as possible by fitting in with their world when they have to, and avoiding as many social demands as possible which would require them to act in a positively socialized way.
Their constriction and relinquishment of direction to the social forces around them leads only to the absence of active immorality . . . . it requires them to suppress enough of their selfish spontaneous impulses to make them tense, restless, and uncomfortable with themselves. . . .
They are would-be hedonists . . . but it seems that the
-331-
inescapable facts of social living make real happiness dependent on actively friendly, mutually warm relationships with other people. Since they have little conception of such relatedness, their efforts to grasp hedonistic pleasure result in empty satisfactions. They seek but do not find, for they are unable to recognize the human warmth and approval they vaguely but intensely want.
IV. The impulsive yet guilt-ridden: 1 These two boys were characterized by a 'primitive, harsh conscience' which they disowned.
Thus, they are not 'masters in their own houses'. They react to impulse or to internalized, irrationally held moral principles in which they do not personally believe . . . They don't care much for other people, and feel themselves to be quite bad. They are not conscious of much of their guilt, for they protect themselves against recognizing their basically low self-regard by consciously picturing themselves in more favourable but not very realistic terms. Even so,
251
their inner conflict is too severe to be successfully ignored. They try hard, but don't find much real pleasure in life.
V. The conforming: These eight children were characterized by a good deal of hostility that was controlled fairly effectively by a punitive conscience.
Two of them, both girls, are described as being unable to express their wishes spontaneously and to derive little satisfaction from life.
They feel strong, chronic guilt about their 'bad impulses', even though they seldom actively express them. Their superegos are almost entirely composed of negative 'Don'ts' which they have incorporated unquestioningly. They feel themselves to be a bad kind of person, just as they see little to like in others. They are unable to check the punitive voices of their conscience (almost a direct echo of harsh parental strictures, it seems) against the reality of daily life, in any rational, self-directing way. They are, in short, depressed, dull, unhappy, and quite unable to stand up to the world even to express their antagonism toward it.
Some of the other children categorized as 'conforming' are described as being 'friendly in their outlook and relatively at
____________________
1 Peck & Havighurst designate this personality type by letters only, and the title given here is
provided by the present author. -332-
ease with themselves'. They were thought, however, to lack inner direction and to conform rather passively to the demands of those around them.
VI. The irrational-conscientious: These three children are described as
walking examples of the 'Puritan conscience'. . . . they have an appreciable degree of generalized hostility. This produces some guilt, but it is not intense since they are so utterly guided by their superego directives. They automatically behave in responsible, 'loyal', honest, 'kind' ways; but it is more by rote than by personal intent. They demand as much of others as of themselves in the way of conventional morality.
Nevertheless, their lack of any strong, positive concern for others as individuals, not to mention their repressed but definite hostility, makes them far too literal minded and rigid in their righteousness to be very easy to live with. . . .
They take some cold satisfaction from rigorously observing the letter of the law. That is about the extent of their joy in living . . . Their peers respect them, but they don't like them.
VII. A type with good integration but less so than in type VIII: These five children show 'a high degree of rationality, friendliness, and altruistic impulse . . . high autonomy and good integration of most major drives'. They are 'thoroughly spontaqeous', like other people, and are liked in return. Although by no means lacking in moral principles, they are judged as rather too apt to put their own enjoyment first to be placed in category VIII. Even so, they are often very considerate of others.
252
VIII. The rational-altruistic: Finally, there were four children who are described as 'well- integrated' and 'emotionally mature' and who possessed 'firm, internalized moral principles' which they applied in an insightful manner.
They enjoy life thoroughly and actively, having as healthy a respect for themselves as they do for other people. There is no false pride in this.