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An Asaiksa, on the contrary, is completely liberated from all the bonds: he is thus characterized, magnified both by his deliverance from the defilements and by the direct knowledge of his deliverance: therefore it is of the Asaiksa alone that one can say that perfect deliverance and the knowledge of this perfect deliverance are his parts.
***
What is deliverance?
462 75d. Deliverance is twofold.
It is conditioned and unconditioned. (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 147a6. )
? 76a-c. Victory over the defilements is unconditioned deliverance; adhimoksa is conditioned deliverance.
The abandoning (prahdna, that is, pratisamkhydnirodha, ii.
English translation, p. 280-281) of the defilements is uncon-
ditioned deliverance. The intention of the Asaiksa is conditioned
463 deliverance.
76b-c. This last is a part.
It is conditioned deliverance which is called a "part pertaining to an Asaik? a"; for the other parts, Right Views, etc. , are conditioned.
464 76c. It is two deliverances.
This same conditioned deliverance is described, in the Sutra
{Samyukta, TD 2, p. 16c24), as being double, mental deliverance
and deliverance through prajnd. [Mental deliverance comes about
through the liberation from desire, and deliverance through prajnd
comes about through liberation from ignorance;] it therefore
constitutes what is called the skandha of deliverance, the 46
466
if the skandha of deliverance is only intention, how do we explain the Sutra? The
467
Sutra says, "Oh Vyaghrabodhayanas! What is the essential factor
of the purification of deliverance? The mind of a Bhiksu is detached, delivered from craving; the mind of this Bhiksu is detached, delivered from hatred and ignorance. In this way, either with a view to the fullness of the skandha of deliverance which is not complete, or with a view to maintaining the skandha of deliverance which is complete, all desire, all energy . . . this is the essential factor. "
vimuktiskandha. *
But, according to another opinion,
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It results from this Sutra that intention does not constitute deliverance: this is the purity of the mind resulting from the abandoning of the defilements, craving, etc. which are expelled by
468 correct knowledge.
Perfect deliverance has been explained.
***
What is the perfect or Right Knowledge {samyagjnana) which is distinct from Right Views (samyagdrsti)?
76d. Bodhi, as described above, is knowledge.
Bodhi, as we have described above, is the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising (vi. 67a-b), and these constitutes Right Knowledge, the tenth part of the Asaiksa.
***
Which mind--past, present, or future-is delivered?
77a-b. The Asaiksa mind, arising, is delivered from its
469 obstacles.
The Sastra (Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 1000b9) says, "The
470
future Asaiksa mind is delivered from its obstacle. " obstacle?
What is this
The possession of the defilements [=ninth category of the defilements of Bhavagra], which in fact creates an obstacle to the arising of an Asaiksa mind. At the moment of Vajropamasamadhi (vi. 44c-d), this possession is abandoned, and an Asaiksa mind arises and is delivered. When this possession has been abandoned,
? the ASaiksa mind has arisen and has been delivered.
But what would you say of the Asaiksa mind which has not arisen at the moment of Vajropamasamadhi, or of the worldly mind which is produced within an Asaiksa?
These two minds are also delivered; but it is of the future Asaiksa mind in the process of arising that the Sastra says is delivered.
From what is the worldly mind of an Asaiksa delivered?
From the same possession of the defilements, an obstacle to its arising.
But is not this same worldly mind produced within a Saiksa, and have you not said that it is delivered?
The worldly mind of a Saiksa is not similar to that of an Asaiksa, for the latter is not accompanied by the possession of the defilements.
***
What is the Path--past, present, or future,--by which the obstacle to the arising of the Asaiksa mind is abandoned?
77c-d. It is while perishing that the Path causes the abandoning of the obstacle.
Perishing, that is to say, in the present. ***
The Sastra and the present work defined unconditioned
471
deliverance (vi. 76a). On the other hand, the Sutra and the Sastra
speak of three dhatus ("spheres"), namely prahanadhatu ("the
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sphere of abandoning"), viragadhatu ("the sphere of the absence of craving"), and nirodhadhdtu ("the sphere of extinction"). What is the relationship between unconditioned deliverance and these three spheres?
78a. Unconditioned deliverance receives the name of dhdtu.
This deliverance is the three dhdtus.
472 78b. The destruction of craving is detachment.
The abandoning of craving (rdga) is viragadhatu, the sphere of the absence of craving.
78c. The destruction of the others is abandoning.
The abandoning of the defilements other than craving is prahanadhdtu, the sphere of abandoning.
78d. The destruction of the object is called nirodhadhdtu, 473
The abandoning of the object, impure physical matter, etc. , with the exception of the abandoning of the defilements, is the realm of extinction.
***
Does one become disgusted by means of the same dharmas through which one obtains detachment?
the sphere of extinction.
There are four alternatives.
? What are they?
79a-b. Disgust arises by means of the Patiences and the Knowledges of Suffering and Origin.
It is only by means of the Patiences and the Knowledges of the Truths of Suffering and Origin (vi. 25d) that one obtains disgust, and not by means of the other Patiences and Knowledges.
79b-c. Detachment arises through all the dharmas by means of which there is abandoning.
The Patiences (=the Path of Seeing) and the Knowledges (=the Path of Meditation) (vi. p. 949) of Suffering, of Origin, of Extinction and of the Path, through which one abandons the defilements, are also the means for acquiring detachment.
79d. There are therefore four alternatives.
1. If the ascetic does not abandon the defilements through the Patiences and Knowledges of Suffering and Origin, he only acquires disgust: these Patiences and these Knowledges have only the causes of disgust for their sphere.
2. If the ascetic abandons his defilements through the Patience and Knowledges of Extinction and the Path, he only acquires detachment: these Patiences and these Knowledges have only the causes of joy for their sphere.
3. If the ascetic abandons the defilements through the Patiences and the Knowledges of Suffering and Origin, he acquires detachment and disgust.
4. If the ascetic does not abandon the defilements through the Patiences and the Knowledges of Extinction and the Path, he acquires neither detachment nor disgust.
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Let us remark, with respect to the first and the fourth
alternative, that the ascetic who, already detached from craving,
enters the Path of Seeing, does not abandon defilements through
the Path of the Dharma Knowledge and the Dharma Know-
474
ledges. Furthermore, one does not abandon them through the
Knowledges which form part of the Preparatory Path, the Path of
475 Deliverance, as the Path of Excellence (vi. 65b).
#*#
1
? 1. At the beginning of this volume we give a summary of the theory of the Path according to the Kofa: preliminary path; pure, impure path, etc.
2. We should not translate "by Seeing and Meditation on the Truths. " Worldly or impure Meditation does not bear on the Truths.
On the different meanings of the word bhdvand, bhdvana, iv. l22c-d, vi. 5. vii. 27. Atthasdlini, 163: a. acquisition, taking possession of (p rat Ham b ha); b. cultivation, repetition {nisevana, nisevd, abhydsa); c. absorbtion (samddhi).
3. Darsanamdrga, i. 40a-b, vi. 25-28; bbdvandmdrga, pure and impure, vi. 29-50. Different mdrgas, vi. 65b.
4. The Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 267a28 presents thirty opinions on the two paths: the Path of Seeing is an active path; once it is realized, at one stroke it cuts off nine catetories of defilements; the Path of Meditation is not active, it is cultivated on many occasions and it cuts off nine catetories of defilements over a long period of time: such as a sharp dagger and a dull dagger . . . ; the defilements abandoned through Seeing are abandoned as a stone is smashed; the defilements abandoned through Meditation are abandoned as a lotus stalk is broken.
The Path of the Seeing of the Truths, first pure view of the truths, cuts off the defilements, satkdyadrsti, etc. , to which it is opposed (pratipsksa) in fifteen moments; the Path of Meditation, pure or impure, opposes one by one each of the nine catetories of defilements (strong-strong rdga, etc. ) of each the nine spheres (Kamadhatu, the Four Dbyanas, and the four drupyas) (vi. 33).
5. According to Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 404bll. 6. vi. 14; 67.
7. vi. 67; Mahdvyutpati, 39: to make an effort for the disappearance of the black dharmas, etc.
8. vyavacdrana - pariksd = pratirupana; this is the period of the nirvedhabhdgiyas, vi. 17.
9. According to the version of Hsiian-tsang this is the Sutra of the Good Doctor; according to Paramartha, the Sutra of the Simile of the Doctor (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 105a2b, p. 120a25).
Vydkhyd: siltre py esa satydndm drstdnta iti vyddhyddisutre jkatham / caturbhtr angaih samanvdgato bhisak ialydpahartd rdjdrhas ca bhavati rdjayogyaf ca rdjdngatve ca samkhydm gacchati / katamais caturbhih / abadhakusalo bhavati / dbddhasamutthdnakusalo bhavati dbddhaprahdnakusalah prahtnasya cdbddhasydyatydm anutpddakusalah / evam eva caturbhir angaih samanvdgapas tathdgato'rhan samyaksambuddho nuttaro bhisak ialydpahartety ucyate / katamais" caturbhih / iha bhiksavas tathdgato . . . idam duhkham dryasatyam iti
yathdbhutam prajdndti . . .
Kern, Manual, p. 47 (Yogasutra, ii. 15; Lalita, p. 448, 458); bhisakka in the Inde* of the
Anguttara; Milinda, trans. 11,8, note: Siksdsamuccaya, 148. 5,243. 4,295. 2; Bodhicarydvatara, ii. 57, vii. 22. etc. See Taish6 17, no. 793-
10. On abhisamaya, below, vi. 27a. Atthasdlini, 22 (57) distinguishes worldly and transworldly abhisamaya; but the Pali sources most frequently understand abhisamaya in the same sense as does the Abhidharma: comprehension of the Truths through arydprajnd.
11. This theory is not that of all the sources; see p. 908. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 397a26: What is the nature of the Four Truths? The masters of the Abhidharma say: 1. the Truth of Suffering consists of the five updddnaskandhas; 2. the Truth of Origin is the cause of the impure dharmas; 3. the Truth of the Extinction is their pratisamkhydnirodha (ii. 55d); 4. the Truth of the Path is the dharmas which create the Saints (faiksa and aiaiksa dharmas). The Darstantikas say: 1. the Truth of Suffering is ndmarupa; 2. the Truth of Arising is karman and kle? a; 3. the Truth of Extinction is the annihilation (ksaya) of karman and of kiefa; 4.
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the Truth of the Path is calm and insight (iamatha andvipaiyand). The Vibhajyavadins (see v. English trans, p. 782, 808,) say: 1. that which has the eight characteristics o(duhkha is duhkha and duhkhasatya; the other impure (sasrava) dharmas are duhkha, but not duhkhasatya [compare the Pali sources quoted below, note 15]; 2. the tfsnd which produces later existence is samudaya and samudayasatya; all other trsnd and the other causes of impure (sdsravahetu) dharmas is samudaya, but not samudayasatya; 3.
the extinction of this trsnd is nirodha and nirodhasatya; the extinction of all other trsnd and of the other causes of impure dharmas is nirodha, but not nirodhasatya; 4. the eight-part ? aiksa path is mdrga and mdrgasatya; the other dharmas of the &aiksa and all the dharmas of the Asaiksa are mdrga, but not mdrgasatya. But, in this system, the Arhats only possess the Truths of duhkha and nirodha, and not the Truths of samudaya and mdrga. Samgitiidstra, TD 26, p. 392al6; sdsravahetu is the Truth of Origin; pratisamkhydnirodha is the Truth of Extinction; the dharmas of the Saiksa and the ASaiksa are the path.
12. Visuddhimagga, 495: yasmd pana etdni buddhddayo ariyd pativijjhanti tasmd ariyasaccdnitivuccanti. . . ariydnititathdniavitathdniavisamvddakdnitiattho.
The Aryan is defined, Koia, iii. 44c; same etymology in Anguttara, iv. 145. Majjhima, i. 280. etc. In Atthasdlini, 349: the Aryans are the Buddhas, the Pratyekas, and the SrSvakas; or rather the Buddhas alone are Aryans: compare Samyutta, v. 435 (tathdgata-ariya).
Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 401c27. What is the meaning of the term dryasatya? Are the Truths so cal led because they are good, because they are pure (andsrava), or because the Aryans are endowed with them? What are the defects of these explanations? All three are bad: 1. one can say that the last two Truths are good; but the first two are of three types, good, bad, and neutral; 2. the last two are pure, but not the first two; 3. the non-Aryans are endowed with the Truths, thus it is said: "Who is endowed with the Truths of duhkha and of samudaya? 'AH beings. Who is endowed with the Truth of nirodha? Those who are not bound by all the bonds (sakalabandhana, see Koia, ii. 36c, English trans, p. 207). " Answer: One must say that, because the Aryans are endowed with them, these Truths are the Aryasatyas . . .
13. Samyutta,iv. 127:yamparesukhatodhutadariyddhudukkhato/yam paredukkhatodhu tad ariya sukhato vidu. The Vydkhyd quotes the second pdda: tat pare dukkhato viduh.
It also quotes the last pdda of the Saundarananda, xii. 22: loke'sminn dlaydrdme nwrttau durlabhd ratih / vyathante hy apunarbhdvdt prapdtdd iva baitsah // In fact, what the Aryans call sukha is Nirvana or extinction.
14. According to P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 333c2), the Sautrantikas and the Sthaviras.
15. a. Vydkhyd: mana dpnuvantiti mandpdh / punahsamdhikaranam cdtreti vydkhydtam. b. On the three types of duhkha, Digha, iii. 216 (Buddhaghosa, if the summary in Dialogues, iii. 210, is correct, deviates from Vasubandhu); Samyutta, iv. 259, v. 56; Visuddhimagga, 499; Madhyamakavrtti, chap, xxiv (p. 227, 475), which depends on the
Koia; Bodhicary avatara, 346; Rockhill, Life, 189; Yogas&tra, ii. 15 {parin dma, tdpa and samskdraduhkhatd). Ndmasamgiti, 85: duhkham samsdrinah skandhdh.
c. According to the Yamaka, i. 174, painful sensation (of the body and mind) is duhkha; the rest is duhkhasatya, but not duhkha. Painful sensation is anubhavanaduhkha (the duhkhaduhkha of the Abhidharma); the rest is duhkha because it is dangerous sappatibhayatthena. (According to Ledi Sayadaw, JPTS, 1914, 133).
Kathavatthu, xvii. 5: the Hetuvadins maintains that all conditioned dharmas, with the exception of the Path but including the cause of suffering, are suffering.
16. Some agreeable dharmas possess viparinamena duhkhatd, the characteristic of suffering, because they do not last. The Vydkhyd quotes the verse of AsVaghosa, Saundarananda, xi. 50: ha caitraratha ha vdpi ha manddkini hdpriye / ity drtam vilapanto gam patanti dwaukasah II (Compare Divya, 194).
Let us note here that Vasubandhu, iv. 86, quotes the same poem: gfhasthena hi duh/odhd drstir vividhadrspina / dfivo bhiksund caiva paresv dyattavrttind. (Correct the note p. 189. )
? The disagreeable dharmas are suffering by their suffering, painful nature (duhkhasvab- hdvena, upaghdtasvabhdvena). But can they to some extent be happy through transforma- tion, in that they pass away (viparindmasukha)? Without doubt, but these definitions (upadesa) have for their purpose depreciating, disliking these things {vidUsandrtham)'. in the same way we hold agreeable sensation that arises and lasts to be suffering.
All things are suffering through samskdraduhkhatd: samskdrenaiva duhkhateti samskdrenaiva jananenaivety arthah / yad anityarh tad duhkham yan na niyatasthitam tad duhkham yaj jayate vinafyati ca tad duhkham ity arthah / tenoktam / pratyaydbhisamska- randd iti pratyayair abhisamskriyate yasmdt tasmdt tad duhkham iti /
Samyutta, iv. 207: sukham dukkhato . . . dukkham sallato. . . adukkhamasukham aniccato. 17. Quoted in Madhyamakavrtti, p. 476; compare Jacob, Third Handful of Popular Maxims
(Bombay, 1911). p. 103: aksipdtranydya.
18. The point of view of the Theravadins, Kathdvatthu, xvii. 5.
19. Vibhdsd (TD 27, p. 402cl0). The Sutra says: "The Path depends on its preparation (sambhdra), Nirvana depends on the Path; through the pleasure (sukha) of the Path, one obtains the pleasure of Nirvana. How can one say that there is no pleasure in the skandhas? There is found therein a little pleasure . . . nevertheless the skandhas are one mass of suffering, the same if one were to pour a drop of honey into a vase filled with poison. . . ; in this same way are the skandhas: little pleasure and much suffering. They are thus solely called duhkhasatya. There are some who say: In the skandhas, there is absolutely no pleasure: therefore it is called duhkhasatya.
20. This is a stanza by Kumaralabha (a Sautrantika).
21. Saha tu sukhena: tu announces the refutation of the purvapaksa represented by a theory of the Sarvastivadins ("According to one explanation . . . ) and by a theory of the Sautrantikas.
Hsiian-tsang: "The true explanation. . . " TheJapanese editor: "The author presents the correct explanation of the Sarvastivadins. "
22. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 402c. According to the Vydkhyd,the Bhadanta Srilabha, etc. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, the Sautrantikas, the Mahasamghikas, etc. Samghabhadra, Nydydnusdra: "The Sthaviras hold that sensation is only suffering. " Compare Kathdvatthu, ii. 8, where the Theravada condemn the Gokulikas (=Kukkulikas, Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 151).
23. These Sutras are discussed p. 904.
24. Compare Majjhima, i. 507. Refuted p. 908.
25. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 399a23. ParSva says that pidana (affliction, pain) is the characteristic of duhkha; Vasumitra says that pravrtti (or samsdra, samcara, liu-ch'uan jf? $( ) is the characteristic of duhkha; etc.
26. According to Hsiian-tsang: If he answers: "Affliction" (bddh), then, since there is contentment, the existence of pleasure is proved. If he answers: "That which harms," then, since there is usefulness (anugrdhaka) in this, the existence of pleasure is proved. If he answers: "That which displeases (arafifanya)," then, since there is something pleasing, the existence of*pleasure is proved. According to Paramartha: If he answers: "That which afflicts is called suffering," how does pleasure afflict? If he answers: "That which harms," how would it harm since pleasure is useful ? If he answers: "That which displeases," how could it be suffering since pleasure pleases?
27. The Vydkhyd explains: idam atra duhkhasya laksanam ity arthah.
The same Sutra in Samyutta, iv. 216, but the questioner of the Bhagavat is "a certain
Bhiksu": tisso imd bhikkhu vedand vuttd maya. . . / vuttam kho panetam bhikkhu maya yam
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kin ci vedayitam tarn dukkhasmin ti / tarn kho panetam bhikkhu maya samkhdrdnam yeva aniccatarh samdhdya bhasitam . . .
viparindma - anyathdtva.
The commentary of the Ndmasamgiti, viii. 9: yat kith cit kdye vedit am idam atra duhkham.
28. Yathabhutam: conforming to reality, without adding or subtracting (adhydropdpavd- ddbhdvdt).
29. The Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 402cl7 and foil. , continues: "When one experiences the suffering of the damned, one has the idea of pleasure with respect to the suffering of animals . . . When one experiences the suffering of mankind, one has the idea of pleasure with respect to the sufferings of the gods.
30. Vydkhyd: aduhkhdnantaram sukhdbhimdnam paiyann aha / yadd gandharasaspraspa- vyavihsajam iti / madhyam hi duhkham aduhkhdsukham bhavatdm na mrduprakdram ato vaktavyam tad a k at am ad duhkham mrdubhutam yatrdsya sukhabuddhir bhavatiti visayabaldd eva hi tat sukham utpadyate mrduduhkhasamanantarapratyayabaldd adhimdtraduhkhasamanantarapratyayabaldd veti /
Paramartha: "When a person experiences the pleasure arisen from some excellent smell, taste, etc. , then what suffering does he experience? He experiences a weak suffering, and with respect to this weak suffering, he produces the idea of pleasure. If this is the case, when this weak suffering has disappeared . . . "
31. Compare Samyutta, ii-173: If the earth element were absolutely agreeable . . . , absolutely suffering. . .
32. Hsiian-tsang adds: "since suffering diminishes little by little. "
If the displacement of the burden does not provoke a pleasure and is only a diminution
of suffering, this diminution would take place gradually: the impression of pleasure would thus grow from the moment when the burden had been displaced.
33. Utsutra. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 403a4: "All the impure {sasrava) dharmas are cause and as a consequence the Truth of Origin. Why does the Blessed One say that thirst is the Truth of Origin? Therearethirtyexplanations . . . "
The Yamaka, i. 174, ii. 250, demonstrates that thirst is the origin, not ignorance (Ledi Sayadaw, JPTS. , 1914, p. 135).
34. Mahdvagga, i. 6.