Now the object of
pleasure
is the good.
Summa Theologica
One is "the act of something imperfect, i.
e.
of something
existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is
in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i. e. of
something existing in act," e. g. to understand, to feel, and to will
and such like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive,
nor is it of itself in time.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose,
according as it is accidentally in time.
Reply to Objection 3: Other passions have not for their object a good
obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of
the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more
to delight not to be in time.
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Whether delight differs from joy?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy.
Because the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. But
delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained.
Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight.
Objection 2: Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one
and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight.
Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same.
Objection 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there
is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and
cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various passions
of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not differ
from delight.
On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas
we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as
delight.
I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of
delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are
natural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated
above ([1262]Q[30], A[3]), so also some delights are natural, and some
are not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13)
and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii. ] put it, "some
delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; which amounts to the
same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire
naturally, when we get them, and in those things which we desire as a
result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight
follows reason; and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but
only delight.
Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned
desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be
the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational
beings. And yet everything is not always the object of joy; since
sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing
thereat according to reason. And accordingly delight extends to more
things than does joy.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the object of the appetite of the soul is
an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to
diversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also
called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called
otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to
concupiscences ([1263]Q[30], A[3], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 2: A like difference is to be observed in
concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence,
while joy corresponds to desire, which seems to pertain more to
concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose
corresponding to the difference of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: These other names pertaining to delight are
derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is
derived from the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say
"latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward
delight, which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks
forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain
special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to
belong to joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational
beings.
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Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual
appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight is a
sensible movement. " But sensible movement is not in an intellectual
power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite.
Objection 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the
sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive
appetite.
Objection 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational
animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we have
in common with irrational animals.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord. " But
the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual
appetite can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite.
I answer that, As stated above [1264](A[3]), a certain delight arises
from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending
something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its
application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual
appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual
appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not
bodily delight.
However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that
delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily
transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing
but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent
to the things we wish. "
Reply to Objection 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses
the word "sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception.
For he says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense,
as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation. " Or we
may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight has the character of passion, properly
speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in
the intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus
it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at
the end of De Coel. Hier. , that "the angels are not susceptible to our
passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness of
incorruption. "
Reply to Objection 3: In us there is delight, not only in common with
dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says
(De Coel. Hier. ) that "holy men often take part in the angelic
delights. " Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive
appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the
intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the angels.
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Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and
intellectual pleasures?
Objection 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are
greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek
some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more
seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures.
Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Objection 2: Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect.
But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the state
of the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore
bodily pleasures are greater.
Objection 3: Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked,
by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check
spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:103): "How sweet are Thy words
to my palate; more than honey to my mouth! " And the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation
of wisdom. "
I answer that, As stated above [1265](A[1]), pleasure arises from union
with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of
the soul, especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be
noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts
or perfections of the agent, e. g. to understand, to feel, to will and
the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions
and perfections rather of the matter transformed; for "movement is the
act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3).
Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and intellectual
soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by
sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and
not only from their objects.
If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures,
according as we delight in the very actions, for instance in sensitive
and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are
much greater than sensible pleasures. For man takes much more delight
in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by
perceiving it with his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more
perfect; and because it is better known, since the intellect reflects
on its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is
more beloved: for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily
sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are
deprived thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).
If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible
bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely speaking,
spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the
consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good
which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and
the conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more
beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even
the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which
is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is much more
noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction
is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More intimate, because
the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the
intellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is
"what a thing is. " More perfect, because the conjunction of the
sensible to the sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act:
wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some
part of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward
to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of the table and
in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement:
hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once. More firm;
because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass
away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.
On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more
vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more
known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible
pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are
accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur
in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the
superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are
sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various
griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding
griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed
more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we
shall state farther on ([1266]Q[35], A[5]).
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is
because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again,
because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and
sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures,
which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to
seek those of the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily
pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive
faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered
and checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which
is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both sober and
moderate.
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Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by
the other senses?
Objection 1: It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater
than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest
pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such
is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to the words of Tob.
5:12: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see
not the light of heaven? " Therefore the pleasure afforded by the sight
is the greatest of sensible pleasures.
Objection 2: Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as
the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight is
loved most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to
be afforded by sight.
Objection 3: Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake
of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause of such
friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by
sight.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the
greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.
I answer that, As stated above ([1267]Q[25], A[2], ad 1;[1268] Q[27],
A[4], ad 1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now,
as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved for two reasons: for
the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. Wherefore
the senses afford pleasure in both these ways. But because it is proper
to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that
the former pleasures of the senses, i. e. those which arise from
knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved
for their usefulness, are common to all animals.
If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which reason of
knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater pleasure than
any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible
pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure
is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is
gauged by their relation to the preservation of the animal's nature.
Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this
usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are
vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and the like.
Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as being
more closely related to the end. For this reason, too, other animals
which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness,
derive no pleasure from the other senses except as subordinated to the
sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not take delight in the
smell of hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel
pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it" (Ethic. iii, 10).
Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of
usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in respect
of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that
the pleasure of touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than the
pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of
sensible pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that which
is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of the touch
that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food, sexual union,
and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider the pleasures of
sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures
of sight are greater, forasmuch as intellectual pleasures are greater
than sensible.
Reply to Objection 1: Joy, as stated above [1269](A[3]), denotes
pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But
natural pleasure belongs principally to the touch.
Reply to Objection 2: The sight is loved most, "on account of
knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish many things," as is
stated in the same passage (Metaph. i, 1).
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the
sight, in another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by
the touch, is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake
of the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a
movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the
lovable object receives an impression of its image, which entices him
to love it and to seek its delight.
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Whether any pleasure is not natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For
pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But
the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural
place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal appetite, which
is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no
pleasure is non-natural.
Objection 2: Further, what is against nature is violent. But "whatever
is violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which is
unnatural can give pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, the fact of being established in one's own
nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the
Philosopher's definition quoted above [1270](A[1]). But it is natural
to every thing to be established in its nature; because natural
movement tends to a natural end. Therefore every pleasure is natural.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some
things are pleasant "not from nature but from disease. "
I answer that, We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord
with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken
in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal
part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has his own specific
nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to
man, which are derived from things pertaining to man in respect of his
reason: for instance, it is natural to man to take pleasure in
contemplating the truth and in doing works of virtue. Secondly, nature
in man may be taken as contrasted with reason, and as denoting that
which is common to man and other animals, especially that part of man
which does not obey reason. And in this sense, that which pertains to
the preservation of the body, either as regards the individual, as
food, drink, sleep, and the like, or as regards the species, as sexual
intercourse, are said to afford man natural pleasure. Under each kind
of pleasures, we find some that are "not natural" speaking absolutely,
and yet "connatural" in some respect. For it happens in an individual
that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted, so
that something which is contrary to the specific nature, becomes
accidentally natural to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot
water to give heat. Consequently it happens that something which is not
natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the
preservation of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, on
account of there being some corruption of nature in him. And this
corruption may be either on the part of the body---from some ailment;
thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem bitter, and vice
versa---or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in eating
earth and coals and the like; or on the part of the soul; thus from
custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural
intercourse of man and beast, or other such things, which are not in
accord with human nature.
This suffices for the answers to the objections.
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Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to
another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and
contrariety from their objects.
Now the object of pleasure is the good.
Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but "good is contrary to
evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one
pleasure is not contrary to another.
Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved
in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore
pleasure is not contrary to pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is
only on account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure.
But this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of
form, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is no contrariety
between one pleasure and another.
On the contrary, Things of the same genus that impede one another are
contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some
pleasures impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some
pleasures are contrary to one another.
I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to
repose in natural bodies, as stated above ([1271]Q[23], A[4]). Now one
repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary
termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low
place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul
that one pleasure is contrary to another.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because
one vice may be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be
contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one
good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the
former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to water.
And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this is
impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that
virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some one
thing---i. e. the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened
to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable
and connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose;
because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as the
place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now
natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same body, and
to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, 6. Wherefore
pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: The things in which we take pleasure, since they
are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a
formal difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different.
Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in
acts and passions, as stated above ([1272]Q[23], AA[1],4;[1273] Q[30],
A[2]).
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OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there
are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?
(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?
(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
(7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
(8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
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Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and first
cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11),
"pleasure consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is
requisite for pleasure, as stated above ([1274]Q[31], A[1]). But the
objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves.
Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained:
since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always an
operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore
operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work:
and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation is
not the proper cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that
"pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1275]Q[31], A[1]), two things are
requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good,
and knowledge of this attainment. Now each of these consists in a kind
of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the
attainment of the suitable good is by means of an operation. Moreover,
the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every
pleasure must needs be the result of some operation.
Reply to Objection 1: The objects of operations are not pleasurable
save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as
when we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or
in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes
pleasure in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the
like; which would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as
possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take
great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the
natural love we have for ourselves. " Now to have such like things is
nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is
through some operation. Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure is
traced to some operation as its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the effect
of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as
possessed or effected: and this implies use or operation.
Reply to Objection 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are
proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is
finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain
measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer
proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome.
And in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to
repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results
from labor.
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Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Because, as stated above ([1276]Q[31], A[1]), the good which is
obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared
with generation, but with the operation of a thing already in
existence. Now that which is being moved towards something has it not
as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its regard, forasmuch
as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in
Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue
in our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are
not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of
pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is
the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, are
pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is
not a cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means this, O
Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some
things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this
portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and
reconciled? " From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes
pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore movement seems to
cause pleasure.
I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i. e. the
one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and a
third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these
three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14
and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned,
change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable: for which
reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at
another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter
but not in summer. Again, on the part of the pleasing good which is
united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an
agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person remains near the
fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being
consists in a certain measure; and therefore when the continued
presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode
of being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of
the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because man desires to
know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be
apprehended all at once as a whole, change in such a thing is pleasant,
so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be
perceived. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not
have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou
hear the whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all
of which do not exist together, all would please collectively more than
they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively. "
If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the
natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of
any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its
delight at once---to such a one change will afford no delight. And the
more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being
continual.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet
perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to
have something thereof: and in this respect movement itself has
something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of
pleasure; because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are
unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so
far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes
suitable or ceases to be, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds
our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by
removing the obstacles to our natural aptitude.
Reply to Objection 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as
it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the
movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom,
but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of
being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the
same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become pleasant.
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Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure.
Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory
is of the past, and hope of the future. Therefore memory and hope do
not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries.
But hope causes affliction, according to Prov. 13:12: "Hope that is
deferred afflicteth the soul. " Therefore hope does not cause pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding
good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned
as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope"; and
(Ps. 76:4): "I remembered God, and was delighted. "
I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in
so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present
to us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i. e. according as the thing
known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in reality---i. e.
according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another,
either actually or potentially. And since real conjunction is greater
than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of knowledge;
and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction:
therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises from sensation
which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place
belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein there is pleasurable
conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect
of the faculty or power of obtaining the pleasurable object. The third
place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction
of apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things which,
absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion,
present, i. e. either according to apprehension only; or according to
apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in different
ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it
implies a present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure;
whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes
affliction.
Reply to Objection 3: Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For
everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a
kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner
every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, since
desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a
certainty of the real presence of the pleasing good, that is not
implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in preference
to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to memory, which is
of that which has already passed away.
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Whether sadness causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For
nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure.
Therefore it does not cause it.
Objection 2: Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures,
when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when
remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love.
But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, as
stated above ([1277]Q[29], A[2]). Therefore sadness does not cause
pleasure.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my bread
day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure.
Therefore tears, which arise from sadness, can give pleasure.
I answer that, Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing
actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can
cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure,
inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the absence of which
causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. The
recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure, on account of the
deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is looked upon as
something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been
delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so much reason
has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31
[*Gregory, Moral. iv. ] that "oftentimes in joy we call to mind sad
things . . . and in the season of health we recall past pains without
feeling pain . . . and in proportion are the more filled with joy and
gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says that "the more peril
there was in the battle, so much the more joy will there be in the
triumph. "
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of
its contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as
stated in Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause
of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension of
something pleasant.
Reply to Objection 2: Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not
in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so
far as man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of
pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love:
i. e. so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating
one and the same thing.
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Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause
of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good when
conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us.
Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us.
Objection 2: Further, the action is the agent's own good. If,
therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the
same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which
is evidently untrue.
Objection 3: Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an
innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon
the pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit
existing in us. " But the actions of others do not proceed from habits
existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents.
Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but to the
agents themselves.
On the contrary, It is written in the second canonical epistle of John
(verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children walking in
truth. "
I answer that, As stated above [1278](A[1]; Q[31], A[1]), two things
are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper
good, and the knowledge of having obtained it. Wherefore the action of
another may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact
that we obtain some good through the action of another. And in this
way, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us:
since it is pleasant to be benefited by another. Secondly, from the
fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own good:
and for this reason men take pleasure in being praised or honored by
others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing
in themselves. And since this appreciation receives greater weight from
the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater pleasure in
being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to
praise, therefore flattery is pleasing to some. And as love is for
something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is
pleasant to be loved and admired by others, inasmuch as a man thus
becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through their giving
pleasure to others. Thirdly, from the fact that another's actions, if
they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by reason of the power of
love, which makes a man to regard his friend as one with himself.
existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is
in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i. e. of
something existing in act," e. g. to understand, to feel, and to will
and such like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive,
nor is it of itself in time.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose,
according as it is accidentally in time.
Reply to Objection 3: Other passions have not for their object a good
obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of
the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more
to delight not to be in time.
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Whether delight differs from joy?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy.
Because the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. But
delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained.
Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight.
Objection 2: Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one
and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight.
Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same.
Objection 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there
is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and
cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various passions
of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not differ
from delight.
On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas
we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as
delight.
I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of
delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are
natural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated
above ([1262]Q[30], A[3]), so also some delights are natural, and some
are not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13)
and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii. ] put it, "some
delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; which amounts to the
same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire
naturally, when we get them, and in those things which we desire as a
result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight
follows reason; and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but
only delight.
Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned
desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be
the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational
beings. And yet everything is not always the object of joy; since
sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing
thereat according to reason. And accordingly delight extends to more
things than does joy.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the object of the appetite of the soul is
an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to
diversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also
called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called
otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to
concupiscences ([1263]Q[30], A[3], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 2: A like difference is to be observed in
concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence,
while joy corresponds to desire, which seems to pertain more to
concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose
corresponding to the difference of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: These other names pertaining to delight are
derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is
derived from the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say
"latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward
delight, which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks
forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain
special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to
belong to joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational
beings.
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Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual
appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight is a
sensible movement. " But sensible movement is not in an intellectual
power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite.
Objection 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the
sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive
appetite.
Objection 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational
animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we have
in common with irrational animals.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord. " But
the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual
appetite can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite.
I answer that, As stated above [1264](A[3]), a certain delight arises
from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending
something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its
application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual
appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual
appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not
bodily delight.
However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that
delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily
transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing
but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent
to the things we wish. "
Reply to Objection 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses
the word "sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception.
For he says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense,
as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation. " Or we
may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight has the character of passion, properly
speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in
the intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus
it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at
the end of De Coel. Hier. , that "the angels are not susceptible to our
passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness of
incorruption. "
Reply to Objection 3: In us there is delight, not only in common with
dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says
(De Coel. Hier. ) that "holy men often take part in the angelic
delights. " Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive
appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the
intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the angels.
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Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and
intellectual pleasures?
Objection 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are
greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek
some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more
seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures.
Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Objection 2: Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect.
But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the state
of the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore
bodily pleasures are greater.
Objection 3: Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked,
by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check
spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:103): "How sweet are Thy words
to my palate; more than honey to my mouth! " And the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation
of wisdom. "
I answer that, As stated above [1265](A[1]), pleasure arises from union
with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of
the soul, especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be
noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts
or perfections of the agent, e. g. to understand, to feel, to will and
the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions
and perfections rather of the matter transformed; for "movement is the
act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3).
Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and intellectual
soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by
sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and
not only from their objects.
If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures,
according as we delight in the very actions, for instance in sensitive
and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are
much greater than sensible pleasures. For man takes much more delight
in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by
perceiving it with his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more
perfect; and because it is better known, since the intellect reflects
on its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is
more beloved: for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily
sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are
deprived thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).
If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible
bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely speaking,
spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the
consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good
which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and
the conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more
beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even
the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which
is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is much more
noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction
is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More intimate, because
the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the
intellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is
"what a thing is. " More perfect, because the conjunction of the
sensible to the sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act:
wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some
part of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward
to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of the table and
in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement:
hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once. More firm;
because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass
away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.
On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more
vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more
known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible
pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are
accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur
in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the
superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are
sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various
griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding
griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed
more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we
shall state farther on ([1266]Q[35], A[5]).
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is
because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again,
because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and
sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures,
which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to
seek those of the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily
pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive
faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered
and checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which
is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both sober and
moderate.
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Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by
the other senses?
Objection 1: It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater
than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest
pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such
is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to the words of Tob.
5:12: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see
not the light of heaven? " Therefore the pleasure afforded by the sight
is the greatest of sensible pleasures.
Objection 2: Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as
the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight is
loved most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to
be afforded by sight.
Objection 3: Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake
of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause of such
friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by
sight.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the
greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.
I answer that, As stated above ([1267]Q[25], A[2], ad 1;[1268] Q[27],
A[4], ad 1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now,
as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved for two reasons: for
the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. Wherefore
the senses afford pleasure in both these ways. But because it is proper
to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that
the former pleasures of the senses, i. e. those which arise from
knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved
for their usefulness, are common to all animals.
If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which reason of
knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater pleasure than
any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible
pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure
is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is
gauged by their relation to the preservation of the animal's nature.
Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this
usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are
vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and the like.
Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as being
more closely related to the end. For this reason, too, other animals
which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness,
derive no pleasure from the other senses except as subordinated to the
sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not take delight in the
smell of hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel
pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it" (Ethic. iii, 10).
Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of
usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in respect
of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that
the pleasure of touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than the
pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of
sensible pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that which
is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of the touch
that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food, sexual union,
and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider the pleasures of
sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures
of sight are greater, forasmuch as intellectual pleasures are greater
than sensible.
Reply to Objection 1: Joy, as stated above [1269](A[3]), denotes
pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But
natural pleasure belongs principally to the touch.
Reply to Objection 2: The sight is loved most, "on account of
knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish many things," as is
stated in the same passage (Metaph. i, 1).
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the
sight, in another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by
the touch, is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake
of the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a
movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the
lovable object receives an impression of its image, which entices him
to love it and to seek its delight.
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Whether any pleasure is not natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For
pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But
the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural
place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal appetite, which
is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no
pleasure is non-natural.
Objection 2: Further, what is against nature is violent. But "whatever
is violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which is
unnatural can give pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, the fact of being established in one's own
nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the
Philosopher's definition quoted above [1270](A[1]). But it is natural
to every thing to be established in its nature; because natural
movement tends to a natural end. Therefore every pleasure is natural.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some
things are pleasant "not from nature but from disease. "
I answer that, We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord
with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken
in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal
part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has his own specific
nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to
man, which are derived from things pertaining to man in respect of his
reason: for instance, it is natural to man to take pleasure in
contemplating the truth and in doing works of virtue. Secondly, nature
in man may be taken as contrasted with reason, and as denoting that
which is common to man and other animals, especially that part of man
which does not obey reason. And in this sense, that which pertains to
the preservation of the body, either as regards the individual, as
food, drink, sleep, and the like, or as regards the species, as sexual
intercourse, are said to afford man natural pleasure. Under each kind
of pleasures, we find some that are "not natural" speaking absolutely,
and yet "connatural" in some respect. For it happens in an individual
that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted, so
that something which is contrary to the specific nature, becomes
accidentally natural to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot
water to give heat. Consequently it happens that something which is not
natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the
preservation of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, on
account of there being some corruption of nature in him. And this
corruption may be either on the part of the body---from some ailment;
thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem bitter, and vice
versa---or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in eating
earth and coals and the like; or on the part of the soul; thus from
custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural
intercourse of man and beast, or other such things, which are not in
accord with human nature.
This suffices for the answers to the objections.
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Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to
another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and
contrariety from their objects.
Now the object of pleasure is the good.
Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but "good is contrary to
evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one
pleasure is not contrary to another.
Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved
in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore
pleasure is not contrary to pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is
only on account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure.
But this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of
form, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is no contrariety
between one pleasure and another.
On the contrary, Things of the same genus that impede one another are
contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some
pleasures impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some
pleasures are contrary to one another.
I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to
repose in natural bodies, as stated above ([1271]Q[23], A[4]). Now one
repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary
termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low
place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul
that one pleasure is contrary to another.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because
one vice may be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be
contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one
good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the
former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to water.
And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this is
impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that
virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some one
thing---i. e. the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened
to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable
and connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose;
because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as the
place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now
natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same body, and
to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, 6. Wherefore
pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: The things in which we take pleasure, since they
are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a
formal difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different.
Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in
acts and passions, as stated above ([1272]Q[23], AA[1],4;[1273] Q[30],
A[2]).
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OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there
are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?
(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?
(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
(7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
(8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
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Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and first
cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11),
"pleasure consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is
requisite for pleasure, as stated above ([1274]Q[31], A[1]). But the
objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves.
Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained:
since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always an
operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore
operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work:
and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation is
not the proper cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that
"pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1275]Q[31], A[1]), two things are
requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good,
and knowledge of this attainment. Now each of these consists in a kind
of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the
attainment of the suitable good is by means of an operation. Moreover,
the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every
pleasure must needs be the result of some operation.
Reply to Objection 1: The objects of operations are not pleasurable
save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as
when we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or
in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes
pleasure in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the
like; which would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as
possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take
great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the
natural love we have for ourselves. " Now to have such like things is
nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is
through some operation. Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure is
traced to some operation as its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the effect
of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as
possessed or effected: and this implies use or operation.
Reply to Objection 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are
proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is
finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain
measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer
proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome.
And in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to
repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results
from labor.
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Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Because, as stated above ([1276]Q[31], A[1]), the good which is
obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared
with generation, but with the operation of a thing already in
existence. Now that which is being moved towards something has it not
as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its regard, forasmuch
as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in
Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue
in our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are
not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of
pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is
the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, are
pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is
not a cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means this, O
Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some
things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this
portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and
reconciled? " From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes
pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore movement seems to
cause pleasure.
I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i. e. the
one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and a
third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these
three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14
and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned,
change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable: for which
reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at
another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter
but not in summer. Again, on the part of the pleasing good which is
united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an
agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person remains near the
fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being
consists in a certain measure; and therefore when the continued
presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode
of being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of
the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because man desires to
know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be
apprehended all at once as a whole, change in such a thing is pleasant,
so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be
perceived. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not
have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou
hear the whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all
of which do not exist together, all would please collectively more than
they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively. "
If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the
natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of
any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its
delight at once---to such a one change will afford no delight. And the
more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being
continual.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet
perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to
have something thereof: and in this respect movement itself has
something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of
pleasure; because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are
unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so
far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes
suitable or ceases to be, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds
our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by
removing the obstacles to our natural aptitude.
Reply to Objection 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as
it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the
movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom,
but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of
being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the
same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become pleasant.
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Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure.
Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory
is of the past, and hope of the future. Therefore memory and hope do
not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries.
But hope causes affliction, according to Prov. 13:12: "Hope that is
deferred afflicteth the soul. " Therefore hope does not cause pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding
good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned
as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope"; and
(Ps. 76:4): "I remembered God, and was delighted. "
I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in
so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present
to us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i. e. according as the thing
known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in reality---i. e.
according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another,
either actually or potentially. And since real conjunction is greater
than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of knowledge;
and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction:
therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises from sensation
which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place
belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein there is pleasurable
conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect
of the faculty or power of obtaining the pleasurable object. The third
place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction
of apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things which,
absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion,
present, i. e. either according to apprehension only; or according to
apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in different
ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it
implies a present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure;
whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes
affliction.
Reply to Objection 3: Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For
everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a
kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner
every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, since
desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a
certainty of the real presence of the pleasing good, that is not
implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in preference
to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to memory, which is
of that which has already passed away.
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Whether sadness causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For
nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure.
Therefore it does not cause it.
Objection 2: Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures,
when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when
remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love.
But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, as
stated above ([1277]Q[29], A[2]). Therefore sadness does not cause
pleasure.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my bread
day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure.
Therefore tears, which arise from sadness, can give pleasure.
I answer that, Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing
actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can
cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure,
inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the absence of which
causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. The
recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure, on account of the
deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is looked upon as
something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been
delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so much reason
has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31
[*Gregory, Moral. iv. ] that "oftentimes in joy we call to mind sad
things . . . and in the season of health we recall past pains without
feeling pain . . . and in proportion are the more filled with joy and
gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says that "the more peril
there was in the battle, so much the more joy will there be in the
triumph. "
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of
its contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as
stated in Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause
of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension of
something pleasant.
Reply to Objection 2: Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not
in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so
far as man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of
pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love:
i. e. so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating
one and the same thing.
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Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause
of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good when
conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us.
Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us.
Objection 2: Further, the action is the agent's own good. If,
therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the
same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which
is evidently untrue.
Objection 3: Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an
innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon
the pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit
existing in us. " But the actions of others do not proceed from habits
existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents.
Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but to the
agents themselves.
On the contrary, It is written in the second canonical epistle of John
(verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children walking in
truth. "
I answer that, As stated above [1278](A[1]; Q[31], A[1]), two things
are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper
good, and the knowledge of having obtained it. Wherefore the action of
another may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact
that we obtain some good through the action of another. And in this
way, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us:
since it is pleasant to be benefited by another. Secondly, from the
fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own good:
and for this reason men take pleasure in being praised or honored by
others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing
in themselves. And since this appreciation receives greater weight from
the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater pleasure in
being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to
praise, therefore flattery is pleasing to some. And as love is for
something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is
pleasant to be loved and admired by others, inasmuch as a man thus
becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through their giving
pleasure to others. Thirdly, from the fact that another's actions, if
they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by reason of the power of
love, which makes a man to regard his friend as one with himself.
