Hence love
makes one quick to mitigate punishment ---and this pertains to
clemency---while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation.
makes one quick to mitigate punishment ---and this pertains to
clemency---while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation.
Summa Theologica
Now a man is said to be incontinent, because "the flesh
lusteth against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence
pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.
On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul.
Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we
ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly
on the part of the soul.
I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than
to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of
the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is
owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the
sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these
passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of
incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as
the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions.
If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of
reason altogether---as in the case of those who become insane through
the vehemence of their passions---the essential conditions of
continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the
judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent
forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is
on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason.
This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7):
first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has
given its counsel; and this is called "unbridled incontinence" or
"impetuosity": secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been
counselled, through holding weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this
kind of incontinence is called "weakness. " Hence it is manifest that
incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has
certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these
organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are
accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the
intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the
senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite.
Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament,
the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds
to it weakly; although in /rare cases the opposite occurs, according to
Prov. 31:10, "Who shall find a valiant woman? " And since small and weak
things "are accounted as though they were not" [*Aristotle, Phys. ii,
5] the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm
judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in some women. Hence
he states that "we do not describe women as being continent, because
they are vacillating" through being unstable of reason, and "are easily
led" so that they follow their passions readily.
Reply to Objection 2: It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man
at once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the
impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious
persons [*Cf. [3560]FS, Q[46], A[5]], or from its vehemence, as in the
melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most
vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to
that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion by
reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with
regard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic
temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are
due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a
sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh
overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain negligence
of the spirit in not resisting strongly.
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Whether incontinence is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot
avoid. " Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis.
8:21, "I know [Vulg. : 'knew'] that I could not . . . be continent,
except God gave it. " Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason.
But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man.
Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man
becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of divine love,
exclaimed: I live, now not I" (Gal. 2:20). Therefore incontinence is
not a sin.
On the contrary, It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim. 3:3)
where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc.
Therefore incontinence is a sin.
I answer that, Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two
ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus
incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as
intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence
([3561]Q[155], A[2] ). In this way incontinence is a sin for two
reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which
is in accord with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful
pleasures. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that
"incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong"---that is, by
straying from reason---"but also because it is wicked"---that is, by
following evil desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is
considered, properly---inasmuch as it is a straying from reason---but
not simply; for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason
in his desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in
themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but
relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence
([3562]Q[155], A[2], ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from
the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to
observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of
themselves desirable.
Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but
metaphorically. for instance about the desires for things of which one
cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be
said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just as
the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a
man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with reason.
Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection of
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without
God's help, according to Jn. 15:5: "Without Me you can do nothing. "
Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be continent,
does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii,
3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves. "
Reply to Objection 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the
incontinent man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but
through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in
resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically
and not properly.
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Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate?
Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely
than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his
conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Lk. 12:47, "That
servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be
beaten with many stripes. " Now the incontinent man would seem to act
against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to
Ethic. vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how wicked are the
things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the
intemperate man judges what he desires to be good. Therefore the
incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
Objection 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more
incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most
grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence
would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a
person's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly
are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong,
and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate man
that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be admonished.
Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins more gravely
than the intemperate.
Objection 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his
sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, since
the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the
intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man
sins more gravely than the intemperate.
On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine
says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12,13) that "impenitence is a sin against
the Holy Ghost. " Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) "the
intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his
choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance. " Therefore
the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent.
I answer that, According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin is
chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live
aright" [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater
inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the
intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own
choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas in
the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion. And
since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a disposition difficult
to remove," the result is that the incontinent man repents at once, as
soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact
he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become
connatural to him by reason of his habit. Wherefore in reference to
such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14) that "they are glad when they
have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things. " Hence it follows
that "the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent," as also
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 7).
Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the
inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the
ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so
far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the
reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such
like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the
inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater. Now in both
the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the
appetite being inclined to something, either by passion, as in the
incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater
ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In
one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this
ignorance lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of
intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the
ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of
the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any
chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another
respect the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the
thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some
particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must choose
this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's ignorance is
about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order
that he may follow his desires without being curbed. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7,8) that "the incontinent man is better
than the intemperate, because he retains the best principle [*{To
beltiston, e arche}, 'the best thing, i. e. the principle']," to wit,
the right estimate of the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the
incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which
quenches concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy
of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his
desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above
([3563]Q[142], A[2] ). By these same means the intemperate man can be
cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is
on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the
last end, which holds the same position as the principle in
demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one
who errs as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters
with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part
of the inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this
proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the
inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is
more easily suppressed.
Reply to Objection 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin,
is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained
above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is
sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin
except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins
even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate
man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm,"
i. e. slight desire. "For what would he have done if he had desired it
with passion? "
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Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire?
Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than
the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist the
passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful, indeed it is
pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures
or pains. " Now, "as Heraclitus says, it is more difficult to resist
desire than anger" [*Ethic. ii. 3]. Therefore incontinence of desire is
less grievous than incontinence of anger.
Objection 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion
be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the
case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is
incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one
who is incontinent in desire: since "anger listens to reason somewhat,
but desire does not" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 6).
Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in
desire.
Objection 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is.
Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it
leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more
grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads.
Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of
desire. "
I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways.
First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of
reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence
of anger, because the movement of desire is more inordinate than the
movement of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher
indicates them, Ethic. vii, 6: First, because the movement of anger
partakes somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to avenge the
injury done to him, and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet
he does not tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due
mode of vengeance. on the other hand, the movement of desire is
altogether in accord with sense and nowise in accord with reason.
Secondly, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily
temperament owing to the quickness of the movement of the bile which
tends to anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to
anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence
is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore also it happens more often that
the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed
to anger, than that the children of those who are disposed to
concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that which
results from the natural disposition of the body is deemed more
deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly,
whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise itself and creeps in by
stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works
with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as though forced by a
certain previous displeasure.
Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the
evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus
incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because it
leads to things that are harmful to one's neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure
perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for
the moment it is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its
impetuousness.
Reply to Objection 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not
as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because
nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is
more disgraceful.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard
to its result.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices.
Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?
(2) Whether each of them is a virtue?
(3) Whether each is a part of temperance?
(4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.
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Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same?
Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely
the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet.
ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency "is leniency of a superior in inflicting
punishment on an inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and
vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem that clemency
and meekness are the same.
Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that
"clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when
unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently
clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi],
hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and
clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely the
same.
Objection 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different
virtues. But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and
clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are absolutely
the same.
On the contrary, According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca
(OBJ[1] ) "clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior":
whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each to
everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the same.
I answer that, As stated in Ethic. ii, 3, a moral virtue is "about
passions and actions. " Now internal passions are principles of external
actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore virtues that
moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards the same effect
as virtues that moderate actions, although they differ specifically.
Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain man from theft,
whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire of money, which
is restrained by liberality; so that liberality concurs with justice
towards the effect, which is abstention from theft. This applies to the
case in point; because through the passion of anger a man is provoked
to inflict a too severe punishment, while it belongs directly to
clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be prevented by
excessive anger.
Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of
anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ
from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment,
while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of
vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is
applied externally for the purpose of vengeance.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's affections incline to the moderation of
things that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from
one man loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's
punishment in itself, but only as directed to something else, for
instance justice, or the correction of the person punished.
Hence love
makes one quick to mitigate punishment ---and this pertains to
clemency---while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this
reason Tully says that "the mind provoked to hatred" that is to punish
too severely, "is restrained by clemency," from inflicting too severe a
punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred but
punishment.
Reply to Objection 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the
passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly
concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in
punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are
called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in
punishing. " Those who delight in a man's punishment for its own sake
may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling
that leads one man to love another.
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Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a
virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these
are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore
neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect"
[*Ethic. ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain
decrease; for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases
anger. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Mat. 5:4) among
the beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues
differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised
under virtue.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): "Every good man is
conspicuous for his clemency and meekness. " Now it is virtue properly
that belongs to a good man, since "virtue it is that makes its
possessor good, and renders his works good also" (Ethic. ii, 6).
Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.
I answer that, The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of
appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Now
this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For clemency, in
mitigating punishment, "is guided by reason," according to Seneca (De
Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to
right reason, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Wherefore it is manifest that
both clemency and meekness are virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for
meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the
external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem
rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external
punishing, as stated above [3564](A[1]). Yet they are not really
opposed to one another, since they are both according to right reason.
For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right
reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also according
to right reason, when and where this is requisite. Wherefore they are
not opposed to one another as they are not about the same thing.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), "the
habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is
denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the name
of meekness. " For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to excess,
because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done
to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since "scarcely anyone
belittles an injury done to himself," as Sallust observes [*Cf.
Q[120]]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not in respect of
that which is according to right reason, but as regards that which is
according to common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on
account of some particular consideration, it mitigates the punishment,
deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be punished any further.
Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1): "Clemency grants this, in the
first place, that those whom she sets free are declared immune from all
further punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to a
pardon. " Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related to severity as
equity [the Greek 'epieikeia' [*Cf. Q[120]]] to legal justice, whereof
severity is a part, as regards the infliction of punishment in
accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs from equity, as we shall
state further on (A[3], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the
fruits are delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders
meekness being reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of
temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above
[3565](A[2]). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to
equity, which pertains to justice, as stated above (Q[120], A[2]).
Therefore seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.
Objection 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences;
whereas meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and
vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.
Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): "A man may be
said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty. " Now this
is opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is
opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of
prudence rather than of temperance.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is
temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge. "
Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of
temperance.
I answer that, Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so far
as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence the
virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and name
of justice consist in a certain "equality," those of fortitude in a
certain "strength of mind," those of temperance in a certain
"restraint," inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement concupiscences
of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise consist
in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, while
meekness represses anger, as stated above ([3566]AA[1],2). Therefore
both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as principal
virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.
Reply to Objection 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation
of punishment. one is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance
with the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter of
the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other point is
a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that he does not
exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs properly to
clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "it is
temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge. " This
moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition,
whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another.
Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is a certain
smoothness of the soul"; for, on the other hand, there would seem to be
a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to pain others.
Reply to Objection 2: The annexation of secondary to principal virtues
depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form of
the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree
with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not in
matter.
Reply to Objection 3: "Unsoundness" is corruption of "soundness. " Now
just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the
condition due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to
the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This
occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of
reason, and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses
that humane feeling whereby "every man is naturally friendly towards
all other men" (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes
the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes
pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind, is
because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane feeling
which gives rise to clemency.
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Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest
virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs
man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness
above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is written (James
1:21): "With meekness receive the ingrafted word," and (Ecclus. 5:13):
"Be meek to hear the word" of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad
Demophil. ) that "Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on
account of his great meekness. " Therefore meekness is the greatest of
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according
as it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to
be most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34,35): "That
which is agreeable" to God is "faith and meekness"; wherefore Christ
expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Mat. 11:29), where
He says: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart"; and
Hilary declares [*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that "Christ dwells in us
by our meekness of soul. " Again, it is most acceptable to men;
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): "My son, do thy works in
meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men": for which
reason it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King's "throne is
strengthened by clemency. " Therefore meekness and clemency are the
greatest of virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that
"the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but
overcome evil by good. " Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety
which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of
Ambrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness']
is profitable to all things," observes that "piety is the sum total of
the Christian religion. " Therefore meekness and clemency are the
greatest virtues.
On the contrary, They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are
annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest,
not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus. It
is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest
virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a
man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more
perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those virtues like
faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which direct
one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and
meekness.
Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain
restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil inclinations.
For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its
impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's free judgment of truth:
wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 10:31): "My son, keep thy soul in meekness. " Yet the
concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more shameful, and harass
more incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned
as a principal virtue. as stated above ([3567]Q[141], A[7], ad 2). As
to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to
approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby
we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by
removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man
self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly,
because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the
words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To be meek is not
to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn our
evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and
have a clearer insight of the truth. "
Reply to Objection 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God
and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the
virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
neighbor's evils.
Reply to Objection 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and
clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation
of our neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For
piety relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior, for
instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil,
because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon it
as affecting oneself, as stated above ([3568]Q[30], A[2]): and this
results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the
same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to
vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far
as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.
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OF ANGER (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to
meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning anger
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?
(2) Whether anger is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
(5) Of its species;
(6) Whether anger is a capital vice?
(7) Of its daughters;
(8) Whether it has a contrary vice?
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Whether it is lawful to be angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For
Jerome in his exposition on Mat. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his
brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without cause. ' However, in the
genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden
altogether. " Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.
Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's
evil is to be without reason. " Now anger is always without reason: for
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen
perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "when anger
sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by
its riot"; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): "From whatever
cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the
mind. " Therefore it is always evil to be angry.
Objection 3: Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle,
Rhet. ii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, "Thou shalt not hate
thy brother in thy heart. " Now it would seem unlawful to desire
vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Dt. 32:35,
"Revenge is Mine. " Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always
an evil.
Objection 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is
evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since God
judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be angry
is always an evil.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry without cause,
shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in
danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments
unstable, crimes unchecked. " Therefore to be angry is not always an
evil.
I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive
appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above
([3569]FS, Q[46], A[1]) when we were treating of the passions. Now with
regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may
be found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion's very
species, which is derived from the passion's object. Thus envy, in
respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at
another's good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason:
wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention
of envy denotes something evil. " Now this does not apply to anger,
which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well
and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the
passion's quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and
thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or
less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with
right reason, one's anger is deserving of praise.
Reply to Objection 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other
passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly
they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above
([3570]FS, Q[24], A[2] ) when we were treating of the passions. It is
in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger
whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing him
a wrong. ---But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion
Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of
the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be
moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not
always evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason.
First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its
rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly,
consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is
directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is
good, and is called "zealous anger. " Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v,
45): "We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of
virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead
of following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey. "
This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason
in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason.
Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger troubles the eye
of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it. " Nor is it incompatible with
virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution
of what reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its
act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while having
to act.
Reply to Objection 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as
evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire
vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to
this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto
by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order
of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to punish "is
God's minister," as stated in Rom. 13:4.
Reply to Objection 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire
for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our
desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the
movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v,
45) that "anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows
to the command of reason. "
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Whether anger is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by
sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do we
incur blame thereby," as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no
passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above ([3571]FS,
Q[46], A[1]) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a
sin.
Objection 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable
good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a
person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as
Augustine asserts [*De Lib. Arb.
lusteth against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence
pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.
On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul.
Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we
ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly
on the part of the soul.
I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than
to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of
the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is
owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the
sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these
passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of
incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as
the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions.
If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of
reason altogether---as in the case of those who become insane through
the vehemence of their passions---the essential conditions of
continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the
judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent
forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is
on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason.
This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7):
first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has
given its counsel; and this is called "unbridled incontinence" or
"impetuosity": secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been
counselled, through holding weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this
kind of incontinence is called "weakness. " Hence it is manifest that
incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has
certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these
organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are
accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the
intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the
senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite.
Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament,
the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds
to it weakly; although in /rare cases the opposite occurs, according to
Prov. 31:10, "Who shall find a valiant woman? " And since small and weak
things "are accounted as though they were not" [*Aristotle, Phys. ii,
5] the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm
judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in some women. Hence
he states that "we do not describe women as being continent, because
they are vacillating" through being unstable of reason, and "are easily
led" so that they follow their passions readily.
Reply to Objection 2: It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man
at once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the
impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious
persons [*Cf. [3560]FS, Q[46], A[5]], or from its vehemence, as in the
melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most
vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to
that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion by
reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with
regard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic
temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are
due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a
sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh
overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain negligence
of the spirit in not resisting strongly.
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Whether incontinence is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot
avoid. " Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis.
8:21, "I know [Vulg. : 'knew'] that I could not . . . be continent,
except God gave it. " Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason.
But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man.
Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man
becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of divine love,
exclaimed: I live, now not I" (Gal. 2:20). Therefore incontinence is
not a sin.
On the contrary, It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim. 3:3)
where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc.
Therefore incontinence is a sin.
I answer that, Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two
ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus
incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as
intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence
([3561]Q[155], A[2] ). In this way incontinence is a sin for two
reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which
is in accord with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful
pleasures. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that
"incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong"---that is, by
straying from reason---"but also because it is wicked"---that is, by
following evil desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is
considered, properly---inasmuch as it is a straying from reason---but
not simply; for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason
in his desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in
themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but
relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence
([3562]Q[155], A[2], ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from
the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to
observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of
themselves desirable.
Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but
metaphorically. for instance about the desires for things of which one
cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be
said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just as
the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a
man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with reason.
Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection of
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without
God's help, according to Jn. 15:5: "Without Me you can do nothing. "
Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be continent,
does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii,
3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves. "
Reply to Objection 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the
incontinent man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but
through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in
resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically
and not properly.
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Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate?
Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely
than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his
conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Lk. 12:47, "That
servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be
beaten with many stripes. " Now the incontinent man would seem to act
against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to
Ethic. vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how wicked are the
things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the
intemperate man judges what he desires to be good. Therefore the
incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
Objection 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more
incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most
grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence
would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a
person's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly
are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong,
and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate man
that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be admonished.
Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins more gravely
than the intemperate.
Objection 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his
sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, since
the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the
intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man
sins more gravely than the intemperate.
On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine
says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12,13) that "impenitence is a sin against
the Holy Ghost. " Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) "the
intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his
choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance. " Therefore
the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent.
I answer that, According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin is
chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live
aright" [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater
inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the
intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own
choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas in
the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion. And
since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a disposition difficult
to remove," the result is that the incontinent man repents at once, as
soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact
he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become
connatural to him by reason of his habit. Wherefore in reference to
such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14) that "they are glad when they
have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things. " Hence it follows
that "the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent," as also
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 7).
Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the
inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the
ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so
far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the
reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such
like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the
inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater. Now in both
the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the
appetite being inclined to something, either by passion, as in the
incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater
ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In
one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this
ignorance lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of
intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the
ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of
the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any
chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another
respect the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the
thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some
particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must choose
this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's ignorance is
about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order
that he may follow his desires without being curbed. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7,8) that "the incontinent man is better
than the intemperate, because he retains the best principle [*{To
beltiston, e arche}, 'the best thing, i. e. the principle']," to wit,
the right estimate of the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the
incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which
quenches concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy
of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his
desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above
([3563]Q[142], A[2] ). By these same means the intemperate man can be
cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is
on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the
last end, which holds the same position as the principle in
demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one
who errs as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters
with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part
of the inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this
proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the
inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is
more easily suppressed.
Reply to Objection 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin,
is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained
above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is
sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin
except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins
even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate
man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm,"
i. e. slight desire. "For what would he have done if he had desired it
with passion? "
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Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire?
Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than
the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist the
passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful, indeed it is
pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures
or pains. " Now, "as Heraclitus says, it is more difficult to resist
desire than anger" [*Ethic. ii. 3]. Therefore incontinence of desire is
less grievous than incontinence of anger.
Objection 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion
be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the
case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is
incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one
who is incontinent in desire: since "anger listens to reason somewhat,
but desire does not" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 6).
Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in
desire.
Objection 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is.
Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it
leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more
grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads.
Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of
desire. "
I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways.
First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of
reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence
of anger, because the movement of desire is more inordinate than the
movement of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher
indicates them, Ethic. vii, 6: First, because the movement of anger
partakes somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to avenge the
injury done to him, and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet
he does not tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due
mode of vengeance. on the other hand, the movement of desire is
altogether in accord with sense and nowise in accord with reason.
Secondly, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily
temperament owing to the quickness of the movement of the bile which
tends to anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to
anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence
is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore also it happens more often that
the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed
to anger, than that the children of those who are disposed to
concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that which
results from the natural disposition of the body is deemed more
deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly,
whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise itself and creeps in by
stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works
with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as though forced by a
certain previous displeasure.
Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the
evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus
incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because it
leads to things that are harmful to one's neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure
perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for
the moment it is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its
impetuousness.
Reply to Objection 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not
as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because
nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is
more disgraceful.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard
to its result.
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OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices.
Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?
(2) Whether each of them is a virtue?
(3) Whether each is a part of temperance?
(4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.
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Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same?
Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely
the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet.
ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency "is leniency of a superior in inflicting
punishment on an inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and
vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem that clemency
and meekness are the same.
Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that
"clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when
unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently
clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi],
hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and
clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely the
same.
Objection 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different
virtues. But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and
clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are absolutely
the same.
On the contrary, According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca
(OBJ[1] ) "clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior":
whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each to
everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the same.
I answer that, As stated in Ethic. ii, 3, a moral virtue is "about
passions and actions. " Now internal passions are principles of external
actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore virtues that
moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards the same effect
as virtues that moderate actions, although they differ specifically.
Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain man from theft,
whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire of money, which
is restrained by liberality; so that liberality concurs with justice
towards the effect, which is abstention from theft. This applies to the
case in point; because through the passion of anger a man is provoked
to inflict a too severe punishment, while it belongs directly to
clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be prevented by
excessive anger.
Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of
anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ
from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment,
while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of
vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is
applied externally for the purpose of vengeance.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's affections incline to the moderation of
things that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from
one man loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's
punishment in itself, but only as directed to something else, for
instance justice, or the correction of the person punished.
Hence love
makes one quick to mitigate punishment ---and this pertains to
clemency---while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this
reason Tully says that "the mind provoked to hatred" that is to punish
too severely, "is restrained by clemency," from inflicting too severe a
punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred but
punishment.
Reply to Objection 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the
passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly
concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in
punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are
called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in
punishing. " Those who delight in a man's punishment for its own sake
may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling
that leads one man to love another.
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Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a
virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these
are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore
neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect"
[*Ethic. ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain
decrease; for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases
anger. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Mat. 5:4) among
the beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues
differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised
under virtue.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): "Every good man is
conspicuous for his clemency and meekness. " Now it is virtue properly
that belongs to a good man, since "virtue it is that makes its
possessor good, and renders his works good also" (Ethic. ii, 6).
Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.
I answer that, The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of
appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Now
this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For clemency, in
mitigating punishment, "is guided by reason," according to Seneca (De
Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to
right reason, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Wherefore it is manifest that
both clemency and meekness are virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for
meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the
external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem
rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external
punishing, as stated above [3564](A[1]). Yet they are not really
opposed to one another, since they are both according to right reason.
For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right
reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also according
to right reason, when and where this is requisite. Wherefore they are
not opposed to one another as they are not about the same thing.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), "the
habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is
denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the name
of meekness. " For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to excess,
because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done
to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since "scarcely anyone
belittles an injury done to himself," as Sallust observes [*Cf.
Q[120]]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not in respect of
that which is according to right reason, but as regards that which is
according to common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on
account of some particular consideration, it mitigates the punishment,
deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be punished any further.
Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1): "Clemency grants this, in the
first place, that those whom she sets free are declared immune from all
further punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to a
pardon. " Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related to severity as
equity [the Greek 'epieikeia' [*Cf. Q[120]]] to legal justice, whereof
severity is a part, as regards the infliction of punishment in
accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs from equity, as we shall
state further on (A[3], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the
fruits are delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders
meekness being reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.
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Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of
temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above
[3565](A[2]). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to
equity, which pertains to justice, as stated above (Q[120], A[2]).
Therefore seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.
Objection 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences;
whereas meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and
vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.
Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): "A man may be
said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty. " Now this
is opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is
opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of
prudence rather than of temperance.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is
temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge. "
Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of
temperance.
I answer that, Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so far
as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence the
virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and name
of justice consist in a certain "equality," those of fortitude in a
certain "strength of mind," those of temperance in a certain
"restraint," inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement concupiscences
of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise consist
in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, while
meekness represses anger, as stated above ([3566]AA[1],2). Therefore
both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as principal
virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.
Reply to Objection 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation
of punishment. one is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance
with the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter of
the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other point is
a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that he does not
exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs properly to
clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "it is
temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge. " This
moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition,
whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another.
Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is a certain
smoothness of the soul"; for, on the other hand, there would seem to be
a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to pain others.
Reply to Objection 2: The annexation of secondary to principal virtues
depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form of
the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree
with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not in
matter.
Reply to Objection 3: "Unsoundness" is corruption of "soundness. " Now
just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the
condition due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to
the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This
occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of
reason, and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses
that humane feeling whereby "every man is naturally friendly towards
all other men" (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes
the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes
pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind, is
because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane feeling
which gives rise to clemency.
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Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest
virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs
man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness
above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is written (James
1:21): "With meekness receive the ingrafted word," and (Ecclus. 5:13):
"Be meek to hear the word" of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad
Demophil. ) that "Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on
account of his great meekness. " Therefore meekness is the greatest of
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according
as it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to
be most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34,35): "That
which is agreeable" to God is "faith and meekness"; wherefore Christ
expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Mat. 11:29), where
He says: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart"; and
Hilary declares [*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that "Christ dwells in us
by our meekness of soul. " Again, it is most acceptable to men;
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): "My son, do thy works in
meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men": for which
reason it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King's "throne is
strengthened by clemency. " Therefore meekness and clemency are the
greatest of virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that
"the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but
overcome evil by good. " Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety
which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of
Ambrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness']
is profitable to all things," observes that "piety is the sum total of
the Christian religion. " Therefore meekness and clemency are the
greatest virtues.
On the contrary, They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are
annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest,
not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus. It
is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest
virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a
man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more
perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those virtues like
faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which direct
one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and
meekness.
Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain
restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil inclinations.
For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its
impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's free judgment of truth:
wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 10:31): "My son, keep thy soul in meekness. " Yet the
concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more shameful, and harass
more incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned
as a principal virtue. as stated above ([3567]Q[141], A[7], ad 2). As
to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to
approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby
we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by
removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man
self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly,
because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the
words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To be meek is not
to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn our
evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and
have a clearer insight of the truth. "
Reply to Objection 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God
and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the
virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
neighbor's evils.
Reply to Objection 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and
clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation
of our neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For
piety relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior, for
instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil,
because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon it
as affecting oneself, as stated above ([3568]Q[30], A[2]): and this
results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the
same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to
vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far
as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.
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OF ANGER (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to
meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning anger
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?
(2) Whether anger is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
(5) Of its species;
(6) Whether anger is a capital vice?
(7) Of its daughters;
(8) Whether it has a contrary vice?
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Whether it is lawful to be angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For
Jerome in his exposition on Mat. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his
brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without cause. ' However, in the
genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden
altogether. " Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.
Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's
evil is to be without reason. " Now anger is always without reason: for
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen
perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "when anger
sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by
its riot"; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): "From whatever
cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the
mind. " Therefore it is always evil to be angry.
Objection 3: Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle,
Rhet. ii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, "Thou shalt not hate
thy brother in thy heart. " Now it would seem unlawful to desire
vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Dt. 32:35,
"Revenge is Mine. " Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always
an evil.
Objection 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is
evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since God
judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be angry
is always an evil.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry without cause,
shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in
danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments
unstable, crimes unchecked. " Therefore to be angry is not always an
evil.
I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive
appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above
([3569]FS, Q[46], A[1]) when we were treating of the passions. Now with
regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may
be found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion's very
species, which is derived from the passion's object. Thus envy, in
respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at
another's good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason:
wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention
of envy denotes something evil. " Now this does not apply to anger,
which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well
and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the
passion's quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and
thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or
less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with
right reason, one's anger is deserving of praise.
Reply to Objection 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other
passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly
they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above
([3570]FS, Q[24], A[2] ) when we were treating of the passions. It is
in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger
whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing him
a wrong. ---But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion
Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of
the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be
moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not
always evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason.
First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its
rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly,
consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is
directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is
good, and is called "zealous anger. " Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v,
45): "We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of
virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead
of following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey. "
This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason
in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason.
Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger troubles the eye
of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it. " Nor is it incompatible with
virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution
of what reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its
act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while having
to act.
Reply to Objection 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as
evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire
vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to
this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto
by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order
of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to punish "is
God's minister," as stated in Rom. 13:4.
Reply to Objection 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire
for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our
desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the
movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v,
45) that "anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows
to the command of reason. "
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Whether anger is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by
sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do we
incur blame thereby," as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no
passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above ([3571]FS,
Q[46], A[1]) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a
sin.
Objection 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable
good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a
person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as
Augustine asserts [*De Lib. Arb.
