The
conception
dawns on us that Plato was not so far wrong when he connected discernment with memory.
Weininger - 1903 - Sex and Character
Putting it in a paradoxical form, I may say : Value is created by the past.
Only that which has a positive value remains protected by memory from the jaws of time ; and so it may be with tlie individual psychical life as a whole.
If it is to have a positive value, it must not be a function of time, but must subdue time by eternal duration after physical death.
This draws us incomparably nearer the innermostmotiveofthedesireforimmortality.
Thecom- plete loss of significance which a rich, individual, fully-lived life would suffer if it were all to end with death, and the consequent senselessness of everything, as Goethe said, in
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other words, to Eckermann (February 14, 1829) lead to the demand for immortality. The strongest craving for immortality is possessed by the genius, and this is explained by all the other facts which have been discussed as to his nature.
Memoryonlyfullyvanquishestimewhenit appearsina universal form, as in universal men.
The genius is thus the only timeless man--at least, this and nothing else is his ideal of himself ; he is, as is proved by his passionate and urgent desire for immortality, just the man with the strongest demand for timeiessness, with the greatest desire for value. *
<And now we are face to face with an almost astonishing coincidence. Thetimeiessnessofthegeniuswillnotonly be manifest in relation to the single moments of his life, but also in his relation to what is known as " his generation," or, in a narrower sense, " his time. " As a matter of fact, he has no relations at all with it. The age does not create the genius it requires. The genius is not the product of his age, is not to be explained by it, and we do him no honour if we attempt to account for him by it. )
Carlyle justly noted how many epochs had called for great men, how badly they had needed them, and how they still did not obtain them.
The coming of genius remains a mystery, and men reverently abandon their efforts to explain it. And as the causes of its appearance do not lie in any one age, so also the consequences are not limited by time. The achieve- ments of genius live for ever, and time cannot change them, By his works a man of genius is granted immortality on the earth, and thus in a threefold manner he has transcended time. His universal comprehension and memory forbid the annihilation of his experiences with the passing of the
* It is often a cause for astonishment that men with quite ordi- nary, even vulgar, natures experience no fear of death. But it is quite explicable : it is not the fear of death which creates the desire for immortality, but the desire for immortality which causes fear of death.
? TALENT AND MEMORY
moment in which each occurred ; his birth is independent of his age, and his work never dies.
Here is the best place to consider a question which, strangely enough, appears to have received no attention. The question is, if there be anything akin to genius in the world of animals and plants ? Although it must be admitted that exceptional forms occur amongst animals and plants, these cannot be regarded as coming under our definition of genius. Talent may exist amongst them as amongst men below the standard of genius. But the special gift, what Moreau, Lombroso, and others have called the"divinespark,"wemustdenytoanimals. Thislimita- tion is not jealousy nor the anxious guarding of a privilege, but is founded on good grounds.
Is there anything unexplained by the assumption that the first appearance of genius was in man ! In the first place, it is because of this that the human race has an objective mind; inotherwords,thatmanistheonlyorganismwitha history.
^The history of the human race (naturally I mean the history of its mind and not merely of its wars) is readily intelligible on the theory of the appearance of genius, and of the imitation by the more monkey-like individuals of the conductofthosewithgenius. Thechiefstages,nodoubt, were house-building, agriculture, and, above all, speech. Every single word has been the invention of a single man, as, indeed, we still see, if we leave out of consideration the merely technical terms. How else could language have
arisen ? The earliest words were " onomatopoetic " sound similar to the exciting cause was evolved almost without the will of the speaker, in direct response to the sensuousstimulation. Alltheotherwordswereoriginally metaphors, or comparisons, a kind of primitive poetry, for all prose has come from poetry, f Many, perhaps the majority of the greatest geniuses, have remained unknown. Think of the proverbs, now almost commonplaces, such as " one good turn deserves another. " These were said for the first time by some great man. How many quotations
137
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a
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from the classics, or sayings of Christ, have passed into the common language, so that we have to think twice before we can remember who were the authors of them. Language is as little the work of the multitude as our ballads. Every form of speech owes much that is not acknowledged to individualsofanotherlanguage. Becauseoftheuniversality of genius, the words and phrases that he invents are useful not only to those who use the language in which he wrote them. /A nation orients itself by its own geniuses, and derives from them its ideas of its own ideals, but the guiding starservesalsoasalighttoothernations. Asspeechhas been created by a few great men, the most extraordinary wisdom lies concealed in it, a wisdom which reveals itself to a few ardent explorers but which is usually overlooked by the stupid professional philologists. ^
The genius is not a critic of language, but its creator, as he is the creator of all the mental achievements which are the material of culture and which make up the objective mind,thespiritofthepeoples. The"timeless"menare those who make history, for history can be made only by those who are not floating with the stream. It is only those who are unconditioned by time who have real value, and whose productions have an enduring force. And the events that become forces of culture become so only because they have an enduring value.
If we make a criterion of genius the exhibition of this threefold " timelessness " we shall have a measure by which itiseasytotestallclaimants. LombrosoandTu? rckhave expanded the popular view which ascribes genius to all whose intellectual or practical achievements are much above the average. Kant and Schelling have insisted on the more exclusive doctrine that genius can be predicated only of the great creative artists. The truth probably lies between the two. I am inclined to think that only great artists and great philosophers (amongst the latter, I include, above all, the great religious teachers) have proved a claim to genius. Neither the " man of action " nor " the man of science " has any claim.
? TALENT AND MEMORY
Men of action, famous politicians and generals, may possess a few traits resembling genius (particularly a specially good knowledge of men and an enormous capacity for remembering people). The psychology of such traits will be dealt with later ; they are confused with genius only by those whom the externals of greatness dazzle. The man of genius almost typically renounces such external greatness becauseoftherealgreatnesswithinhim. Thereallygreat man has the strongest sense of values ; the distinguished general is absorbed by the desire for power. The former seeks to link power with real value ; the latter desires that power itself should be valued. Great generals and great politicians, like the bird Phoenix, are born out of fiery chaos and like it disappear again in chaos. The great emperor or the great demagogue is the only man who lives entirely in the present ; he does not dream of a more beautiful, better future ; his mind does not dwell on his own past which has already passed, and so in the two ways most possible to man, he does not transcend time, but lives only in the moment. The great genius does not let his work be determined by the concrete finite conditions that surround him, whilst it is from these that the work of the statesman takes its direction and its termination. And so the great
emperor is no more than a phenomenon of nature, whereas the genius is outside nature and is an incorporation of the mind. Theworksofmenofactioncrumbleatthedeathof their authors, if indeed they have not already decayed, or they survive only a brief time leaving no traces behind them except what the chronicles record as having been done and later undone. The emperor creates no works that survive time, passing into eternity ; such creations come from genius. It is the genius in reality and not the other who is the creator of history, for it is only the genius who is outside and unconditioned by history. The great man has a history, the emperor is only a part of history. The great man transcends time ; time creates and time destroys the emperor.
The great man of science, unless he is also a philosopher
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(I think of such names as Newton and Gauss, Linnasus and Darwin, Copernicus and GaHleo), deserves the title of genius as little as the man of action. Men of science are
not universal ; they deal only with a branch or branches of knowledge. Thisisnotdue,asissometimessaid,merelyto the extreme modern specialisation that makes it impossible tomastereverything. Eveninthenineteenthandtwentieth centuries there are still amongst the learned men individuals with a knowledge as many-sided as that of Aristotle or
Leibnitz ; the names of von Humboldt and William Wundt atoncecometomymind. Theabsenceofgeniuscomes from something much more deeply seated in the men of science, and in science itself, from a cause which I shall explain in the eighth chapter. Probably some one may be disposed to argue that if even the most distinguished men of science have not a knowledge so universal as that of the philosopher, there are some who stand on the outermost fringes of philosophy, and to whom it is yet difficult to deny the word genius. I think of such men as Fichte, Schleier- macher, Carlyle, and Nietzsche. Which of the merely scientitic has felt in himself an unconditioned comprehen- sion of all men and of all things, or even the capacity to verify any single thing in his mind and by his mind ? On
the contrary, has not the whole history of the science of the last thousand years been directed against this ? This is the reasonwhymenofsciencearenecessarilyone-sided. No man of science, unless he is also a philosopher, however eminent his achievements, has that continuous unforgetting life that the genius exhibits, and this is because of his want of universality.
finally, it is to be observed that the investigations of the scientific are always in definite relation to the knowledge of theirday. Thescientificmantakespossessionofadefinite store of experimental or observed knowledge, increases or altersitmoreorless,andthenhandsiton. Andmuchwill be taken away from his achievements, much will silently disappear ; his treatises may make a brave show in the libraries, but they cease to be actively alive. On the other
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hand, we can ascribe to the work of the great philosopher, as to that of the great artist, an imperishable, unchangeable presentation of the world, not disappearing with time, and which, because it was the expression of a great mind, will always find a school of men to adhere to it. There still exist disciples of Plato and Aristotle, of Spinoza and Berkeley and Bruno, but there are now none who denote them- selves as followers of Galileo or Helmholtz, of Ptolemy or Copernicus. It is a misuse of terms, due to erroneous ideas, to speak of the " classics " of science or of pedagogy in the sense that we speak of the classics of philosophy and art. ^
The great philosopher bears the name of genius deservedly and with honour. And if it will always be the greatest pain to the philosopher that he is not an artist, so the artist envies the philosopher his tenacious and controlled strength of systematic thought, and it is not surprising that the artist has taken pleasure in depicting Prometheus and Faust, Prospera and Cyprian, Paul the Apostle and II Penseroso. The philo- sopher and the artist are alternate sides of one another.
We must not be too lavish in attributing genius to those who are philosophers or we shall not escape the reproach of being merely partisans of philosophy against science. Such a partisanship is foreign to my purpose, and, I hope, to this book, ^t would only be absurd to discuss the claims to genius of such men as Anaxagoras, Geulincx, Baader, or
Emerson. I deny genius either to such unoriginally pro- found writers as Angelus Silesius, Philo and Jacobi, or to original yet superficial persons such as Comte Feuerbach, Hume,Herbart,Locke,andKarneades. Thehistoryofart is equally full of preposterous valuations, whilst, on the other hand, the history of science is extremely free from false estimations. / The history of science busies itself very little with the biographies of its protagonists ; its object is a system of objective, collective knowledge in which the individual is swept away. The service of science demands the greatest sacrifice, for in it the individual human being renounces all claim to eternity as such.
? CHAPTER VI
MEMORY, LOGIC, AND ETHICS
The title that I have given to this chapter at once opens the way to misinterpretation. It might appear as if the author supported the view that logical and ethical values were the objects exclusively of empirical psychology, psychical phenomena, like perception and sensation, and that logic and ethics, therefore, were subsections of psychology and
based upon psychology.
I declare at once that I call this view, the so-called psy-
chologismus, at once false and injurious. It is false because it can lead to nothing ; and injurious because, while it hardly touches logic and ethics, it overthrows psychology itself. The exclusion of logic and ethics from the foun- dations of psychology, and the insertion of them in an appendix, is one of the results of the overgrowth of the doctrine of empirical perception, of that strange heap of dead, fleshless bones which is known as empirical psycho- logy, and from which all real experience has been excluded. I have nothing to do with the empirical school, and in this matter lean towards the transcendentalism of Kant.
As the object of my work, however, is to discover the differences between different members of humanity, and not to discuss categories that would hold good for the angels in heaven, I shall not follow Kant closely, but remain more directly in psychological paths.
The justification of the title of this chapter must be reached along other Unes. The tedious, because entirely new, demonstration of the earlier part of my work has shown that the human memory stands in intimate relation
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with things hitherto supDOsed unconnected with it--such things as time, value, genius, immortality. I have attempted to show that memory stands in intimate connection with all these. There must be some strong reason for the complete absence of earlier allusions to this side of the subject. I believe the reason to be no more than the inadequacy and slovenliness which hitherto have spoiled theories of memory.
I must here call attention to a theory first propounded by Charles Bonnet in the middle of the eighteenth century and towards the end of the nineteenth century, specially insisted uponbyEwaldHeringandE. Mach. Thistheoryregarded the human memory as being only a special case of a pro- perty common to all organised matter, the property that makes the path of new stimuli rather easier if these resemble stimuli that have acted at some former time. The theory really makes the human memory an adaptation in the sense of Lamarck, the result on the living organism of repeated stimulation. It is true that there is a point in common between the human memory and the increase of sensitiveness caused by the repeated application of a stimu- lus ; that identical element consists in the permanence of the effect of the first stimulation. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the growth of a muscle
that is much used or the adaptation of the eater of arsenic or morphia to increased doses, and the recollection of past experiencesbyhumanbeings. Intheonecasethetraceof the old is just to be felt in the new stimulation ; in the other case, by means of the consciousness, the old situations are actuallyreproducedwithalltheirindividuation. Theiden- tification of the two is so superficial that it is a waste of time to dwell longer on it.
The doctrine of association as the theory of memory is linked with the foregoing physiological theory as a matter of history, through Hartley, and, as a matter of fact, becausetheideaofhabitissharedbythetwo. Theasso- ciation theory attributes memory to the mechanical play of the linking of presentations according to four laws. It
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overlooks the fact that memory (the continuous memory of man) is a function of the will. I can remember a thing if I really will. In the case of hypnosis, when the recollec- tion of all that has been forgotten is induced, an outside will replaces the will of the subject. It is will that sets in action the chains of association, and we have to deal here with something deeper than a mechanical principle.
In the association psychology, which first splits up the psychic life, and then vainly imagines that it can weld the re-assorted pieces together again, there is another confusion, the confusion between memory and recollection, which has persisted in spite of the well-founded objections of Avenarius and von Ho? ffding. The recognition of a circum- stance does not necessarily involve the special reproduction of the former impression, even although there seems to be a tendency for the new impression, at least, partly to recall the old one. But there is another kind of recognition, perhaps as common, in which the new impression does not appear to be directly linked with an association, but in which it comes, so to speak, "coloured" (James would say "tinged") with that character that would be called by von Ho? ffding the "familiarity quality. " To him who returns to his native place the roads and streets seem familiar, even although he has forgotten the names, has to ask his way, and can think of no special occasion on which he went along them. A melodymayseem"familiar"andyetI maybeunableto say where I heard it. /The " character " (in the sense of Avenarius) of familiarity, of intimacy, hovers over the sense- impression itself, and analysis can detect no associations, none of the fusing of the old and new, which, according to the assertion of a presumptuous pseudo-psychology, produces the feeling ; these cases are quite easy to distinguish from cases in which there is a real although vague association with an older experience in henid formj
In individual psychology this distinction is of great importance. Inthehighesttypesofmankindtheconscious- ness of the continuous past is present in so active a form that the moment such a one sees a acquaintance in the
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street he is at once able to reproduce the last meeting as a complete experience, whereas in the case of the less gifted person, the feeling of familiarity that makes recognition possible, occurs when he is able to recall the past connection in all its details.
If we now, in conclusion, ask whether or no other animals than man possess a similar faculty for remembering and reviving their earlier lives in their entirety it is most probable that the answer must be in the negative. Animals could not, as they do, remain for hours at a time, motionless and peaceful on one spot, if they were capable of thinking of the future or of remembering the past. Animals have the feeling of familiarity and the sense of expectation (as we find from the recognition of his master by a dog after twenty years' absence); buttheypossessnomemoryandnohope. They are capable of recognition through the sense of familiarity, but they have no memory.
As memory has been shown to be a special character unconnected with the lower spheres of psychical life, and the exclusive property of human beings, it is not surprising that it is closely related to such higher things as the idea of value and of time, and the craving for immortality, which is absent in animals, and possible to men only in so far as they possess the quality of genius. If memory be an essen- tially human thing, part of the deepest being of humanity, finding expression in mankind's most peculiar qualities, then it will not be surprising if memory be also related to the phenomena of logic and ethics. I have now to explore this relationship.
I may set out from the old proverb that liars have bad memories. It is certain that the pathological liar has prac- tically no memory. About male liars I shall have more to say ; they are not common, however. But if we remember what was said as to the absence of memory amongst women we shall not be surprised at the existence of the numerous proverbs and common sayings about the untruthfulness of women. It is evident that a being whose memory is very, slight, and who can recall only in the most imperfect fashion
K
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\vhat it has said or done, or suffered, must lie easily if it has the gift of speech. The impulse to untruthfulness will be hard to resist if there is a practical object to be gained, and if the influence that comes from a full conscious reality of the past be not present. The impulse to lie is stronger in woman, because, unlike that of man, her memory is not continuous, whilst her life is discrete, unconnected, dis- continuous, swayed by the sensations and perceptions of themomentinsteadofdominatingthem. Unlikeman,her experiences float past without being referred, so to speak, to a definite, permanent centre ; she does not feel herself, past and present, to be one and the same throughout all her life. It happens almost to every man that sometimes he
"does not understand himself"; indeed, wilh very many men, it happens (leaving out of the question the facts of psychical periodicity) that if they think over their pasts in their minds they find it very difficult to refer all the events to a single conscious personality ; they do not grasp how it could have been that they, being what they feel themselves at the time to be, could ever have done or felt or thought this, that, or the other. And yet in spite of the difficulty, they know that they had gone through these experiences. The feeling of identity in all circumstances of life is quite wanting in the true woman, because her memory, even if exceptionallygood,isdevoidofcontinuity. Theconscious- ness of identity of the male, even although he may fail to understand his own past, manifests itself in the very desire to understand that past. Women, if they look back on their earlier lives, never understand themselves, and do not even wish to understand themselves, and this reveals itself in the scanty interest they give to the attempts of man to understand them, u he woman does not interest herself about herself, and hence there have been no female psychologists, no psychology of women written by a woman, and she is incapable of grasping the anxious desire of the man to understand the beginning, middle, and end of his individual
life in their relation to each other, and to interpret the whole as a continual, logical, necessary sequence. )
? MEMORY, LOGIC, AND ETHICS
At this point there is a natural transition to logic. A creature like woman, the absolute woman, who is not con- scious of her own identity at different stages of her life, has no evidence of the identity of the subject-matter of thought at different times. \If in her mind the two stages of a change cannot be present simultaneously by means of memory, it is impossible for her to make the comparison and note the change. ) A being whose memory is never sufficiently good as to make it psychologically possible to perceive identity through the lapse of time, so as to enable her, for instance, to pursue a quantity through a long mathematical reckoning
;
such a creature in the extreme case would be unable to control her memory for even the moment of time required to say that A will be still A in the next moment, to pronounce judgment on the identity A=A, or on the opposite propo- sition that A is not equal to A, for that proposition also requires a continuous memory of A to make the comparison possible.
I have been making no mere joke, no facetious sophism or paradoxical proposition. I assert that the judgment of identity depends on conceptions, never on mere perceptions and complexes of perceptions, and the conceptions, as logical conceptions, are independent of time, retaining their constancy, whether I, as a psychological entity, think them constant or not. But man never has a conception in the purely logical form, for he is a psychological being, affected by the condition of sensations ; he is able only to form a general idea (a typical, connotative, representative concep- tion) out of his individual experiences by a reciprocal effacing of the differences and strengthening of the simi- larities, thus, however, very closely approximating to an abstract conception, and in a most wonderful fashion using it as such. He must also be able to preserve this idea which he thinks clear, although in reality it is confused, and it is memory alone that brings about the possibility of that Were he deprived of memory he would lose the possibility of thinking logically, for this possibility is incarnated, so to speak, only in a psychological medium.
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Memory, then, is a necessary part of the logical faculty. The propositions of logic are not conditioned by the exist- ence of memory, but only the power to use them. The proposition A=A must have a psychological relation to time, otherwise it would be Ati = At2. Of course this is not the case in pure logic, but man has no special faculty of pure logic, and must act as a psychological being.
I have already shown that the continuous memory is the vanquisher of time, and, indeed, is necessary even for the ideaoftimetobeformed. Andsothecontinuousmemory is the psychological expression of the logical proposition of identity. The absolute woman, in whom memory is absent, cannot take the proposition of identity, or its contradictory, or the exclusion of the alternative, as axiomatic.
Besides these three conditions of logical thought, the fourth condition, the containing of the conclusion in the major premiss, is possible only through memory. That proposition is the groundwork of the syllogism. The pre- misses psychologically precede the conclusion, and must be retained by the thinking person whilst the minor premiss appliesthelawofidentityorofnon-identity. Thegrounds for the conclusion must lie in the past. And for this reason continuity which dominates the mental processes of man is bound up with causality. Every psychological application of the relation of a conclusion to its premisses implies the continuity of memory to guarantee the identity of the propo- sitions. As woman has no continuous memory she can have no principium rationis sufficientis.
And so it appears that woman is without logic.
George Simmel has held this familiar statement to be erroneous, inasmuch as women have been known to draw conclusionswiththestrongestconsistency. Thatawoman in a concrete case can unrelentingly pursue a given course at the stimulation of some object is no more a proof that she understands the syllogism, than is her habit of perpetually recurring to disproved arguments a proof that the law of identity is an axiom for her. ^he point at issue is whether or no they recognise the logical axioms as the criteria of
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the validity of their thoughts, as the directors of their process of thinking, whether they make or do not make these the rule of conduct and the principle of judgment. A woman cannot grasp that one must act from principle ; as she has no continuity she does not experience the necessity for logical support of her mental processes. Hence the ease withwhichwomenassumeopinions. Ifawomangivesvent to an opinion, or statement, and a man is so foolish as to take it seriously and to ask her for the proof of it, she regards the request as unkind and offensive, and as impugninghercharacter. Amanfeelsashamedofhimself, feels himself guilty if he has neglected to verify a thought, whether or no that thought has been uttered by him ; he feels the obligation to keep to the logical standard which he has set up for himself. Woman resents any attempt to require from her that her thoughts should be logical. <^he may be regarded as " logically insane. "/
The most common defect which one could discover in the conversation of a woman, if one really wished to apply to it the standard of logic (a feat that man habitually shuns, so showing his contempt for a woman's logic) is the quaternio terminorum, that form of equivocation which is the result of an incapacity to retain definite presentations; in other words, the result of a failure to grasp the law of identity. Woman is unaware of this ; she does not realise the law nor make it a criterionofthought. <^Manfeelshimselfboundtologic; the woman is without this feeling. It is only this feeling of guilt that guarantees man's efforts to think logically. Probably the most profound saying of Descartes, and yet one that has been widely misunderstood, is that all errors are crimes)
(The source of all error in life is failure of memory. Thus logic and ethics, both of which deal with the furtherance of truth and join in its highest service, are dependent on memory.
The conception dawns on us that Plato was not so far wrong when he connected discernment with memory. Memory, it is true, is not a logical and ethical act, but it is a
logical and ethical phenomenon) <^A man who has had a vivid and deep perception regards it as a fault, if some half-
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hour afterwards he is thinking of something different, even ifexternalinfluenceshaveintervened. Amanthinkshim- self unconscientious and blameworthy if he notices that he has not thought of a particular portion of his life for a long time. Memory, moreover, is linked with morality, because itisonlythroughmemorythatrepentanceispossible. All forgetfulness is in itself immoral. And so reverence ps a moral exercise ; it is a duty to forget nothing, and for this reason we should reverence the dead. ) Equally from logical and ethical motives, man tries to carry logic into his past, in
order that past and present may become one.
\It is with something of a shock that we realise here*that we approach the deep connection between logic and ethics, long ago suggested by Socrates and Plato, discovered anew
by Kant and Fichte, but lost sight of by living workers.
A creature that cannot grasp the mutual exclusiveness of A and not A has no difficulty in lying ; more than that, such a creature has not even any consciousness of lying, being without a standard of truth. Such a creature if endowed with speech will lie without knowing it, without the possibility of knowing it; Veritas norma sui et falsa est. There is nothing more upsetting to a man than to find, when he has discovered a woman in a lie, and has asked her, " Why did you lie about it ? " that she simply does not understand the question, but simply looks at him and
laughingly tries to soothe him, or bursts into tearsi
The subject does not end with the part played by memory. Lyingiscommonenoughamongstmen. Andliescanbe told in spite of a full remembrance of the subject which for some purpose some one wishes to be informed about. Indeed, it might almost be said that the only persons who can lie are those who misrepresent facts in spite of a
superior knowledge and consciousness of them.
-(Truth must first be regarded as the real value of logic and ethics before it is correct to speak of deviations from truth for special motives as lies from the moral point of view. Those who have not this high conception should be adjudged as guilty rather of vagueness and exaggeration
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than of lying : they are not immoral but non-moral. And in this sense the woman is non-moral. )
The root of such an absolute misconception of truth must lie deep. The continuous memory against which alone a man can be false, is not the real source of the effort for truth, the desire for truth, the basal ethical-logical phenomenon, but only stands in intimate relation with it,
(That which enables man to have a real relation to truth and which removes his temptation to lie, must be some- thing independent of all time, something absolutely unchangeable, which as faithfully reproduces the old as if it were new, because it is permanent itself ; it can only be that source in which all discrete experiences unite and which creates from the first a continuous existence. It is what produces the feehng of responsibility which oppresses all men, young and old, as to their actions, which makes them know that they are responsible, which leads to the phenomena of repentance and consciousness of sin, which calls to account before an eternal and ever present self things that are long past, its judgment being subtler and more comprehensive than that of any court of law or of the laws of society, and which is exerted by the individual him- self quite independently of all social codes (so condemning the moral psychology which would derive morality from the social life of man). Society recognises the idea of illegality, but not of sin ; it presses for punishment without wishing to produce repentance ; lying is punished by the law only in its ceremonious form of perjury, and error has never been placed under its ban. ) Social ethics with its conception of duty to our neighbour and to society, and
practical exclusion from consideration of the other fifteen
hundred million human beings, cannot extend the realm of morality, when it begins by limiting it in this arbitrary fashion.
What is this " centre of apperception " that is superior to time and change ?
It can be nothing less than what raises man above himself (as a part of the world of sense) which joins him to an
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order of things that only the reason can grasp, and that puts the whole world of sense at his feet. It is nothing else than personality.
The most sublime book in the world, the " Criticism of Practical Reason," has referred morality to an intelli. ^ent ego,distinctfromallempiricalconsciousness. Imustnow turn to that side of my subject.
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(PAVID Hume is well known to have abolished the concep- tion of the ego by seeing in it only a bundle of different perceptionsincontinualebbandflow. Howevercompletely Hume thought himself to have compromised the ego, at least he explained his view relatively moderately. He proposed to say nothing about a few metaphysicians who appeared to rejoice in another kind of ego ; for himself he was quite certain that he had none, and he dared to suppose that the majority of mankind, leaving the few peculiar metaphysicians out of the question, were, like himself, mere bundles. So the polite man expressed himself. In the next chapter I shall show how his irony recoils on himself. That his view became so famous depends partly on the over-estimation in which Hume is held and which is largely
due to Kant. Hume was a most distinguished empirical psychologist, but he cannot be regarded as a genius, the popular view notwithstanding. ) It is not very much to be the first of English philosophers, but Hume has not even a claim to that position. I do not think that Kant would have given so much praise to Hume if he had been fully acquainted with all Hume's work and not merely with the " Enquiry," as he certainly rejected the position of Spinoza, according to which men were not " substances," but merely accidents.
-Lichtenberg, who took the field against the ego later than Hume, was still bolder. He is the philosopher of imperson- ality, and calmly corrects the conversational " I think" mto
an actual " it thinks "
;
he regards the ego as a creation of
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the grammarian. In this Hume had anticipated him, inas- much as he also had declared, at the end of his analysis, all disputes as to the identity of the person to be merely a battle of words. )
E. Mach has recently represented the universe as a coherent mass, and the egos as points in which the coherent mass has greater consistency. The only realities are the perceptions, which are connected in one individual strongly, but which are weaker in another individual who is thus differentiated from the first.
The contents of the perceptions are the realities, and they persist externally to the worthless personal recollections. The ego is not a real but only a practical entity and cannot be isolated, and, therefore, the idea of individual immortality must be rejected. None the less the idea of an ego is not wholly to be rejected ; here and there, as, for instance, in Darwin's struggle for existence, it appears to have some validity.
It is extraordinary how an investigator who has accom- plished so much, not only as a historian of his special branch and as a critic of ideas, but who is also fully equipped with knowledge of biology, should have paid no heed to the fact that every organic being is indivisible from the first, and is not composed of anything like atoms, monads, &c. The first distinctive mark of the living as opposed to inorganic matter is that the former is always differentiated into dissimilar, mutually dependent parts, and is not homogeneous like a crystal. And so it should have been borne in mind that it was at least possible that individuation>> the fact that organic beings are not united, like Siamese twins, would prove to have importance in psychical matters, and the ego, therefore, was more than Mach's idea of it as a mere waiting-hall of perceptions.
It may be that there exists a psychical correlation even amongst animals. Everythmg that an animal feels and perceives has a different " note " or " colour " in every individual. Thisindividualqualityisnotonlycharacteristic of the class, genus, species, race, and family, but also is
? LOGIC, ETHICS AND THE EGO
different in every individual of the same family, &c. The idioplasm is the physiological equivalent of this specific individual quality of the sensations and perceptions, and there are reasons analogous with those in favour of the supposition of an idioplasm for the supposition of an individual character amongst animals. The sportsman who has to do with dogs, the trainer with horses, and the keeper with animals will readily admit the existence of this individualityasaconstantelement. Itisclearthatwehave to do here with something more than a mere rendezvous of perceptions.
But even if this psychical analogue of the idioplasm were proved to exist in the case of animals, it could not be ranked with the intelligible character, the existence of which in any living creature except man cannot be maintained. The intelligible character of men, their individuation, has the same relation to empirical character that memory has tothesimplepowerofrecognition. Andfinallywecome to identity, by which the structure, form, law, and cosmos persist even through the change of contents. \The conside- rations from which is drawn the proof of the existence in man of such a noumenal, trans-empirical subject must now be stated briefly. / They come from logic and ethics.
Logic deals with the true significance of the principle of identity (also with that of contradiction ; the exact relation of these two, and the various modes of stating it are con- troversialmattersoutsidethepresentsubject). Thepropo- sition A = A is axiomatic and self-evident. It is the primi- tive measure of truth for all other propositions ; however much we may think over it we must return to this funda- mental proposition. It is the principle of the distinction betweentruthanderror; andhewhoregardsitasmeaning- less tautology, as was the case with Hegel and many of the later empiricists (this being not the only surprising point of contact between two schools apparently so different) is right in a fashion, but has misunderstood the nature of the proposition. A=A,theprincipleofalltruth,cannotitself be a special truth. He who finds the proposition of identity
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or that of non-identity meaningless does so by his own fault. He must have expected to find in these propositions special ideas, a source of positive knowledge. ''^But they are not in themselves knowledge, separate acts of thought, but the common standard for all acts of thought^ And so they cannot be compared with other acts of thought. <(The rule of the process of thought must be outside thought. The proposition of identity does not add to our knowledge ;
it does not increase but rather founds a kingdom. The proposition of identity is either meaningless or means everything. Upon what do the propositions of identity and of non-identity depend ? The common view is that theyarejudgments. Sigwart,forinstance,whohasrecently discussed the matter, puts it as follows : The two judgments A is B and A is not B cannot be true at the same time because the judgment "An unlearned man is learned" would involve a contradiction because the predicate "learned" is affirmed of a subject of which the judg- ment has been made implicitly that he is unlearned, so that in reality two judgments are made, X is learned and
Xisunlearned. The"psychologismus"ofthismethodof argument is plain. It has recourse to a temporary judg- ment preceding the formation of the conception "unlearned man. " Theproposition,however,AisnotAclaimsvalidity quite apart from the past, present, or future existence of other judgments. It depends on the conception " unlearned man. " It makes the conception more certain by excluding
contradictory instances.
^ This, then, gives us the true function of the principles of
identityandnon-identity. Theyarematerialsforconcep- tions^
This function concerns only logical conceptions, but not what have been called psychological conceptions. The conception is always represented psychologically by a generalisation ; and this presentation in a certain fashion is included in the conception. The generalisation represents the conception psychologically, but is not identical with it.
It can, so to speak, be richer (as when I think of a triangle)
? LOGIC, ETHICS AND THE EGO
or it can be poorer (the conception of a lion contains more than my generaUsation of Hons). The logical conception is the plumb-line which the attention tries to follow ; it is the goal and pole-star of the psychological generalisation. \Pure logical thought cannot occur in the case of men
;
it would be an attribute of deity. A human being must always think partly psychologically because he possesses not only reason but also senses, and his thought cannot free itself from temporal experiences but must remain bound by them. Logic, however, is the supreme standard by which the individual can test his own psychological ideas and those of others. When two men are discussing anything it is the conception and not the varying individual pre- sentations of it that they aim at. ) The conception, then, is the standard of value for the individual presentations. The
mode in which the psychological generalisation comes into existence is quite independent of the conception and has no significance in respect to it. The logical character which invests the conception with dignity and power is not derived from experience, for experience can give only vague and wavering generalisations. Absolute constancy and absolute coherence which cannot come from ex-
perience are the essence of the conception of that power concealed in the depths of the human mind whose handi- work we try hard but in vain to see in nature. Concep- tions are the only true realities, and the conception is not in nature ; it is the rule of the essence not of the actual existence.
\When I enunciate the proposition A = A, the meaning of the proposition is not that a special individual A of experience or of thought is like itself. The judgment of identity does not depend on the existence of an A. It means only that if an A exists, or even if it does not exist, thenA=A. Somethingisposited,theexistenceofA=A whether or no A itself exists. It cannot be the result of experience, as Mill supposed, for it is independent of the
existence of A. But an existence has been posited ; it is not the existence of the object ; it must be the existence of
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the subject. "sThe reality of the existence is not in the first A or the second A, but in the simultaneous identity of the two. And so the proposition A = A is no other than the proposition " I am. "^
/From the psychological point of view, the real meaning oT^the proposition of identity is not so difficult to interpret. It is clear that to be able to say A = A, to establish the per- manence of the conception through the changes of ex- perience, there must be something unchangeable, and this can be only the subject. Were I part of the stream of change I could not verify that the A had remained unchanged, had remained itself. Were I part of the change, I could not recognise the change. Fichte was right when he stated that the existence of the ego was to be found concealed in pure logic, inasmuch as the ego is
the condition of intelligible existence.
/ The logical axioms are the principle of all truth. These I posit an existence towards which all cognition serves. ) Logic is a law which must be obeyed, and man realises / himself only in so far as he is logical. He finds himself
j
in cognition. ^
\ All error must be felt to be crime. And so man must
not err. He must find the truth, and so he can find it. The duty of cognition involves the possibility of cognition, the freedom of thought, and the hope of ascertaining truth. In the fact that logic is the condition of the mind lies the proof that thought is free and can reach its goal.
O can treat ethics briefly and in another fashion, inas- much as what I have to say is founded on Kant's moral philosophy. Thedeepest,theintelligible,partofthenature of man is that part which does not take refuge in causality, but which chooses in freedom the good or the bad. ^ This is manifest in consciousness of sin and in repentance. No one has attempted to explain these facts otherwise ; and no one allows himself to be persuaded that he must commit this or that act. In the shall there lies the possibility of the can. The causal determining factors, the lower motives that act upon him, he is fully
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159 aware of, but he remains conscious of an intelligible ego
free to act in a different way from other egos.
Truth, purity, faithfulness, uprightness, with reference to oneself ; these give the only conceivable ethics. Duty is only duty to oneself, duty of the empirical ego to the intelligible ego. These appear in the form of two impera- tives that will always put to shame every kind of psycho- logismus--the logical law and the moral law. The internal direction, the categorical imperatives of logic and morality which dominate all the codes of social util'tarianism are factors that no empiricism can explain. All empiricism and scepticism, positivism and relativism, instinctively feel that their principal difficulties lie in logic and ethics. And so perpetually renewed and fruitless efforts are made to explain this inward discipline empirically and psychologi-
cally.
Logic and ethics are fundamentally the same, they are
no more than duty to oneself. They celebrate their union by the highest service of truth, which is overshadowed in the one case by error, in the other by untruth. <A11 ethics are possible only by the laws of logic, and logic is no more than the ethical side of law. Not only virtue, but also insight, not only sanctity but also wisdom, are the duties and tasks of mankind. Through the union of these alone comes perfection. \
Ethics, however, the laws of which are postulates, cannot bemadethebasisofalogicalproofofexistence. Ethicsare not logical in the same sense that logic is ethical. Logic proves the absolute actual existence of the ego ; ethics con- troltheformwhichtheactualityassumes. Ethicsdominate logic and make logic part of their contents.
In thinking of the famous passage in the "Critique of Practical Reason," where Kant introduces man as a part of the intelligible cosmos, it may be asked how Kant assured himself that the moral law was inherent in personality. The answer Kant gave was simply that no other and no nobler origin could be found for it. He goes no further than to say that the categorical imperative is the law of
? i6o SEX AND CHARACTER
the noumenon, belonging to it and inherent in it from the beginning. That, however, is the nature of ethics. / Ethics make it possible for the intelligible ego to act free from the shackles of empiricism, and so through ethics, the existence of whose possibilities logic assures us, is able to become actual in all its purit3^|
There remains a most important point in which the Kantian system is often misunderstood. It reveals itself plainly in every case of wrong-doing.
Duty is only towards oneself ; Kant must have realised this in his earlier days when first he felt an impulse to lie. Except for a few indications in Nietzsche, and in Stirner, and a few others, Ibsen alone seems to have grasped the principle of the Kantian ethics (notably in " Brand " and " Peer Gvnt "). The following two quotations also give the Kantian view in a general way :
First Nebbel's epigram, " Lies and Truth. "
" Which do you pay dearer for, lies or the truth ? The former costs you yourself, the latter at most your happiness. " )
Next, the well-known words of Sleika from the "Wes- to? stlichen Diwan " :
(All sorts go to make a world,
The crowd and the rogue and the hero; But the highest fortune of earth's children Is always in their own personality.
It matters little how a man lives
If only he is true to himself;
It matters nothing what a man may lose If he remains what he really is. )
It is certainly true that most men need some kind of a God. A few, and they are the men of genius, do not bow to an alien law. The rest try to justify their doings and misdoings, their thinking and existence (at least the mental side of it), to some one else, whether it be the personal God of the Jews, or a beloved, respected, and revered human being. Itisonlyinthiswaythattheycanbringtheirlives under the social law.
--
? LOGIC, ETHICS AND THE EGO i6i
Kant was permeated with his conviction, as is con- spicuous in the minutest details of his chosen Hfe-work, that man was responsible only to himself, to such an extent that he regarded this side of his theory as self- evidentandleastlikelytobedisputed. ThissilenceofKant has brought about a misunderstanding of his ethics--the only ethics tenable from the psychologically introspective standpoint, the only system according to which the insistent strong inner voice of the one is to be heard through the noise of the many.
I gather from a passage in his " Anthropology " that even in the case of Kant some incident in his actual earthly life precededthe"formationofhischaracter. " Thebirthof the Kantian ethics, the noblest event in the history of the world, was the moment when for the first time the dazzling awful conception came to him, " I am responsible only to myself ; I must follow none other ; I must not forget myselfevenin mywork; I amalone; I amfree; I amlord of myself. " ;
" Two things fill my mind with ever renewed wonder and awe the more often and the deeper I dwell on them thestarryvaultabovemeandthemorallawwithinme. I must not look on them both as veiled in mystery or think that their majesty places them beyond me. I see them before me, and they are part of the consciousness of my existence. The first arises from my position in the outer world of the senses, and links me with the immeasurable space in which worlds and worlds and systems and systems, although in immeasurable time, have their ebbs and flows, their beginnings and ends. The second arises from my invisible self, my personality, and places me in a world that has true infinity, but which is evident only to the reason and with which I recognise myself as being bound, not accidentally as in the other case but in a universal and necessary union. On the one hand, the consciousness of an endless series of worlds destroys my sense of importance, making me only one of the animal creatures which must
return its substance again to the planet (that, too, being nc L
\rhus he becomes one and all ; he has the law in him, and so he himself is the law, and no mere changing caprice. The desire is in him to be only the law, to be the law that is ihimself, without afterthought or forethought. This is the awful conclusion, he has no longer the sense that there can be duty for him. Nothing is superior to him, to the isolated absolute unity. But there are no alternatives for him ; he must respond to his own categorical imperatives, absolutely, impartially. " Freedom," he cries (for instance, Wagner, or Schopenhauer), " rest, peace from the enemy peace,notthisendlessstriving ;
" and he is terrified. Even in this wish for freedom there is cowardice ; in the igno- minious lament there is desertion as if he were too small for the fight. What is the use of it all, he cries to the
universe ; and is at once ashamed, for he is demanding happiness, and that his own burden should rest on other shoulders. Kant's lonely man does not dance or laugh he neither brawls nor makes merry ; he feels no need to make a noise, because the universe is so silent around him. To acquiesce in his loneliness is the splendid supremacy of the Kantian. )
;;
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more than a point in space) from whence it came, after having been in some unknown way endowed with life for a brief space. The second point of view enhances my im- portance, makes me an intelHgence, infinite and uncon- ditioned through my personaHty, the moral law in which separates me from the animals and from the world of sense, removes me from the limits of time and space, and links me with infinity. "
The secret of the critique of practical reason is that man is alone in the world, in tremendous eternal isolation.
He has no object outside himself ; lives for nothing else ;
he is far removed from being the slave of his wishes, of his abilities, of his necessities ; he stands far above social ethics ; he is alone.
? CHAPTER VIII
THE "I" PROBLEM AND GENIUS
? ' In the beginning the world was nothing but the Atman, in the form of a man. It looked around and saw nothing different to itself. Then it cried out once,
Itis L' Thatis howtheword' I' cameto be. That is why even at the present day, if any one is called, he answers, 'It is I,' and then recalls his other name, the one he bears. "--(Brihadaranyata-Upanishad. )
Many disputations about principles in psychology arise from individual characterological differences in the dis- putants. Thus, in the mode that I have already suggested, charactero)ogy might play an important part.
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other words, to Eckermann (February 14, 1829) lead to the demand for immortality. The strongest craving for immortality is possessed by the genius, and this is explained by all the other facts which have been discussed as to his nature.
Memoryonlyfullyvanquishestimewhenit appearsina universal form, as in universal men.
The genius is thus the only timeless man--at least, this and nothing else is his ideal of himself ; he is, as is proved by his passionate and urgent desire for immortality, just the man with the strongest demand for timeiessness, with the greatest desire for value. *
<And now we are face to face with an almost astonishing coincidence. Thetimeiessnessofthegeniuswillnotonly be manifest in relation to the single moments of his life, but also in his relation to what is known as " his generation," or, in a narrower sense, " his time. " As a matter of fact, he has no relations at all with it. The age does not create the genius it requires. The genius is not the product of his age, is not to be explained by it, and we do him no honour if we attempt to account for him by it. )
Carlyle justly noted how many epochs had called for great men, how badly they had needed them, and how they still did not obtain them.
The coming of genius remains a mystery, and men reverently abandon their efforts to explain it. And as the causes of its appearance do not lie in any one age, so also the consequences are not limited by time. The achieve- ments of genius live for ever, and time cannot change them, By his works a man of genius is granted immortality on the earth, and thus in a threefold manner he has transcended time. His universal comprehension and memory forbid the annihilation of his experiences with the passing of the
* It is often a cause for astonishment that men with quite ordi- nary, even vulgar, natures experience no fear of death. But it is quite explicable : it is not the fear of death which creates the desire for immortality, but the desire for immortality which causes fear of death.
? TALENT AND MEMORY
moment in which each occurred ; his birth is independent of his age, and his work never dies.
Here is the best place to consider a question which, strangely enough, appears to have received no attention. The question is, if there be anything akin to genius in the world of animals and plants ? Although it must be admitted that exceptional forms occur amongst animals and plants, these cannot be regarded as coming under our definition of genius. Talent may exist amongst them as amongst men below the standard of genius. But the special gift, what Moreau, Lombroso, and others have called the"divinespark,"wemustdenytoanimals. Thislimita- tion is not jealousy nor the anxious guarding of a privilege, but is founded on good grounds.
Is there anything unexplained by the assumption that the first appearance of genius was in man ! In the first place, it is because of this that the human race has an objective mind; inotherwords,thatmanistheonlyorganismwitha history.
^The history of the human race (naturally I mean the history of its mind and not merely of its wars) is readily intelligible on the theory of the appearance of genius, and of the imitation by the more monkey-like individuals of the conductofthosewithgenius. Thechiefstages,nodoubt, were house-building, agriculture, and, above all, speech. Every single word has been the invention of a single man, as, indeed, we still see, if we leave out of consideration the merely technical terms. How else could language have
arisen ? The earliest words were " onomatopoetic " sound similar to the exciting cause was evolved almost without the will of the speaker, in direct response to the sensuousstimulation. Alltheotherwordswereoriginally metaphors, or comparisons, a kind of primitive poetry, for all prose has come from poetry, f Many, perhaps the majority of the greatest geniuses, have remained unknown. Think of the proverbs, now almost commonplaces, such as " one good turn deserves another. " These were said for the first time by some great man. How many quotations
137
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a
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from the classics, or sayings of Christ, have passed into the common language, so that we have to think twice before we can remember who were the authors of them. Language is as little the work of the multitude as our ballads. Every form of speech owes much that is not acknowledged to individualsofanotherlanguage. Becauseoftheuniversality of genius, the words and phrases that he invents are useful not only to those who use the language in which he wrote them. /A nation orients itself by its own geniuses, and derives from them its ideas of its own ideals, but the guiding starservesalsoasalighttoothernations. Asspeechhas been created by a few great men, the most extraordinary wisdom lies concealed in it, a wisdom which reveals itself to a few ardent explorers but which is usually overlooked by the stupid professional philologists. ^
The genius is not a critic of language, but its creator, as he is the creator of all the mental achievements which are the material of culture and which make up the objective mind,thespiritofthepeoples. The"timeless"menare those who make history, for history can be made only by those who are not floating with the stream. It is only those who are unconditioned by time who have real value, and whose productions have an enduring force. And the events that become forces of culture become so only because they have an enduring value.
If we make a criterion of genius the exhibition of this threefold " timelessness " we shall have a measure by which itiseasytotestallclaimants. LombrosoandTu? rckhave expanded the popular view which ascribes genius to all whose intellectual or practical achievements are much above the average. Kant and Schelling have insisted on the more exclusive doctrine that genius can be predicated only of the great creative artists. The truth probably lies between the two. I am inclined to think that only great artists and great philosophers (amongst the latter, I include, above all, the great religious teachers) have proved a claim to genius. Neither the " man of action " nor " the man of science " has any claim.
? TALENT AND MEMORY
Men of action, famous politicians and generals, may possess a few traits resembling genius (particularly a specially good knowledge of men and an enormous capacity for remembering people). The psychology of such traits will be dealt with later ; they are confused with genius only by those whom the externals of greatness dazzle. The man of genius almost typically renounces such external greatness becauseoftherealgreatnesswithinhim. Thereallygreat man has the strongest sense of values ; the distinguished general is absorbed by the desire for power. The former seeks to link power with real value ; the latter desires that power itself should be valued. Great generals and great politicians, like the bird Phoenix, are born out of fiery chaos and like it disappear again in chaos. The great emperor or the great demagogue is the only man who lives entirely in the present ; he does not dream of a more beautiful, better future ; his mind does not dwell on his own past which has already passed, and so in the two ways most possible to man, he does not transcend time, but lives only in the moment. The great genius does not let his work be determined by the concrete finite conditions that surround him, whilst it is from these that the work of the statesman takes its direction and its termination. And so the great
emperor is no more than a phenomenon of nature, whereas the genius is outside nature and is an incorporation of the mind. Theworksofmenofactioncrumbleatthedeathof their authors, if indeed they have not already decayed, or they survive only a brief time leaving no traces behind them except what the chronicles record as having been done and later undone. The emperor creates no works that survive time, passing into eternity ; such creations come from genius. It is the genius in reality and not the other who is the creator of history, for it is only the genius who is outside and unconditioned by history. The great man has a history, the emperor is only a part of history. The great man transcends time ; time creates and time destroys the emperor.
The great man of science, unless he is also a philosopher
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140
(I think of such names as Newton and Gauss, Linnasus and Darwin, Copernicus and GaHleo), deserves the title of genius as little as the man of action. Men of science are
not universal ; they deal only with a branch or branches of knowledge. Thisisnotdue,asissometimessaid,merelyto the extreme modern specialisation that makes it impossible tomastereverything. Eveninthenineteenthandtwentieth centuries there are still amongst the learned men individuals with a knowledge as many-sided as that of Aristotle or
Leibnitz ; the names of von Humboldt and William Wundt atoncecometomymind. Theabsenceofgeniuscomes from something much more deeply seated in the men of science, and in science itself, from a cause which I shall explain in the eighth chapter. Probably some one may be disposed to argue that if even the most distinguished men of science have not a knowledge so universal as that of the philosopher, there are some who stand on the outermost fringes of philosophy, and to whom it is yet difficult to deny the word genius. I think of such men as Fichte, Schleier- macher, Carlyle, and Nietzsche. Which of the merely scientitic has felt in himself an unconditioned comprehen- sion of all men and of all things, or even the capacity to verify any single thing in his mind and by his mind ? On
the contrary, has not the whole history of the science of the last thousand years been directed against this ? This is the reasonwhymenofsciencearenecessarilyone-sided. No man of science, unless he is also a philosopher, however eminent his achievements, has that continuous unforgetting life that the genius exhibits, and this is because of his want of universality.
finally, it is to be observed that the investigations of the scientific are always in definite relation to the knowledge of theirday. Thescientificmantakespossessionofadefinite store of experimental or observed knowledge, increases or altersitmoreorless,andthenhandsiton. Andmuchwill be taken away from his achievements, much will silently disappear ; his treatises may make a brave show in the libraries, but they cease to be actively alive. On the other
? TALENT AND MEMORY 141
hand, we can ascribe to the work of the great philosopher, as to that of the great artist, an imperishable, unchangeable presentation of the world, not disappearing with time, and which, because it was the expression of a great mind, will always find a school of men to adhere to it. There still exist disciples of Plato and Aristotle, of Spinoza and Berkeley and Bruno, but there are now none who denote them- selves as followers of Galileo or Helmholtz, of Ptolemy or Copernicus. It is a misuse of terms, due to erroneous ideas, to speak of the " classics " of science or of pedagogy in the sense that we speak of the classics of philosophy and art. ^
The great philosopher bears the name of genius deservedly and with honour. And if it will always be the greatest pain to the philosopher that he is not an artist, so the artist envies the philosopher his tenacious and controlled strength of systematic thought, and it is not surprising that the artist has taken pleasure in depicting Prometheus and Faust, Prospera and Cyprian, Paul the Apostle and II Penseroso. The philo- sopher and the artist are alternate sides of one another.
We must not be too lavish in attributing genius to those who are philosophers or we shall not escape the reproach of being merely partisans of philosophy against science. Such a partisanship is foreign to my purpose, and, I hope, to this book, ^t would only be absurd to discuss the claims to genius of such men as Anaxagoras, Geulincx, Baader, or
Emerson. I deny genius either to such unoriginally pro- found writers as Angelus Silesius, Philo and Jacobi, or to original yet superficial persons such as Comte Feuerbach, Hume,Herbart,Locke,andKarneades. Thehistoryofart is equally full of preposterous valuations, whilst, on the other hand, the history of science is extremely free from false estimations. / The history of science busies itself very little with the biographies of its protagonists ; its object is a system of objective, collective knowledge in which the individual is swept away. The service of science demands the greatest sacrifice, for in it the individual human being renounces all claim to eternity as such.
? CHAPTER VI
MEMORY, LOGIC, AND ETHICS
The title that I have given to this chapter at once opens the way to misinterpretation. It might appear as if the author supported the view that logical and ethical values were the objects exclusively of empirical psychology, psychical phenomena, like perception and sensation, and that logic and ethics, therefore, were subsections of psychology and
based upon psychology.
I declare at once that I call this view, the so-called psy-
chologismus, at once false and injurious. It is false because it can lead to nothing ; and injurious because, while it hardly touches logic and ethics, it overthrows psychology itself. The exclusion of logic and ethics from the foun- dations of psychology, and the insertion of them in an appendix, is one of the results of the overgrowth of the doctrine of empirical perception, of that strange heap of dead, fleshless bones which is known as empirical psycho- logy, and from which all real experience has been excluded. I have nothing to do with the empirical school, and in this matter lean towards the transcendentalism of Kant.
As the object of my work, however, is to discover the differences between different members of humanity, and not to discuss categories that would hold good for the angels in heaven, I shall not follow Kant closely, but remain more directly in psychological paths.
The justification of the title of this chapter must be reached along other Unes. The tedious, because entirely new, demonstration of the earlier part of my work has shown that the human memory stands in intimate relation
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145
with things hitherto supDOsed unconnected with it--such things as time, value, genius, immortality. I have attempted to show that memory stands in intimate connection with all these. There must be some strong reason for the complete absence of earlier allusions to this side of the subject. I believe the reason to be no more than the inadequacy and slovenliness which hitherto have spoiled theories of memory.
I must here call attention to a theory first propounded by Charles Bonnet in the middle of the eighteenth century and towards the end of the nineteenth century, specially insisted uponbyEwaldHeringandE. Mach. Thistheoryregarded the human memory as being only a special case of a pro- perty common to all organised matter, the property that makes the path of new stimuli rather easier if these resemble stimuli that have acted at some former time. The theory really makes the human memory an adaptation in the sense of Lamarck, the result on the living organism of repeated stimulation. It is true that there is a point in common between the human memory and the increase of sensitiveness caused by the repeated application of a stimu- lus ; that identical element consists in the permanence of the effect of the first stimulation. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the growth of a muscle
that is much used or the adaptation of the eater of arsenic or morphia to increased doses, and the recollection of past experiencesbyhumanbeings. Intheonecasethetraceof the old is just to be felt in the new stimulation ; in the other case, by means of the consciousness, the old situations are actuallyreproducedwithalltheirindividuation. Theiden- tification of the two is so superficial that it is a waste of time to dwell longer on it.
The doctrine of association as the theory of memory is linked with the foregoing physiological theory as a matter of history, through Hartley, and, as a matter of fact, becausetheideaofhabitissharedbythetwo. Theasso- ciation theory attributes memory to the mechanical play of the linking of presentations according to four laws. It
? SEX AND CHARACTER
overlooks the fact that memory (the continuous memory of man) is a function of the will. I can remember a thing if I really will. In the case of hypnosis, when the recollec- tion of all that has been forgotten is induced, an outside will replaces the will of the subject. It is will that sets in action the chains of association, and we have to deal here with something deeper than a mechanical principle.
In the association psychology, which first splits up the psychic life, and then vainly imagines that it can weld the re-assorted pieces together again, there is another confusion, the confusion between memory and recollection, which has persisted in spite of the well-founded objections of Avenarius and von Ho? ffding. The recognition of a circum- stance does not necessarily involve the special reproduction of the former impression, even although there seems to be a tendency for the new impression, at least, partly to recall the old one. But there is another kind of recognition, perhaps as common, in which the new impression does not appear to be directly linked with an association, but in which it comes, so to speak, "coloured" (James would say "tinged") with that character that would be called by von Ho? ffding the "familiarity quality. " To him who returns to his native place the roads and streets seem familiar, even although he has forgotten the names, has to ask his way, and can think of no special occasion on which he went along them. A melodymayseem"familiar"andyetI maybeunableto say where I heard it. /The " character " (in the sense of Avenarius) of familiarity, of intimacy, hovers over the sense- impression itself, and analysis can detect no associations, none of the fusing of the old and new, which, according to the assertion of a presumptuous pseudo-psychology, produces the feeling ; these cases are quite easy to distinguish from cases in which there is a real although vague association with an older experience in henid formj
In individual psychology this distinction is of great importance. Inthehighesttypesofmankindtheconscious- ness of the continuous past is present in so active a form that the moment such a one sees a acquaintance in the
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street he is at once able to reproduce the last meeting as a complete experience, whereas in the case of the less gifted person, the feeling of familiarity that makes recognition possible, occurs when he is able to recall the past connection in all its details.
If we now, in conclusion, ask whether or no other animals than man possess a similar faculty for remembering and reviving their earlier lives in their entirety it is most probable that the answer must be in the negative. Animals could not, as they do, remain for hours at a time, motionless and peaceful on one spot, if they were capable of thinking of the future or of remembering the past. Animals have the feeling of familiarity and the sense of expectation (as we find from the recognition of his master by a dog after twenty years' absence); buttheypossessnomemoryandnohope. They are capable of recognition through the sense of familiarity, but they have no memory.
As memory has been shown to be a special character unconnected with the lower spheres of psychical life, and the exclusive property of human beings, it is not surprising that it is closely related to such higher things as the idea of value and of time, and the craving for immortality, which is absent in animals, and possible to men only in so far as they possess the quality of genius. If memory be an essen- tially human thing, part of the deepest being of humanity, finding expression in mankind's most peculiar qualities, then it will not be surprising if memory be also related to the phenomena of logic and ethics. I have now to explore this relationship.
I may set out from the old proverb that liars have bad memories. It is certain that the pathological liar has prac- tically no memory. About male liars I shall have more to say ; they are not common, however. But if we remember what was said as to the absence of memory amongst women we shall not be surprised at the existence of the numerous proverbs and common sayings about the untruthfulness of women. It is evident that a being whose memory is very, slight, and who can recall only in the most imperfect fashion
K
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\vhat it has said or done, or suffered, must lie easily if it has the gift of speech. The impulse to untruthfulness will be hard to resist if there is a practical object to be gained, and if the influence that comes from a full conscious reality of the past be not present. The impulse to lie is stronger in woman, because, unlike that of man, her memory is not continuous, whilst her life is discrete, unconnected, dis- continuous, swayed by the sensations and perceptions of themomentinsteadofdominatingthem. Unlikeman,her experiences float past without being referred, so to speak, to a definite, permanent centre ; she does not feel herself, past and present, to be one and the same throughout all her life. It happens almost to every man that sometimes he
"does not understand himself"; indeed, wilh very many men, it happens (leaving out of the question the facts of psychical periodicity) that if they think over their pasts in their minds they find it very difficult to refer all the events to a single conscious personality ; they do not grasp how it could have been that they, being what they feel themselves at the time to be, could ever have done or felt or thought this, that, or the other. And yet in spite of the difficulty, they know that they had gone through these experiences. The feeling of identity in all circumstances of life is quite wanting in the true woman, because her memory, even if exceptionallygood,isdevoidofcontinuity. Theconscious- ness of identity of the male, even although he may fail to understand his own past, manifests itself in the very desire to understand that past. Women, if they look back on their earlier lives, never understand themselves, and do not even wish to understand themselves, and this reveals itself in the scanty interest they give to the attempts of man to understand them, u he woman does not interest herself about herself, and hence there have been no female psychologists, no psychology of women written by a woman, and she is incapable of grasping the anxious desire of the man to understand the beginning, middle, and end of his individual
life in their relation to each other, and to interpret the whole as a continual, logical, necessary sequence. )
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At this point there is a natural transition to logic. A creature like woman, the absolute woman, who is not con- scious of her own identity at different stages of her life, has no evidence of the identity of the subject-matter of thought at different times. \If in her mind the two stages of a change cannot be present simultaneously by means of memory, it is impossible for her to make the comparison and note the change. ) A being whose memory is never sufficiently good as to make it psychologically possible to perceive identity through the lapse of time, so as to enable her, for instance, to pursue a quantity through a long mathematical reckoning
;
such a creature in the extreme case would be unable to control her memory for even the moment of time required to say that A will be still A in the next moment, to pronounce judgment on the identity A=A, or on the opposite propo- sition that A is not equal to A, for that proposition also requires a continuous memory of A to make the comparison possible.
I have been making no mere joke, no facetious sophism or paradoxical proposition. I assert that the judgment of identity depends on conceptions, never on mere perceptions and complexes of perceptions, and the conceptions, as logical conceptions, are independent of time, retaining their constancy, whether I, as a psychological entity, think them constant or not. But man never has a conception in the purely logical form, for he is a psychological being, affected by the condition of sensations ; he is able only to form a general idea (a typical, connotative, representative concep- tion) out of his individual experiences by a reciprocal effacing of the differences and strengthening of the simi- larities, thus, however, very closely approximating to an abstract conception, and in a most wonderful fashion using it as such. He must also be able to preserve this idea which he thinks clear, although in reality it is confused, and it is memory alone that brings about the possibility of that Were he deprived of memory he would lose the possibility of thinking logically, for this possibility is incarnated, so to speak, only in a psychological medium.
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Memory, then, is a necessary part of the logical faculty. The propositions of logic are not conditioned by the exist- ence of memory, but only the power to use them. The proposition A=A must have a psychological relation to time, otherwise it would be Ati = At2. Of course this is not the case in pure logic, but man has no special faculty of pure logic, and must act as a psychological being.
I have already shown that the continuous memory is the vanquisher of time, and, indeed, is necessary even for the ideaoftimetobeformed. Andsothecontinuousmemory is the psychological expression of the logical proposition of identity. The absolute woman, in whom memory is absent, cannot take the proposition of identity, or its contradictory, or the exclusion of the alternative, as axiomatic.
Besides these three conditions of logical thought, the fourth condition, the containing of the conclusion in the major premiss, is possible only through memory. That proposition is the groundwork of the syllogism. The pre- misses psychologically precede the conclusion, and must be retained by the thinking person whilst the minor premiss appliesthelawofidentityorofnon-identity. Thegrounds for the conclusion must lie in the past. And for this reason continuity which dominates the mental processes of man is bound up with causality. Every psychological application of the relation of a conclusion to its premisses implies the continuity of memory to guarantee the identity of the propo- sitions. As woman has no continuous memory she can have no principium rationis sufficientis.
And so it appears that woman is without logic.
George Simmel has held this familiar statement to be erroneous, inasmuch as women have been known to draw conclusionswiththestrongestconsistency. Thatawoman in a concrete case can unrelentingly pursue a given course at the stimulation of some object is no more a proof that she understands the syllogism, than is her habit of perpetually recurring to disproved arguments a proof that the law of identity is an axiom for her. ^he point at issue is whether or no they recognise the logical axioms as the criteria of
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the validity of their thoughts, as the directors of their process of thinking, whether they make or do not make these the rule of conduct and the principle of judgment. A woman cannot grasp that one must act from principle ; as she has no continuity she does not experience the necessity for logical support of her mental processes. Hence the ease withwhichwomenassumeopinions. Ifawomangivesvent to an opinion, or statement, and a man is so foolish as to take it seriously and to ask her for the proof of it, she regards the request as unkind and offensive, and as impugninghercharacter. Amanfeelsashamedofhimself, feels himself guilty if he has neglected to verify a thought, whether or no that thought has been uttered by him ; he feels the obligation to keep to the logical standard which he has set up for himself. Woman resents any attempt to require from her that her thoughts should be logical. <^he may be regarded as " logically insane. "/
The most common defect which one could discover in the conversation of a woman, if one really wished to apply to it the standard of logic (a feat that man habitually shuns, so showing his contempt for a woman's logic) is the quaternio terminorum, that form of equivocation which is the result of an incapacity to retain definite presentations; in other words, the result of a failure to grasp the law of identity. Woman is unaware of this ; she does not realise the law nor make it a criterionofthought. <^Manfeelshimselfboundtologic; the woman is without this feeling. It is only this feeling of guilt that guarantees man's efforts to think logically. Probably the most profound saying of Descartes, and yet one that has been widely misunderstood, is that all errors are crimes)
(The source of all error in life is failure of memory. Thus logic and ethics, both of which deal with the furtherance of truth and join in its highest service, are dependent on memory.
The conception dawns on us that Plato was not so far wrong when he connected discernment with memory. Memory, it is true, is not a logical and ethical act, but it is a
logical and ethical phenomenon) <^A man who has had a vivid and deep perception regards it as a fault, if some half-
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hour afterwards he is thinking of something different, even ifexternalinfluenceshaveintervened. Amanthinkshim- self unconscientious and blameworthy if he notices that he has not thought of a particular portion of his life for a long time. Memory, moreover, is linked with morality, because itisonlythroughmemorythatrepentanceispossible. All forgetfulness is in itself immoral. And so reverence ps a moral exercise ; it is a duty to forget nothing, and for this reason we should reverence the dead. ) Equally from logical and ethical motives, man tries to carry logic into his past, in
order that past and present may become one.
\It is with something of a shock that we realise here*that we approach the deep connection between logic and ethics, long ago suggested by Socrates and Plato, discovered anew
by Kant and Fichte, but lost sight of by living workers.
A creature that cannot grasp the mutual exclusiveness of A and not A has no difficulty in lying ; more than that, such a creature has not even any consciousness of lying, being without a standard of truth. Such a creature if endowed with speech will lie without knowing it, without the possibility of knowing it; Veritas norma sui et falsa est. There is nothing more upsetting to a man than to find, when he has discovered a woman in a lie, and has asked her, " Why did you lie about it ? " that she simply does not understand the question, but simply looks at him and
laughingly tries to soothe him, or bursts into tearsi
The subject does not end with the part played by memory. Lyingiscommonenoughamongstmen. Andliescanbe told in spite of a full remembrance of the subject which for some purpose some one wishes to be informed about. Indeed, it might almost be said that the only persons who can lie are those who misrepresent facts in spite of a
superior knowledge and consciousness of them.
-(Truth must first be regarded as the real value of logic and ethics before it is correct to speak of deviations from truth for special motives as lies from the moral point of view. Those who have not this high conception should be adjudged as guilty rather of vagueness and exaggeration
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than of lying : they are not immoral but non-moral. And in this sense the woman is non-moral. )
The root of such an absolute misconception of truth must lie deep. The continuous memory against which alone a man can be false, is not the real source of the effort for truth, the desire for truth, the basal ethical-logical phenomenon, but only stands in intimate relation with it,
(That which enables man to have a real relation to truth and which removes his temptation to lie, must be some- thing independent of all time, something absolutely unchangeable, which as faithfully reproduces the old as if it were new, because it is permanent itself ; it can only be that source in which all discrete experiences unite and which creates from the first a continuous existence. It is what produces the feehng of responsibility which oppresses all men, young and old, as to their actions, which makes them know that they are responsible, which leads to the phenomena of repentance and consciousness of sin, which calls to account before an eternal and ever present self things that are long past, its judgment being subtler and more comprehensive than that of any court of law or of the laws of society, and which is exerted by the individual him- self quite independently of all social codes (so condemning the moral psychology which would derive morality from the social life of man). Society recognises the idea of illegality, but not of sin ; it presses for punishment without wishing to produce repentance ; lying is punished by the law only in its ceremonious form of perjury, and error has never been placed under its ban. ) Social ethics with its conception of duty to our neighbour and to society, and
practical exclusion from consideration of the other fifteen
hundred million human beings, cannot extend the realm of morality, when it begins by limiting it in this arbitrary fashion.
What is this " centre of apperception " that is superior to time and change ?
It can be nothing less than what raises man above himself (as a part of the world of sense) which joins him to an
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order of things that only the reason can grasp, and that puts the whole world of sense at his feet. It is nothing else than personality.
The most sublime book in the world, the " Criticism of Practical Reason," has referred morality to an intelli. ^ent ego,distinctfromallempiricalconsciousness. Imustnow turn to that side of my subject.
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(PAVID Hume is well known to have abolished the concep- tion of the ego by seeing in it only a bundle of different perceptionsincontinualebbandflow. Howevercompletely Hume thought himself to have compromised the ego, at least he explained his view relatively moderately. He proposed to say nothing about a few metaphysicians who appeared to rejoice in another kind of ego ; for himself he was quite certain that he had none, and he dared to suppose that the majority of mankind, leaving the few peculiar metaphysicians out of the question, were, like himself, mere bundles. So the polite man expressed himself. In the next chapter I shall show how his irony recoils on himself. That his view became so famous depends partly on the over-estimation in which Hume is held and which is largely
due to Kant. Hume was a most distinguished empirical psychologist, but he cannot be regarded as a genius, the popular view notwithstanding. ) It is not very much to be the first of English philosophers, but Hume has not even a claim to that position. I do not think that Kant would have given so much praise to Hume if he had been fully acquainted with all Hume's work and not merely with the " Enquiry," as he certainly rejected the position of Spinoza, according to which men were not " substances," but merely accidents.
-Lichtenberg, who took the field against the ego later than Hume, was still bolder. He is the philosopher of imperson- ality, and calmly corrects the conversational " I think" mto
an actual " it thinks "
;
he regards the ego as a creation of
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the grammarian. In this Hume had anticipated him, inas- much as he also had declared, at the end of his analysis, all disputes as to the identity of the person to be merely a battle of words. )
E. Mach has recently represented the universe as a coherent mass, and the egos as points in which the coherent mass has greater consistency. The only realities are the perceptions, which are connected in one individual strongly, but which are weaker in another individual who is thus differentiated from the first.
The contents of the perceptions are the realities, and they persist externally to the worthless personal recollections. The ego is not a real but only a practical entity and cannot be isolated, and, therefore, the idea of individual immortality must be rejected. None the less the idea of an ego is not wholly to be rejected ; here and there, as, for instance, in Darwin's struggle for existence, it appears to have some validity.
It is extraordinary how an investigator who has accom- plished so much, not only as a historian of his special branch and as a critic of ideas, but who is also fully equipped with knowledge of biology, should have paid no heed to the fact that every organic being is indivisible from the first, and is not composed of anything like atoms, monads, &c. The first distinctive mark of the living as opposed to inorganic matter is that the former is always differentiated into dissimilar, mutually dependent parts, and is not homogeneous like a crystal. And so it should have been borne in mind that it was at least possible that individuation>> the fact that organic beings are not united, like Siamese twins, would prove to have importance in psychical matters, and the ego, therefore, was more than Mach's idea of it as a mere waiting-hall of perceptions.
It may be that there exists a psychical correlation even amongst animals. Everythmg that an animal feels and perceives has a different " note " or " colour " in every individual. Thisindividualqualityisnotonlycharacteristic of the class, genus, species, race, and family, but also is
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different in every individual of the same family, &c. The idioplasm is the physiological equivalent of this specific individual quality of the sensations and perceptions, and there are reasons analogous with those in favour of the supposition of an idioplasm for the supposition of an individual character amongst animals. The sportsman who has to do with dogs, the trainer with horses, and the keeper with animals will readily admit the existence of this individualityasaconstantelement. Itisclearthatwehave to do here with something more than a mere rendezvous of perceptions.
But even if this psychical analogue of the idioplasm were proved to exist in the case of animals, it could not be ranked with the intelligible character, the existence of which in any living creature except man cannot be maintained. The intelligible character of men, their individuation, has the same relation to empirical character that memory has tothesimplepowerofrecognition. Andfinallywecome to identity, by which the structure, form, law, and cosmos persist even through the change of contents. \The conside- rations from which is drawn the proof of the existence in man of such a noumenal, trans-empirical subject must now be stated briefly. / They come from logic and ethics.
Logic deals with the true significance of the principle of identity (also with that of contradiction ; the exact relation of these two, and the various modes of stating it are con- troversialmattersoutsidethepresentsubject). Thepropo- sition A = A is axiomatic and self-evident. It is the primi- tive measure of truth for all other propositions ; however much we may think over it we must return to this funda- mental proposition. It is the principle of the distinction betweentruthanderror; andhewhoregardsitasmeaning- less tautology, as was the case with Hegel and many of the later empiricists (this being not the only surprising point of contact between two schools apparently so different) is right in a fashion, but has misunderstood the nature of the proposition. A=A,theprincipleofalltruth,cannotitself be a special truth. He who finds the proposition of identity
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or that of non-identity meaningless does so by his own fault. He must have expected to find in these propositions special ideas, a source of positive knowledge. ''^But they are not in themselves knowledge, separate acts of thought, but the common standard for all acts of thought^ And so they cannot be compared with other acts of thought. <(The rule of the process of thought must be outside thought. The proposition of identity does not add to our knowledge ;
it does not increase but rather founds a kingdom. The proposition of identity is either meaningless or means everything. Upon what do the propositions of identity and of non-identity depend ? The common view is that theyarejudgments. Sigwart,forinstance,whohasrecently discussed the matter, puts it as follows : The two judgments A is B and A is not B cannot be true at the same time because the judgment "An unlearned man is learned" would involve a contradiction because the predicate "learned" is affirmed of a subject of which the judg- ment has been made implicitly that he is unlearned, so that in reality two judgments are made, X is learned and
Xisunlearned. The"psychologismus"ofthismethodof argument is plain. It has recourse to a temporary judg- ment preceding the formation of the conception "unlearned man. " Theproposition,however,AisnotAclaimsvalidity quite apart from the past, present, or future existence of other judgments. It depends on the conception " unlearned man. " It makes the conception more certain by excluding
contradictory instances.
^ This, then, gives us the true function of the principles of
identityandnon-identity. Theyarematerialsforconcep- tions^
This function concerns only logical conceptions, but not what have been called psychological conceptions. The conception is always represented psychologically by a generalisation ; and this presentation in a certain fashion is included in the conception. The generalisation represents the conception psychologically, but is not identical with it.
It can, so to speak, be richer (as when I think of a triangle)
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or it can be poorer (the conception of a lion contains more than my generaUsation of Hons). The logical conception is the plumb-line which the attention tries to follow ; it is the goal and pole-star of the psychological generalisation. \Pure logical thought cannot occur in the case of men
;
it would be an attribute of deity. A human being must always think partly psychologically because he possesses not only reason but also senses, and his thought cannot free itself from temporal experiences but must remain bound by them. Logic, however, is the supreme standard by which the individual can test his own psychological ideas and those of others. When two men are discussing anything it is the conception and not the varying individual pre- sentations of it that they aim at. ) The conception, then, is the standard of value for the individual presentations. The
mode in which the psychological generalisation comes into existence is quite independent of the conception and has no significance in respect to it. The logical character which invests the conception with dignity and power is not derived from experience, for experience can give only vague and wavering generalisations. Absolute constancy and absolute coherence which cannot come from ex-
perience are the essence of the conception of that power concealed in the depths of the human mind whose handi- work we try hard but in vain to see in nature. Concep- tions are the only true realities, and the conception is not in nature ; it is the rule of the essence not of the actual existence.
\When I enunciate the proposition A = A, the meaning of the proposition is not that a special individual A of experience or of thought is like itself. The judgment of identity does not depend on the existence of an A. It means only that if an A exists, or even if it does not exist, thenA=A. Somethingisposited,theexistenceofA=A whether or no A itself exists. It cannot be the result of experience, as Mill supposed, for it is independent of the
existence of A. But an existence has been posited ; it is not the existence of the object ; it must be the existence of
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the subject. "sThe reality of the existence is not in the first A or the second A, but in the simultaneous identity of the two. And so the proposition A = A is no other than the proposition " I am. "^
/From the psychological point of view, the real meaning oT^the proposition of identity is not so difficult to interpret. It is clear that to be able to say A = A, to establish the per- manence of the conception through the changes of ex- perience, there must be something unchangeable, and this can be only the subject. Were I part of the stream of change I could not verify that the A had remained unchanged, had remained itself. Were I part of the change, I could not recognise the change. Fichte was right when he stated that the existence of the ego was to be found concealed in pure logic, inasmuch as the ego is
the condition of intelligible existence.
/ The logical axioms are the principle of all truth. These I posit an existence towards which all cognition serves. ) Logic is a law which must be obeyed, and man realises / himself only in so far as he is logical. He finds himself
j
in cognition. ^
\ All error must be felt to be crime. And so man must
not err. He must find the truth, and so he can find it. The duty of cognition involves the possibility of cognition, the freedom of thought, and the hope of ascertaining truth. In the fact that logic is the condition of the mind lies the proof that thought is free and can reach its goal.
O can treat ethics briefly and in another fashion, inas- much as what I have to say is founded on Kant's moral philosophy. Thedeepest,theintelligible,partofthenature of man is that part which does not take refuge in causality, but which chooses in freedom the good or the bad. ^ This is manifest in consciousness of sin and in repentance. No one has attempted to explain these facts otherwise ; and no one allows himself to be persuaded that he must commit this or that act. In the shall there lies the possibility of the can. The causal determining factors, the lower motives that act upon him, he is fully
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159 aware of, but he remains conscious of an intelligible ego
free to act in a different way from other egos.
Truth, purity, faithfulness, uprightness, with reference to oneself ; these give the only conceivable ethics. Duty is only duty to oneself, duty of the empirical ego to the intelligible ego. These appear in the form of two impera- tives that will always put to shame every kind of psycho- logismus--the logical law and the moral law. The internal direction, the categorical imperatives of logic and morality which dominate all the codes of social util'tarianism are factors that no empiricism can explain. All empiricism and scepticism, positivism and relativism, instinctively feel that their principal difficulties lie in logic and ethics. And so perpetually renewed and fruitless efforts are made to explain this inward discipline empirically and psychologi-
cally.
Logic and ethics are fundamentally the same, they are
no more than duty to oneself. They celebrate their union by the highest service of truth, which is overshadowed in the one case by error, in the other by untruth. <A11 ethics are possible only by the laws of logic, and logic is no more than the ethical side of law. Not only virtue, but also insight, not only sanctity but also wisdom, are the duties and tasks of mankind. Through the union of these alone comes perfection. \
Ethics, however, the laws of which are postulates, cannot bemadethebasisofalogicalproofofexistence. Ethicsare not logical in the same sense that logic is ethical. Logic proves the absolute actual existence of the ego ; ethics con- troltheformwhichtheactualityassumes. Ethicsdominate logic and make logic part of their contents.
In thinking of the famous passage in the "Critique of Practical Reason," where Kant introduces man as a part of the intelligible cosmos, it may be asked how Kant assured himself that the moral law was inherent in personality. The answer Kant gave was simply that no other and no nobler origin could be found for it. He goes no further than to say that the categorical imperative is the law of
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the noumenon, belonging to it and inherent in it from the beginning. That, however, is the nature of ethics. / Ethics make it possible for the intelligible ego to act free from the shackles of empiricism, and so through ethics, the existence of whose possibilities logic assures us, is able to become actual in all its purit3^|
There remains a most important point in which the Kantian system is often misunderstood. It reveals itself plainly in every case of wrong-doing.
Duty is only towards oneself ; Kant must have realised this in his earlier days when first he felt an impulse to lie. Except for a few indications in Nietzsche, and in Stirner, and a few others, Ibsen alone seems to have grasped the principle of the Kantian ethics (notably in " Brand " and " Peer Gvnt "). The following two quotations also give the Kantian view in a general way :
First Nebbel's epigram, " Lies and Truth. "
" Which do you pay dearer for, lies or the truth ? The former costs you yourself, the latter at most your happiness. " )
Next, the well-known words of Sleika from the "Wes- to? stlichen Diwan " :
(All sorts go to make a world,
The crowd and the rogue and the hero; But the highest fortune of earth's children Is always in their own personality.
It matters little how a man lives
If only he is true to himself;
It matters nothing what a man may lose If he remains what he really is. )
It is certainly true that most men need some kind of a God. A few, and they are the men of genius, do not bow to an alien law. The rest try to justify their doings and misdoings, their thinking and existence (at least the mental side of it), to some one else, whether it be the personal God of the Jews, or a beloved, respected, and revered human being. Itisonlyinthiswaythattheycanbringtheirlives under the social law.
--
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Kant was permeated with his conviction, as is con- spicuous in the minutest details of his chosen Hfe-work, that man was responsible only to himself, to such an extent that he regarded this side of his theory as self- evidentandleastlikelytobedisputed. ThissilenceofKant has brought about a misunderstanding of his ethics--the only ethics tenable from the psychologically introspective standpoint, the only system according to which the insistent strong inner voice of the one is to be heard through the noise of the many.
I gather from a passage in his " Anthropology " that even in the case of Kant some incident in his actual earthly life precededthe"formationofhischaracter. " Thebirthof the Kantian ethics, the noblest event in the history of the world, was the moment when for the first time the dazzling awful conception came to him, " I am responsible only to myself ; I must follow none other ; I must not forget myselfevenin mywork; I amalone; I amfree; I amlord of myself. " ;
" Two things fill my mind with ever renewed wonder and awe the more often and the deeper I dwell on them thestarryvaultabovemeandthemorallawwithinme. I must not look on them both as veiled in mystery or think that their majesty places them beyond me. I see them before me, and they are part of the consciousness of my existence. The first arises from my position in the outer world of the senses, and links me with the immeasurable space in which worlds and worlds and systems and systems, although in immeasurable time, have their ebbs and flows, their beginnings and ends. The second arises from my invisible self, my personality, and places me in a world that has true infinity, but which is evident only to the reason and with which I recognise myself as being bound, not accidentally as in the other case but in a universal and necessary union. On the one hand, the consciousness of an endless series of worlds destroys my sense of importance, making me only one of the animal creatures which must
return its substance again to the planet (that, too, being nc L
\rhus he becomes one and all ; he has the law in him, and so he himself is the law, and no mere changing caprice. The desire is in him to be only the law, to be the law that is ihimself, without afterthought or forethought. This is the awful conclusion, he has no longer the sense that there can be duty for him. Nothing is superior to him, to the isolated absolute unity. But there are no alternatives for him ; he must respond to his own categorical imperatives, absolutely, impartially. " Freedom," he cries (for instance, Wagner, or Schopenhauer), " rest, peace from the enemy peace,notthisendlessstriving ;
" and he is terrified. Even in this wish for freedom there is cowardice ; in the igno- minious lament there is desertion as if he were too small for the fight. What is the use of it all, he cries to the
universe ; and is at once ashamed, for he is demanding happiness, and that his own burden should rest on other shoulders. Kant's lonely man does not dance or laugh he neither brawls nor makes merry ; he feels no need to make a noise, because the universe is so silent around him. To acquiesce in his loneliness is the splendid supremacy of the Kantian. )
;;
? i62 SEX AND CHARACTER
more than a point in space) from whence it came, after having been in some unknown way endowed with life for a brief space. The second point of view enhances my im- portance, makes me an intelHgence, infinite and uncon- ditioned through my personaHty, the moral law in which separates me from the animals and from the world of sense, removes me from the limits of time and space, and links me with infinity. "
The secret of the critique of practical reason is that man is alone in the world, in tremendous eternal isolation.
He has no object outside himself ; lives for nothing else ;
he is far removed from being the slave of his wishes, of his abilities, of his necessities ; he stands far above social ethics ; he is alone.
? CHAPTER VIII
THE "I" PROBLEM AND GENIUS
? ' In the beginning the world was nothing but the Atman, in the form of a man. It looked around and saw nothing different to itself. Then it cried out once,
Itis L' Thatis howtheword' I' cameto be. That is why even at the present day, if any one is called, he answers, 'It is I,' and then recalls his other name, the one he bears. "--(Brihadaranyata-Upanishad. )
Many disputations about principles in psychology arise from individual characterological differences in the dis- putants. Thus, in the mode that I have already suggested, charactero)ogy might play an important part.
