No More Learning

He had hardly established his


## p. 372 (#408) ############################################

372
MUHAMMAD SHAH
authority in Afghanistan when the treachery of Shah Nawaz Khan,
governor of the Punjab, encouraged him to devise schemes of foreign
conquest.
Among the advisers of Shah Nawaz Khan was one Adina Beg
Khan, “a devil in human form”, who seems to have gone about
deliberately to ruin him. He reminded him that his elder brother,
whom he had ousted, was the minister's son-in-law as well as nephew,
and advised him, therefore, to come to terms with the Abdali. Shah
Nawaz Khan followed this advice and his unexpected advances were
welcomed by Ahmad Shah, who accepted his offers and concluded
an alliance. Adina Beg Khan then informed the minister Qamar-ud-
din Khan of this treasonable correspondence. The crafty minister mis-
led his nephew by suggesting that the emperor wished him to conquer
the provinces of Kabul, Kashmir, Sind and Multan, and to confer
the government of these provinces, as well as that of the Punjab, on
him. Shah Nawaz Khan now regretted his precipitancy and, acting
still on the advice of Adina Beg Khan, resolved to repudiate his
agreement. Ahmad Shah advanced to Peshawar and called on Shan
Nawaz Khan to permit him to pass freely through the Punjab and
to join him with his troops. Receiving a flat refusal Ahmad Shah
crossed the Indus with 30,000 horse and invaded the Punjab. Shah
Nawaz Khan entrenched himself before Lahore. Superstitious faith
in the warning of a darvish kept him inactive and his troops lost spirit.
An indecisive movement from his tent towards the city, which he
was persuaded might be a better defensive position than his entrenched
camp, was construed as an attempt at flight. Soon the whole army
was on its way to Delhi and Shah Nawaz Khan had no choice but
to accompany it. The Afghan and Qizilbash troops entered and sacked
the undefended city.
The emperor' and the courtiers, on learning that Ahmad Shah
Abdali had crossed the Indus, made preparations to resist the invader.
A large army was assembled under the nominal command of princa
Ahmad, the emperor's son, who was placed under the tutelage of
Sadat Khan, Zu-'l-fiqar Jang, and the great amirs. Safdar Jang,
-
Qamar-ud-din Khan, and others joined it with their contingents. On
this occasion many of the chiefs of Rajasthan assisted in the defence
of the empire.
The army left Delhi on 19 January, 1748, and marched through
Sirhind to Machiwara on the Sutlej. Meanwhile Ahmad Shah
Abdali had left Lahore and, marching by Ludhiana, avoided the
imperial army and occupied Sirhind, between it and Delhi, Sirhind
was plundered and all men bearing arms were put to the sword.
Prince Ahmad was thus forced to retrace his steps and near Sirhind,
as had now become usual with the demoralised forces of the emperor
of Delhi, he entrenched himself before an army greatly inferior in
numerical strength. Ahmad Shah Abdali's troops had captured part


## p. 373 (#409) ############################################

MUGHULS REPEL AHMAD SHAH
373
of the imperial train of artillery and had thus supplied themselves
with arms and munitions of which they stood much in need. The
imperial army, devoid of every military virtue, was besieged in its
entrenched camp from 15 March to 28 March and on 22 March the
death of Qamar-ud-din Khan, the minister, who was killed by a
gunshot while he was sitting at prayers in his tent, still further
discouraged the army and caused the desertion of all the Rajput
chiefs.
There still remained some able and brave officers in the army,
and Safdar Jang, with a useful force of Persian troops, and Mu'in-
ul-Mulk, son of the late minister, insisted on taking the field. After
three or four days of this desultory and indecisive fighting, operations
assumed a more serious character. Ahmad Shah Abdali led a deter-
mined attack on Mu'in-ul-Mulk, who opposed to it a resistance as
determined. Another attack was then led on the imperial centre, com-
manded by the prince, who was so hard pressed that Safdar Jang was
obliged to send some of his troops to his assistance. Safdar Jang then
advanced with his Persian troops on foot, preceded by his artillery
which kept up a continuous fire on the enemy, and attacked Ahmad
Shah Abdali. By great good fortune a rocket or some other missile
ignited the waggon-loads of rockets which the invaders had captured
and these exploded in all directions, causing many casualties among
the Afghan troops and throwing them into confusion. Many fled,
but Ahmad Shah Abdali contrived to hold his ground until the
evening, and during the night began his retreat towards Afghanistan.
The news of the victory was received with great joy in Delhi and
Mu'in-ul-Mulk was rewarded for his services with the government
of the Punjab and set out for Lahore, while the prince, Sadat Khan,
and Safdar Jang returned slowly towards Delhi.
Muhammad Shah had now fallen sick of dropsy and grew rapidly
worse. Feeling his end approaching he sent repeated messages to
his son and Safdar Jang, begging them to hasten, that he might see
his son once more. The army moved, therefore, with greater speed,
but Ahmad failed to reach Delhi in time to see his father alive and
was met at Panipat by the news that he had died on 26 April.
Safdar Jang at once raised an umbrella over Ahmad's head in the
camp, the march to Delhi was continued and on 29 April, 1748, the
prince was enthroned in the Shalamar garden as Ahmad Shah.
Muhammad Shah demands our pity if he may not command our
respect. Placed in a position which called for a genius he was a very
ordinary person. Historians blame him for his devotion to pleasure
rather than to business, but the tragedy of his situation was that the
most absolute devotion to business by a man of his mental calibre
would in no way have altered the course of events. A mere sickly
puppet like Rafi'-ud-Darajat or Rafi -ud-Daula was perhaps hardly
conscious of humiliation, but Muhammad Shah appears to have


## p. 374 (#410) ############################################

374
MUHAMMAD SHAH
realised both the hopelessness of the situation and his own powerless-
ness to amend it. The seeds of decay had been sown by Aurangzib
and the process was now nearly complete. The bigotry which had
alienated the Rajputs and exasperated the Marathas, the leniency
which regarded laxity and even treachery as venial faults in a military
officer and ultimately dissolved the bonds of discipline throughout
the army, the shortsightedness which permitted or rather encouraged
the erection of principalities on agglomerations of provinces, had now
caused a result which is clear from a survey of the condition of the
empire at the time of Muhammad Shah's death.
India south of the Narbada and west of the Wainganga and the
Godavari was ruled by a prince independent in all but name. This
prince's authority was, indeed, disputed not without success by a great
Hindu power, but in this dispute the emperor had neither a share
nor an interest. The three provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa
were ruled by another independent prince, whose authority, like
that of his neighbour to the south-west, was contested by a Hindu
power that at this time wrested one of the three provinces from him.
In the same region a power was rising which was destined, at no
distant date, to overthrow both Muslim and Hindu rule. With all
these disputes between the competitors the emperor had no concern,
save when a prince who deigned to describe himself as lieutenant
found it convenient to appeal for aid. The viceroyalty of Bengal
contributed not an officer or a man to the defence of the empire
during the invasions of Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Abdali. West
of this state lay the viceroyalty of Oudh, already virtually independent
under a hereditary ruler and destined soon to absorb the provinces
of Allahabad and Rohilkhand, as Katehr soon began to be called
from its new masters. The rich province of Malwa formed part of
the dominions of that Hindu power which was contesting supremacy
with Muslim princes in the Deccan and Bengal, and the same may
be said of the still richer province of Gujarat. Rajputana stood
sullenly aloof from the empire, ruled by the descendants of her
princesses, and the Punjab, Multan and Sind lay at the feet of the
Afghan king. All that remained to Delhi were the northern half of
the Gangetic Duab, a region of about twice the area of that tract
on the west of the Jumna, the southern portion of which, however,
was occupied by the rebellious Jats, and a strip of territory which
only at one point attained a width of a hundred miles, extending
eastward from about the seventieth degree of east longitude, along the
southern banks of the Indus, Panjnad and Sutlej rivers. Within this
limited area the emperor of India exercised such authority as his
ministers were pleased to leave in his hands.
The demoralisation of the army was one of the principal factors
in the disintegration of the empire. It cannot be attributed to the
puppets who during the first half of the eighteenth century disgraced
1


## p. 375 (#411) ############################################

THE DEGENERATION OF THE MUGHUL ARMY 375
the throne of Babur and of Akbar, or even to Aurangzib. The source
of the weakness was the composition of the army, which consisted
chiefly of contingents maintained by the great nobles from the
revenues of assignments held by them for the purpose. The defects
of this system had been clearly perceived both by 'Ala-ud-Din Khalji
and by Akbar, as later by Nadir Shah, but neither had succeeded
in permanently abolishing it. They were less apparent in the reign
of a monarch who could command the affections and the obedience
of the nobles, but the system was radically unsound, as every system
must be which depends upon such an uncertain factor as the personal
character of a monarch, and as the authority of the sovereign relaxed
the general tendency among the great nobles was naturally to hold
as their own those assignments which maintained their troops. Thus,
the later emperors had no personal body of troops with which to assert
authority.
Two other grave defects appeared, as early as in 1595, at the first
siege of Ahmadnagar. The first was the jealousy which afterwards
became so prominent a characteristic of the imperial officers that
a commander would sometimes deliberately refrain from bringing
to a successful conclusion a battle already more than half won or
a siege which had reduced the garrison of a fortress to extremities
if he perceived that another would share the credit of his success.
The second was the habit of treacherous correspondence with the
enemy. The constant internecine wars between the five independent
Muhammadan kingdoms of the Deccan had been conducted on a most
pernicious system. A campaign was regarded by the commanders
on either side as an occasion for the display of diplomatic as well as
of military skill, and as an opportunity for enriching themselves.
This spirit appears to have infected the imperial army in the Deccan
and during Aurangzib's quarter of a century of warfare in that region
only one fortress was taken by storm. Conflicts in the field, as well
as the attack and defence of förtified places, were decided by negotia-
tions and money payments as often as by force of arms.
Finally, the general laxity of discipline converted the army into
a mob. Drill was unknown and a soldier's training, which he might
undergo or not, as he liked, consisted in muscular exercise and in
individual practice in the use of the weapons with which he was
armed. He mounted guard or not as he liked, the punishment for
absence, not invariably inflicted, consisting in the loss of a day's pay.
There was, indeed, no regular punishment for military crimes. An
infuriated commander might occasionally expose officers and men
guilty of cowardice to the ridicule of their comrades by mounting
them on asses and parading them through the camp, but even this
grave crime frequently went unpunished, and Aurangzib himself
habitually overlooked as matters of course acts of treason, cowardice
and deliberate neglect of duty before the enemy.


## p. 376 (#412) ############################################

376
MUHAMMAD SHAH
In an army thus composed and thus commanded no military spirit
was to be looked for, and the imperial troops, both officers and men,
were characterised by a complete absence of the will to victory.
"The Deccan is the bread of the soldier” ran the proverb, and
probably nobody, except Aurangzib, saw why the war should ever
end. In such circumstances an army dissolved before the first foreign
invader.


## p. 377 (#413) ############################################

CHAPTER XIII
THE HYDERABAD STATE (1724-1762)
()
NIZAM-UL-MULK (Qamar-ud-din, Chin Qilich Khan, Khan
Dauran) had held the viceroyalty of the Mughul Deccan once in
1713-14 and again from 1720 to 1722, and though in February,
1722, he migrated to Delhi to take up the post of chief minister of
the empire, he retained his Deccan appointment by means of his
agents. Early in 1724, in despair of reforming the government of
Delhi, he set out for the Deccan, with the secret intention of resigning
the more responsible office. The intrigue by which his enemies sought
to destroy his position in the Deccan by urging his deputy Mubariz
Khan to usurp power there, and the failure of the plan and death of
Mubariz Khan in the battle of Shakarkhelda, have been related in
chap. XII. This one blow was decisive, and its effect was completed
by the Nizam's wise conciliation of his dead rival's son and his
peaceful acquisition of Golconda by liberal gifts (early in 1725). In
a short time the entire Mughul Deccan was brought under his control
and revenue began to be collected regularly. The emperor recog.
nised the accomplished fact by “pardoning" the Nizam and confir-
ming him in the viceroyalty of the Deccan, with the title of Asaf Jah
(June, 1725). This was the foundation of the present state of Hydera.
bad.
When in 1724 Nizam-ul-Mulk went to the Deccan for the last time
as its governor, he dropped the curtain on one act of his career and
began a new one. All his aspirations for restoring the power and pres-
tige of the Mughul empire and guiding the government from its
centre, as its minister, were abandoned, for he felt that the mean and
jealous favourites of the fickle emperor would not let him do any:
thing, and he was not the man to agree to a passive sleepy existence
like Muhammad Amin Khan, his predecessor, or Muhammad Amin's
son, his successor. He thus set out for the Deccan, determined to
make it a stage on which he could at least play a man's part and build
up a political structure that would justify his title of “Regulator of
the Realm”.
In the history of the Mughul Deccan, too, a new scene opens with
the battle of Shakarkhelda. The constant succession of short-term
viceroys, the discord due to the six divisions being held by six
different officers, and the civil strife between rivals for the viceroyalty,
henceforth ceased. There was now one ruler over the whole tract;
he made it his home and planted his dynasty there; and he had not to
take his orders from a far-off master. His strong arm brought peace
to that unhappy land harried by war for forty years since the invasion


## p. 378 (#414) ############################################

378
THE HYDERABAD STATE (1724-1762)
of Aurangzib. Ambitious local officers, rebel chieftains and robber
leaders thought twice before challenging the vanquisher of Dilavar
'Ali, 'Alim 'Ali and Mubariz Khan. This enforcement of law and order,
coupled with his moderate revenue assessment and strict prohibition
of illegal cesses, gave security to the peasant and the trader, and the
wealth of the country increased rapidly.
It was a splendid heritage into which Asaf Jah had entered. The
six Deccan provinces had a standard revenue of 160 million rupees,
against 170 million from the other twelve provinces of the Indian
empire taken together; and though the actual collection here had now
fallen to 130 million or even less, it was still larger than what came
to the impoverished exchequer of Delhi, and was capable of rapid
improvement under an orderly and beneficent administration. For the
land in the old Qutb Shahi kingdom was exceedingly fertile and its
wealth had excited the cupidity of prince Aurangzib in 1654, when he
described it to his father as “a spacious kingdom, well cultivated, rich
in mines of diamond, crystal etc. —a money-yielding country, un-
matched by the imperial dominions". Its annexe of the eastern
Carnatic was proverbially rich, “a kingdom by itself”. Bijapur, though
less favoured by nature, was enriched by the tributes of a wide belt
of vassal states on its south and west, which made it the richest
among the six provinces, Hyderabad being a close second. The
population in Hyderabad and Berar was dense and industrious. Such
a soil required only peace to yield gold, and that peace Asaf Jah's
long and uninterrupted rule for a quarter of a century assured to it.
After the victory of Shakarkhelda, the terror of Asaf Jah's arms
and the high reputation for capacity and spirit which he had brought
with him cowed his own refractory subjects. But the Marathas were
an ever present menace to his state and proved his chief preoccupation
throughout his rule, and they succeeded in nibbling away his state
when he was no more. And yet he was sincerely desirous of living
at peace with them. He had seen with his own eyes how the whole
force of the empire wielded by a sovereign of the stamp of Aurangzib
for twenty-five years had failed to crush the Maratha people. Asaf
Jah therefore recognised the basic truth that the Marathas were the
native landowners of the Deccan and that the Mughul governor of
that country must cultivate their friendship if he was to live at all.
On the other side, Raja Shahu too was eager to remain on good terms
with the Mughul government and to avoid war at all costs. Com-
pletely enervated by his long captivity in Aurangzib's harem, con-
stitutionally weak and unenterprising, faced with disobedience and
tumult by many of his own subjects, the Maratha king was content
with the chauth and sardeshmukhi which had been legally granted to
him by the Delhi sovereign in 1718, so long as he could collect them
in peace. Thus, the principals on the two sides sincerely sought
"
- 1 Chap. XI, P: 338.


## p. 379 (#415) ############################################

NIZAM-UL-MULK AND RAJA SHAHU
379
peace and the maintenance of the status quo established in 1718, but
their followers forced their hands.
The Nizam rightly claimed to enter into the full territorial legacy
of Aurangzib in the Deccan, modified only by the grant of 1718. This
completely barred the expansion of the Maratha race and threatened
to coop them up for ever within the narrow limits of Shivaji's small
possessions in their homeland. Then began the inevitable clash
between a legitimate but static authority and the dynamic spirit of
expansion of a new people trying to find its place in the sun, which
was witnessed a century and a half earlier when the Elizabethan
adventurers burst upon the lawful Spanish government of the New
World. There were some distinct cen es of friction. The Nizam's
possession of Baglan blocked the easiest path for Maratha penetration
into Gujarat; similarly, his province of Khandesh lay across their
way to Malwa. Much of the true home of the Maratha race, like the
districts of Junnar and Ahmadnagar, still owned Mughul sway. In
the closing years of his life the triumphant Marathas swept onwards
to raid the eastern Carnatic and also penetrated into the Kanarese
country southwards (Savanur, Bednur, etc. ), and squeezed the
(
Nizam's tribute-payers there, while in the north-east the Bhonsles
of Nagpur conquered the Gond rajas and encroached upon the
Deccan province of Berar.
Shahu's authority as king was so little backed by force and was
recognised by so few of the Marathas that it was beyond his power
to control the actions of the free-lances and adventurers among his
nominal subjects and effectively keep them out of the Mughul
Deccan. Thus, the regular payment of the stipulated contribution
(chauth) did not invariably safeguard the Nizam's dominions from
Maratha depredation.
One of Asaf Jah's earliest acts, after taking full possession of his
charge (1725), was to make an agreement with the Marathas. The
chauth of the Deccan provinces having been granted by the emperor
by a royal rescript, Asaf Jah had to recognise the settled fact. But
he did what was possible in the circumstances to save his realm from
ruinous occupation and unlimited extortion by a host of greedy
Maratha tribute-collectors and their troops. He settled with Raja
Shahu that in respect of the province of Hyderabad he would himself
pay the amount of the tribute in cash from his treasury, so that no
Maratha collector need enter his dominions for the money. Un-
authorised extra taxes (like the sardeshmukhi and rahdari), which the
Marathas used to realise in the Mughul Deccan by sharing with the
former governors, were definitely abolished. This arrangement was
concluded on Shahu's behalf by his minister, Shrinivas Rao, while
the Peshwa Baji Rao advocated a more aggressive and ambitious
policy. Its details had not been fully worked out and the agreement
had not been put into actual operation before war broke out. The


## p. 380 (#416) ############################################

380
THE HYDERABAD STATE (1724-1762)
Nizam encountered opposition in taking possession of the Mughul
territories in the Kanarese districts (south-west), while Maratha
raiders disturbed the country west and south of Aurangabad.
Unable to keep the Marathas within their own limits, Asaf Jah
took refuge in diplomatic machination. Malcontents among Shahu's
subjects and those ministers of his government who were jealous of
the Peshwa's ascendancy all found welcome at the Nizam's court.
By their advice, he planned to create division and weakness in the
Maratha state by undertaking to instal Shambhuji of Kolhapur (the
first cousin of Shahu) as the head of the Maratha royal family
(Chhatrapati) and to make an equal partition of Shivaji's kingdom
between the two cousins. He attached the ancestral estate (watan)
of the house of Shivaji, which Shahu had so long enjoyed and to
which Shahu like all other Marathas felt an almost religious attach-
ment. The attempt ultimately failed through the utter incapacity of
the Nizam's puppet Chhatrapati and the unreliability of his Maratha
allies, but mainly because of the superior genius and energy of Baji
Rao. It left behind it two results very harmful to the Nizam's
interests : Shahu was bitterly estranged from him, and Baji Rao's
ascendancy in the council of his king became unrivalled.
Shambhuji of Kolhapur had gone to Asaf Jah in October, 1726,
and kept claiming to be placed on Shivaji's throne. Two great
Maratha nobles, Rambha Nimbalkar and Chandra Sen Jadav (the
ex-commander-in-chief of Shahu), were on the Nizam's side. Shahu's
officer (Rajadnya) Chimnaji Damodar joined Shambhuji in 1727 and
became his prime minister. Several captains of lesser note like Thorat
were also in the same camp. With their support, Asaf Jah assembled
a large army for the invasion of Maharashtra in November, 1727,
in the interests of Shambhuji. But his plan leaked out, Shahu learnt
of it long in advance, warned all his fort garrisons to be carefully
on the defensive, and struck the first blow by launching Baji Rao
upon the Nizam's dominions. The Peshwa, passing west of Parner,
forded the Godavari at Puntambe, and skirting the larger cities like
Baizapur and Aurangabad some distance on their west and north,
burst into the Jalna and Sindhkhed districts at the end of October
and sacked the country right and left. But now at last the Nizam
was on the move; his advanced division led by 'Iwaz Khan attacked
the Maratha bands dispersed for plunder (17 November) and beat
them back. Baji Rao, avoiding pitched battles, began a series of
bewilderingly rapid marches, which completely baffled and exhausted
his enemy. In fact, in this cross-country race over a vast broken
country, the Nizam, with his mail-clad heavy cavalry and cumbrous
artillery, was completely out-mancuvred by the Maratha light horse
and toiled painfully behind it without being able to prevent its
ravages or to bring it to an action. After a feint against Burhanpur,
Baji Rao made a dash eastwards to Mangrul, beyond Basim in the


## p. 381 (#417) ############################################

PALKHED CAMPAIGN AGAINST BAJI RAO 381
extreme east of Berar (20 December), and then turning sharply to
the north-west, crossed the Tapti some distance west of Chopra (30
December) and the Narbada at the Baba Piara ford (14 January,
1728), and arrived wthin twenty-five miles of Broach. Then he
swooped down due south, spending a fortnight near Songarh (forty-
five miles east of Surat), and doubled back northwards across the
Tapti and the Narbada to the 'Ali Mohan country (fifty miles east
of Baroda city) on 11 February. From this point he was recalled
by news of the danger to Poona and reached Betavad (twenty miles
north of Dhulia in west Khandesh) on 24 February.
In the meantime the Nizam, worn out by his long and futile marches,
had wisely changed his plan of war. Giving up the pursuit of the
elusive Baji Rao, he in full force entered the Poona district now
denuded of defenders, his vanguard under Turktaz Khan opening
the way. Nothing could stand against him. Raja Shahu and Chimaji
(the Peshwa's brother and agent at court) took refuge in Purandar
fort; every military station and town in the Poona district submitted
to the Nizam in terror and was placed in charge of some agent of
Shambhuji. One fort alone, Udapur, made a bold defence and had to
be taken by bombardment. Finally, the Nizam entered Poona city,
,
proclaimed Shambhuji's authority over the country, and celebrated
that raja's marriage with a princess of Ramnagar.
All this time, owing to Baji Rao's rapid marches, Shahu had
received little news of his position and success, and was frantically
writing to him to come back for the defence of his home. From Betavad,
Baji Rao turned southwards, crossed the Ajanta range at Kasar ghati
about 28 February, and like a master strategist ensured the automatic
relief of Poona by marching upon the Nizam's capital Aurangabad.
While he was sacking the Gandapur and Baizapur districts west of
that city, the-Nizam evacuated the Poona district, deposited his camp
and baggage at Ahmadnagar, and then on 4 March set out in light
marching order to overtake Baji Rao. But the Peshwa, by his
"Cossack-like tactics", plundered on both sides of the Nizam's line
of advance, stopped his grain supply, and harassed his troops at every
difficult place like a watercourse or ravine. At last the Nizam was
manæuvred into a broken waterless ground near Palkhed (twelve
miles east of Baizapur and twenty miles west of Daulatabad) and
completely hemmed in (11 March). However, after undergoing
unspeakable hardship, he cut his way out, but in utter disgust at the
worthlessness of his Maratha allies, he gave up the plan of backing
Shambhuji. Negotiations were opened with Baji Rao and a treaty
was made at Shevgaon (22 March) by which the Nizam abandoned
Shambhuji's cause, gave up several forts as security for the payment
of the tribute (including all arrears), and made Rambha Rao Nim-
1 Twenty miles due east of Manmad railway junction and the same distance
north of Baizapur.


## p. 382 (#418) ############################################

382
THE HYDERABAD STATE (1724-1762)
balkar transfer "the Twelve Mavals" (western Poona and Nasik)
to Baji Rao. Shahu's collectors were restored to all their former
places and the Nizam returned to Hyderabad. It was a complete
triumph for Shahu.
But this treaty did not bring peace, any more than the former
settlement of the Hyderabad tribute had done. Though there were
no more regular wars between the Nizam and Shahu's government,
the events of 1727 left behind them a spirit of mutual suspicion and
alarm which continued for the next four years, with occasional
conflicts between local officers and small invading bands of both sides.
Shambhuji having been cast off as a broken tool, the Nizam formed
a plot with Trimbak Rao Dabhade (the Maratha commander-in-chief,
jealous of the Brahman Peshwa) and many other malcontents to
crush Baji Rao. But before the two allies could complete their musters
and effect a junction, Baji Rao's alertness again triumphed. Hastening
to Gujarat he slew Dabhade near Dabhoi (12 April, 1731) and broke
up his party. In the preceding month the Nizam had gone to Bur-
hanpur, suppressed a rebel, Mohan Singh, and held secret consulta-
tions with Muhammad Khan Bangash (the new viceroy of Malwa)
on the bank of the Narbada, and now after a fruitless chase of Baji
Rao through Khandesh and Baglan, he returned to Aurangabad. Un-
successful in war, the Nizam at last entered into a secret compact with
Baji Rao, by which the Maratha government promised to leave the
Deccan unmolested and to levy nothing beyond the stipulated chauth
and sardeshmukhi from them, while the Nizam agreed to remain
neutral during the projected Maratha invasions of Hindustan, pro-
vided that they did not injure his province of Khandesh in their
northward march through it. This pact was confirmed during Baji
Rao's visit to the Nizam in the Christmas week of 1732. Thus Maratha
ambition was diverted to the north, and the heart of the Mughul
Deccan enjoyed comparative peace.
During the next four years, the government of the Deccan followed
an even course, only disturbed by minor Maratha raids here and
there. The Nizam used to go out on tour every winter and return to
Aurangabad or Burhanpur for cantoning during the rainy season.
He collected tribute from his dependents, like the Rajas of (western)
Kanara and the Pathan Nawabs, and attended to the normal admi-
nistration, following his usual practice of changing the local officers
every two years.
When in 1736-37 the Marathas carried their depredations to the
gates of Delhi, the emperor repeatedly wrote to Asaf Jah to come to
his aid. The Nizam reached Delhi on 13 July, 1737. His defeat by
Baji Rao at Bhopal (December, 1737) and the humiliating treaty
(16 January, 1738) by which he extricated himself, his passive
participation in the battle of Karnal with Nadir Shah (24 February,
1739), and his quarrels with the emperor's new favourites after the


## p. 383 (#419) ############################################

NASIR JANG'S REBELLION SUPPRESSED
383
departure of Nadir, do not belong to the history of the Deccan and
have been dealt with elsewhere. A second time despairing of reform-
ing his master's government or even of preserving his own honour in
that worthless court, he finally left Delhi on 7 August, 1740, and
returned to Burhanpur on 19 November.
Here he found a perilous situation created by the ambition of his
second son Nasir Jang, whom he had left in the Deccan as his deputy
during his three and a half years' absence in northern India. This
young noble was of a fiery impetuous nature, in contrast with his
father's cool and far-sighted judgment and perfect self-control.
Taking advantage of the shock given to the imperial power by Nadir's
invasion and Asaf Jah's absence, the Marathas achieved some con-
spicuous successes. Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur slew the Mughul
governor of Berar (January, 1738) and exacted contribution from
Ellichpur. Chimaji raided the environs of Burhanpur. Gopal Rao
seized the fort of Mahur (in Berar). In April, 1739, Baji Rao began
to confiscate grants near the capital of Khandesh, but retired at the
end of next month on hearing of Nadir's retreat. In the winter of
1739–40 he renewed his depredations south of Aurangabad, but Nasir
Jang sallied out and drove him beyond the Godavari. For one
month (28 January-29 February, 1740) there was daily marching
and fighting.
At last a meeting was arranged between the two chiefs
and peace was made by granting the districts of Khargon and Handiya
to the Peshwa.
Shortly afterwards Baji Rao died. Nasir Jang, now freed of all
enemies at home, formed the plan of usurping the government of the
Deccan from his aged and absent father. Evil counsellors gathered
round the hot-headed youth, who began to act with unrestrained
caprice and tyranny.
This news brought Asaf Jah to Burhanpur, where he halted for two
months, trying to reason with his son. Many of the rebel's adherents
took this opportunity to come over to the Nizam's side. Nasir Jang,
unable to face his father in the field, sought asylum at the tomb of
Shah Burhan-ud-din. The Nizam crossed the Tapti on 16 January,
1741, and after a friendly meeting with the new Peshwa Balaji Rao,
on the bank of the Purna (at 'Adilabad), crossed the Kasar pass, and
reached Aurangabad in March. Nasir Jang, in fear of his father, fled
to Mulher fort (in Baglan), but while the Nizam's forces were dis-
persed in cantonments for the rains, the rebel returned to Aurangabad
at the head of 7000 horse, on 2 August, 1741. Asaf Jah boldly rode
out of the city with his small escort but strong artillery and
encamped at the 'Idgah outside. In the next day's battle, most of the
rebel captains fled away, Nasir Jang was taken prisoner, and his
chief counsellor Shah Nawaz Khan (the future author of Maasir-ul-
umara) went into hiding for five years.
After suppressing his son's rebellion, Asaf Jah engaged himself


## p. 384 (#420) ############################################

384
THE HYDERABAD STATE (1724-1762)
for some time in exacting tribute from refractory dependents, and
then his attention was drawn to the Carnatic. This rich province,
with its capital at Arcot, was governed by an Arab family of the
Navait clan, which had offended the Marathas and the Nizam
alike by neglecting to pay to the former the annual compensation
agreed upon for the relinquishment of Shivaji's forts and territories
in that region, and to the latter the homage and surplus revenue
(1,200,000 rupees a year) due to him as the supreme representative
of the emperor in the south. Besides, in 1737 Chanda Sahib, the
son-in-law of the ruling Nawab of Arcot, had seized Trichinopoly
and many other places in the Maratha kingdom of Tanjore by
treachery, with the Nawab's support. But a Maratha army, 10,000
strong, led by Fath Singh and Raghuji Bhonsle, started from Satara
on 17 January, 1740, invaded Arcot, defeated and slew its Nawab
Dost ‘Ali (31 May), and took from his successor Safdar 'Ali a promise
of ten million rupees as indemnity. On 6 April, 1741, they captured
Trichinopoly, made Chanda Sahib prisoner and left Murari Rao
Ghorpare as their governor there. On 12 October, 1742, Safdar 'Ali
was murdered by his cousin Murtaza ‘Ali and the whole province
fell into anarchy.
Asaf Jah set out from Hyderabad in January, 1743, with a vast
force, and after establishing his authority at Arcot, laid siege to
Trichinopoly in March. Murari, at the head of 2000 horse and 4000
foot, held out for five months, but evacuated the fort on 25 August
and left the province with all his Marathas. Asaf Jah took from the
Raja of Tanjore a million rupees in cash and three and a half millions
in promises, left Trichinopoly in October, and at Arcot deposed the
family of Safdar 'Ali and installed his own agentAnvar-ud-din aş
its Nawab. When, in January, 1744, he reached the bank of the
Krishna on his return journey, he found his passage threatened by
a large Maratha force on the opposite bank and fell back three
marches. But their opposition was removed by "treaty, which was
more agreeable (than war) to the Nizam's general method of pro-
ceeding", and he reached Aurangabad in April. The other notable
events of his last years were the capture of Balkonda (sixteen miles
south of Nirmal) from a rebel noble (1746) and a terrible famine
which desolated Gujarat and the Deccan (1747), grain selling at
112 seers a rupee. ? Since his return from the Carnatic, Asaf Jha's
health had visibly declined, and at last he died at the Mohan Nala,
outside Burhanpur, on 1 June, 1748, at the age of seventy-nine lunar
years. Besides liberally patronising Muslim theologians and holy
men, scholars and poets, from all parts of India and the outer Islamic
world, he himself wrote Persian poetry, filling two volumes. Among
his constructions are the new walls of Burhanpur city (replacing
the dilapidated walls built by Aurangzib to keep Maratha raiders
I Madras Consultations.
2 About 10d. a pound.


## p. 385 (#421) ############################################

CHARACTER OF ASAF JAH I
886
out), a new city named Nizamabad above the ruined pass of Farda-
pur, protective walls round Hyderabad city, and the Harsul canal
running through Aurangabad.
For a quarter of a century Asaf Jah had been the most outstanding
personality in the Mughul empire. He was universally regarded
as the sole representative of the spacious times of Aurangzib and of
the policy and traditions of that strenuous monarch. The higher
minds among the younger generation of the court nobility looked
up to him with the respect due to a father, while fools and knaves
hated him for his love of discipline and honesty of administration.
He was undoubtedly the foremost general of his time in India. In
statecraft and diplomacy he was no less eminent. He had the true
statesman's length of vision and spirit of moderation, and of this
we have many proofs. He won over the surviving partisans of Muba-
riz Khan by liberal provision for their support. After crushing
the rebellion of his son Nasir Jang, he destroyed unread the rebel's
despatch-box, which was reported to contain promises of adhesion
from thirty-eight nobles of his own court. Still more strongly was
his wisdom shown when in 1739, Nadir Shah, disgusted with the
imbecility of Muhammad Shah, offered the throne of Delhi to Asaf
Jah, but the latter refused to be disloyal to his master. On his
deathbed he gave his son Nasir Jang several pieces of very good
counsel-telling him to live on good terms with the Marathas, to
abstain from putting men to death except by the judge's sentence,
to scorn repose and frequently to go out on tours, to live laborious
days in doing state business, to respect the rights of his servants
and treat every man in a manner worthy of his position, to be loyal
to his king, and not to provoke war by aggression. The only wrong
policy that he followed and recommended to his son was that of
removing his local officers after only a year or two of service and
putting new men in their places, on the strange ground that thus "a
large number of God's creatures would be fed”. In fact, in spite of
his possessing exceptional military capacity, his conduct was through-
out marked by prudence, the avoidance of waste or unnecessary ex-
penditure, and simplicity of living, worthy of a pupil of Aurangzib.
With the death of Asaf Jah a change came over the scene. The
striking inferiority of his successors to him in ability and character
was aggravated by the domination of Indian warfare by the Euro-
pean system which requires far larger and far more punctual ex-
penditure on troops and munitions than was necessary in the middle
ages. Now more than ever before the life of the state depended on
the regular collection and wise expenditure of the revenue. But Asaf
Jah's sons had not half his skill in war and diplomacy, nor even the
wisdom to choose able instruments and confide in them. After his
death we find frequent change of ministers and of the fainéant ruler's
1 Hadiqat, ii, 179-180.


## p. 386 (#422) ############################################

386
THE HYDERABAD STATE (1724-1762)
guiding genius, the Vakil-i-mutlaq (corresponding to the Peshwa in
the Maratha kingdom), and consequent mismanagement of the
finances and shrinkage of revenue. The state, faced, with constant
deficit, could not pay its troops; hence arose mutinies, and finally
the pernicious system of mortgaging the revenue and government of
districts to the creditors of the state, which inflicted untold misery
on the subject population and which in the nineteenth century
required all the genius of Salar Jang and the strong support of wise
British Residents to root out. Under Asaf Jah's successors we have
a repetition of the scene of the declining ‘Abbasid Caliphate : "A
brilliant and extravagant Court, where the arts flourished and hospi-
tality and charity were practised on an immense scale, was supported
by a rapacious hierarchy of peculative officials, who were always
striving to extort a fortune from their functions before the Court
should pounce upon their corruption. ”
The indigenous troops of the Hyderabad government were in-
effective when pitted against the native forces of the Peshwa or Tipu
Sultan, and its sole defenders were the French and then the English.
On the cultural side the picture was equally dark. Light came to
Hyderabad under the Asaf Jahi dynasty, but not progress. Its rulers
continued to dream the dreams of Aurangzib's reign and to live in
the seventeenth century. Titles of hyperbolical sound and fury but
signifying no real worth were profusely showered among the officials,
regardless of the great Asaf Jah's threat of flogging.
The modern spirit was shut out with the scorn bred of ignorance.
The impact of the west, which was causing a marvellous renaissance
in the British provinces and breathing a new life into the dry bones
of Hindu society and thought, left Hyderabad untouched. Thus it
happened that the intellectual leadership of Indian Islam eluded the
grasp of the foremost Muhammadan state in India.
At the time of Asaf Jah's death, his eldest son Mir Muhammad
Panah (Ghazi-ud-din Khan) was living in Delhi as his father's deputy
at court. The viceroyalty of the Deccan was seized by his second son
Nasir Jang, who had for some years past acted as his father's lieutenant
and being present on the spot could easily get hold of his treasures
and troops. At the secret invitation of the emperor he started foc
Delhi with the object of overthrowing the new minister Safdar Jang,
but had to return from the bank of the Narbada (5 June, 1749),
as the emperor was cowed by his minister and ordered Nasir Jang
to go back, formally creating him viceroy of the Deccan with the
title of Nizam-ud-Daula. At this time Asaf Jah's daughter's son,
Muzaffar Jang, claiming the viceroyalty, went to the Carnatic in
concert with Chanda Sahib, an aspirant to the Nawabship of Arcot,
1 For Berar, Khandesh, Aurangabad and Bidar, the revenue amounted to 37
million rupees in 1785, against nearly 79 million in 1725, a reduction to less than
one-half (Jagjivandas).


## p. 387 (#423) ############################################

BUSSY DOMINATES HYDERABAD COURT
887
who had recently secured release from a Maratha prison. The two
allies bought the help of Dupleix (July) and gained Arcot after
killing its Nawab. Nasir Jang, with a vast army of 70,000 horse and
100,000 foot, marched to the Carnatic, came upon his enemies near
Valudavur (end of March, 1750), secured the abject surrender of
Muzaffar Jang (5 April), and returned to Arcot. But on 16 December
he was shot dead by Himmat Khan, the Pathan chief of Kurnool,
during a treacherous attack on his camp by the French under
Dupleix's orders, twenty miles north of Gingee. 2
The French raised Muzaffar Jang to the viceroyalty and marched
escorting him towards his capital; but on the way, at Lakkaredi-palli
(thirty-five miles south of Cuddapah city), the new viceroy fought
his Pathan dependent and was slain (13 February, 1751). Bussy, the
commander of his French escort, was bribed by his revenue minister
Raja Raghunath (a black Brahman of Chicacole, originally named
Ramdas") to transfer his support to Asaf Jah's third son, Salabat
Jang, who was at once proclaimed his successor, and ultimately
gained from Delhi the titles of Asaf-ud-daula Zafar Jang and Amir-
ul-mamalik and recognition as viceroy of the Deccan. "Muzaffar
Jang was the first to engage Europeans and bring them into the
realm of Islam. After his death the French troops continued in the
service of Salabat Jang and got (extensive) jagirs, so that they soon
became all-in-all in the Deccan" (Azad Bilgrami).
Bussy soon justified the high price paid for his support. The suc-
cession of Salabat Jang was opposed by the Peshwa, who wished the
Deccan viceroyalty to be given to Asaf Jah's eldest son, Ghazi-ud-din,
a tame scholarly priest-ridden man, without any military capacity
or ambition, under whom the Peshwa would practically govern the
Deccan as his deputy. Balaji intrigued at the imperial court in
favour of Ghazi-ud-din, and at the same time obstructed Salabat
Jang's agents in taking possession of their territory. War resulted.
But while the Peshwa was entangled in a civil war with his domestic
enemies, the Maratha governors of Gujarat and Berar, Salabat Jang
invaded Maharashtra with his French contingent and forced his way
towards Poona. The rival forces came into contact on 1 December,
1751, and there was daily fighting, the Marathas retreating and the
Mughuls advancing. In the night of 3 December, the French sur-
prised Balaji between Arangaon and Sarola 3 on the bank of the
Sina, put him to flight in his undress, slew many of his troops and
plundered all their property, including the Peshwa's idols and gold
ritual vassels. But Balaji soon rallied his scattered forces and deli-
vered a counter-attack only five days later, in which many were slain
on both sides. Salabat advanced plundering up to Talegaon Dham-
dhera, eighteen miles north-east of Poona. The campaign, however,
1 See vol. v, p. 126.
2 See vol. v, p. 127.
3 Two railway
stations, respectively eight and twenty miles south of Ahmadnagar,


## p. 388 (#424) ############################################

388
THE HYDERABAD STATE (1724–1762)
ended indecisively owing to scarcity of provisions and dissensions in
the Muslim camp. A truce was patched up and Salabat started for
his capital in the middle of April, 1752.
The danger which Salabat Jang dreaded most now approached
him. His eldest brother Ghazi-ud-din started (17 May) from Delhi
with a strong Maratha escort, in order to wrest the viceroyalty of
the Deccan which had been conferred upon him by the emperor
with the titles of Nizam-ul-Mulk, Asaf Jah. To meet this invasion,
Bussy arranged for Salabat Jang a defensive subsidiary alliance with
Balaji (signed on 5 August), ceding to the Peshwa the province of
Khandesh (reserving only the imperial forts and the city of Burhan-
pur), the district of Baglan, and lands yielding 200,000 rupees a year
in the Sangamner and Jalna subdivisions, besides tribute for the
Carnatic and Hyderabad. The Peshwa on his part promised to
defend Salabat Jang against all “who might come to dispute the
Deccan with him, even if it were the vazir himself, furnished with the
emperor's authority", to look after his interests at the imperial court
against his enemies, and to keep the Marathas out of the rest of
Mughul Deccan. He also freed Salabat Jang from any liability to
pay the six million rupees for which Ghazi-ud-din had given a bond
to the Peshwa. But the storm unexpectedly blew over. Ghazi-ud-din
was poisoned by his stepmother on 16 October, only seventeen days
after his arrival at Aurangabad.
Salabat Jang thus gained security, but he had neither civil or
military capacity, nor character enough to act of his own will or trust
able agents. Throughout his régime he was a mere puppet in the
hands of his successive regents who ruled the state, while the intrigues
of his courtiers and the mutinies of his unpaid soldiery paralysed the
administration. The best of these regents was Samsam-ud-daula Shah
Nawaz Khan (in office, December 1753-July 1757), who succeeded
in removing financial insolvency, restoring administrative efficiency,
repressing foreign enemies and rebellious vassals, and giving some
peace and happiness to the subject population.
Shah Nawaz Khan was versed in many branches of knowledge,
particularly in history (in which his enduring monument is his
Maasir-ul-umara, or biographical dictionary of the Mughul peers, in
three large volumes). High-minded, sympathetic to all, habitually
charitable, a lover of justice, dealing directly with suitors in an open
court without allowing intermediaries, an expert in financial manage-
ment and diplomacy alike, “he wrought a magical change during
his four years of Chancellorship by his wisdom and administrative
genius, converted the insolvency of the State—when household goods
had to be sold for feeding the Nizam-into a balanced budget at
the end of the fourth year" (Hadiqat), and kept the Marathas within
their own limits. If he failed, in the end, to reform the government,
1 Lettres et Conventions, 261-2.


## p. 388 (#425) ############################################

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## p. 388 (#426) ############################################



## p. 389 (#427) ############################################

BUSSY RECOVERS CONTROL OVER NIZAM 389
it was due to the selfishness and incurable love of intrigue of the entire
official class and nobility, the imbecile character of his master, and
the domination of the French praetorians. The proved worthlessness
of his indigenous troops made Salabat Jang absolutely dependent on
the French corps for protection. In his letters he represents himself
as a helpless orphan who looked for the defence of his rights to his
deceased father's brother, "mon oncle le Gouverneur Bahadour"
Dupleix! (Lettres et Conventions, p. 267).
In 1754 Shah Nawaz exacted 500,000 rupees as tribute from
Raghuji of Nagpur, and arrested Surja Rao, the rebel officer of
Nirmal. Next year he sent the Nizam to Mysore and levied over
five million. Early in 1756, he repulsed Janoji Bhonsle's officers who
were raiding Bidar, and by a friendly alliance with the Peshwa
reduced the Pathan Nawabs of Bankapur and Savanur to obedience.
A year later he subdued Ramchandra Nimbalkar, the Maratha
grantee of Bhalki. The imperial forts of Asir and Daulatabad—the
greatest in the Deccan—were gained for the Nizam by bribery. But
his attempt to rid his master of French domination led to Shah Nawaz
Khan's fall. These foreign troops had been constantly troubling the
Government for their pay of 2,900,000 rupees a year. They now
demanded the great fort of Bidar in addition to holding vast districts
in Chicacole and Rajahmundry. Bussy's chief of artillery, Ibrahim
Khan Gardi, was seduced by Nizam 'Ali, and Shah Nawaz induced
Salabat Jang to dismiss the French corps. Bussy took leave to go to
his grants in Chicacole, but on the way he seized the city of Hydera-
bad, and stood at bay in the Chaumahalla palace (14 June, 1756). Here
he received from Pondicherry a reinforcement of 300 Europeans and
2000 Gardi troops under M. Law. Salabat and Shah Nawaz failed
to dislodge Bussy after a two months' siege, and at last had to make
peace with him (August).
Within a year of this, French intrigue succeeded in overthrowing
the great minister. The pay of the army was due for two years, and
"instigated by others" the soldiers caused a riot in the city and forced
the Nizam to dismiss Shah Nawaz (23 July, 1757) and appoint the
pro-French Basalat Jang as regent. A terrible popular' rising broke
out that day; the ruffians and the mob of the city wanted to sack
Shah Nawaz's house; but two nights later he escaped to Daulatabad,
abandoning his house to plunder. Profiting by this internal division,
the Peshwa's son Vishvas Rao invaded the country east of Auranga-
bad. So, Salabat made terms with Shah Nawaz and induced him to
return (13 November). But all power now passed into the hands of
Nizam 'Ali, who was appointed heir and regent. The campaign of
Nizam 'Ali against the Peshwa in the Sindkhed region ended in a
peace by which the Marathas gained two and a half million rupees
worth of land in the Deccan and the fort of Naldrug (January, 1758).
All this time Bussy and his force had been absent on the east coast.


## p. 390 (#428) ############################################

390
THE HYDERABAD STATE (1724–1762)
They now returned to Aurangabad, where Bussy's manager Haidar
Jang completely deceived Shah Nawaz, seduced Nizam Ali's army
by paying 800,000 rupees, and at last, on 5 April, 1758, caused Shah
Nawaz to be arrested. Salabat Jang himself was placed under a
French guard. Haidar was planning to imprison Nizam 'Ali and to
seize the supreme power, when he himself was treacherously mur-
dered by that prince (12 May), who escaped the vengeance of the
French brigade by “marvellous skill and bravery". A riot raged
through the city, in the course of which Shah Nawaz and his son were
murdered in prison by Lachhmana, an officer of the French corps.
The new regent Basalat Jang (the fifth son of Asaf Jah) proved a
cypher. The French star waned as the English asserted their armed
superiority in the Carnatic in the Seven Years' War. These disasters
reacted on the French position at the Nizam's court. Bussy was
recalled by Lally to the Madras coast (June, 1758). Nizam 'Ali came
back to Hyderabad, and after some quarrel among the three brothers
succeeded in being invested with all power vice Basalat Jang dis-
missed (June, 1759).
The Nizam's army, deprived of its French corps and Ibrahim Khan
Gardi's artillery (the latter having entered the Peshwa's service
now), was reduced to helplessness. On the other hand, the strength
and ambition of the Marathas proportionately increased from the
adhesion of Ibrahim Khan, which stiffened their "myriads of light
horse" with French-drilled modern artillery. The Peshwa renewed
war with the Nizam; his cousin Sadashiv Bhao gained the important
fort of Ahmadnagar by terms (9 November, 1759). A vast Maratha
army under the Peshwa's brother Raghunath and cousin Sadashiv,
with Ibrahim Gardi's artillery, began the invasion in the beginning
of January, 1760. Nizam 'Ali with Salabat Jang issued forth to
oppose them and reached Udgir on the 11th. Daily fighting began
immediately. Hopelessly outnumbered, the Nizam planned to force
his way to Dharur and join a large body of his troops who were
detained there. The Mughul force, only 7000 strong, was completely
enveloped by 60,000 Maratha horse, its progress impeded, and its
supplies cut off. “This time the Cossack-tactics of the Marathas
were combined with the European mode of warfare (of Ibrahim
Khan Gardi) against the Nizam. ” The march from Udgir to Ausa
was a long drawn agony. The small Mughul army, slowly moving
in the open field in close column, presented a sure target to the
French-drilled artillery hovering round, while the dispersed and
wheeling Maratha horse were practically safe from their enemy's fire.
It was the situation of Panipat inverted in favour of the Marathas.
When on 3 February the Nizam reached Ausa, forty miles south of
Dharur, 40,000 Marathas attacked his rear-guard, which
straggling some miles behind, and a great disaster fell on it, all the
commanders and most of the men being killed. The victorious
was


## p. 391 (#429) ############################################

NIZAM 'ALI DEPOSES SALABAT JANG
391
Marathas then fell upon the Mughul centre and the battle raged till
sunset. The Nizam's army was in no condition to fight any more.
So, he made peace by ceding territory, yielding six million rupees in
the province of Aurangabad, half of Bijapur and Bidar, the forts of
Asir, Daulatabad and Mulher, and the cities of Bijapur and Burhanpur
to the Peshwa (February, 1760). The descendants of Asaf Jah retained
nothing more than Hyderabad, some parts of the province of Bijapur,
and a little of Bidar, and that, too, on condition of paying the
Marathas one-fourth of the revenue.
This was the apogee of Maratha success. Nemesis came at Panipat
within one year, followed by the death of Balaji Rao, the succession
of his minor son, and the internal dissensions caused by the guilty
ambition of his brother Raghunath Rao, which paralysed the Maratha
power. Seizing this opportunity, Nizam 'Ali invaded Maharashtra
in November, 1761, and made his way to within fourteen miles of
Poona. The Peshwa made peace (2 January, 1762), relinquishing
nearly half of his father's territorial gains in the Mughul Deccan.
Nizam 'Ali returned to Bidar, seized the government, and threw
Salabat Jang into prison (6 July, 1762), where the latter died two
years later. The shadowy emperor of Delhi sanctioned the usurpation
by creating Nizam 'Ali viceroy with the title of Nizam-ul-mulk Asaf
Jah II.
With the accession of Nizam 'Ali (1762) a long period of stability
begins in the affairs of the Mughul Deccan. We have at last one man
ruling for forty-one years, and passing an undisputed succession on
to his progeny. Family dissensions, except for a short and futile
outbreak by his son, end. At the same time the centre of gravity of
the Maratha power slowly shifts from Poona to northern India. The
Peshwa's family was stricken by disease, physical and moral. The
ensuing peace could have been utilised for reforming the Hyderabad
state and improving its people's lot, if only there had been wise rulers
and honest ministers.


## p. 392 (#430) ############################################

CHAPTER XIV
THE RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
THE
HE aged emperor Aurangzib died in February, 1707, worn out
by his long guerrilla campaign in the Deccan. His successor, Bahadur
Shah, decided, on the advice of Zu-'l-Fiqar Khan, the viceroy of
the Deccan, to put into effect Aurangzib's plan of restoring Shahu,
the grandson of Shivaji, who, after the capture and execution of his
father Shambhuji in 1689, had been brought up in the Mughul court.
He was not twenty-six years old. Daud Khan, the deputy viceroy,
who was stationed at Aurangabad, was directed to give him all
possible assistance. After Shambhuji's death, the direction of Maratha
affairs had fallen into the hands of his half-brother Raja Ram. Raja
Ram died in 1700, whereupon his widow Tara Bai, a strong and
masterful woman, declared herself regent for her infant son Shivaji,
and profiting by the disorders at Delhi, reconquered Poona and
Chakan from the Mughuls. The return of Shahu, as was intended,
threw an apple of discord into the Maratha camp. Tara Bai refused
to give up her son's claims. She declared that Shahu was an im-
postor, assembled her ministers, and made them take an oath of
fidelity to resist the pretender to the last gasp.