No More Learning

Reply to Objection 1: Although those things which are beyond man's
knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason,
nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by
faith. Hence the sacred text continues, "For many things are shown to
thee above the understanding of man" (Ecclus. 3:25). And in this, the
sacred science consists.

Reply to Objection 2: Sciences are differentiated according to the
various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer
and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion: that the earth,
for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i. e.
abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself.
Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from
philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason,
may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within
revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind
from that theology which is part of philosophy.
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Whether sacred doctrine is a science?

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every
science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine
proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since their
truth is not admitted by all: "For all men have not faith" (2 Thess.
3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

Objection 2: Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this
sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is
not a science.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) "to this science
alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished,
protected and strengthened. " But this can be said of no science except
sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science.

I answer that, Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that
there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a
principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as
arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from
principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of
perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music
from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred
doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established
by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the
blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the
principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is
established on principles revealed by God.

Reply to Objection 1: The principles of any science are either in
themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher
science; and such, as we have said, are the principles of sacred
doctrine.

Reply to Objection 2: Individual facts are treated of in sacred
doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but they
are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as
in moral sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those men
through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture or
doctrine is based, has come down to us.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether sacred doctrine is one science?

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for
according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) "that science is one which
treats only of one class of subjects. " But the creator and the
creature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot be
grouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore sacred doctrine
is not one science.

Objection 2: Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal
creatures and human morality. But these belong to separate
philosophical sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one
science.

On the contrary, Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science: "Wisdom
gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of holy things" (Wis. 10:10).

I answer that, Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty
or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material
aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an
object. For example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise formality
of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight. Therefore,
because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality
of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed
possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science; and
therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science.

Reply to Objection 1: Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and
creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far
as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the unity
of this science is not impaired.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits
from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher
faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards
the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the
"common sense" is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore,
whatever is visible or audible. Hence the "common sense," although one
faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly,
objects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical
sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under
one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation. So
that in this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the
divine science which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science?

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science; for
a practical science is that which ends in action according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained to action:
"Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only" (James 1:22). Therefore
sacred doctrine is a practical science.

Objection 2: Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the
New Law. But law implies a moral science which is a practical science.
Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

On the contrary, Every practical science is concerned with human
operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and
architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned
with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a
practical but a speculative science.

I answer that, Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which
belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each
the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through
divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one
is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine
includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself
and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical because
it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it
does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to
the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss. This is a
sufficient answer to the Objections.
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Whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences?

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other
sciences; for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it
establishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be
doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its
principles---namely, articles of faith---can be doubted. Therefore
other sciences seem to be nobler.

Objection 2: Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon
a higher; as music depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in a
sense depend upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in his
Epistle to Magnus, that "the ancient doctors so enriched their books
with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou knowest not
what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or their
scriptural learning. " Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other
sciences.

On the contrary, Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this one:
"Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower" (Prov. 9:3).

I answer that, Since this science is partly speculative and partly
practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one
speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by reason
of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its
subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other
speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because other
sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason,
which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the light of
divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth
of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those
things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while other
sciences consider only those things which are within reason's grasp. Of
the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained to a
further purpose, as political science is nobler than military science;
for the good of the army is directed to the good of the State. But the
purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal
bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical
science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every standpoint, it
is nobler than other sciences.

Reply to Objection 1: It may well happen that what is in itself the
more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the weakness
of our intelligence, "which is dazzled by the clearest objects of
nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun" (Metaph. ii,
lect. i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles of
faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths, but to the
weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest knowledge that may
be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most
certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said in de
Animalibus xi.

Reply to Objection 2: This science can in a sense depend upon the
philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but
only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its
principles not from other sciences, but immediately from God, by
revelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon
the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as handmaidens:
even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that supply their
materials, as political of military science. That it thus uses them is
not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our
intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known through natural
reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that which is above
reason, such as are the teachings of this science.
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Whether this doctrine is the same as wisdom?

Objection 1: It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom. For
no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of
wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (Metaph.
i). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science is
not wisdom.

Objection 2: Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles of
other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is clear
in Ethic. vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of other
sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.

Objection 3: Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas
wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered among
the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Is. 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is not
the same as wisdom.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of nations. "

I answer that, This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not
merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a
wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be
judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in
any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus
in the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called
wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim the
wood and make ready the stones: "As a wise architect, I have laid the
foundation" (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life, the
prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a
fitting end: "Wisdom is prudence to a man" (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore he
who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe,
namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the
knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But
sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest
cause---not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as
philosophers knew Him---"That which is known of God is manifest in
them" (Rom. 1:19)---but also as far as He is known to Himself alone and
revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom.

Reply to Objection 1: Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from
any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as
through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.

Reply to Objection 2: The principles of other sciences either are
evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through
some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes
through revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no
concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge of
them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of
this science must be condemned as false: "Destroying counsels and every
height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God" (2 Cor.
10:4,5).

Reply to Objection 3: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold
manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way
by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of
what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it. Hence it
is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human
acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral
science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he
had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs
to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost:
"The spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15). And Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ii): "Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by
experience of divine things. " The second manner of judging belongs to
this doctrine which is acquired by study, though its principles are
obtained by revelation.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether God is the object of this science?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not the object of this science. For
in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this
science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. i, iv): "It is impossible to define the essence of God. "
Therefore God is not the object of this science.

Objection 2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science
must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ
we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many other
things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is not the
object of this science.

On the contrary, The object of the science is that of which it
principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about
God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is
the object of this science.

I answer that, God is the object of this science. The relation between
a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty
and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit
is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that
faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight
in that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects
of sight. But in sacred science, all things are treated of under the
aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because they
refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is
in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also from the
principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is
about God. The object of the principles and of the whole science must
be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its
principles. Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this
science, and not to the aspect under which it is treated, have asserted
the object of this science to be something other than God---that is,
either things and signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole
Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we
treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God.

Reply to Objection 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the
essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His
effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in
regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even
as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a
cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of
the cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this
sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or
accidents but as in some way related to Him.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?

Objection 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For
Ambrose says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where faith is sought. "
But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: "But these things are
written that you may believe" (Jn. 20:31). Therefore sacred doctrine is
not a matter of argument.

Objection 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is
either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems
unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest
form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting its end,
because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), "faith has no merit in those
things of which human reason brings its own experience. " Therefore
sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.

On the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop should "embrace that
faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to
exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers" (Titus 1:9).

I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of their
principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths
in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its
principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on
to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ
argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15). However, it is
to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the
inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those
who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest
of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its
principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he
concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer
his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above
itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the
opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine
revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ,
and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from
another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there
is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning,
but only of answering his objections---if he has any---against faith.
Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a
truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought
against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can
be answered.

Reply to Objection 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot avail
to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine
argues from articles of faith to other truths.

Reply to Objection 2: This doctrine is especially based upon arguments
from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation:
thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the
revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of
this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human
reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine
revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of
human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of
faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are
put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy
nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the
natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says:
"Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of
Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the
authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to
know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus:
"As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His offspring"
(Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these
authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the
authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and
the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be
used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation
made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, and
not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors.
Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only those books of
Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such
honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing
them. But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their
works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and
written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Holy Scripture should use metaphors?

Objection 1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors. For
that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this
science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the
aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least
of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science
should make use of such similitudes.

Objection 2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth
clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: "They that
explain me shall have life everlasting" (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such
similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths
by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.

Objection 3: Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they
approach to the divine likeness.
If therefore any creature be taken to
represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the
higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in
Scriptures.

On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied
visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets. "
But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use
metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.

I answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and
spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God
provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now it
is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible
objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy
Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of
material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): "We
cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within
the covering of many sacred veils. " It is also befitting Holy Writ,
which is proposed to all without distinction of persons---"To the wise
and to the unwise I am a debtor" (Rom. 1:14)---that spiritual truths be
expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order
that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp
intellectual things may be able to understand it.

Reply to Objection 1: Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a
representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with
representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both
necessary and useful.

Reply to Objection 2: The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished
by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow
the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in the
metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through
those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive
instruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught
metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught more
openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise
of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of the
impious, according to the words "Give not that which is holy to dogs"
(Mat. 7:6).

Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more
fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of less
noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly,
because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error. For
then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of
divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been
expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who
could think of nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is
more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what
He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes drawn
from things farthest away from God form within us a truer estimate that
God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him. Thirdly, because
thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the unworthy.
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Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses?

Objection 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several
senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and
anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion and
deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, but
only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But
Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy.
Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to a word.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that "the Old
Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy and
allegory. " Now these four seem altogether different from the four
divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem
fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four
different senses mentioned above.

Objection 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical,
which is not one of these four.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): "Holy Writ by the manner
of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same
sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery. "

I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to
signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also
by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are
signified by words, this science has the property, that the things
signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore
that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the
first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby
things signified by words have themselves also a signification is
called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and
presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For
as the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law,
and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a figure of
future glory. " Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a
type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old
Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense;
so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which
signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral
sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there
is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense is that which the
author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one
act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as
Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the literal sense,
one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.

Reply to Objection 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not produce
equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these
senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things,
but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types
of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the
senses are founded on one---the literal---from which alone can any
argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as
Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture
perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is
contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward
by the Scripture in its literal sense.

Reply to Objection 2: These three---history, etiology, analogy---are
grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as Augustine
expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it is called
etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason
why Moses allowed the putting away of wives---namely, on account of the
hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever the truth of
one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another.
Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses.
Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog. ) includes the anagogical
under the allegorical sense, laying down three senses only---the
historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.

Reply to Objection 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the
literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively.
Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense.
When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not that God
has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely
operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie
the literal sense of Holy Writ.
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TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)

Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of
God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of
things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is
clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to
expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational
creature's advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way
to God.

In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall
consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever
concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the
procession of creatures from Him.

Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God
exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is NOT the
manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations---namely,
His knowledge, will, power.

Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?

(2) Whether it is demonstrable?

(3) Whether God exists?
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Whether the existence of God is self-evident?

Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now
those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which
is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first
principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the
knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all. " Therefore the
existence of God is self-evident.

Objection 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which
are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1
Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration.
Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once
recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as
the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen
that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which
nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and
mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore,
since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it
also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God
exists" is self-evident.

Objection 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For
whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist:
and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not
exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But
God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn. 14:6)
Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.

On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is
self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states
concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of
the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in
his heart, There is no God" (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is
not self-evident.

I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on
the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,
self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident
because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as
"Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If,
therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the
proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the
first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things
that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and
part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of
the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be
self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of
the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as
Boethius says (Hebdom. , the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is
good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the
learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space. " Therefore I
say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for
the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own
existence as will be hereafter shown ([2]Q[3], A[4]). Now because we do
not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us;
but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us,
though less known in their nature---namely, by effects.

Reply to Objection 1: To know that God exists in a general and confused
way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude.
For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by
man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know
absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching
is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is
Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's
perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in
pleasures, and others in something else.

Reply to Objection 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God"
understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be
thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted
that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it
does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word
signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it
be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there
actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought;
and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not
exist.

Reply to Objection 3: The existence of truth in general is self-evident
but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
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Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?

Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith
cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific
knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1). Therefore it
cannot be demonstrated that God exists.

Objection 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration.
But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what
it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore
we cannot demonstrate that God exists.

Objection 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this
could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate
to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between
the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a
cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it
seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom.
1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be
demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we
must know of anything is whether it exists.

I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through
the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is
prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a
demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior
relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And
from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be
demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because
since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the
cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is
not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects
which are known to us.

Reply to Objection 1: The existence of God and other like truths about
God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith,
but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural
knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes
something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to
prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of
faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
known and demonstrated.

Reply to Objection 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated
from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the
cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in
regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it
is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and
not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the
question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from
His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from
His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word
"God".

Reply to Objection 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no
perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect
the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can
demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we
cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
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Whether God exists?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two
contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But
the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God
existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the
world. Therefore God does not exist.

Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be
accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it
seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other
principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be
reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can
be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore
there is no need to suppose God's existence.

On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am. " (Ex.
3:14)

I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is
certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are
in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for
nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards
which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from
potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality
to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that
which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot,
to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not
possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and
potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For
what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it
is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in
the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and
moved, i. e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in
motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in
motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in
motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to
infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and,
consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only
inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff
moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is
necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and
this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world
of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no
case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found
to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to
itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible
to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in
order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the
intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the
intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause
is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among
efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate
cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity,
there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an
ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is
plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient
cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus.
We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since
they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they
are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always
to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.
Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there
could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now
there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist
only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at
one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for
anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in
existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely
possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is
necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by
another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary
things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been
already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but
postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own
necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in
others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among
beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the
like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things,
according as they resemble in their different ways something which is
the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more
nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something
which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest
in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the
maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which
is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there
must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being,
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world.