They are good Czechs,
good Germans, and good Magyars, but not good
Austrians; and this flaw may some day bring
about disastrous consequences.
good Germans, and good Magyars, but not good
Austrians; and this flaw may some day bring
about disastrous consequences.
Treitschke - 1914 - His Doctrine of German Destiny
We have learned to
recognize the moral majesty of war just in those
aspects of it which superficial observers describe
as brutal and inhuman. Men are called upon to
overcome all natural feeling for the sake of their
country, to murder people who have never before
done them any harm, and whom they perhaps
respect as chivalrous enemies. It is things such
as these that seem at the first glance horrible and
repulsive. Look at them again and you will see
in them the greatness of war. Not only the life
of man, but also the right and natural emotions
of his inmost soul, his whole ego, are to be sacri-
ficed to a great patriotic ideal; and herein lies the
moral magnificence of war. If we pursue this
idea still further, we shall see that in spite of its
hardness and roughness, war links men together
in brotherly love, for it levels all differences of
rank, and draws men together by a common sense
of the imminence of death. Every student of
history knows that to do away with war would
be to cripple human nature. No liberty can exist
without an armed force ready to sacrifice itself
for the sake of freedom. One cannot insist too
often on the fact that scholars never touch upon
these questions without presupposing that the
State only exists as a sort of academy of arts and
sciences. This is of course also part of its duty,
but not its most immediate duty. A State which
cultivates its mental powers at the expense of its
physical ones cannot fail to go to ruin.
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? 140 Treitschke
Generally speaking, we must admit that the
greatness of historical life lies in character rather
than m' education ; the driving forces of history
are to be found on spheres where character is
developing. Only hra. vft nations have any real
history. In the hour of trial in national life it be-
comes evident that warlike virtues have the cast-
jng^ vote. ^There is great truth in the old phrase
which described war as the examen rigorosum
of the States. In war, the States are called upon
to show, not only the extent of their physical,
but also of their moral power, and in a certain
measure of their intellectual capacity. . . . War
brings to light all that a nation has collected in
secret. It is not an essential part of the nature
of armies to be always righting; the noiseless
labour of armament goes on equally in time of
peace. The entire value of the work done for
Prussia by Frederick William I did not appear until
the days of Frederick the Great, when the tremen-
dous force which had been slowly collecting sud-
denly revealed itself to the world at large. The
same is true of the year 1866.
And just because war is nothing more than a
powerful embodiment of politics, its issues are
decided, not by technical factors alone, but chiefly
by the policy which directs it. It is very signi-
ficant that when Wrangel and Prittwitz might
have been able to get the better of the Danes in
1848, and 1849, the King, who seems to have
felt horror at the thought of taking this step, and
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? The Army 141
who, moreover, feared Russia, did not himself
know what he wanted. An Army can never be
expected to fight when its leaders are in doubt as
to the advisability of a particular military action.
Every war is by nature a radical one, and in many
cases the efficiency of the troops will prove useless
in face of the hesitation and aimlessness of the
policy which it serves. Remember the campaign
in Champagne in 1792. One technical superiority
of the Prussian and Austrian troops over the sans
culottes was at that date still very considerable,
and in the neighbourhood of Mannheim a single
battalion of the Wedell Regiment prevented two
French divisions from crossing the Rhine during
the whole of one day. But still the political result
of the war was the complete downfall of the coali-
tion. The Allies were not of one mind; their
policy lacked all definite aim, and the campaign
was being conducted at haphazard. Political
considerations of this kind, which interfere with
the strategy of the leaders, are particularly dis-
astrous in wars conducted by coalitions, and
history has often proved the truth of the line,
"the strong man is strongest when alone. " In the
campaigns of 1813 and 1814, the incompetent
Prussian generals, in concert with the talented
Prussian commanders, carried on war to the knife,
whereas the more competent Austrians, who were
hindered by the aimless policy of their country,
showed themselves lukewarm and indifferent.
A policy such as that of the Austrians could not
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? 142 Treitschke
hope to find a better commander than Schwarzen-
berg. Many wars have been lost before they
were begun because they were the result of a
policy which did not know its own mind. Every
healthy-minded Army is conscious of a strong
sense of chivalry and personal honour. But under
certain circumstances this military sense of honour
becomes oversensitive. Abuses are, of course,
to 'be deplored, but this touchiness is in itself a
wholesome symptom. The duel is not a thing
which can be disregarded even among civilians.
In a democratic community the duel is the last
protest which can be made against a complete
subversion of social manners and customs. A
certain restraint is put upon a man by the thought
that he will risk his life by offending against social
usage; and it is better that now and then a pro-
mising young life should be laid down than that
the social morality of a whole people should be
brutalized. A sense of class honour also fosters
the great moral strength which resides in the Army
and which is the cause of a large part of its effec-
tiveness. The officers would lose the respect of
their subordinates if they did not show a more
ticklish sense of honour and a finer breeding.
Since duelling was abolished in England, moral
coarseness in the Army has been on the increase,
and officers have been known to come to blows in
railway carriages in the very presence of their
wives. It is obvious how greatly such conduct
must impair the respect due from the men to their
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? The Army 143
superiors. The statement of the democrat that
a man of the lower classes will more readily obey
his equal than a gentleman is entirely false. The
respect of a soldier for a man of really distinguished
character will always be greater than his respect
for an old corporal. This truth was plainly de-
monstrated in the last war, when it was found that
the French officers did not possess enough authority
over their men.
As warfare is but the tremendous embodiment
of foreign policy, everything relating to military
affairs must have a very intimate connection with
the constitution of the State, and, in its turn,
the particular organization of the Army must
determine which of many types of warfare shall
be followed. Because the Middle Ages were
aristocratic, most of the battles then fought
were between cavalry, which has always been the
pre-eminently aristocratic instrument of war.
The results of this idea may still be observed
to-day. Too great a preponderance of cavalry is
always a sign that the economic condition of a
nation is still defective, and that the power of the
aristocracy in the State is too absolute. . . .
Mechanical weapons have, on the other hand,
always been the especial property of the middle
classes. Engineering has always flourished among
commercial nations, because they possess both
capital and technical skill. Among the ancients,
the Carthaginians were technically the most
important nation in military affairs; but Rome
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? 144 Treitschke
conquered them in the end, not because
her generals were better, but because of
the moral force which held her National Army
together.
For however important technique may be in
war, it never turns the scales unaided. Economic
considerations such as skill in engineering or in
systematic collaboration can never help one to
determine the value of an Army. Still, this is
what the commercial nations seek to do, for they
look upon an Army of purely professional soldiers
as the best. It is not technical but abstract and
moral superiority that tells in the long run in war.
As far as physical capacity goes, the English
soldiers are very efficient; they are trained to box,
and are fed on an incredibly liberal scale. But
even people in England are realizing more and
more strongly that there is something wrong with
their Army, and that it cannot be compared with
a National Army because the moral energies of
the people are excluded from it. The world is not
as materialistic as Wellington supposed. Wel-
lington used to say that enthusiasm in an Army
could only produce confusion and other ill-
effects. The really national weapon of England
is the Fleet. The martial enthusiasm of the
country and it is far stronger than is usually
supposed on the Continent, because the idea of
a British universal Empire is very general among
the people must be sought on the men-of-
war.
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? The Army 145
In considering these questions we must never
lose sight of the purely moral value of the National
Army as opposed to its purely national and poli-
tical value. We must be quite clear as to whether
the perpetual complaints of the great cost of our
military system are justified. It is certain that
the blood-tax imposed by the military burden is
the greatest which a nation can be called upon to
bear. But we must never forget that there are,
and ought to be, things which are above all price.
Moral possessions have no price, and it is therefore
unreasonable to try to reckon the value of the
honour and power of the State in terms of money.
Money can never represent what we lost when the
flower of our youthful manhood fell on the battle-
fields of France. It is unworthy to judge the
possessions of the soul as if they were material.
A great nation is acting in a right and reasonable
way if it seeks to give expression to the idea of the
State, which stands for power, in the form of a
well-ordered military organization. Without it,
trade and intercourse could not prosper. If one
were to try to imagine the country without the
Army which protects our civil peace, it would be
impossible to say how great would be the decrease
in our national revenues.
Under ordinary circumstances the right to bear
arms must always be looked upon as the privilege
of a free man. It was only during the last period
of the Roman Empire that the system of keeping
mercenaries was adopted. And as mercenary
10
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? 146 Treitschke
troops consisted, except for their officers, of the
lowest dregs of society, the idea soon became
prevalent that military service was a disgrace;
and the free citizen began to show himself anxious
not to take part in it. This conception of the
mercenary system has gone on perpetuating itself
through the ages, and its after-effects have been
strikingly demonstrated even in our own day.
Our century has been called upon to witness, in
the formation of the National and Civil Guards,
the most immoral and unreasonable developments
of which the military system is capable. The
citizens imagined themselves too good to bear
arms against the enemies of their country, but
they were not averse to playing at soldiers at
home, and even to being able to defend their purse
if it should happen to be in danger. Hence the
truly disgusting invention of the National Guard,
and the inhuman legal provision that in the event
of a popular disturbance the adored rabble might
receive an immediate shaking at the hands of the
guard. The Army was only to interfere if things
became serious. This shows a complete failure
to realize the moral nobility of the duty of defence.
The right to bear arms will ever remain the honor-
ary privilege of the free man. All noble minds
have more or less recognized the truth that
"The God Who created iron did not wish
men to be thralls. " And it is the task of all
reasonable political systems to keep this idea
in honour.
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? The Army 147
II.
The example of the German National Army
has had an irresistible influence on the rest of
Europe. The ridicule heaped on it in previous
decades has now been shown to be unwarranted.
It was the custom abroad to look down on the
Prussian territorial system (Landwehr) and on the
Prussian boy army. -Things are very different
now. We know now that moral factors in war-
fare weigh more heavily than technical excellence ;
and it is further evident that the ever-increasing
technical experience of life in barracks brings
with it a corresponding brutalization of the moral
instincts. The old sergeants of France were in
no way superior to the German troops, as the
French had expected. We may say with truth
that the problem of giving a military education
to the strength of the nation and of making full
use of the trained Army was first seriously dealt
with in Germany. Our Army constitutes a pecu-
liar and necessary continuation of the scholastic
system. For many people it would be impossible
to devise a better means of education. For such
persons, living as they do in a period in which
mental restraint is lacking, the drill and enforced
cleanliness, and strict military discipline are in-
dispensable from every point of view. Carry le
prophesied that the Prussian conception of uni-
versal military service would go the round of the
globe. Since 1866 and 1870, when the organiza-
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? 148 Treitschke
tion of the Prussian Army stood its trial so bril-
liantly, nearly all the other great Powers of the
Continent have sought to imitate its methods.
But imitation abroad is not as easy as was
supposed because the Prussian Army is really a
nation in arms, and the peculiarities and refine-
ments of the national character are naturally
exemplified in it. Above all, a system of this
kind cannot be established unless the nation pos-
sesses a certain degree of political freedom, is
satisfied with the existing regime, and can count
on social freedom in the Government. A natural
respect for superior education is also necessary, for
without it the institution of the One-year Volun-
teers would be unthinkable. This system has
been introduced simply in order to make it econo-
mically and morally possible for young men belong-
ing to the educated classes to serve in the ranks.
In France this voluntary system has proved a
failure because an external equality between
different classes of men has been insisted upon.
In Germany we could hardly do without it. Quite
apart from the fact that our supply of professional
officers is not nearly large enough in the event of
war, the educated young men who in the One-year
Voluntary Service transforms into territorial
reserve officers, and who stand in many ways in
a closer relationship to the people than the pro-
fessional officers, form a natural link between the
latter and the rank and file of the Army.
The heavy burden of universal military service
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? The Army 149
can be lightened in a certain measure by decentrali-
zation, which usually enables a man to serve in
his native province. Our Provincial Army Corps
have, on the whole, quite justified their existence.
They should remain the rule; and as a wholesome
counterweight we have, in the Guard, a corps
which includes men from all parts of the country,
and forms a crack regiment, one of whose functions
it is to spur on the rest of the Army. The rigid
centralization of France makes the existence of
Provincial Army Corps such as ours an impossibil-
ity. The natives of Normandy and of the Pyre-
nees there stand side by side in the same regiment.
In Germany, on the other hand, common national-
ity is rightly looked upon as a strong cement which
will ensure the solidarity of separate bodies of
troops. This universal military service, if it is
to preserve the existence of the State, must
naturally presuppose unity in the nation as a
whole. One or two isolated little provinces,
peopled by foreign races, do not greatly affect the
question, and a few simple precautions will do
away with any threatened danger from those
quarters. In Austria things are more serious,
because there the officers in the Reserve are the
weak point of the army.
They are good Czechs,
good Germans, and good Magyars, but not good
Austrians; and this flaw may some day bring
about disastrous consequences.
In all these matters of military organization
we were until quite lately the leader of the other
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? 150 Treitschke
nations. During the last few years the neighbour-
ing States have made such strenuous efforts to
obtain military power that we have been obliged
to go further this time in imitation of other
nations. The furthest limits to this onward move-
ment are improved by nature of things, and the
enormous physical strength of the Germanic race
will see to it that we have a perpetual advantage
in this respect over the less faithful nations.
The French have nearly reached the utmost limits
of their capacity; the Germans possess, in this
respect, far wider elbow-room.
I will ask you once more to observe the nature
of the influence exercised on warfare by these new
methods in military affairs. The general tend-
ency of this system is towards peace. A nation
in arms is not as easily drawn away from its social
occupations to take part in a frivolous war as a
Conscript Army would be. Wars will become
rarer and of shorter duration, although more
bloody. Desire to return home will drive the
Army to advance. The temper of the Prussian
soldiers in the summer of 1866, expressed in the
words, "Let us press on towards the Danube, so
that we may get home again soon," should be
looked upon as the normal temper of a courageous
and, at the same time, peace-loving National Army.
There can be no difficulty, to-day, in understand-
ing the bold spirit in warfare which seeks, above
all, to plunge a dagger into the heart of the enemy.
It may be said that nothing is absolutely impossible
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? The Army 151
to a National Army of this kind when the nation
can look back over a glorious past. The experi-
ences of our last two wars, especially in the Battles
of Koniggratz and Mars La Tour, have proved
this to be true. We saw, at the Battle of Sadowa,
that fourteen Prussian battalions could stand
against something like forty- two Austrian ones;
and the Franco-Prussian War furnished us with
numerous instances of decisive battles in which we
fought facing our own frontiers, so that if we had
lost we should have been driven back into the
interior of the enemy 's country. In the case of
a modern national army, the duty of sparing men
is entirely swallowed up in the higher duty of
annihilating the enemy. The fear of desertion
need not be entertained; the Army can be billeted
wherever it is.
The famous saying of Montecucoli, cited even
by Frederick the Great, belongs to a period now
entirely past. Montecucoli had said that in order
to wage war a nation must have money, and
money, and yet more money. It is true that a
great deal of money is needed for the preparations
involved by war; but when fighting has once begun,
the conqueror can do without ready money. He
can simply fall back on the resources of the occu-
pied territory, and may even abstain from paying
his troops for the moment. Once, when Bliicher
imposed a huge war contribution on the French
in order to feed his hungry soldiers, the King sent
an order forbidding him to embitter the French
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? 152 Treitschke
too much, and promising that the soldiers' pay
should be procured in Prussia. Bliicher replied,
"Your Majesty's Army is not 1 a mercenary army.
Even if I am not permitted to take money from a
hostile country, we will not be an unnecessary
burden to our mother country. " It is a well-
known fact that Napoleon began the campaign of
1806 with a war chest of forty thousand francs,
and in 1813 we were, ourselves, in a far worse
plight. We had, at the beginning, only two
thousand thalers (about six thousand marks) in
cash; but the first thing we did was to turn the
pecuniary resources of the Saxons into ready
money, and so we went on.
A certain self-reliance on the part of under-
commanders has become a necessity in the enor-
mous National Army of the present day. General
Manteuffel once told me that on the misty morning
of the Battle of Noisseville, he was only able to
give quite general directions ; for the rest, he relied
entirely on the initiative and sense of responsibility
of his generals. The final stages in the develop-
ment of war on the principle of universal service
have not yet been reached, and the world has not,
as yet, beheld a war between two national armies.
During the first half of the last great war, we
witnessed a meeting between a really national
army and a conscript army, and later, an impro-
vised Militia. The spectacle of the encounter
between two perfectly trained national armies,
which we have yet to see, will certainly be a
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? The Army 153
gigantic one. The world will then witness enor-
mous losses, and enormous results. And, if we
consider the multitude of new technical devices
produced in these modern times, we must realize
that future wars will give rise to far more astound-
ing revelations than any during the Franco-
Prussian War.
The new means of transport are especially
important in modern warfare. A State cannot
have too many railways for military purposes.
An immediate occupation of an enemy's country
is especially important in modern warfare, for it
puts an effective stop to all recruiting. One of
Napoleon Ill's most serious mistakes in 1870
was, that he failed to occupy at least a portion of
the left bank of the Rhine. We could not, at the
outset, have prevented him from doing so, and
this fact is openly stated in the introduction to the
work composed by the general staff, which Moltke
no doubt wrote himself. We should, by that
means, have lost two army corps from our field
army.
It is certain, then, that the more railways lead
to the frontier, the better. But I must here repeat
that everything has its natural limits. It is true
that an extensive railway system facilitates the
collection of an army on the frontier the moment
war is declared; but during the war its use is far
more restricted. It is quite easy for a scouting
party to make a railway impracticable for a long
time. The working capacity of a railway is also
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? 154 Treitschke
limited, and it can only transport a given number
of men and guns in each day. Our general staff
has calculated that an army of 60,000 men can
cover thirty miles as quickly on foot as by train.
It is often more useful for the troops to spend this
time in marching. It thus follows that railway
transport is only an advantage when the distances
to be covered are great, and even then the advant-
age is sometimes doubtful. If a line of advance
is to be kept secret, the troops must march. This
is proved by Bourbaki's unsuccessful expedition
against Southern Alsace. He collected his army
in trains, and tried to bring it up in that way as
far as the Vosges. All officers are of opinion that
if the troops had gone on foot, the German out-
posts of the small detachments, on the western
spurs of the Vosges, would not have observed
them soon enough. As it was, our Uhlan patrols
on the heights were able to report a noticeable
activity on the railway lines in the valley, and
General Werder thus had time to draw in his men,
and cause them to take up a defensive position.
The old truth that very much depends on the
marching capacity of an efficient body of infantry,
still holds good in modern warfare.
Our ideas regarding the importance of the fort-
ress have, on the other hand, undergone a complete
change. The time has long vanished when every
town was a fortress, and a long campaign in a
hostile country usually ended by taking the form
of siege-warfare. To-day, the question is even
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? The Army 155
being asked, "Are fortresses any longer of practical
use? " The Germans answer this question far
more sensibly than the French. France sur-
rounded herself with a tremendous rampart of
fortresses, reaching from Sedan to Belfort, and
thus believed herself shut off from Germany as
by a Chinese wall. But in so long a line there
must somewhere be a weak spot, which the Ger-
mans will certainly end by rinding. There is,
however, an even more important consideration.
Walls cannot defend themselves, and if they are
to be effectually defended, the great fortresses
need a huge garrison, which is thus lost to the
field army. The Germans are of opinion that
small-barrier forts are necessary, and may be useful
even to-day. A little mountain fortress of this
kind, situated on a defile can, under certain cir-
cumstances, cut the enemy off from using a
whole system of roads.
The Saxon fortress of Konigstein, for instance,
is not impregnable, but a siege of the place might
drag on indefinitely. It was from this fortress
that a successful attempt was made in 1866 to
destroy the important railway from Dresden to
Prague, so that the Prussians were unable to use
it for a fortnight. The railway could not be
repaired, because the batteries of the fortress
commanded the line. The advance of the Prus-
sians into Bohemia was thus made very difficult.
The fortress of Bitsch, in the Vosges, plays a very
similar part. Little mountain strongholds will
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? 156 Treitschke
thus continue to be of service for some time to
come.
On the other hand, it is necessary to maintain
the large strongholds known as army fortresses,
in order to have places of refuge for a whole army,
and especially so that one may there shelter and
replenish a beaten army. Strassburg and Metz
exist for this purpose. All our officers agree,
however, that we must not have too many fort-
resses of this type. Many deny that they have
any use at all, for decisive actions in war are
always fought in the open field, and any military
system which lessens our forces in the field presents
very serious drawbacks. A fortress of this kind
needs a large garrison even when no enemy is
in the neighbourhood. We are always brought
back to the fact that national armies, which are
so full of moral energy, must be looked upon as
pre-eminently capable of assuming a vigorous
offensive.
I will conclude by pointing out, very briefly,
that the fleet has begun to assume a far more
important position not, in the first place, as an
essential factor in a European war, for no one
believes now that a war between great Powers
could be decided by a naval battle but as a pro-
tection for the merchant navy and the colonies.
The task of ruling countries on the other side of
the Atlantic will, from henceforth, be the chief
duty of European fleets. For, since the object
of human culture must be to assert the supremacy
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? The Army 157
of the white races on the entire globe, the import-
ance of a people will finally depend on the share
it takes in the rule of the transatlantic world. It
is on this account that the importance of the fleet
has so largely increased during our own day.
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? INTERNATIONAL LAW
IS there really such a thing as international law?
Certainly there are two common theories of
international relations, each contradictory to the
other, each quite untenable. One, the so-called
naturalistic theory, dates from Machiavelli. It
is based on the notion that the State is merely
might personified, that it has the right to do any-
thing that is profitable to it. On this view the
State cannot fetter itself by international law; its
relations with other States depend simply on the
respective strength which it and they possess.
This theory leads to an absurdity. It is of course
true that the State implies physical might. But if
a State be that and nothing else, if it pay no heed
to reason or to conscience, it will never maintain
itself in a proper condition of safety. Even na-
turalistic thinkers allow that it is a function of
the State to preserve internal order; that it cannot
do if it refuses to obey any law in its relations with
other States. Its deliberate contempt for good
faith, loyalty, and treaty agreements in external
relations would raise a crowd of enemies, and pre-
vent it from fulfilling its purpose the embodi-
ment of physical force. Even Machiavelli's ideal,
Caesar Borgia, ultimately fell into the pit which he
158
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? International Law 159
had digged for others. For the end and object
of the State's existence is not physical might; it
embodies might only in order that it may protect
and develop the nobler aspects of mankind. Thus
the doctrine of pure might is a vain doctrine; it
is immoral because it cannot justify its own
existence.
Directly contrary to this view of the State, is
another an equally false view. This is the
"moral" conception due to German liberalism.
The State is here regarded as a good little boy,
to be washed, brushed, and sent to school ; he must
have his ears pulled, to keep him good, and in
return he is to be thankful, just-minded, and
Heaven knows what else. This German doctri-
naire theory has done as much harm to our political
thinking as to other forms of German life. All
our political sins can be traced back to the notion
natural enough in a learned nation that the
pronouncement of some scientific truth is ade-
quate to turn the world's course into a new channel.
That notion underlies the German spirit of sci-
entific research; it also underlies our tendency to
all manner of practical blunders. The doctri-
naire exponent of international law fondly imagines
that he need only emit a few aphorisms and that
the nations of the world will forthwith, as reason-
able men, accept them. We forget that stupidity
and passion matter, and have always mattered
in history. Who, after all, can fail to see the
growth of national passions during the nineteenth
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? 160 Treitschke
century? And whence do individuals Rotteck,
Bluntschli, Heffter, and others say to States per-
emptorily, "Thou shalt"? No single man stands
high enough to impose his doctrines on all States ;
he must be ready to see his theories crossed or
crushed by actual life. The delusion that there
can be such a thing as hypothetical law is at the
root of these errors. Positive law is the only law
that has real existence. Until the general public
has grown convinced of the truth and righteous-
ness of various legal principles, the function of
learned men is really limited to preparing the way.
Were we to pursue the abstract conception of the
State to its logical conclusion, we should find
ourselves demanding a supreme authority with
world-wide power. The authority would be such
as that claimed by the Papal See, an authority
not of this world, represented by the Vicegerent
of Christ and ruling in the name of God. That is
the sort of authority which we do not want on
earth; our beautiful world should be a world of
liberty. Nevertheless it is only ultramontane
thinkers who have consistently worked out to its
logical issue the weak and sentimental view of
international law which we at this moment are
considering. That logical issue has been rightly
stated in the great "Codex" of the Jesuits; accord-
ing to it, the world is, as it were, an ethnarchy in
which the nations form an ideal community, while
the Pope, as ethnarch, wields over them a coercive
power, keeping each State within bounds by spiri-
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recognize the moral majesty of war just in those
aspects of it which superficial observers describe
as brutal and inhuman. Men are called upon to
overcome all natural feeling for the sake of their
country, to murder people who have never before
done them any harm, and whom they perhaps
respect as chivalrous enemies. It is things such
as these that seem at the first glance horrible and
repulsive. Look at them again and you will see
in them the greatness of war. Not only the life
of man, but also the right and natural emotions
of his inmost soul, his whole ego, are to be sacri-
ficed to a great patriotic ideal; and herein lies the
moral magnificence of war. If we pursue this
idea still further, we shall see that in spite of its
hardness and roughness, war links men together
in brotherly love, for it levels all differences of
rank, and draws men together by a common sense
of the imminence of death. Every student of
history knows that to do away with war would
be to cripple human nature. No liberty can exist
without an armed force ready to sacrifice itself
for the sake of freedom. One cannot insist too
often on the fact that scholars never touch upon
these questions without presupposing that the
State only exists as a sort of academy of arts and
sciences. This is of course also part of its duty,
but not its most immediate duty. A State which
cultivates its mental powers at the expense of its
physical ones cannot fail to go to ruin.
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? 140 Treitschke
Generally speaking, we must admit that the
greatness of historical life lies in character rather
than m' education ; the driving forces of history
are to be found on spheres where character is
developing. Only hra. vft nations have any real
history. In the hour of trial in national life it be-
comes evident that warlike virtues have the cast-
jng^ vote. ^There is great truth in the old phrase
which described war as the examen rigorosum
of the States. In war, the States are called upon
to show, not only the extent of their physical,
but also of their moral power, and in a certain
measure of their intellectual capacity. . . . War
brings to light all that a nation has collected in
secret. It is not an essential part of the nature
of armies to be always righting; the noiseless
labour of armament goes on equally in time of
peace. The entire value of the work done for
Prussia by Frederick William I did not appear until
the days of Frederick the Great, when the tremen-
dous force which had been slowly collecting sud-
denly revealed itself to the world at large. The
same is true of the year 1866.
And just because war is nothing more than a
powerful embodiment of politics, its issues are
decided, not by technical factors alone, but chiefly
by the policy which directs it. It is very signi-
ficant that when Wrangel and Prittwitz might
have been able to get the better of the Danes in
1848, and 1849, the King, who seems to have
felt horror at the thought of taking this step, and
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? The Army 141
who, moreover, feared Russia, did not himself
know what he wanted. An Army can never be
expected to fight when its leaders are in doubt as
to the advisability of a particular military action.
Every war is by nature a radical one, and in many
cases the efficiency of the troops will prove useless
in face of the hesitation and aimlessness of the
policy which it serves. Remember the campaign
in Champagne in 1792. One technical superiority
of the Prussian and Austrian troops over the sans
culottes was at that date still very considerable,
and in the neighbourhood of Mannheim a single
battalion of the Wedell Regiment prevented two
French divisions from crossing the Rhine during
the whole of one day. But still the political result
of the war was the complete downfall of the coali-
tion. The Allies were not of one mind; their
policy lacked all definite aim, and the campaign
was being conducted at haphazard. Political
considerations of this kind, which interfere with
the strategy of the leaders, are particularly dis-
astrous in wars conducted by coalitions, and
history has often proved the truth of the line,
"the strong man is strongest when alone. " In the
campaigns of 1813 and 1814, the incompetent
Prussian generals, in concert with the talented
Prussian commanders, carried on war to the knife,
whereas the more competent Austrians, who were
hindered by the aimless policy of their country,
showed themselves lukewarm and indifferent.
A policy such as that of the Austrians could not
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? 142 Treitschke
hope to find a better commander than Schwarzen-
berg. Many wars have been lost before they
were begun because they were the result of a
policy which did not know its own mind. Every
healthy-minded Army is conscious of a strong
sense of chivalry and personal honour. But under
certain circumstances this military sense of honour
becomes oversensitive. Abuses are, of course,
to 'be deplored, but this touchiness is in itself a
wholesome symptom. The duel is not a thing
which can be disregarded even among civilians.
In a democratic community the duel is the last
protest which can be made against a complete
subversion of social manners and customs. A
certain restraint is put upon a man by the thought
that he will risk his life by offending against social
usage; and it is better that now and then a pro-
mising young life should be laid down than that
the social morality of a whole people should be
brutalized. A sense of class honour also fosters
the great moral strength which resides in the Army
and which is the cause of a large part of its effec-
tiveness. The officers would lose the respect of
their subordinates if they did not show a more
ticklish sense of honour and a finer breeding.
Since duelling was abolished in England, moral
coarseness in the Army has been on the increase,
and officers have been known to come to blows in
railway carriages in the very presence of their
wives. It is obvious how greatly such conduct
must impair the respect due from the men to their
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? The Army 143
superiors. The statement of the democrat that
a man of the lower classes will more readily obey
his equal than a gentleman is entirely false. The
respect of a soldier for a man of really distinguished
character will always be greater than his respect
for an old corporal. This truth was plainly de-
monstrated in the last war, when it was found that
the French officers did not possess enough authority
over their men.
As warfare is but the tremendous embodiment
of foreign policy, everything relating to military
affairs must have a very intimate connection with
the constitution of the State, and, in its turn,
the particular organization of the Army must
determine which of many types of warfare shall
be followed. Because the Middle Ages were
aristocratic, most of the battles then fought
were between cavalry, which has always been the
pre-eminently aristocratic instrument of war.
The results of this idea may still be observed
to-day. Too great a preponderance of cavalry is
always a sign that the economic condition of a
nation is still defective, and that the power of the
aristocracy in the State is too absolute. . . .
Mechanical weapons have, on the other hand,
always been the especial property of the middle
classes. Engineering has always flourished among
commercial nations, because they possess both
capital and technical skill. Among the ancients,
the Carthaginians were technically the most
important nation in military affairs; but Rome
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? 144 Treitschke
conquered them in the end, not because
her generals were better, but because of
the moral force which held her National Army
together.
For however important technique may be in
war, it never turns the scales unaided. Economic
considerations such as skill in engineering or in
systematic collaboration can never help one to
determine the value of an Army. Still, this is
what the commercial nations seek to do, for they
look upon an Army of purely professional soldiers
as the best. It is not technical but abstract and
moral superiority that tells in the long run in war.
As far as physical capacity goes, the English
soldiers are very efficient; they are trained to box,
and are fed on an incredibly liberal scale. But
even people in England are realizing more and
more strongly that there is something wrong with
their Army, and that it cannot be compared with
a National Army because the moral energies of
the people are excluded from it. The world is not
as materialistic as Wellington supposed. Wel-
lington used to say that enthusiasm in an Army
could only produce confusion and other ill-
effects. The really national weapon of England
is the Fleet. The martial enthusiasm of the
country and it is far stronger than is usually
supposed on the Continent, because the idea of
a British universal Empire is very general among
the people must be sought on the men-of-
war.
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? The Army 145
In considering these questions we must never
lose sight of the purely moral value of the National
Army as opposed to its purely national and poli-
tical value. We must be quite clear as to whether
the perpetual complaints of the great cost of our
military system are justified. It is certain that
the blood-tax imposed by the military burden is
the greatest which a nation can be called upon to
bear. But we must never forget that there are,
and ought to be, things which are above all price.
Moral possessions have no price, and it is therefore
unreasonable to try to reckon the value of the
honour and power of the State in terms of money.
Money can never represent what we lost when the
flower of our youthful manhood fell on the battle-
fields of France. It is unworthy to judge the
possessions of the soul as if they were material.
A great nation is acting in a right and reasonable
way if it seeks to give expression to the idea of the
State, which stands for power, in the form of a
well-ordered military organization. Without it,
trade and intercourse could not prosper. If one
were to try to imagine the country without the
Army which protects our civil peace, it would be
impossible to say how great would be the decrease
in our national revenues.
Under ordinary circumstances the right to bear
arms must always be looked upon as the privilege
of a free man. It was only during the last period
of the Roman Empire that the system of keeping
mercenaries was adopted. And as mercenary
10
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? 146 Treitschke
troops consisted, except for their officers, of the
lowest dregs of society, the idea soon became
prevalent that military service was a disgrace;
and the free citizen began to show himself anxious
not to take part in it. This conception of the
mercenary system has gone on perpetuating itself
through the ages, and its after-effects have been
strikingly demonstrated even in our own day.
Our century has been called upon to witness, in
the formation of the National and Civil Guards,
the most immoral and unreasonable developments
of which the military system is capable. The
citizens imagined themselves too good to bear
arms against the enemies of their country, but
they were not averse to playing at soldiers at
home, and even to being able to defend their purse
if it should happen to be in danger. Hence the
truly disgusting invention of the National Guard,
and the inhuman legal provision that in the event
of a popular disturbance the adored rabble might
receive an immediate shaking at the hands of the
guard. The Army was only to interfere if things
became serious. This shows a complete failure
to realize the moral nobility of the duty of defence.
The right to bear arms will ever remain the honor-
ary privilege of the free man. All noble minds
have more or less recognized the truth that
"The God Who created iron did not wish
men to be thralls. " And it is the task of all
reasonable political systems to keep this idea
in honour.
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? The Army 147
II.
The example of the German National Army
has had an irresistible influence on the rest of
Europe. The ridicule heaped on it in previous
decades has now been shown to be unwarranted.
It was the custom abroad to look down on the
Prussian territorial system (Landwehr) and on the
Prussian boy army. -Things are very different
now. We know now that moral factors in war-
fare weigh more heavily than technical excellence ;
and it is further evident that the ever-increasing
technical experience of life in barracks brings
with it a corresponding brutalization of the moral
instincts. The old sergeants of France were in
no way superior to the German troops, as the
French had expected. We may say with truth
that the problem of giving a military education
to the strength of the nation and of making full
use of the trained Army was first seriously dealt
with in Germany. Our Army constitutes a pecu-
liar and necessary continuation of the scholastic
system. For many people it would be impossible
to devise a better means of education. For such
persons, living as they do in a period in which
mental restraint is lacking, the drill and enforced
cleanliness, and strict military discipline are in-
dispensable from every point of view. Carry le
prophesied that the Prussian conception of uni-
versal military service would go the round of the
globe. Since 1866 and 1870, when the organiza-
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? 148 Treitschke
tion of the Prussian Army stood its trial so bril-
liantly, nearly all the other great Powers of the
Continent have sought to imitate its methods.
But imitation abroad is not as easy as was
supposed because the Prussian Army is really a
nation in arms, and the peculiarities and refine-
ments of the national character are naturally
exemplified in it. Above all, a system of this
kind cannot be established unless the nation pos-
sesses a certain degree of political freedom, is
satisfied with the existing regime, and can count
on social freedom in the Government. A natural
respect for superior education is also necessary, for
without it the institution of the One-year Volun-
teers would be unthinkable. This system has
been introduced simply in order to make it econo-
mically and morally possible for young men belong-
ing to the educated classes to serve in the ranks.
In France this voluntary system has proved a
failure because an external equality between
different classes of men has been insisted upon.
In Germany we could hardly do without it. Quite
apart from the fact that our supply of professional
officers is not nearly large enough in the event of
war, the educated young men who in the One-year
Voluntary Service transforms into territorial
reserve officers, and who stand in many ways in
a closer relationship to the people than the pro-
fessional officers, form a natural link between the
latter and the rank and file of the Army.
The heavy burden of universal military service
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? The Army 149
can be lightened in a certain measure by decentrali-
zation, which usually enables a man to serve in
his native province. Our Provincial Army Corps
have, on the whole, quite justified their existence.
They should remain the rule; and as a wholesome
counterweight we have, in the Guard, a corps
which includes men from all parts of the country,
and forms a crack regiment, one of whose functions
it is to spur on the rest of the Army. The rigid
centralization of France makes the existence of
Provincial Army Corps such as ours an impossibil-
ity. The natives of Normandy and of the Pyre-
nees there stand side by side in the same regiment.
In Germany, on the other hand, common national-
ity is rightly looked upon as a strong cement which
will ensure the solidarity of separate bodies of
troops. This universal military service, if it is
to preserve the existence of the State, must
naturally presuppose unity in the nation as a
whole. One or two isolated little provinces,
peopled by foreign races, do not greatly affect the
question, and a few simple precautions will do
away with any threatened danger from those
quarters. In Austria things are more serious,
because there the officers in the Reserve are the
weak point of the army.
They are good Czechs,
good Germans, and good Magyars, but not good
Austrians; and this flaw may some day bring
about disastrous consequences.
In all these matters of military organization
we were until quite lately the leader of the other
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? 150 Treitschke
nations. During the last few years the neighbour-
ing States have made such strenuous efforts to
obtain military power that we have been obliged
to go further this time in imitation of other
nations. The furthest limits to this onward move-
ment are improved by nature of things, and the
enormous physical strength of the Germanic race
will see to it that we have a perpetual advantage
in this respect over the less faithful nations.
The French have nearly reached the utmost limits
of their capacity; the Germans possess, in this
respect, far wider elbow-room.
I will ask you once more to observe the nature
of the influence exercised on warfare by these new
methods in military affairs. The general tend-
ency of this system is towards peace. A nation
in arms is not as easily drawn away from its social
occupations to take part in a frivolous war as a
Conscript Army would be. Wars will become
rarer and of shorter duration, although more
bloody. Desire to return home will drive the
Army to advance. The temper of the Prussian
soldiers in the summer of 1866, expressed in the
words, "Let us press on towards the Danube, so
that we may get home again soon," should be
looked upon as the normal temper of a courageous
and, at the same time, peace-loving National Army.
There can be no difficulty, to-day, in understand-
ing the bold spirit in warfare which seeks, above
all, to plunge a dagger into the heart of the enemy.
It may be said that nothing is absolutely impossible
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? The Army 151
to a National Army of this kind when the nation
can look back over a glorious past. The experi-
ences of our last two wars, especially in the Battles
of Koniggratz and Mars La Tour, have proved
this to be true. We saw, at the Battle of Sadowa,
that fourteen Prussian battalions could stand
against something like forty- two Austrian ones;
and the Franco-Prussian War furnished us with
numerous instances of decisive battles in which we
fought facing our own frontiers, so that if we had
lost we should have been driven back into the
interior of the enemy 's country. In the case of
a modern national army, the duty of sparing men
is entirely swallowed up in the higher duty of
annihilating the enemy. The fear of desertion
need not be entertained; the Army can be billeted
wherever it is.
The famous saying of Montecucoli, cited even
by Frederick the Great, belongs to a period now
entirely past. Montecucoli had said that in order
to wage war a nation must have money, and
money, and yet more money. It is true that a
great deal of money is needed for the preparations
involved by war; but when fighting has once begun,
the conqueror can do without ready money. He
can simply fall back on the resources of the occu-
pied territory, and may even abstain from paying
his troops for the moment. Once, when Bliicher
imposed a huge war contribution on the French
in order to feed his hungry soldiers, the King sent
an order forbidding him to embitter the French
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? 152 Treitschke
too much, and promising that the soldiers' pay
should be procured in Prussia. Bliicher replied,
"Your Majesty's Army is not 1 a mercenary army.
Even if I am not permitted to take money from a
hostile country, we will not be an unnecessary
burden to our mother country. " It is a well-
known fact that Napoleon began the campaign of
1806 with a war chest of forty thousand francs,
and in 1813 we were, ourselves, in a far worse
plight. We had, at the beginning, only two
thousand thalers (about six thousand marks) in
cash; but the first thing we did was to turn the
pecuniary resources of the Saxons into ready
money, and so we went on.
A certain self-reliance on the part of under-
commanders has become a necessity in the enor-
mous National Army of the present day. General
Manteuffel once told me that on the misty morning
of the Battle of Noisseville, he was only able to
give quite general directions ; for the rest, he relied
entirely on the initiative and sense of responsibility
of his generals. The final stages in the develop-
ment of war on the principle of universal service
have not yet been reached, and the world has not,
as yet, beheld a war between two national armies.
During the first half of the last great war, we
witnessed a meeting between a really national
army and a conscript army, and later, an impro-
vised Militia. The spectacle of the encounter
between two perfectly trained national armies,
which we have yet to see, will certainly be a
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? The Army 153
gigantic one. The world will then witness enor-
mous losses, and enormous results. And, if we
consider the multitude of new technical devices
produced in these modern times, we must realize
that future wars will give rise to far more astound-
ing revelations than any during the Franco-
Prussian War.
The new means of transport are especially
important in modern warfare. A State cannot
have too many railways for military purposes.
An immediate occupation of an enemy's country
is especially important in modern warfare, for it
puts an effective stop to all recruiting. One of
Napoleon Ill's most serious mistakes in 1870
was, that he failed to occupy at least a portion of
the left bank of the Rhine. We could not, at the
outset, have prevented him from doing so, and
this fact is openly stated in the introduction to the
work composed by the general staff, which Moltke
no doubt wrote himself. We should, by that
means, have lost two army corps from our field
army.
It is certain, then, that the more railways lead
to the frontier, the better. But I must here repeat
that everything has its natural limits. It is true
that an extensive railway system facilitates the
collection of an army on the frontier the moment
war is declared; but during the war its use is far
more restricted. It is quite easy for a scouting
party to make a railway impracticable for a long
time. The working capacity of a railway is also
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? 154 Treitschke
limited, and it can only transport a given number
of men and guns in each day. Our general staff
has calculated that an army of 60,000 men can
cover thirty miles as quickly on foot as by train.
It is often more useful for the troops to spend this
time in marching. It thus follows that railway
transport is only an advantage when the distances
to be covered are great, and even then the advant-
age is sometimes doubtful. If a line of advance
is to be kept secret, the troops must march. This
is proved by Bourbaki's unsuccessful expedition
against Southern Alsace. He collected his army
in trains, and tried to bring it up in that way as
far as the Vosges. All officers are of opinion that
if the troops had gone on foot, the German out-
posts of the small detachments, on the western
spurs of the Vosges, would not have observed
them soon enough. As it was, our Uhlan patrols
on the heights were able to report a noticeable
activity on the railway lines in the valley, and
General Werder thus had time to draw in his men,
and cause them to take up a defensive position.
The old truth that very much depends on the
marching capacity of an efficient body of infantry,
still holds good in modern warfare.
Our ideas regarding the importance of the fort-
ress have, on the other hand, undergone a complete
change. The time has long vanished when every
town was a fortress, and a long campaign in a
hostile country usually ended by taking the form
of siege-warfare. To-day, the question is even
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? The Army 155
being asked, "Are fortresses any longer of practical
use? " The Germans answer this question far
more sensibly than the French. France sur-
rounded herself with a tremendous rampart of
fortresses, reaching from Sedan to Belfort, and
thus believed herself shut off from Germany as
by a Chinese wall. But in so long a line there
must somewhere be a weak spot, which the Ger-
mans will certainly end by rinding. There is,
however, an even more important consideration.
Walls cannot defend themselves, and if they are
to be effectually defended, the great fortresses
need a huge garrison, which is thus lost to the
field army. The Germans are of opinion that
small-barrier forts are necessary, and may be useful
even to-day. A little mountain fortress of this
kind, situated on a defile can, under certain cir-
cumstances, cut the enemy off from using a
whole system of roads.
The Saxon fortress of Konigstein, for instance,
is not impregnable, but a siege of the place might
drag on indefinitely. It was from this fortress
that a successful attempt was made in 1866 to
destroy the important railway from Dresden to
Prague, so that the Prussians were unable to use
it for a fortnight. The railway could not be
repaired, because the batteries of the fortress
commanded the line. The advance of the Prus-
sians into Bohemia was thus made very difficult.
The fortress of Bitsch, in the Vosges, plays a very
similar part. Little mountain strongholds will
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? 156 Treitschke
thus continue to be of service for some time to
come.
On the other hand, it is necessary to maintain
the large strongholds known as army fortresses,
in order to have places of refuge for a whole army,
and especially so that one may there shelter and
replenish a beaten army. Strassburg and Metz
exist for this purpose. All our officers agree,
however, that we must not have too many fort-
resses of this type. Many deny that they have
any use at all, for decisive actions in war are
always fought in the open field, and any military
system which lessens our forces in the field presents
very serious drawbacks. A fortress of this kind
needs a large garrison even when no enemy is
in the neighbourhood. We are always brought
back to the fact that national armies, which are
so full of moral energy, must be looked upon as
pre-eminently capable of assuming a vigorous
offensive.
I will conclude by pointing out, very briefly,
that the fleet has begun to assume a far more
important position not, in the first place, as an
essential factor in a European war, for no one
believes now that a war between great Powers
could be decided by a naval battle but as a pro-
tection for the merchant navy and the colonies.
The task of ruling countries on the other side of
the Atlantic will, from henceforth, be the chief
duty of European fleets. For, since the object
of human culture must be to assert the supremacy
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? The Army 157
of the white races on the entire globe, the import-
ance of a people will finally depend on the share
it takes in the rule of the transatlantic world. It
is on this account that the importance of the fleet
has so largely increased during our own day.
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? INTERNATIONAL LAW
IS there really such a thing as international law?
Certainly there are two common theories of
international relations, each contradictory to the
other, each quite untenable. One, the so-called
naturalistic theory, dates from Machiavelli. It
is based on the notion that the State is merely
might personified, that it has the right to do any-
thing that is profitable to it. On this view the
State cannot fetter itself by international law; its
relations with other States depend simply on the
respective strength which it and they possess.
This theory leads to an absurdity. It is of course
true that the State implies physical might. But if
a State be that and nothing else, if it pay no heed
to reason or to conscience, it will never maintain
itself in a proper condition of safety. Even na-
turalistic thinkers allow that it is a function of
the State to preserve internal order; that it cannot
do if it refuses to obey any law in its relations with
other States. Its deliberate contempt for good
faith, loyalty, and treaty agreements in external
relations would raise a crowd of enemies, and pre-
vent it from fulfilling its purpose the embodi-
ment of physical force. Even Machiavelli's ideal,
Caesar Borgia, ultimately fell into the pit which he
158
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? International Law 159
had digged for others. For the end and object
of the State's existence is not physical might; it
embodies might only in order that it may protect
and develop the nobler aspects of mankind. Thus
the doctrine of pure might is a vain doctrine; it
is immoral because it cannot justify its own
existence.
Directly contrary to this view of the State, is
another an equally false view. This is the
"moral" conception due to German liberalism.
The State is here regarded as a good little boy,
to be washed, brushed, and sent to school ; he must
have his ears pulled, to keep him good, and in
return he is to be thankful, just-minded, and
Heaven knows what else. This German doctri-
naire theory has done as much harm to our political
thinking as to other forms of German life. All
our political sins can be traced back to the notion
natural enough in a learned nation that the
pronouncement of some scientific truth is ade-
quate to turn the world's course into a new channel.
That notion underlies the German spirit of sci-
entific research; it also underlies our tendency to
all manner of practical blunders. The doctri-
naire exponent of international law fondly imagines
that he need only emit a few aphorisms and that
the nations of the world will forthwith, as reason-
able men, accept them. We forget that stupidity
and passion matter, and have always mattered
in history. Who, after all, can fail to see the
growth of national passions during the nineteenth
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? 160 Treitschke
century? And whence do individuals Rotteck,
Bluntschli, Heffter, and others say to States per-
emptorily, "Thou shalt"? No single man stands
high enough to impose his doctrines on all States ;
he must be ready to see his theories crossed or
crushed by actual life. The delusion that there
can be such a thing as hypothetical law is at the
root of these errors. Positive law is the only law
that has real existence. Until the general public
has grown convinced of the truth and righteous-
ness of various legal principles, the function of
learned men is really limited to preparing the way.
Were we to pursue the abstract conception of the
State to its logical conclusion, we should find
ourselves demanding a supreme authority with
world-wide power. The authority would be such
as that claimed by the Papal See, an authority
not of this world, represented by the Vicegerent
of Christ and ruling in the name of God. That is
the sort of authority which we do not want on
earth; our beautiful world should be a world of
liberty. Nevertheless it is only ultramontane
thinkers who have consistently worked out to its
logical issue the weak and sentimental view of
international law which we at this moment are
considering. That logical issue has been rightly
stated in the great "Codex" of the Jesuits; accord-
ing to it, the world is, as it were, an ethnarchy in
which the nations form an ideal community, while
the Pope, as ethnarch, wields over them a coercive
power, keeping each State within bounds by spiri-
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