And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is
distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of its
object.
distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of its
object.
Summa Theologica
In the first way
hope is caused by everything that increases a man's power; e. g. riches,
strength, and, among others, experience: since by experience man
acquires the faculty of doing something easily, and the result of this
is hope. Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): "No one fears to do
that which he is sure of having learned well. "
In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think
that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching and persuasion may
be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so
far as it makes him reckon something possible, which before his
experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way,
experience can cause a lack of hope: because just as it makes a man
think possible what he had previously thought impossible; so,
conversely, experience makes a man consider as impossible that which
hitherto he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope in
two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason we may say rather
that it causes hope.
Reply to Objection 1: Experience in matters pertaining to action not
only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of
custom, which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual
virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease: because it shows
something to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope.
Reply to Objection 2: The old are wanting in hope because of their
experience, in so far as experience makes them think something
impossible. Hence he adds (Rhet. ii, 13) that "many evils have befallen
them. "
Reply to Objection 3: Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope
accidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one
to judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a
cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes lack of hope.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?
Objection 1: It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of
hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so that it
is compared to an anchor (Heb. 6:19). But young men and drunkards are
wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore
youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1356](A[5]), the cause of hope
is chiefly whatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness
are united to weakness. Therefore they are not causes of hope.
Objection 3: Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above
[1357](A[5]). But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause
of hope.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men
are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope. "
I answer that, Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the
Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be
gathered from the three conditions of the good which is the object of
hope---namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated above
[1358](A[1]). For youth has much of the future before it, and little of
the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the
future, it has little to remember and lives very much in hope. Again,
youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so
that their heart expands: and it is owing to the heart being expanded
that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited
and hopeful. Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had
experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing
possible to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles
and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing possible; and
consequently are of good hope. Two of these causes are also in those
who are in drink---viz. heat and high spirits, on account of wine, and
heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same reason all
foolish and thoughtless persons attempt everything and are full of
hope.
Reply to Objection 1: Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness
in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think
that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for.
In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that
young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady in reality: but, in
their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their
shortcomings.
Reply to Objection 3: Not only experience, but also lack of experience,
is, in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A[5], ad 3).
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Whether hope is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because,
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first of the
soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love
precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause love.
Objection 2: Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by
love, as stated above ([1359]Q[25], A[2]). Therefore hope, too, follows
love, and consequently is not its cause.
Objection 3: Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above
([1360]Q[32], A[3]). But pleasure is only of the good that is loved.
Therefore love precedes hope.
On the contrary, The gloss commenting on Mat. 1:2, "Abraham begot
Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i. e. "faith begets hope, and hope
begets charity. " But charity is love. Therefore love is caused by hope.
I answer that, Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its
object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is
something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens
sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, not through
ourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that
by which something becomes possible to us.
In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused
by love: since we do not hope save for that which we desire and love.
But in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes
possible to us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa. Because by
the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone,
we are moved towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love
him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him,
except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our
love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope in
him; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.
Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.
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Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to
action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence
which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above
([1361]Q[37], A[3]). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is
written (Prov. 13:12): "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul. "
Therefore hope hinders action.
Objection 3: Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above
[1362](A[4]). But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to
action; for it is written (2 Kings 2:26), that "it is dangerous to
drive people to despair. " Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely,
by hindering action.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 9:10) that "he that plougheth
should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit": and the same applies to
all other actions.
I answer that, Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it
more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its object,
which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being
difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that it is possible
is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man
is intent on his action. Secondly, on account of its effect. Because
hope, as stated above ([1363]Q[32], A[3]), causes pleasure; which is a
help to action, as stated above ([1364]Q[33], A[4]). Therefore hope is
conducive to action.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security
regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary
to fear rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget
negligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty:
whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in which
a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon as difficult.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident
that it causes sorrow, as stated above ([1365]Q[32], A[3], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a
certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight,
strive less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in
this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove dangerous
to the foe.
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OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring.
With regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in
itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether fear is a special passion?
(3) Whether there is a natural fear?
(4) Of the species of fear.
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Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by way of
{systole}"---i. e. of contraction---"desirous of vindicating nature. "
But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 5. Therefore
fear is not a passion.
Objection 2: Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of
an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something
future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is
not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the
sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses.
But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear
is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq. ) reckons fear
among the other passions of the soul.
I answer that, Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, fear
chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above
(Q[22] ), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a
passive power---i. e. of a power whose object is compared to it as its
active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way,
both "to feel" and "to understand" are passions. Secondly, more
properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive power; and
more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a
bodily organ, such movement being accompanied by a bodily
transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are called
passions, which imply some deterioration. Now it is evident that fear,
since it regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself
regards good and evil. Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite:
for it is accompanied by a certain transmutation---i. e.
contraction---as Damascene says (Cf. OBJ 1). Again, it implies relation
to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore it
has most properly the character of passion; less, however, than sorrow,
which regards the present evil: because fear regards future evil, which
is not so strong a motive as present evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore,
in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are
principles of external action, they are called virtues. But the
Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the passion of a natural body is due to
the bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to
the agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor
really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which is really
future, is present in the apprehension of the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: The senses do not apprehend the future: but from
apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to
hope for a future good, or to fear a future evil.
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Whether fear is a special passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught by
fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by sickness"---i. e.
sorrow---"nor tossed about in transports of empty joys. " Wherefore it
seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other passions are removed.
Therefore fear is not a special but a general passion.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit
and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial are in
the intellect. " But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as
neither is affirmation, but something common to many. Therefore neither
is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is nothing but
a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a special passion.
Objection 3: Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be
chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible:
since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of
sorrow"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is "a
power of desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible
faculty, as stated above ([1366]Q[23], A[4]). Therefore fear is not a
special passion, since it belongs to different powers.
On the contrary, Fear is condivided with the other passions of the
soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12,15).
I answer that, The passions of the soul derive their species from their
objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special object.
Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of
hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; so the object
of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear
is a special passion of the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: All the passions of the soul arise from one
source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By
reason of this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions
of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general
passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but
avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance
be something common, yet fear is a special passion.
Reply to Objection 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it
regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be
almost unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the
passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated
above ([1367]Q[25], A[1]); hence it is that what belongs to the
concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far
as the object of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the
representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful. "
In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as
hope arises from the desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of
evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is
evident from what has been said above ([1368]Q[25], A[2];[1369] Q[29],
A[2];[1370] Q[36], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is a natural fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear, through the
soul refusing to be severed from the body. "
Objection 2: Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A[2], ad
1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore there is also a natural fear.
Objection 3: Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above
([1371]Q[40], A[4], ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident
from Rom. 4:18, where it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of
nature, "he believed in hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear
of nature.
On the contrary, That which is natural is common to things animate and
inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is no
natural fear.
I answer that, A movement is said to be natural, because nature
inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is
entirely accomplished by nature, without any operation of the
apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to
fire, and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants.
Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines thereto,
though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as
stated above ([1372]Q[10], A[1]), the movements of the cognitive and
appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first
principle. In this way, even the acts of the apprehensive power, such
as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of
the animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural.
And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is
distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of its
object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of
"corruptive evil," which nature shrinks from on account of its natural
desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a
fear of "painful evil," which is repugnant not to nature, but to the
desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In this sense we
have stated above ([1373]Q[26], A[1];[1374] Q[30], A[3];[1375] Q[31],
A[7]) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and
non-natural.
But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that
certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural, as love,
desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. The
reason of this is because love and hatred, desire and avoidance, imply
a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil;
which inclination is to be found in the natural appetite also.
Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire
and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the
other hand the other passions of the soul denote certain movements,
whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due
either to the fact that perception or knowledge is essential to these
passions (thus we have said[1376], Q[31], AA[1],3;[1377] Q[35], A[1],
that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow),
wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be said to take pleasure or
to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary
to the very nature of natural inclination: for instance, despair flies
from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from
repelling a contrary evil; both of which are contrary to the
inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way
ascribed to inanimate beings.
Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably
assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness,
shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety. " Because, as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil. "
Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of
sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above
([1378]Q[35], A[8]). Therefore there should only be four species of
fear corresponding to them.
Objection 2: Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in
our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, as stated
above [1379](A[2]). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame,
which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of
fear.
Objection 3: Further, fear is of the future, as stated above
([1380]AA[1], 2). But "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done,"
as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx. ] says. Therefore shame
is not a species of fear.
Objection 4: Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor
regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore
amazement and stupor are not species of fear.
Objection 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek
the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads to
flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of
fear.
On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).
I answer that, As stated above [1381](A[2]), fear regards a future evil
which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is
irresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be considered either
in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold
evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature: and
hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of
too much toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in the
opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is
yet to be done, there is "shamefacedness"; if, however, it be a deed
already done, there is "shame. "
On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may
surpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First by reason of
its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil
the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is
"amazement. " Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to
wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great
in our estimation: and then there is "stupor," which is caused by the
representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being
unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind
is called "anxiety. "
Reply to Objection 1: Those species of sorrow given above are not
derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of
effects, and for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need
for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of fear,
which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear
itself.
Reply to Objection 2: A deed considered as being actually done, is in
the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration
something connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the
doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense
that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of
fear.
Reply to Objection 3: The past deed may be the occasion of fear of
future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of
fear.
Reply to Objection 4: Not every amazement and stupor are species of
fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that
stupor which arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that,
just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement
and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and
unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and stupor
stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to
external work.
Reply to Objection 5: He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming
a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the
truth, but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor
fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore
amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a
hindrance thereto.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?
(2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?
(3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
(4) Whether fear itself can be feared?
(5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?
(6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no
remedy?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the object of fear is good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that good is the object of fear. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose what
we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for. " But that
which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good as its proper
object.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power
and to be above another is a thing to be feared. " But this is a good
thing. Therefore good is the object of fear.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded
to fear God, according to Ps. 33:10: "Fear the Lord, all ye saints. "
Therefore even the good is an object of fear.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of
future evil.
I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it
belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in
Ethic. vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil.
Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies pursuit,
has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance,
has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since fear implies an avoidance,
in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper
object.
It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil. This
can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of
good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of
some good. Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it
follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one
pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that
there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love.
In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far as
some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love: and so, just
as hope, as stated above ([1382]Q[40], A[7]), regards two things,
namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there
is a hope of obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two
things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by
its power, can inflict that evil. In this way God is feared by man,
inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this
way, too, we fear the power of man; especially when it has been
thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us
a harm.
In like manner one fears "to be over another," i. e. to lean on another,
so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a man fears another,
who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of
fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take
counsel. " But we do not take counsel about things which happen
naturally, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is not
an object of fear.
Objection 2: Further, natural defects such as death and the like are
always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object of
fear, man would needs be always in fear.
Objection 3: Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of
nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such
like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature.
Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and yet it seems
that it should be.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most
terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by
the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or
painful. " Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the
will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and
this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the
object of fear.
But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a
natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, not merely from
being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect
of nature; such are natural death and other like defects. But sometimes
evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death
inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of nature is feared to a
certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear arises
"from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes
fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as
about to be. First, through being remote and far off: for, on account
of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to
be. Hence we either do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very
far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near,
they heed it not. " Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it
were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look
upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5)
that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing
that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no
escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of
escape for him. "
Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as
future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, be apprehended as
near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared.
Reply to Objection 1: The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of
nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature,
although it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be
possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about
avoiding it.
Reply to Objection 2: Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it
does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not
always feared.
Reply to Objection 3: Death and other defects of nature are the effects
of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them
as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual
nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear
when threatening in the future.
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Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of
fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. ix),
that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God. " Now nothing but
sin severs us from God; according to Is. 59:2: "Your iniquities have
divided between you and your God. " Therefore the evil of sin can be an
object of fear.
Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that "we fear
when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when they
are present. " But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on
account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of
sin.
Objection 3: Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue
can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4):
and the Apostle says (Gal. 5:10): "I have confidence in you in the
Lord, that you will not be of another mind. " Therefore fear can regard
evil of sin.
Objection 4: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above
([1383]Q[41], A[4]). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an
evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils
are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1384]Q[40], A[1];[1385] Q[41], A[2]),
as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to
obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be
easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely
subject to our power and will, is not an object of fear; and that
nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now
human will is the proper cause of the evil of sin: and consequently
evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear.
But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause;
if this cause have a strong power of inclination, in that respect a man
may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic
cause: as when he fears to dwell in the company of wicked men, lest he
be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed,
fears the being led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper
nature, i. e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this light it is not
an object of fear to him.
Reply to Objection 1: Separation from God is a punishment resulting
from sin: and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic
cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each
regards evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because
sorrow is about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly,
because sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil
absolutely; wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas
fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with the addition of a
certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so far as
a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that give
us pain when they are present, make us fear when they are yet to come,
but only some things, namely, those that are difficult.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may
obtain a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may
be of an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other
hand, fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: and
consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic
cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both from an intrinsic
and from an extrinsic cause.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above ([1386]Q[41], A[4], ad 2,3),
shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or
ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is due to an extrinsic
cause.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear itself can be feared?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever is
feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus a man
who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If
therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear by
being afraid: which seems absurd.
Objection 2: Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from
itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear.
Objection 3: Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to
him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear.
On the contrary, A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own
sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear.
I answer that, As stated above [1387](A[3]), nothing can be an object
of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which
ensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic
cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic
cause, in so far as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of
an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the
object of fear, i. e. a man may fear lest he should be threatened by the
necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil. It is
subject to the will, in so far as the lower appetite obeys reason;
wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be
the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however,
anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear cannot be
at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution to the same.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every fear is identically the same; there are
various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, then,
prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by fearing
another, so that the fear which he has preserves him from the fear
which he has not.
Reply to Objection 2: Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical
with the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a
thing flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases.
Reply to Objection 3: On account of the various kinds of fear already
alluded to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its
object.
hope is caused by everything that increases a man's power; e. g. riches,
strength, and, among others, experience: since by experience man
acquires the faculty of doing something easily, and the result of this
is hope. Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): "No one fears to do
that which he is sure of having learned well. "
In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think
that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching and persuasion may
be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so
far as it makes him reckon something possible, which before his
experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way,
experience can cause a lack of hope: because just as it makes a man
think possible what he had previously thought impossible; so,
conversely, experience makes a man consider as impossible that which
hitherto he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope in
two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason we may say rather
that it causes hope.
Reply to Objection 1: Experience in matters pertaining to action not
only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of
custom, which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual
virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease: because it shows
something to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope.
Reply to Objection 2: The old are wanting in hope because of their
experience, in so far as experience makes them think something
impossible. Hence he adds (Rhet. ii, 13) that "many evils have befallen
them. "
Reply to Objection 3: Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope
accidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one
to judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a
cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes lack of hope.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?
Objection 1: It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of
hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so that it
is compared to an anchor (Heb. 6:19). But young men and drunkards are
wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore
youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1356](A[5]), the cause of hope
is chiefly whatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness
are united to weakness. Therefore they are not causes of hope.
Objection 3: Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above
[1357](A[5]). But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause
of hope.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men
are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope. "
I answer that, Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the
Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be
gathered from the three conditions of the good which is the object of
hope---namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated above
[1358](A[1]). For youth has much of the future before it, and little of
the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the
future, it has little to remember and lives very much in hope. Again,
youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so
that their heart expands: and it is owing to the heart being expanded
that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited
and hopeful. Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had
experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing
possible to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles
and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing possible; and
consequently are of good hope. Two of these causes are also in those
who are in drink---viz. heat and high spirits, on account of wine, and
heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same reason all
foolish and thoughtless persons attempt everything and are full of
hope.
Reply to Objection 1: Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness
in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think
that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for.
In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that
young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady in reality: but, in
their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their
shortcomings.
Reply to Objection 3: Not only experience, but also lack of experience,
is, in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A[5], ad 3).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because,
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first of the
soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love
precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause love.
Objection 2: Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by
love, as stated above ([1359]Q[25], A[2]). Therefore hope, too, follows
love, and consequently is not its cause.
Objection 3: Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above
([1360]Q[32], A[3]). But pleasure is only of the good that is loved.
Therefore love precedes hope.
On the contrary, The gloss commenting on Mat. 1:2, "Abraham begot
Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i. e. "faith begets hope, and hope
begets charity. " But charity is love. Therefore love is caused by hope.
I answer that, Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its
object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is
something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens
sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, not through
ourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that
by which something becomes possible to us.
In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused
by love: since we do not hope save for that which we desire and love.
But in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes
possible to us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa. Because by
the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone,
we are moved towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love
him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him,
except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our
love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope in
him; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.
Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to
action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence
which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above
([1361]Q[37], A[3]). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is
written (Prov. 13:12): "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul. "
Therefore hope hinders action.
Objection 3: Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above
[1362](A[4]). But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to
action; for it is written (2 Kings 2:26), that "it is dangerous to
drive people to despair. " Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely,
by hindering action.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 9:10) that "he that plougheth
should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit": and the same applies to
all other actions.
I answer that, Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it
more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its object,
which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being
difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that it is possible
is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man
is intent on his action. Secondly, on account of its effect. Because
hope, as stated above ([1363]Q[32], A[3]), causes pleasure; which is a
help to action, as stated above ([1364]Q[33], A[4]). Therefore hope is
conducive to action.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security
regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary
to fear rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget
negligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty:
whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in which
a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon as difficult.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident
that it causes sorrow, as stated above ([1365]Q[32], A[3], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a
certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight,
strive less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in
this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove dangerous
to the foe.
__________________________________________________________________
OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring.
With regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in
itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether fear is a special passion?
(3) Whether there is a natural fear?
(4) Of the species of fear.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by way of
{systole}"---i. e. of contraction---"desirous of vindicating nature. "
But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 5. Therefore
fear is not a passion.
Objection 2: Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of
an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something
future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is
not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the
sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses.
But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear
is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq. ) reckons fear
among the other passions of the soul.
I answer that, Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, fear
chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above
(Q[22] ), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a
passive power---i. e. of a power whose object is compared to it as its
active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way,
both "to feel" and "to understand" are passions. Secondly, more
properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive power; and
more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a
bodily organ, such movement being accompanied by a bodily
transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are called
passions, which imply some deterioration. Now it is evident that fear,
since it regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself
regards good and evil. Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite:
for it is accompanied by a certain transmutation---i. e.
contraction---as Damascene says (Cf. OBJ 1). Again, it implies relation
to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore it
has most properly the character of passion; less, however, than sorrow,
which regards the present evil: because fear regards future evil, which
is not so strong a motive as present evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore,
in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are
principles of external action, they are called virtues. But the
Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the passion of a natural body is due to
the bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to
the agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor
really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which is really
future, is present in the apprehension of the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: The senses do not apprehend the future: but from
apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to
hope for a future good, or to fear a future evil.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is a special passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught by
fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by sickness"---i. e.
sorrow---"nor tossed about in transports of empty joys. " Wherefore it
seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other passions are removed.
Therefore fear is not a special but a general passion.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit
and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial are in
the intellect. " But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as
neither is affirmation, but something common to many. Therefore neither
is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is nothing but
a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a special passion.
Objection 3: Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be
chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible:
since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of
sorrow"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is "a
power of desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible
faculty, as stated above ([1366]Q[23], A[4]). Therefore fear is not a
special passion, since it belongs to different powers.
On the contrary, Fear is condivided with the other passions of the
soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12,15).
I answer that, The passions of the soul derive their species from their
objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special object.
Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of
hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; so the object
of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear
is a special passion of the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: All the passions of the soul arise from one
source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By
reason of this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions
of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general
passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but
avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance
be something common, yet fear is a special passion.
Reply to Objection 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it
regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be
almost unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the
passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated
above ([1367]Q[25], A[1]); hence it is that what belongs to the
concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far
as the object of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the
representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful. "
In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as
hope arises from the desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of
evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is
evident from what has been said above ([1368]Q[25], A[2];[1369] Q[29],
A[2];[1370] Q[36], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is a natural fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear, through the
soul refusing to be severed from the body. "
Objection 2: Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A[2], ad
1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore there is also a natural fear.
Objection 3: Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above
([1371]Q[40], A[4], ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident
from Rom. 4:18, where it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of
nature, "he believed in hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear
of nature.
On the contrary, That which is natural is common to things animate and
inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is no
natural fear.
I answer that, A movement is said to be natural, because nature
inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is
entirely accomplished by nature, without any operation of the
apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to
fire, and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants.
Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines thereto,
though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as
stated above ([1372]Q[10], A[1]), the movements of the cognitive and
appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first
principle. In this way, even the acts of the apprehensive power, such
as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of
the animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural.
And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is
distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of its
object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of
"corruptive evil," which nature shrinks from on account of its natural
desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a
fear of "painful evil," which is repugnant not to nature, but to the
desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In this sense we
have stated above ([1373]Q[26], A[1];[1374] Q[30], A[3];[1375] Q[31],
A[7]) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and
non-natural.
But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that
certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural, as love,
desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. The
reason of this is because love and hatred, desire and avoidance, imply
a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil;
which inclination is to be found in the natural appetite also.
Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire
and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the
other hand the other passions of the soul denote certain movements,
whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due
either to the fact that perception or knowledge is essential to these
passions (thus we have said[1376], Q[31], AA[1],3;[1377] Q[35], A[1],
that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow),
wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be said to take pleasure or
to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary
to the very nature of natural inclination: for instance, despair flies
from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from
repelling a contrary evil; both of which are contrary to the
inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way
ascribed to inanimate beings.
Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably
assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness,
shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety. " Because, as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil. "
Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of
sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above
([1378]Q[35], A[8]). Therefore there should only be four species of
fear corresponding to them.
Objection 2: Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in
our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, as stated
above [1379](A[2]). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame,
which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of
fear.
Objection 3: Further, fear is of the future, as stated above
([1380]AA[1], 2). But "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done,"
as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx. ] says. Therefore shame
is not a species of fear.
Objection 4: Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor
regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore
amazement and stupor are not species of fear.
Objection 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek
the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads to
flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of
fear.
On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).
I answer that, As stated above [1381](A[2]), fear regards a future evil
which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is
irresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be considered either
in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold
evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature: and
hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of
too much toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in the
opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is
yet to be done, there is "shamefacedness"; if, however, it be a deed
already done, there is "shame. "
On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may
surpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First by reason of
its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil
the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is
"amazement. " Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to
wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great
in our estimation: and then there is "stupor," which is caused by the
representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being
unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind
is called "anxiety. "
Reply to Objection 1: Those species of sorrow given above are not
derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of
effects, and for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need
for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of fear,
which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear
itself.
Reply to Objection 2: A deed considered as being actually done, is in
the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration
something connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the
doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense
that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of
fear.
Reply to Objection 3: The past deed may be the occasion of fear of
future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of
fear.
Reply to Objection 4: Not every amazement and stupor are species of
fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that
stupor which arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that,
just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement
and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and
unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and stupor
stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to
external work.
Reply to Objection 5: He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming
a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the
truth, but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor
fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore
amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a
hindrance thereto.
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OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?
(2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?
(3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
(4) Whether fear itself can be feared?
(5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?
(6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no
remedy?
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Whether the object of fear is good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that good is the object of fear. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose what
we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for. " But that
which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good as its proper
object.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power
and to be above another is a thing to be feared. " But this is a good
thing. Therefore good is the object of fear.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded
to fear God, according to Ps. 33:10: "Fear the Lord, all ye saints. "
Therefore even the good is an object of fear.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of
future evil.
I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it
belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in
Ethic. vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil.
Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies pursuit,
has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance,
has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since fear implies an avoidance,
in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper
object.
It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil. This
can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of
good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of
some good. Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it
follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one
pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that
there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love.
In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far as
some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love: and so, just
as hope, as stated above ([1382]Q[40], A[7]), regards two things,
namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there
is a hope of obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two
things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by
its power, can inflict that evil. In this way God is feared by man,
inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this
way, too, we fear the power of man; especially when it has been
thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us
a harm.
In like manner one fears "to be over another," i. e. to lean on another,
so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a man fears another,
who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of
fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take
counsel. " But we do not take counsel about things which happen
naturally, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is not
an object of fear.
Objection 2: Further, natural defects such as death and the like are
always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object of
fear, man would needs be always in fear.
Objection 3: Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of
nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such
like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature.
Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and yet it seems
that it should be.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most
terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by
the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or
painful. " Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the
will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and
this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the
object of fear.
But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a
natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, not merely from
being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect
of nature; such are natural death and other like defects. But sometimes
evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death
inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of nature is feared to a
certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear arises
"from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes
fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as
about to be. First, through being remote and far off: for, on account
of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to
be. Hence we either do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very
far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near,
they heed it not. " Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it
were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look
upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5)
that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing
that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no
escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of
escape for him. "
Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as
future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, be apprehended as
near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared.
Reply to Objection 1: The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of
nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature,
although it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be
possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about
avoiding it.
Reply to Objection 2: Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it
does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not
always feared.
Reply to Objection 3: Death and other defects of nature are the effects
of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them
as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual
nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear
when threatening in the future.
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Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of
fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. ix),
that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God. " Now nothing but
sin severs us from God; according to Is. 59:2: "Your iniquities have
divided between you and your God. " Therefore the evil of sin can be an
object of fear.
Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that "we fear
when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when they
are present. " But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on
account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of
sin.
Objection 3: Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue
can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4):
and the Apostle says (Gal. 5:10): "I have confidence in you in the
Lord, that you will not be of another mind. " Therefore fear can regard
evil of sin.
Objection 4: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above
([1383]Q[41], A[4]). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an
evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils
are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1384]Q[40], A[1];[1385] Q[41], A[2]),
as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to
obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be
easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely
subject to our power and will, is not an object of fear; and that
nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now
human will is the proper cause of the evil of sin: and consequently
evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear.
But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause;
if this cause have a strong power of inclination, in that respect a man
may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic
cause: as when he fears to dwell in the company of wicked men, lest he
be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed,
fears the being led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper
nature, i. e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this light it is not
an object of fear to him.
Reply to Objection 1: Separation from God is a punishment resulting
from sin: and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic
cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each
regards evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because
sorrow is about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly,
because sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil
absolutely; wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas
fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with the addition of a
certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so far as
a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that give
us pain when they are present, make us fear when they are yet to come,
but only some things, namely, those that are difficult.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may
obtain a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may
be of an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other
hand, fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: and
consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic
cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both from an intrinsic
and from an extrinsic cause.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above ([1386]Q[41], A[4], ad 2,3),
shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or
ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is due to an extrinsic
cause.
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Whether fear itself can be feared?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever is
feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus a man
who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If
therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear by
being afraid: which seems absurd.
Objection 2: Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from
itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear.
Objection 3: Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to
him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear.
On the contrary, A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own
sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear.
I answer that, As stated above [1387](A[3]), nothing can be an object
of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which
ensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic
cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic
cause, in so far as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of
an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the
object of fear, i. e. a man may fear lest he should be threatened by the
necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil. It is
subject to the will, in so far as the lower appetite obeys reason;
wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be
the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however,
anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear cannot be
at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution to the same.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every fear is identically the same; there are
various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, then,
prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by fearing
another, so that the fear which he has preserves him from the fear
which he has not.
Reply to Objection 2: Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical
with the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a
thing flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases.
Reply to Objection 3: On account of the various kinds of fear already
alluded to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its
object.
