First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another's
sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he
speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to
sin.
sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he
speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to
sin.
Summa Theologica
Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the
truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the
existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying
something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself to
possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly.
For there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly
folly annexed to it, according to 1 Cor. 3:18, "If any man among you
seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be
wise. " But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same
text goes on to say, "is foolishness with God. " Accordingly, he that is
strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the
estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which
human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, "and the wisdom of
men is not with me," and farther on, "and I have known the science of
the saints" [*Vulg. : 'and I have not known the science of the saints'].
It may also be replied that "the wisdom of men" is that which is
acquired by human reason, while the "wisdom of the saints" is that
which is received by divine inspiration.
Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not
of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, "nor am I the son of a
prophet. "
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man
tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty,
not only if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a
sin, but also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which
sometimes is not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does
not acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.
Reply to Objection 3: A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid
another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid
pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan. ): "Shun not
arrogance so as to forsake truth": and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3)
that "it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies. "
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Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting?
Objection 1: It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than
boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is a
kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any
more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin
than boasting.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony
is not a less grievous sin than boasting.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25): "When he shall speak
low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart. "
Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold
wickedness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): "Those who speak
with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, seemingly, in
their manners. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3223]Q[110], AA[2],4), one lie is more
grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is
about---thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most
grievous---and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a
mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now
irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by
any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person: so
that in this respect they are equal.
But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely,
the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man's
averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by
uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
7) that "boasting is a more grievous sin than irony. "
Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some
other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then
irony is more grievous.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting,
according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account
of its matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.
Reply to Objection 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the
other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by
outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for
instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the kind,
and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual
excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Mat. 6:16) that "they
disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast. " Wherefore
such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in
different respects, and for this reason they sin more grievously. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that it is "the practice of
boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little
of themselves": and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that
he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too
shabby, because by both do men seek glory.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, "There
is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of
deceit," and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who,
through deceitful humility, "speaks low" wickedly.
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OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and
the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning
friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a special virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
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Whether friendliness is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect friendship is
that which is on account of virtue. " Now any virtue is the cause of
friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as Dionysius states
(Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a
consequence of every virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind
of friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both from those
he loves and from those who are not his friends. " Now it seems to
pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to
those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue.
Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a wise man
decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): "The heart of
the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there
is mirth": wherefore "it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of
pleasure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), "is essentially desirous of sharing
pleasures, but fears to give pain. " Therefore this kind of friendliness
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now
it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): "Make thyself affable to the congregation
of the poor. " Therefore affability, which is what we mean by
friendship, is a special virtue.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[109], A[2]; [3224]FS, Q[55], A[3]),
since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of
good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists
in order, as stated above (Q[109], A[2]). And it behooves man to be
maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their
mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so
that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the
need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order:
and this virtue is called friendliness.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in
his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves
another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in
treating of charity ([3225]Q[23], A[1], A[3], ad 1; QQ[25],26), what
things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another
friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has
not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness
thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those
with whom he is in contact.
Reply to Objection 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a
certain general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that "every
beast loveth its like. " This love is signified by signs of friendship,
which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are
strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this:
because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not
treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to us by
special friendship.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that "the heart of the wise is
where there is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his
neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat,
thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity": but
that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus.
7:38, "Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them
that mourn. " Again, "the heart of fools is where there is mirth," not
that they may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness.
Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with
those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns,
but honest pleasures, according to Ps. 132:1, "Behold how good and how
pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity. "
Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of
some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the
virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those
among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): "Although I
made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent," and further on (2
Cor. 7:9), "I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because
you were made sorrowful unto repentance. " For this reason we should not
show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we
may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, and in a way
encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:26):
"Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and show not thy
countenance gay towards them. "
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Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of
justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this
virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably
towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part
of justice.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this
virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in
fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest
pleasures, as stated above ([3226]FS, Q[60], A[5]; [3227]FS, Q[61],
A[3]). Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is
contrary to justice, as stated above ([3228]Q[59], AA[1],2). Now,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in
like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers. " Therefore
this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.
On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a
part of justice.
I answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to it as
to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is directed to
another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of the notion of
justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is
bound to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to pay,
or by some debt arising out of a favor received. For it regards merely
a certain debt of equity, namely, that we behave pleasantly to those
among whom we dwell, unless at times, for some reason, it be necessary
to displease them for some good purpose.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([3229]Q[109], A[3], ad 1),
because man is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the
manifestation of truth without which human society could not last. Now
as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not
without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one
could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a
certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his
fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for
their good.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the
senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which have
their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves becomingly
towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they
were noisome.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that
one ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and
strangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), "it is not fitting to
please and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way. "
This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all in
a fitting manner.
__________________________________________________________________
OF FLATTERY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: (1)
Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether flattery is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
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Whether flattery is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists
in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is
not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov. 31:28, "Her children
rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her. "
Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1
Cor. 10:33, "I . . . in all things please all men. " Therefore flattery
is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise.
But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise
good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore
Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against
flattery. "It must be observed," says he, "that by the wonderful
moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by detractions
but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the
flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may humble. " But
detraction is an evil, as stated above ([3230]Q[73], AA[2],3).
Therefore flattery is a good.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, "Woe to them that sew
cushions under every elbow," says, "that is to say, sweet flattery. "
Therefore flattery is a sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3231]Q[114], A[1], ad 3), although the
friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends
chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not
fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or
of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always
to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing,
and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere
intention of pleasing he is said to be "complaisant," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of
making some gain out of it, he is called a "flatterer" or "adulator. "
As a rule, however, the term "flattery" is wont to be applied to all
who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or
deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their fellows.
Reply to Objection 1: One may praise a person both well and ill,
according as one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while
observing other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person
by praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive
to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of
friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a
person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since perhaps
they are evil, according to Ps. 9:24, "The sinner is praised in the
desires of his soul"; or they may be uncertain, according to Ecclus.
27:8, "Praise not a man before he speaketh," and again (Ecclus. 11:2),
"Praise not a man for his beauty"; or because there may be fear lest
human praise should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written,
(Ecclus. 11:30), "Praise not any man before death. " Again, in like
manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster charity,
so that he may make spiritual progress therein. But it would be sinful
to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain, or to please
them in something evil, according to Ps. 52:6, "God hath scattered the
bones of them that please men," and according to the words of the
Apostle (Gal. 1:10), "If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant
of Christ. "
Reply to Objection 2: Even to blame evil is sinful, if due
circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one
another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which is
contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as regards
the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas
the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at
times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether flattery is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to
Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is harmful. "
But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, "For the sinner is
praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The
sinner hath provoked the Lord. " Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant):
"Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery": and a gloss on
Ps. 69:4, "Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that
say to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well," says: "The tongue of the flatterer
harms more than the sword of the persecutor. " Therefore flattery is a
most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less
than others: wherefore it is written (Ps. 36:15): "Let their sword
enter into their own hearts. " Now he that flatters another induces him
to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, "Let not the oil of the
sinner fatten my head," says: "The false praise of the flatterer
softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders
it susceptive of vice. " Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in
himself.
Objection 3: Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3):
"The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and
treachery shall be degraded from his office. " Now such a punishment as
this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de Sanctis)
reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any person of
higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of necessity. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3232]Q[112], A[2]), a mortal sin is
one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to
charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways.
First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another's
sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he
speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to
sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Is. 5:20. "Woe to you
that call evil good. " Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one
man flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in
body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written
(Prov. 27:6): "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful
kisses of an enemy. " Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise of
a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an
occasion of sin. In this case it is necessary to consider, whether the
occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall,
as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal
([3233]Q[43], AA[3],4). If, however, one man flatters another from the
mere craving to please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or
to acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to
charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who
praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than
the sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of
greater consequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so
efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively,
being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be
a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (Q[43],
A[1], ad 3; [3234]FS, Q[73], A[8], ad 3; [3235]FS, Q[80], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to one that flatters with
the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than
others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning,
whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.
Reply to Objection 3: The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters
another treacherously, in order to deceive him.
__________________________________________________________________
OF QUARRELING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship?
(2) Of its comparison with flattery?
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Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability?
Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of
friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord,
just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated
above ([3236]Q[37], A[1]). Therefore quarreling is also.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): "An angry man
stirreth up strife. " Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife
or quarreling is also.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:1): "From whence are wars
and quarrels [Douay: 'contentions'] among you? Are they not hence, from
your concupiscences which war in your members? " Now it would seem
contrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it
seems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship
(Ethic. iv, 6).
I answer that, Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely, one
person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be observed in
this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of
the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him
from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this seems to
pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity. Whereas at times
contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being a person to whom
someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarreling,
which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or affability, to which it
belongs to behave agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "those who are opposed to
everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody,
are said to be peevish and quarrelsome. "
Reply to Objection 1: Contention pertains rather to the contradiction
of discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the
intention of displeasing.
Reply to Objection 2: The direct opposition of virtues to vices
depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from many
causes, but on the species of their acts. And although quarreling
arises at times from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence
it does not follow that it is directly opposed to meekness.
Reply to Objection 3: James speaks there of concupiscence considered as
a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says:
"The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all
evil. "
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Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery?
Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the
contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin does
the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than
quarreling, for it is written (Is. 3:12): "O My people, they that call
thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps. "
Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.
Objection 2: Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in
flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another:
whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts
openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin
than quarreling.
Objection 3: Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a flatterer
than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous sin than
flattery.
On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual
state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be
more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Tim.
3:2,3) that it "behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome"; and (2
Tim. 3:24): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle. " Therefore
quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.
I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In one
way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more a vice
is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now
the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to
displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving
displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who
exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as
regards certain external motives, and thus flattery sometimes more
grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue
honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for
instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up the
speaker to contempt.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving
secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly.
Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person
openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a
more grievous sin than theft, as stated above ([3237]Q[66], A[9]).
Reply to Objection 2: In human acts, the more grievous is not always
the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his
reason: wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the
reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since
they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are
committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem to arise
from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason,
although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a
greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by deceit,
seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding from
greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the objection, shame regards the
vileness of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more
grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more
ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more
grievous.
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OF LIBERALITY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely,
covetousness and prodigality.
Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether liberality is a virtue?
(2) What is its matter?
(3) Of its act;
(4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take?
(5) Whether liberality is a part of justice?
(6) Of its comparison with other virtues.
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Whether liberality is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue is
contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination for
one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it pertains to
the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 1), "it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to
himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things. " Therefore
liberality is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth
contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in Ethic. i, 8.
Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the
liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic.
iv, 1) that "he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but
to give it away. "
Objection 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But
liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues: since
many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing to give;
and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise.
Therefore liberality is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "the Gospel contains
many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated. " Now in the
Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. Therefore
liberality is a virtue.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), "it belongs to
virtue to use well the things that we can use ill. " Now we may use both
well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as the
powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are without,
such as the things of this world that are granted us for our
livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these
things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp. ) and
Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to
some, in order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship.
But it suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal
man commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we
are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in
which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And
yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to
attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those
belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "It is a
commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them
to be in want. "
Reply to Objection 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to give
away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the
wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is
acquired. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the liberal
man does not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain
people"; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "Our Lord does not wish a
man to pour out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he
do as Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might
not be bound by any household cares. " For this belongs to the state of
perfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Q[184][3238], Q[186],
A[3]).
It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's
possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is directed
to happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "those
who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal"; and
likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence
Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "If you assist to rob others of their
possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your
liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than of
pity. " Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend much
on certain evil works, are not liberal.
Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good uses,
without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform works of
other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not in the
same way as virtuous people, as stated above ([3239]FS, Q[65], A[1]).
In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal,
although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1):
"Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance," i. e. his means,
"for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the
giver": and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "it is the heart that makes
a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether liberality is about money?
Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not about money. For every
moral virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to
justice to be about operations, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Therefore,
since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is about passions
and not about money.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any
kind of wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial
riches, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5,6). Therefore
liberality is not chiefly about money.
Objection 3: Further, different virtues have different matter, since
habits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are the
matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they are not
the matter of liberality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "liberality
seems to be a mean in the matter of money. "
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it belongs
to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is also called
open-handedness [largitas], because that which is open does not
withhold things but parts of them. The term "liberality" seems also to
allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees it
[liberat], so to speak, from his keeping and ownership, and shows his
mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things which are the
subject of a man's free-handedness towards others are the goods he
possesses, which are denoted by the term "money. " Therefore the proper
matter of liberality is money.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 3), liberality depends
not on the quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart
of the giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire,
and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things
given. Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of
liberality, while exterior money is the object of those same passions.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in his book De Disciplina
Christi (Tract. de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth,
and whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of "'pecunia' [money], because
in olden times men's possessions consisted entirely of 'pecora'
[flocks]. " And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "We give the name
of money to anything that can be valued in currency. "
Reply to Objection 3: Justice establishes equality in external things,
but has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of
internal passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of
liberality, and in another way of justice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether using money is the act of liberality?
Objection 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality.
For different virtues have different acts. But using money is becoming
to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence. Therefore it is not
the proper act of liberality.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but
also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be
connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be
unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality.
Objection 3: Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it
but also in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the
spender, and consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says
(De Benef. v): "A man is not liberal by giving to himself. " Therefore
not every use of money belongs to liberality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "In whatever
matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter:
Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the
best use of riches. " Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good
use of money is the act of liberality.
I answer that, The species of an act is taken from its object, as
stated above ([3240]FS, Q[18], A[2]). Now the object or matter of
liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the
foregoing Article (ad 2). And since every virtue is consistent with its
object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is
consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful goods,
since all external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the proper
act of liberality is making use of money or riches.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to liberality to make good use of
riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On
the other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under
another aspect, namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing is
due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches
under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for the
fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in relation to
liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall explain
farther on ([3241]Q[134]).
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make
good use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide opportunities
for that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier's fortitude not only to
wield his sword against the foe, but also to sharpen his sword and keep
it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to use
money, but also to keep it in preparation and safety in order to make
fitting use of it.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated (A[2], ad 1), the internal passions
whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of
liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man should
not be prevented from making any due use of money through an inordinate
affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one consists in
applying it to one's own use, and would seem to come under the
designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in
devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts.
Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an
immoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from
making suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with giving
and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1).
truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the
existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying
something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself to
possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly.
For there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly
folly annexed to it, according to 1 Cor. 3:18, "If any man among you
seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be
wise. " But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same
text goes on to say, "is foolishness with God. " Accordingly, he that is
strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the
estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which
human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, "and the wisdom of
men is not with me," and farther on, "and I have known the science of
the saints" [*Vulg. : 'and I have not known the science of the saints'].
It may also be replied that "the wisdom of men" is that which is
acquired by human reason, while the "wisdom of the saints" is that
which is received by divine inspiration.
Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not
of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, "nor am I the son of a
prophet. "
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man
tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty,
not only if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a
sin, but also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which
sometimes is not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does
not acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.
Reply to Objection 3: A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid
another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid
pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan. ): "Shun not
arrogance so as to forsake truth": and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3)
that "it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting?
Objection 1: It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than
boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is a
kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any
more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin
than boasting.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony
is not a less grievous sin than boasting.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25): "When he shall speak
low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart. "
Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold
wickedness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): "Those who speak
with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, seemingly, in
their manners. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3223]Q[110], AA[2],4), one lie is more
grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is
about---thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most
grievous---and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a
mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now
irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by
any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person: so
that in this respect they are equal.
But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely,
the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man's
averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by
uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
7) that "boasting is a more grievous sin than irony. "
Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some
other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then
irony is more grievous.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting,
according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account
of its matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.
Reply to Objection 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the
other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by
outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for
instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the kind,
and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual
excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Mat. 6:16) that "they
disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast. " Wherefore
such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in
different respects, and for this reason they sin more grievously. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that it is "the practice of
boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little
of themselves": and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that
he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too
shabby, because by both do men seek glory.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, "There
is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of
deceit," and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who,
through deceitful humility, "speaks low" wickedly.
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OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and
the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning
friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a special virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
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Whether friendliness is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect friendship is
that which is on account of virtue. " Now any virtue is the cause of
friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as Dionysius states
(Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a
consequence of every virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind
of friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both from those
he loves and from those who are not his friends. " Now it seems to
pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to
those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue.
Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a wise man
decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): "The heart of
the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there
is mirth": wherefore "it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of
pleasure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), "is essentially desirous of sharing
pleasures, but fears to give pain. " Therefore this kind of friendliness
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now
it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): "Make thyself affable to the congregation
of the poor. " Therefore affability, which is what we mean by
friendship, is a special virtue.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[109], A[2]; [3224]FS, Q[55], A[3]),
since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of
good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists
in order, as stated above (Q[109], A[2]). And it behooves man to be
maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their
mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so
that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the
need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order:
and this virtue is called friendliness.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in
his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves
another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in
treating of charity ([3225]Q[23], A[1], A[3], ad 1; QQ[25],26), what
things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another
friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has
not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness
thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those
with whom he is in contact.
Reply to Objection 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a
certain general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that "every
beast loveth its like. " This love is signified by signs of friendship,
which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are
strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this:
because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not
treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to us by
special friendship.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that "the heart of the wise is
where there is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his
neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat,
thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity": but
that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus.
7:38, "Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them
that mourn. " Again, "the heart of fools is where there is mirth," not
that they may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness.
Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with
those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns,
but honest pleasures, according to Ps. 132:1, "Behold how good and how
pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity. "
Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of
some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the
virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those
among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): "Although I
made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent," and further on (2
Cor. 7:9), "I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because
you were made sorrowful unto repentance. " For this reason we should not
show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we
may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, and in a way
encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:26):
"Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and show not thy
countenance gay towards them. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of
justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this
virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably
towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part
of justice.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this
virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in
fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest
pleasures, as stated above ([3226]FS, Q[60], A[5]; [3227]FS, Q[61],
A[3]). Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is
contrary to justice, as stated above ([3228]Q[59], AA[1],2). Now,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in
like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers. " Therefore
this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.
On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a
part of justice.
I answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to it as
to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is directed to
another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of the notion of
justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is
bound to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to pay,
or by some debt arising out of a favor received. For it regards merely
a certain debt of equity, namely, that we behave pleasantly to those
among whom we dwell, unless at times, for some reason, it be necessary
to displease them for some good purpose.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([3229]Q[109], A[3], ad 1),
because man is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the
manifestation of truth without which human society could not last. Now
as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not
without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one
could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a
certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his
fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for
their good.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the
senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which have
their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves becomingly
towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they
were noisome.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that
one ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and
strangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), "it is not fitting to
please and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way. "
This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all in
a fitting manner.
__________________________________________________________________
OF FLATTERY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: (1)
Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether flattery is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether flattery is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists
in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is
not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov. 31:28, "Her children
rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her. "
Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1
Cor. 10:33, "I . . . in all things please all men. " Therefore flattery
is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise.
But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise
good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore
Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against
flattery. "It must be observed," says he, "that by the wonderful
moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by detractions
but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the
flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may humble. " But
detraction is an evil, as stated above ([3230]Q[73], AA[2],3).
Therefore flattery is a good.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, "Woe to them that sew
cushions under every elbow," says, "that is to say, sweet flattery. "
Therefore flattery is a sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3231]Q[114], A[1], ad 3), although the
friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends
chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not
fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or
of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always
to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing,
and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere
intention of pleasing he is said to be "complaisant," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of
making some gain out of it, he is called a "flatterer" or "adulator. "
As a rule, however, the term "flattery" is wont to be applied to all
who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or
deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their fellows.
Reply to Objection 1: One may praise a person both well and ill,
according as one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while
observing other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person
by praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive
to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of
friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a
person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since perhaps
they are evil, according to Ps. 9:24, "The sinner is praised in the
desires of his soul"; or they may be uncertain, according to Ecclus.
27:8, "Praise not a man before he speaketh," and again (Ecclus. 11:2),
"Praise not a man for his beauty"; or because there may be fear lest
human praise should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written,
(Ecclus. 11:30), "Praise not any man before death. " Again, in like
manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster charity,
so that he may make spiritual progress therein. But it would be sinful
to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain, or to please
them in something evil, according to Ps. 52:6, "God hath scattered the
bones of them that please men," and according to the words of the
Apostle (Gal. 1:10), "If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant
of Christ. "
Reply to Objection 2: Even to blame evil is sinful, if due
circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one
another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which is
contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as regards
the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas
the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at
times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether flattery is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to
Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is harmful. "
But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, "For the sinner is
praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The
sinner hath provoked the Lord. " Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant):
"Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery": and a gloss on
Ps. 69:4, "Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that
say to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well," says: "The tongue of the flatterer
harms more than the sword of the persecutor. " Therefore flattery is a
most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less
than others: wherefore it is written (Ps. 36:15): "Let their sword
enter into their own hearts. " Now he that flatters another induces him
to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, "Let not the oil of the
sinner fatten my head," says: "The false praise of the flatterer
softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders
it susceptive of vice. " Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in
himself.
Objection 3: Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3):
"The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and
treachery shall be degraded from his office. " Now such a punishment as
this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de Sanctis)
reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any person of
higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of necessity. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3232]Q[112], A[2]), a mortal sin is
one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to
charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways.
First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another's
sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he
speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to
sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Is. 5:20. "Woe to you
that call evil good. " Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one
man flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in
body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written
(Prov. 27:6): "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful
kisses of an enemy. " Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise of
a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an
occasion of sin. In this case it is necessary to consider, whether the
occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall,
as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal
([3233]Q[43], AA[3],4). If, however, one man flatters another from the
mere craving to please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or
to acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to
charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who
praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than
the sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of
greater consequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so
efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively,
being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be
a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (Q[43],
A[1], ad 3; [3234]FS, Q[73], A[8], ad 3; [3235]FS, Q[80], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to one that flatters with
the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than
others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning,
whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.
Reply to Objection 3: The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters
another treacherously, in order to deceive him.
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OF QUARRELING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship?
(2) Of its comparison with flattery?
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Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability?
Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of
friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord,
just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated
above ([3236]Q[37], A[1]). Therefore quarreling is also.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): "An angry man
stirreth up strife. " Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife
or quarreling is also.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:1): "From whence are wars
and quarrels [Douay: 'contentions'] among you? Are they not hence, from
your concupiscences which war in your members? " Now it would seem
contrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it
seems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship
(Ethic. iv, 6).
I answer that, Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely, one
person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be observed in
this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of
the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him
from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this seems to
pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity. Whereas at times
contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being a person to whom
someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarreling,
which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or affability, to which it
belongs to behave agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "those who are opposed to
everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody,
are said to be peevish and quarrelsome. "
Reply to Objection 1: Contention pertains rather to the contradiction
of discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the
intention of displeasing.
Reply to Objection 2: The direct opposition of virtues to vices
depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from many
causes, but on the species of their acts. And although quarreling
arises at times from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence
it does not follow that it is directly opposed to meekness.
Reply to Objection 3: James speaks there of concupiscence considered as
a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says:
"The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all
evil. "
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Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery?
Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the
contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin does
the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than
quarreling, for it is written (Is. 3:12): "O My people, they that call
thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps. "
Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.
Objection 2: Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in
flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another:
whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts
openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin
than quarreling.
Objection 3: Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a flatterer
than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous sin than
flattery.
On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual
state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be
more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Tim.
3:2,3) that it "behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome"; and (2
Tim. 3:24): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle. " Therefore
quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.
I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In one
way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more a vice
is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now
the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to
displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving
displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who
exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as
regards certain external motives, and thus flattery sometimes more
grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue
honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for
instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up the
speaker to contempt.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving
secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly.
Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person
openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a
more grievous sin than theft, as stated above ([3237]Q[66], A[9]).
Reply to Objection 2: In human acts, the more grievous is not always
the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his
reason: wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the
reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since
they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are
committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem to arise
from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason,
although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a
greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by deceit,
seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding from
greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the objection, shame regards the
vileness of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more
grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more
ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more
grievous.
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OF LIBERALITY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely,
covetousness and prodigality.
Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether liberality is a virtue?
(2) What is its matter?
(3) Of its act;
(4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take?
(5) Whether liberality is a part of justice?
(6) Of its comparison with other virtues.
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Whether liberality is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue is
contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination for
one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it pertains to
the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 1), "it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to
himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things. " Therefore
liberality is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth
contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in Ethic. i, 8.
Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the
liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic.
iv, 1) that "he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but
to give it away. "
Objection 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But
liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues: since
many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing to give;
and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise.
Therefore liberality is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "the Gospel contains
many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated. " Now in the
Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. Therefore
liberality is a virtue.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), "it belongs to
virtue to use well the things that we can use ill. " Now we may use both
well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as the
powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are without,
such as the things of this world that are granted us for our
livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these
things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp. ) and
Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to
some, in order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship.
But it suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal
man commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we
are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in
which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And
yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to
attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those
belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "It is a
commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them
to be in want. "
Reply to Objection 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to give
away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the
wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is
acquired. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the liberal
man does not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain
people"; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "Our Lord does not wish a
man to pour out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he
do as Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might
not be bound by any household cares. " For this belongs to the state of
perfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Q[184][3238], Q[186],
A[3]).
It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's
possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is directed
to happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "those
who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal"; and
likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence
Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "If you assist to rob others of their
possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your
liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than of
pity. " Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend much
on certain evil works, are not liberal.
Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good uses,
without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform works of
other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not in the
same way as virtuous people, as stated above ([3239]FS, Q[65], A[1]).
In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal,
although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1):
"Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance," i. e. his means,
"for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the
giver": and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "it is the heart that makes
a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value. "
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Whether liberality is about money?
Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not about money. For every
moral virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to
justice to be about operations, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Therefore,
since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is about passions
and not about money.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any
kind of wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial
riches, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5,6). Therefore
liberality is not chiefly about money.
Objection 3: Further, different virtues have different matter, since
habits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are the
matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they are not
the matter of liberality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "liberality
seems to be a mean in the matter of money. "
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it belongs
to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is also called
open-handedness [largitas], because that which is open does not
withhold things but parts of them. The term "liberality" seems also to
allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees it
[liberat], so to speak, from his keeping and ownership, and shows his
mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things which are the
subject of a man's free-handedness towards others are the goods he
possesses, which are denoted by the term "money. " Therefore the proper
matter of liberality is money.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 3), liberality depends
not on the quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart
of the giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire,
and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things
given. Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of
liberality, while exterior money is the object of those same passions.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in his book De Disciplina
Christi (Tract. de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth,
and whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of "'pecunia' [money], because
in olden times men's possessions consisted entirely of 'pecora'
[flocks]. " And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "We give the name
of money to anything that can be valued in currency. "
Reply to Objection 3: Justice establishes equality in external things,
but has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of
internal passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of
liberality, and in another way of justice.
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Whether using money is the act of liberality?
Objection 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality.
For different virtues have different acts. But using money is becoming
to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence. Therefore it is not
the proper act of liberality.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but
also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be
connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be
unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality.
Objection 3: Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it
but also in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the
spender, and consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says
(De Benef. v): "A man is not liberal by giving to himself. " Therefore
not every use of money belongs to liberality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "In whatever
matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter:
Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the
best use of riches. " Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good
use of money is the act of liberality.
I answer that, The species of an act is taken from its object, as
stated above ([3240]FS, Q[18], A[2]). Now the object or matter of
liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the
foregoing Article (ad 2). And since every virtue is consistent with its
object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is
consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful goods,
since all external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the proper
act of liberality is making use of money or riches.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to liberality to make good use of
riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On
the other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under
another aspect, namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing is
due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches
under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for the
fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in relation to
liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall explain
farther on ([3241]Q[134]).
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make
good use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide opportunities
for that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier's fortitude not only to
wield his sword against the foe, but also to sharpen his sword and keep
it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to use
money, but also to keep it in preparation and safety in order to make
fitting use of it.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated (A[2], ad 1), the internal passions
whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of
liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man should
not be prevented from making any due use of money through an inordinate
affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one consists in
applying it to one's own use, and would seem to come under the
designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in
devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts.
Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an
immoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from
making suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with giving
and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1).
