No More Learning

496), p. 75.
Kurram Agency Gazetteer, 1908, p. 13.


## p. 471 (#511) ############################################

THE JIRGA SYSTEM
471
important of the former are the Gar and Samil, which appear to have
originated in the Bangash country whence they spread to the Afridis,
Orakzais, and Mohmands. Whatever their origin may have been,
their existence has undoubtedly complicated the frontier problem and
produced a chronic state of internal warfare. West of the Gar and
Samil, the Spin (White) and Tor (Black) political factions prevail.
With the exception of the Turis of Kurram and certain Bangash and
Orakzai clans who are Shiahs, the border tribesmen are orthodox
Muhammadans of the Sunni sect. The important point to remember is
that the religious creed of the Pathans does not affect their political
convictions, for a tribe or clan may be Samil and Sunni, or Samil and
a
Shiah: the combination varies.
No description of these tribes would be complete without some
account of their internal administration and of their method of
negotiating with the British raj. Even the most lawless community
is compelled to recognise the necessity for some sort of government;
even the rudest form of customary law needs enforcing. From Chitral
to the Kabul River the British are able to deal with important chiefs
and rulers, such as the Mehtar of Chitral and the hereditary chiefs of
the numerous khanates into which Dir and Bajaur are divided.
Farther south, between the Kabul and the Gumal, this is not the case.
Here the controlling power is a council of elders or tribal maliks,
known as the jirga, through which agency all negotiations between the
tribesmen and British frontier officials are carried out. The more
democratic a tribe the larger the jirga. For this reason a full jirga
often means nothing less than a gathering of every adult male.
Rarely, if ever, does any jirga represent the whole tribe, for there are
always unruly members who refuse to recognise any control save their
own interests and desires. The tribal council is usually composed of
a certain number of influential maliks and mullahs wilo attempt to
enforce their decrees by meting out punishment in the form of out-
lawry, heavy fines, or the destruction of property. For the enforce-
ment of jirga decrees, the Mahsuds have an institution known as the
chalweshtis, or tribal police. No blood-feud can arise because of any
death caused by them in the execution of their duties. In ordinary
times the jirga deals with questions of inter-tribal politics, and, since
its functions are political rather than social, it cannot be compared
to a caste panchayat.
Because of the close connection between the semi-independent hills
and the settled districts, a modified form of the jirga system has been
introduced into the administered area. This system is in accordance
with the Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901, which superseded the
Panjab Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1887. This regulation empowers
the deputy-commissioner to make both civil and criminal references
to councils of elders, that is, to jirgas of three or more persons convened
according to tribal custom. Where the deputy-commissioner is con-


## p. 472 (#512) ############################################

472
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
vinced that a civil dispute is likely to lead to a blood-feud or to a
breach of the peace, especially where a frontier tribesman is a party
to the dispute, he is at liberty to refer the case, for investigation and
report, to a council of elders of his own nomination. When the decision
of the jirga is received, he may remand the case for further investiga-
tion, refer the enquiry to another jirga, or pass a decree in accordance
with the finding, provided that not less than three-quarters of the
members of the jirga have agreed to this decision. Similarly, criminal
references may be made to a council of elders, if it is inexperient that
the question of the guilt or innocence of an accused person suvuld be
tried in the ordinary criminal courts. Here the deputy-commissioner's
power to nominate the jirga is limited by the accused person's right
to object to any member. The maximum punishment for an offence
investigated in this manner is fourteen years' rigorous imprisonment.
Under this regulation members of hostile tribes may be debarred from
entering British India. Again, where a blood-feud is likely to arise
between two families or factions in British territory, the deputy-
commissioner may, on the recommendation of a jirga, order the
parties concerned to execute a bond for their good behaviour, for a
period not exceeding three years.
An attempt was made in certain parts of the province to modify
this system of trial by jirga, and to assimilate it to that in use in the
Baluchistan Agency. Instead of appointing small jirgas for each case,
periodical "jirga sessions” were held to which all cases awaiting trial
were referred. It was hoped that this arrangement would do away
with the corruption inherent in small councils and avoid constant
summonses to the members of the jirga. But even this system had its
drawbacks, for, on account of its size and the large number of cases
which came before this jirga, the members were precluded from
proceeding to the scene of each offence for the purpose of supple-
menting by their own investigations the facts which had already been
brought to their notice. 1
It was not only in the administration of justice that difficulties were
experienced. To-day the land tenures of the settled areas resemble
those of the adjoining Panjab districts, but this generalisation was not
true of the early days of Panjab rule. When the Pathans overran the
frontier zone, between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, they
divided the land amongst their various tribes, clans, and septs. Their
intensely democratic constitution resulted, with rare exceptions, in a
periodical redistribution of lands, known as vesh or khasanne. The land
of each tribal sept was termed a tappa, and there was a time when
redistribution even of these tappas took place. When this ceased, vesh
still continued within the tappa, and involved the transfer of whole
villages, not merely of individual holdings within the village itself.
i See also N. -W. F. Province Administration Report, 1921-2, p. 40.
* For Pathan invasions see Kalid-i-Afghani, Selections from the Tarikh-i-Murass'a (ed.
Plowden), chaps. i-v.


## p. 473 (#513) ############################################

THE ARMS TRAFFIC
473
This was the state of affairs when the British took over the frontier
tracts from the Sikhs, and vesh was recognised in the early settlements.
This system gradually disappeared in the settled districts, because it
was opposed to the spirit of British revenue procedure, and because
the Pathan began to realise the advantages of fixity of tenure. When
the Frontier Province was formed, vesh, with a few exceptions, was to
be found only across the administrative border. The most important
exception was the system of khulla (mouth) vesh, which prevailed, as
late as 1904, in certain unirrigated tracts of the Marwat tahsil of
Bannu. 1 Under khulla vesh fresh shares were allotted to every man,
woman, and child. The custom of vesh is now obsolete, except in the
independent hills of Buner, Dir, Swat, Bajaur, and Utman Khel.
There is, however, one important difference between frontier ad-
ministrations, like British Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier
Province, and an ordinary province in the heart of British India.
Geographical and strategical considerations make the marches of
Hindustan a military area, and render the defence of these provinces a
matter of vital importance to the Government of India. On the Indian
frontier there is necessarily a large excess of expenditure over income,
but critics often fail to realise that expenditure on frontier defence is
not merely for the protection of the inhabitants of the settled districts
from the marauding incursions of the turbulent tribesmen, but is also
for the defence of India as a whole.
Lord Curzon knew full well that finality could never be reached on
the Indian frontier, and did not claim that his solution of the problem
would last for ever. Although, by the Anglo-Russian Convention of
1907, Russia recognised Afghanistan as outside her sphere of influence,
the refusal of the home government to consult the amir only served
to add more fuel to the smouldering fires of Habib-ullah's resentment,
and his displeasure was reflected, to a certain extent, in the wave
of unrest which swept over the Afridi and Mohmand valleys in the
year 1908. But, with the exception of short expeditions, no punitive
operations took place until the late war. It must not be imagined,
however, that this period was devoid of interest, for it was marked by
the growth of the arms traffic, which entirely revolutionised the nature
of border warfare; by the increase of raiding by well-organised gangs
of outlaws from Afghanistan; and by the development of the Mahsud
problem which still awaits solution.
The evil effects of gun-running in the Persian Gulf, which flooded
the tribal areas with arms of precision, first became apparent during
the Tirah campaign, 1897–8, but ten years were to elapse before
adequate attempts were made to suppress it. From 1906 onwards
there was an alarming increase in the number of rifles imported into
Afghanistan, the number increasing from 15,000 in 1907 to 40,000 in
1909. Some idea of the volume of trade may be gained from the fact
i Kohat Settlement Report, 1907, p. 2.
• Gooch and Temperley, Origins of the War, 1898–1914, iv, 577.


## p. 474 (#514) ############################################

474
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
that whereas, in 1906, the price of a Martini rifle in Tirah was
approximately Rs. 500, in 1908 it had dropped to Rs. 130. 1 Although
the Chagai caravan route was effectively blocked in 1908, the real
result of this precautionary measure was to deflect the traffic to more
westerly routes through Persian territory. The necessity for immediate
repressive measures becomes apparent from the following report:
It is estimated that over 16,500 rifles, 352 revolvers and pistols and 1,079,100
rounds as well as 13; boxes of ammunition were landed between the 31st March
1909 and 1st April 1910. 3
It was not until 1910, when the British established a rigorous
blockade of the Gulf, that this pernicious traffic was in any way
checked. Unfortunately, these repressive measures came too late, for
the powers of resistance of the Pathan tribesmen had already been
increased. Indeed, it can be safely asserted that this arming of the
border tribes with more modern weapons in place of the old-fashioned
jezails has not only greatly aggravated the difficulty of dealing with
the frontier problem, but has also radically altered the whole situation.
It is always possible to coerce tribes within the British sphere of
influence: it is an entirely different matter when the subjects of a
neighbouring power make marauding incursions into the settled
districts of India. From 1908 onwards, the peace of the border was
seriously disturbed by large raiding gangs from Afghan territory. By
1910 the situation had become so critical that the viceroy was forced
to remonstrate with the amir, for it was in this year that the Hindustani
fanatics visited Kabul, where they were received with great honour
by the anti-British Nasr-ullah Khan. As a result of this remonstrance
steps were taken by the Afghan Government to root out the colonies
of outlaws living in Khost. The British attempted to solve the problem
by the formation of conciliation committees, of prominent persons
from the settled districts and chiefs and elders from adjacent tribal
terriiory, for the purpose of making recommendations for the repatria-
tion of outlaws residing in the independent hills. 4 British efforts were
remarkably successful, but, owing to the state of anarchy prevailing
in Khost, the same cannot be said of the attempts made by the Afghan
authorities. The British also introduced a special system of patrolling
for the protection of their subjects, but, unfortunately, British subjects
resembled sheep exposed to ravening wolves, for, against the almost
unanimous opinion of the greatest frontier administrators, they had
been disarmed in 1900. Far worse than this, the tribesmen were
better armed than either the Border Military Police or the militia,
the very forces maintained for the purpose of reprisals. In 1909 ihe
state of the police was so disgraceful that twenty-five out of every
hundred sepoys were either unfit or too old for frontier service. Both
native officers and the non-commissioned ranks were selected, not for
i Secret Border Report, 1908-9, p. 5.
: Secret Border Report, 1910-11, p. 1.
2 Baluchistan Agency Report, 1909-10, p. 2.
• Idem, pp. 2–3.
5 Idem, 1908-9, p. 17.


## p. 475 (#515) ############################################

1914-1918
475
military efficiency, but for political reasons, because they happened
to be the sons or relatives of influential border landowners. In addi-
tion, the rank and file were so badly paid that it was practically
impossible for them to make both ends meet, unless they were stationed
in close proximity to their native villages. Not only were the border
villagers disarmed, the tribesmen well armed, the police inefficient and
undisciplined, but the moral of the militia was being rapidly under-
mined by the knowledge that their obsolete weapons could be easily
outranged by those of their enemies across the border. Before 1914
these abuses had been remedied as far as possible by the arming of
the border villagers and by the creation of a more efficient and better
armed Frontier Constabulary to take the place of the Border Military
Police.
The outbreak of war, in August, 1914, aroused but little immediate
interest amongst the frontier population. Of course undercurrents of
disloyalty existed, and a certain lack of confidence was displayed by
a run on the savings banks in Peshawar. The entry of Turkey in
November created considerable excitement. One of the great dangers
on the frontier is the possible attitude of the Afridis, whose lead in war
the other tribes are usually prepared to follow. The danger of an
Afridi rising, however, was averted, when, on 1 February, 1915, the
government decided to double their allowances. Great pressure was
brought to bear upon the amir to persuade him to declare war. In
fact, all the leading mullahs of Afghanistan preached openly in favour
of war, but, fortunately for the peace of the Indian borderland,
Habib-ullah, the first years of whose reign had been marked by ex-
tensive intrigues on the Indian side of the Durand line, remained
faithful to the British alliance. Nevertheless, a wave of unrest necessi-
tated the dispatch of punitive expeditions against the Mohmands and
Mahsuds.
The history of British relations with the Mahsud tribes inhabiting
the heart of Waziristan has been a history of constant friction. Neither
punitive expedition nor stringent blockade has served to curb their
lawlessness. After the Mahsud blockade, 1900–2, that pestilential
priest, the mullah Powindah, became paramount in the Mahsud
council chamber, and several dastardly assassinations of British officers
were traced to his direct instigation. His death on the eve of the great
war did not make for peace, for, from 1914 to 1917, the history of the
Dera Ismail Khan district was one long tale of rapine and outrage,
so much so, that it was difficult to understand why British subjects on
the borders of Waziristan had not moved en masse across the Indus.
Eventually, in the hot season of 1917, troops marched into the Mahsud
country, but were able to effect only a temporary settlement. British
preoccupations elsewhere delayed the day of retribution; and, until
quite recently, the wind-swept raghzas of Waziristan have witnessed
the severest fighting in the blood-stained annals of the Indian frontier.
1 Secret Border Report, 1914-15, p. 11.


## p. 476 (#516) ############################################

CHAPTER XXVI
a
INDIA AND THE WAR
FOR India, the war possessed—nay, still possesses—a twofold
significance. It was, in the first place, a transient if exhausting crisis
in the history of the British Commonwealth: a crisis in which India
bore herself bravely: contributed substantially to the cause of victory,
and vindicated once and for all her attachment to the person of the
king. But it was also something far more significant. It was a wind
from the West, fanning to a blaze the embers of old Nationalist ambi-
tions, bearing with it the sparks of new fires which readily seized upon
combustible elements already heaped together. Strange enthusiasms
were kindled: unfamiliar ideals furnished fuel to the flames. A furnace
glowed, and into its fires the polity of India passed. That which will
at length emerge from the conflagration remains a matter of con-
jecture.
To describe what India did for the war is to tell a tale as simple as
it is inspiring. To estimate what the war did for India is a problem
that may perplex the wisest, since the issue is still unknown. Inevitably,
therefore, the pages which immediately follow will deal mainly with
the former and obvious aspect of war-time India: and will contain
only such references to the more fundamental matter as can escape
the charge of prophecy or speculation.
From one point of view the outbreak of hostilities saw India better
prepared than her sister members of the commonwealth: from another
she was far more severely handicapped than they in shouldering her
share of the common burden. This apparent contradiction arose from
the fact that the Army in India Committee, the majority report of
which was accepted by the Government of India in 1913, had specially
limited the part she would be called upon to play in any future struggle.
It was officially determined that
while India should provide for her own defence against local aggression, and, if
necessary, for an attack on the Indian Empire by a great Power until reinforce-
ments can come from home, she is not called upon to maintain troops for the
specific purpose of placing them at the disposal of the Home Government for wars
outside the Indian sphere. "
Accordingly, while August, 1914, found the Indian Army at war
strength, the magazines full, and the equipment complete, the whole
measure of this preparedness was based upon a principle of limitation
which the home government itself was the first to disregard. Instead
of India's task being restricted to the defence of her frontiers and the
1 India's Contribution to the Great War (official document), p. 73.


## p. 477 (#517) ############################################

THE INDIAN PRINCES
477
maintenance of internal order-responsibilities which, be it remem-
bered, had jointly or severally ruined alike the Moghul Empire and
its many predecessors-she found herself in no long time obliged to
fight for the commonwealth in half a dozen theatres of war. "As was
only to be expected, the overloaded military machine could not at
first cope with strains which its designers had specifically excluded
from their calculations.
But if the more prudent might well have harboured doubts as to
the capacity of India to undertake the task which fell to her lot, it
was impossible to question the spirit in which she assumed her obliga-
tions. The great princes of India, true to their martial traditions and
tested loyalty, rallied with one accord to the defence of the empire,
offering their personal services and the resources of their states for the
prosecution of the war. From among the many princes who volun-
teered for active service, the viceroy, Lord Hardinge, selected the
rulers of Bikaner, Jodhpur, Kishengarh, Patiala and Sachin. The
veteran Sir Pertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, despite his seventy
years, would not be denied his right to serve the king: and insisted
upon accompanying his sixteen-year-old nephew and ward, the
Maharaja of Jodhpur, to the fighting line. The twenty-seven larger
states which maintain Imperial Service Troops immediately placed
every regiment at the disposal of the Government of India: and the
viceroy accepted from twelve states contingents of cavalry, infantry,
sappers and transport, besides the famous Camel Corps of Bikaner.
From the remoter parts of India, and even from beyond her borders,
loyal messages, coupled with generous offers of assistance, came pouring
in. The government of Nepal placed the whole of its formidable
resources at the disposal of the empire. Even the Dalai Lama of Tibet
offered a contingent of a thousand troops, while the innumerable
lamas who owed him allegiance chanted prayers for a British victory
at the behest of “The Lord of All the Beings in the Snowy Country”.
Throughout British India a similar spirit prevailed, even if its mani-
festations were more conventional. Hundreds of letters and telegrams
were received by the central and local governments expressing loyalty
and service. Private individuals and political associations, monied
magnates and poor pensioners, prominent politicians and private
citizens—all alike seemed animated by a single purpose--to demon-
strate in every possible manner their loyalty to the throne and their
attachment to the commonwealth. When the imperial legislative
council met on 8 September, 1914, there were witnessed remarkable
scenes of enthusiasm: the non-official members vying with one another
in expressing whole-hearted devotion to the British cause. Of their
own initiative, they expressed a desire that India should share in the
heavy financial burden which the war was already imposing upon
the United Kingdom.
It is no exaggeration to say that this immense and spontaneous
a


## p. 478 (#518) ############################################

478
INDIA AND THE WAR
manifestation of loyal enthusiasm took the Government of India some-
what unawares. No one who knew the country at first hand had
attached importance to the confident prophecies of such writers as
Count von Reventlow, who preached, for the edification of the
German public, that India would flame into formidable revolt when-
ever trouble overtook Britain. Government was well aware of the
fine-spun net of German intrigue so sedulously woven in the years
preceding the war: and also knew what its authors failed to realise-
the essential futility of the fabric upon which German secret service
agents had expended so much money and toil. There were, indeed,
terrorist conspiracies: some childish, others formidable. But they
were confined to a mere handful of persons, whose worst efforts were
powerless to distract government from its task. All this had been
foreseen. What took the authorities by surprise was the whole-hearted
rally of the country to their side. The history of India, it must be
admitted, provided no precedent for the remarkable spectacle now
unfolding itself before the eyes of observers. Since the beginning of
the connection between India and England, the empire had been at
war on many occasions. But with the exception of offers of help from
the great princes, the country as a whole had on each occasion given
,
no sign of any deep feeling. In these circumstances, the government
cannot fairly be blamed for failing to anticipate the manner in which
Britain's entry into the struggle would arouse all the most generous
instincts of the Indian people. Here was no war of aggrandisement:
no project of imperialist expansion: but a solemn fulfilment of treaty
obligations to defend a small nation. The whole of India was filled
with enthusiasm. Unfortunately, the Government of India was in-
capable of turning this enthusiasm to the best account. Imagination
is not a prominent characteristic of bureaucratic administrations: and
the authorities in India had been accustomed for so long to rule the
country with the passive acquiescence of the population, while en-
during in the process the pin-prick criticism of an educated class
anxious for the privileges and responsibilities of office, that the uni-
versal desire to assist and to co-operate became almost a source of
embarrassment. To a lesser extent, it may be argued, the governments
of all the belligerents experienced a similar difficulty. But elsewhere
the enthusiasm of the people, after a period in which it was suffered
to run to waste, was canalised into voluntary organisations and sub-
sidiary services, which provided at once an outlet for patriotic energy
and a stimulus to further efforts. In India very little was done to this
end: the government desired rather to be left alone, and only valued
such enthusiasm as could be turned to immediate and direct account
for official purposes. The small British community, both men and
women, played their part nobly, and devoted themselves whole-
heartedly to war work where they could not be spared for active
service. Indians, however, were left without much guidance. In


## p. 479 (#519) ############################################

THE MILITARY EFFORT
479
consequence, the astonishing outburst of popular emotion was allowed
to exhaust itself almost fruitlessly in proportion to its magnitude: until,
at a later date, it had to be artificially revived to meet a domestic
danger and to sustain the unprecedented war effort of 1918. The
authorities seemed to rest content with the knowledge that India was
safe from revolution: it appeared scarcely to occur to them to enlist
in the cause of the commonwealth even a proportion of the energy
and devotion so freely proffered. Offers of service were courteously
acknowledged: some few were accepted, others were pigeon-holed.
But no attempt was made to set up any organisation which might be
capable of co-ordinating them, encouraging them, and turning them
to the best account.
Only in one single respect, it would seem, did the Government of
India take full advantage of the remarkable position in which circum-
stances had placed it. The country was denuded of troops to such an
extent that the British garrison for the space of some weeks stood at
a figure of 15,000 men. Of the British cavalry establishment in India,
seven regiments out of nine were sent overseas: of infantry battalions,
only eight were left out of fifty-two: of artillery, forty-three batteries
out of fifty-six were dispatched abroad. Instead of the two divisions
and one cavalry brigade, which the government had indicated its
willingness to send overseas in certain circumstances, India proceeded
to provide at once for France two infantry and two cavalry divisions,
accompanied by four field artillery brigades in excess of the normal
allotment. It is to the abiding glory of the Indian corps that it reached
France in the first great crisis of the war. The only trained reinforce-
ments immediately available in any part of the empire arrived in time
to stem the German thrust towards Ypres and the Channel ports
during the autumn of 1914. They consecrated with their blood the
unity of India with the empire: and few indeed are the survivors of
that gallant force. But, even in the first few months of the war, the
Indian Army was to distinguish itself upon many fronts. In September,
1914, personnel, transport and equipment accompanied the mixed
division of troops to East Africa. In October and November, two
divisions of Indian infantry and one brigade of cavalry were sent to
Egypt. Only when eight divisions had already been mobilised and sent
either abroad or to the frontier, was action undertaken in Mesopotamia
with the remainder of the forces. On 31 October an Indian brigade
seized the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab: and in three months' time, this
force was increased to an army corps of two divisions. Further, a
battalion of Indian infantry was sent to Mauritius: another to the
Cameroons: while two were dispatched to the Persian Gulf for the
protection of the Abadan pipe-line. In all, approximately 80,000
British officers and men and 210,000 Indian officers and men were
dispatched overseas in the first few months of the war. To replace
* Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, quoted in India's Contribution to the Great War, pp. 99–102.


## p. 480 (#520) ############################################

480
INDIA AND THE WAR
them twenty-nine territorial field batteries and thirty-five territorial
battalions were sent from England. For India, the exchange was
highly unprofitable, and, indeed, involved considerable risk: since the
new arrivals were unfit for employment either upon the frontier or
in Mesopotamia until they had been properly armed, duly equipped,
and completely trained. The difficulty of these tasks was increased by
the fact that, within a few weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, India
had supplied England with 70,000,000 rounds of small arm ammu-
nition, 60,000 rifles of the latest type, and more than 550 guns.
The effort made by the administration in the early months of the
war showed no signs of diminishing. By the early spring of 1915, India
had sent overseas two Indian army corps, seven infantry brigades,
two cavalry divisions, two cavalry brigades, and a mixed force in-
cluding three infantry battalions: together with the necessary acces-
sories of corps, divisional, attached troops, administrative services and
reinforcements.
Moreover, as the struggle gradually assumed a
world-wide character, the area of operations constantly extended.
When at length peace came, Indian soldiers had fought in France,
Belgium, Gallipoli, Salonika, Palestine, Egypt, the Sudan, Meso-
potamia, Aden, Somaliland, the Cameroons, East Africa, North-West
Persia, Kurdistan, South Persia, Trans-Caspia, and North China,
besides the North-West and North-East frontiers of India.
It was hardly to be expected that the Government of India, despite
the best will in the world, would rise at once to the task of discharging
in an adequate manner the obligations so suddenly laid upon it. The
difficulties it encountered were beyond measure enhanced by its own
peculiar characteristics. Of this government it has been remarked by
a cynic that its guiding principle would seem to consist in entrusting
three men's work to a single individual. In times of peace, such an
arrangement is only possible because the backbone of the adminis-
tration is composed of picked men, thoroughly trained in their duties.
But in the early days of the war, such a condition no longer obtained.
Many of the best officials managed, on one pretext or another, to
place themselves “nearer the fighting”: while for those who remained,
the tasks now for the first time laid upon them constituted a burden
as heavy as it was unfamiliar. After the commencement of the Meso-
potamia campaign, India's needs became urgent. The results of her
sacrifices at the beginning of the war were soon reaped in disastrous
fashion. Her best troops were not available: her supplies were de-
pleted. Owing to shortage of transport, essential munitions were
unobtainable. As a natural result, while the civil machinery managed
somehow to “carry on”, the military machinery came perilously near
a break-down. The management of the Mesopotamia campaign
became an ugly scandal: official enquiry serving only to confirm some
of the worst rumours. Indeed it was painfully obvious to all that the
“Frontier War” standard of military preparedness, when exposed to


## p. 481 (#521) ############################################

RECRUITMENT
481
a strain it was never designed to endure, had involved India in a
confusion almost as disastrous as any that might have arisen from
sheer unreadiness. From the standpoint of the whole commonwealth,
it is true, the importance of India's contribution during the early days
of the war is difficult to exaggerate: but it was made at a cost to herself
which entailed a heavy loss of lives, of reputation, and of efficiency.
Fortunately, by the time the Report of the Mesopotamia Commission
was published, the Indian headquarters staff had been strengthened,
and the administrative machinery had adapted itself to new re-
quirements. Sir Stanley Maude's brilliant campaign, culminating in
the capture of Baghdad, and the crushing of the Turkish Army in
Iraq, rehabilitated the reputation of India in the eyes of the world.
One by one the pressing problems which beset the authorities were
faced and overcome: and in a comparatively short space of time, the
machinery of war-time administration was running with a smoothness
reminiscent of the days of peace.
The first, and most obvious, of these problems was the provision of
the personnel required for the various expeditionary forces overseas.
At the outbreak of the war, there were in India some 80,000 British
officers and men, and some 230,000 Indian ranks, combatant and
non-combatant. During the course of hostilities, government re-
cruited, on a voluntary basis, more than 800,000 combatants and over
400,000 non-combatants, giving a grand total of some 1,300,000 men.
Prior to the war, the normal rate of recruitment had been about
15,000 nien per annum. In the year ending May, 1917, thanks to the
efforts of the administration, this figure had risen to 121,000: and in
the year ending May, 1918, it stood at 300,000. From that time
forward, until the end of the war, it was immensely stimulated by
the call for further efforts, as will subsequently be related. Certain
provinces and certain communities distinguished themselves from
the first. The Panjab, under the energetic guidance of Sir Michael
O'Dwyer, furnished 110,000 fighting men in the first two years
of the war. Between April, 1917, and March, 1918, it further
distinguished itself by raising 114,000 men. Up to the date of the
armistice the total recruitment, combatant and non-combatant, rose
nearly to half a million. The United Provinces, after 1916, redoubled
its efforts, and in the last two years of the struggle, recruited 140,000
men for the fighting services. In the matter of non-combatant
recruiting, the United Provinces led the way, providing more than
200,000 men between April, 1917, and November, 1918. Among the
particular communities, Panjabi Mussulmans and Sikhs stood out
pre-eminent: the former with 136,000 fighting men: the latter with
88,000-an immensely preponderating proportion of their eligible
man-power. The Indian states, considering their comparatively small
population, bore their share well. Kashmir sent nearly 5000 com-
1 India's Contribution to the Great War, p. 79.
31
CHIVI


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482
INDIA AND THE WAR
batants to serve overseas: Patiala sent 2700: Gwalior 2600; Bharatpur
1600; Alwar 1500; Mysore 1400; Jodhpur 1300; Jaipur 1200 and
Bikaner 1100. Other states sent according to their resources.
Another, and more difficult, aspect of the problem of man-power
was the provision of British officers for Indian units. The small British
community in India, engaged as it was in government service or in
industries of national importance, offered a very limited scope for
recruitment. At the same time, the pre-war organisation of the army
in India, with its “Frontier Campaign” standard, had made no
provision for such a reserve of officers as might have sufficed to
replace casualties on a large scale and to fill the junior commissioned
ranks of newly raised units. The first step was to augment the
Indian Army reserve. The English commercial community made
great sacrifices in order to relieve every eligible man. Cadet colleges
were opened at Quetta and Wellington: and a large number of officers
were transferred, by arrangement with the War Office, from the
special reserve or the territorial force, to the Indian Army. Nearly
a thousand temporary commissions were given to men in the ranks
of British units: the public services were depleted of all their reserves
in order that some five hundred officials might join the officers' schools
of instruction now established at Ambala, Bangalore and Nasik. The
result of the efforts of the authorities in this direction is summed up in
the statement that whereas the pre-war establishment of British
officers of the Indian Army stood at 2586, the total number of British
officers sent overseas from India up to 31 October, 1918, amounted
to no less than 23,040.
The provision of specialist personnel was also successfully accom-
plished. At the outbreak of the war, there were fewer than 300 officers
of the Indian Medical Service immediately available in military
employ. But by the surrender of officers from civil employ and the
grant of temporary commissions to private practitioners, a force of
nearly 1400 qualified medical men became available. The establish-
ment of the Indian Medical Department, which stood at 646 before
the war, was doubled. In all, 1069 officers of the Indian Medical
Service, 360 of the Royal Army Medical Corps, 1200 nursing sisters,
2142 assistant and sub-assistant surgeons, 979 British other ranks,
2674 Indian other ranks, and 26,179 followers were sent to the various
theatres of war. Personnel for the various technical directorates over-
seas presented a difficult problem. At first, since railway training was
in great demand, recruitment was done through the agency of the
Railway Board. Late", when operations developed, the need arose
for skilled staff in connection with other branches: such as military
works, inland water transport, irrigation, ordnance labour, and other
services. Training schools were accordingly started for railwaymen,
mechanical transport personnel, and the like: with the result that
in the course of the war years, some 150,000 operatives, skilled and


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THE MUNITIONS BOARD
483
unskilled were sent overseas. In addition India provided a large
number of labour, porter, and syce corps for service in France and
Mesopotamia: supply and transport personnel, veterinary personnel,
and very considerable quantities of horses, mules, camels, draught
bullocks and dairy cattle.
In the matter of material, India's contribution to the allied cause
was at least as important as her effort in man-power. From the
first she had a great and growing task to perform in equipping her
armies overseas, while at the same time placing her immense wealth
of raw material at the service of the empire. Her difficulties were
increased by the rudimentary condition of her industrial develop-
ment. At the moment when her sea communications were seriously
threatened, she could not produce more than a small fraction of the
articles essential for the maintenance of ordinary civilised activities.
She made no nails, screws, steel springs, iron chains, wire ropes, steel
,
plates, machine tools, or internal combustion engines. The munition-
making resources of the country were first co-ordinated by the Rail-
way Board. Excellent work was done; but as the magnitude of the
task became more apparent, it was plain that a special organisation
was needed to prevent overlapping purchase, to restrict to the mini-
mum all demands upon the United Kingdom, and to develop local
industries and manufactures. The difficulties in the way were great,
and to the genius of Sir Thomas Holland is due the eventual triumph
over them. The Indian Munitions Board, which was set up in 1917,
gathered together the existing fragments of purchasing departments,
and welded them into an organised machine for regulating con-
tracts and amalgamating demands. Local resources were utilised and
developed. Great Britain and America were relieved of a heavy
burden as India became an adequate base of supply for Mesopotamia
and other theatres of war. The flourishing cotton and jute industries
were placed at the service of the allies; the infant iron and steel
industry proved remarkably useful. The wolfram mines of Burma were
developed until they produced one-third of the world's output; the
Indian deposits of manganese ore became the principal source of
supply to the European allies. Mica, saltpetre, rubber, skins, petro-
leum, tea—the list of supplies forthcoming for the needs of the empire
could be lengthened almost indefinitely. In foodstuffs also, India's
services, particularly to Great Britain, were remarkable, for she was
able to place at the disposal of the Royal Commission on Wheat
Supplies a total of some 5,000,000 tons. 1
From the financial standpoint, the war effort of India is well
worthy of commemoration. The country is poor, there are rigid limits
to her taxable capacity. Despite these two handicaps, the monetary
assistance she rendered to the allied cause was by no means incon-
siderable. In the first place must be counted her expenditure upon
1 India in 1917–18.
31-2


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484
INDIA AND THE WAR
military services. The cost of expeditions sent outside India does not
normally fall upon the Indian exchequer, but in compliance with her
own request, she paid the normal cost of maintaining the troops no
longer employed within her borders. This cost varied between
£20,000,000 and £30,000,000 per annum, at a time when India's
central revenues were less than £100,000,000. Further, in September,
1918, the imperial legislative council voted that India should assume,
as from the previous April, the cost of an additional 200,000 men, and
from the succeeding April, a further 100,000. The cessation of hos-
tilities prevented the scheme from fully developing, but even in its
elementary stage it cost the country another £12,000,000. There
were also financial contributions of a more direct character. India
made a free gift of £100,000,000 to the British Government--a sum
which was equivalent to more than a year's income, which added
30 per cent. to her national debt. The greater part of this amount was
raised by two war loans which together aggregated nearly £75,000,000
-an immense sum in view of the fact that the largest loan ever raised
by an Indian Government before the war realised only £3,000,000.
In addition to these services, India found herself obliged to act as
banker for Great Britain in purchasing the enormous quantities of
foodstuffs and munitions which were factors so essential for the
prosecution of the war. Payment for these commodities was, it is true,
made in London, but owing to the difficulty of transferring funds,
India had to find the money in the first instance. As a result, she
became involved in currency difficulties of the most serious nature,
which may claim to be ranked among her sacrifices in the cause of
victory. In the years 1917 and 1918, her whole currency system was
threatened with inconvertibility, the Government of India being com-
pelled to purchase silver from every available quarter—including the
United States treasury--for the coining of 700,000,000 rupees. Lastly,
mention must be made of generous contributions towards war
charities, which, among other causes, bore the burden of Red Cross
work. The “Our Day” fund rose to £800,000, the “Imperial Indian
Relief” fund to £1,000,000. The various provincial war funds realised
large amounts, which were expended upon comforts for the troops
and their dependents. " Here, as in other directions, the great princes
of India played a worthy part. The bare list of their donations fills
200 printed pages. In money, in cars, and in supplies, the aggregate
value of these gifts totals many millions. But quite beyond all value
is the imagination and the good will which these gifts display. The
princes placed their palaces at the disposal of the wives and children
of British officers, they entertained whole armies of troops, they
equipped and maintained hospital ships, they presented their most
magnificent vehicles as ambulances, they subscribed colossal sums to
1 India in 1917-18.


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CENTRAL ASIA
485
the war loan, and in many cases gave the scrip to the government or
arranged for its cancellation.
It is only fair to recall at this time the manifold anxieties of the
authorities. The country remained quiet: but the occurrence of revo-
lutionary outbreaks was a contingency which government did not
omit from its calculations. There was a small anarchist element among
the Sikhs, which came into prominence with the Ghadr conspiracy.
In Bengal, the Nihilists, though few in numbers, were extremely active
and formidable. In 1915-16 there were sixty-four outrages in this
part of India, including the murder of eight police officers. There
were also serious movements, directed from beyond the frontier,
which had as their object the undermining of the loyalty of the
Muhammadan community, already uneasy from the alliance of
Turkey with the Central Powers. All possible precautionary measures
were taken. The Defence of India Act invested the executive with
wide discretionary authority. The establishment of the Indian defence
force mobilised the entire British and Anglo-Indian community for
the preservation of internal security.
All these anxieties were enhanced by the fact that the peace of the
frontier itself hung upon a hair. Much assistance was derived from
the friendly attitude of Amir Habib-ullah of Afghanistan, who, despite
all difficulties and dangers, kept his turbulent people to strict neu-
trality and threw the whole of his great influence into the task of
tranquillising the border. He displayed remarkable dexterity in
countering German and Turkish intrigues with the militant party
among his subjects, while at the same time curbing the fanaticism of
the mullahs. Even so, there was more or less serious trouble with the
Mohmands and the Marris: while in 1917 the persistent hostility of
the Mahsuds necessitated the dispatch of a regular expeditionary
force into Waziristan. The border was still unquiet when the collapse
of Russia enabled the Central Powers to carry their aggressive designs
to the very gates of India. German troops overran a large part of
South Russia, and crossed into the Caucasus, while Turkish forces
invaded Persia. In the last country, precautions had already been
taken to offset any damage that might ensue from the failure of the
administration to resist attack or to maintain order. Cordons of troops
had been established along the boundaries of Eastern and Western
Persia; the Nushki railway was extended, and the approaches to India
generally safeguarded as much as possible. Baku was also temporarily
occupied in order to block the enemy line of advance.
The necessity of meeting a probable German diversion in the
direction of India was the signal for a redoubling of war effort
throughout the whole country. Since the first great outburst of en-
thusiasm, of which the government made so little use, the bulk of
Indian opinion had relapsed into comparative apathy. Early in 1918,
in response to appeals from the prime minister, government for the


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486
INDIA AND THE WAR
first time seriously endeavoured to give a lead to the people. Towards
the end of April, a war conference was held at Delhi, attended by
ruling princes, political leaders, and representatives of the central and
local governments. As a result, all parties agreed to sink their political
differences and to co-operate wholeheartedly in the increased effort
necessitated by the new danger. Central organisations for controlling
recruiting, communications, foodstuffs, voluntary service and war
publicity, were either established for the first time or galvanised into
new life. The result was immediate. The resources of the country were
for the remaining months of the war utilised as never before; and it is
no exaggeration to say that when the armistice was declared, India
was at the climax of her effort. The significance of the struggle had
been brought home in a somewhat highly coloured form even to the
masses: recruiting was at its maximum, and the possibility of further
sacrifices was clearly envisaged. Accordingly, the country as a whole
having just commenced to throw her real strength into the scale, and
being newly aroused to the supreme importance of victory, received
the news with less relief than expectancy. The spontaneous rejoicings
which broke out were not so much a sign that India was relieved from
apprehension, as a symptom that she expected the immediate dawn
of the Golden Age which she had been newly taught to associate with
the victory of the allies. Whence arose many troubles which are
1
discussed in another section of this volume.
So much for the obvious, the external, aspects of India in war time.
But what were the real currents of opinion which flowed beneath the
calm impenetrability of her people? To the careful observer, a dis-
tinct sequence of emotion is perceptible, and this we shall endeavour,
in however summary and inadequate a fashion, to trace.
At the time when war broke out, the educated classes of India were
uneasy. They had realised that from their own standpoint the Morley-
Minto constitution was unsatisfactory. It gave them no power to
achieve the various measures upon which they had set their heart-
the Indianisation of the higher administrative offices: an accelerated
educational programme, some degree of financial control, and co-
operation in national defence. It is true that these classes were small
in comparison with the mass of their fellow. countrymen. But they were
leaders, and their influence counted for much. They were growing
impatient. In certain parts of India, anarchism gained ground. There
is every reason to believe that if the year 1914 had pursued its antici-
pated course, an intense campaign of political agitation for constitu-
tional progress would have occurred. Now when war broke out, much
of this pent-up energy found release in the channels of loyal enthusiasm.
Some leaders there were who adopted the not unnatural course of
attempting to bargain with authorities; such and such constitutional
advance to be the price of India's assistance. But they found no
support with their fellows, and were compelled to rehabilitate them-
1 India in 1917-18; India in 1919.


## p. 487 (#527) ############################################

POLITICAL EFFECTS
487
selves as best they could. In effect, it is entirely impossible to doubt
that India's war enthusiasm was wholly disinterested and entirely
genuine. In this fact, it may be hoped, historians will find excuse for
the exaggerated eulogies of India in which British statesmen so
lavishly indulged in the early days of the war. These solemn pledges
of the empire's gratitude surprised India. Her educated classes,
awaking to the fact that the doings of their countrymen had become
a "front page feature" of the English press, leaped to the conclusion
that the British cabinet was about to give some tangible expression
to its gratitude. But as the months drew on, and the prosecution of
the war engrossed all the efforts of government both in England and
in India, disillusionment set in. Little had been done to guide and
enlist the early war enthusiasm, and the educated classes turned back
to politics. Rumours of imperial federation were in the air; some
readjustment of relations between the mother country and the
dominions seemed already in progress. What would India's place
be in the new scheme? Would she become an equal member of the
commonwealth, or would the dominions, whose treatment of Indian
settlers had inflicted such a blow upon her national pride, hence-
forward share in controlling her destinies? Moreover, as the war
proceeded, and the defence of democratic ideals became an acknow-
ledged plank in the allied platform, the scope of Indian Nationalist
ambitions became imperceptibly enlarged. Was a struggle waged on
behalf of the weak against the strong, on behalf of the peaceful against
the aggressive, on behalf of the oppressed against the oppressors, to
leave the political status of India unaffected? The heady doctrine
of self-determination, with all the catchwords of modern democracy,
swept India like a flame. The educated classes determined to assert
their right to control their own destinies. They turned eagerly to the
home rule movements launched by such leaders as Mrs Besant and
the late Bal Gangadhan Tilak. Even educated Islam, which had for
so long held itself aloof, joined the congress fold on the assurance of
adequate safeguards for the interests of the Muhammadan community.
A scheme of constitutional reform was hastily adumbrated, and as
hastily accepted as the minimum of India's demand. A whirlwind
campaign of political agitation was launched in its support. Govern-
ment unwittingly added fuel to the flames by arresting and interning
Mrs Besant, whose activities were considered inconvenient. This
'action united in support of the home rule movement many Indians
who had previously held aloof from it. The pressure upon the adminis-
tration became overwhelming, and was only relieved by a dramatic
announcement. The home government at length, amidst all the
preoccupations of the war, turned their attention to Indian affairs.
Mr E. S. Montagu, who had succeeded Mr Austen Chamberlain as
secretary of state, declared on August 20, 1917, that the policy of His
Majesty's Government was the increasing association of Indians in
1 India in 1917–18.


## p. 488 (#528) ############################################

488
INDIA AND THE WAR
every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of
self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of
responsiblegovernmentin India as anintegral partofthe British Empire.
The effect of this announcement was startling. In the first place
it dramatically confirmed the hopes of those who aspired for India's
equality with the self-governing dominions, thus suddenly enlarging
the scope of “legitimate” aspirations. But in the second place it
threw the apple of discord into the Nationalist camp. The moderate
party, after being temporarily submerged beneath the domination of
the left wing, found in the declaration a long-sought battle-cry. The
extremists in their turn were heartened by what they regarded as
merely the firstfruits of intensive agitation, and prepared to exploit
their control over the impressionable youth of the educated classes.
Thirdly, the Muhammadan community, already disquieted by the
misfortunes of Turkey, saw in the declaration at once a triumph of
Hindu ideals, and a threat to themselves. The “political" section lost
ground; communal tension grew, and a serious breach between
Hindus and Muslims shortly developed. The visit of the secretary of
state to India, which called forth a flood of separate memorials and
representations, increased the sectional spirit already prevailing.
In the midst of all these currents and cross-currents came the war
crisis of 1918. For the moment discord ceased, and the old unanimity
of feeling was in some measure restored. But long before the dissen-
sions really healed, the armistice intervened. Peace found India
united indeed, so far as the war effort was concerned, but divided on
every other ground, and fiercely discussing the merits and demerits
of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. The terrible influenza epidemic,
which accounted for more victims in India alone than had perished
in four years of world war, cast a sombre shadow over the scene of
victory. Economic dislocation, now become serious, was causing deep
distress to the masses. The educated classes were but little happier.
Their political horizon had, indeed, enlarged, but they felt themselves
disappointed of their hopes. They were distracted by conflicting pro-
grammes, perplexed by divergent ideals. Their country had been set
upon the path of dominion status; their representatives had found
admission to the innermost councils of the empire in the war cabinet
and the imperial conference. The old stigma upon Indian military
prowess had been removed by admitting Indian gentlemen to king's
commissions in the army. A territorial force and a university training
corps were being organised to give the lie to the charge that England
had “disarmed and emasculated ” India. Yet the millennium had not
come to pass. The alien was still master in their country. What was
left to them but agitation, agitation and yet more agitation?
As succeeding years were to prove only too plainly, the closing
scenes of the world war brought to India, despite all her sacrifices in
the cause of victory, not peace, but a sword.


## p. 489 (#529) ############################################

CHAPTER XXVII
THE RELATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA WITH THE INDIAN STATES, 1858-1918
The relations of the Government of India with the Indian states
offer questions of extraordinary difficulty for the historian, especially
in the period covered by the present chapter.