Reply to
Objection
2: This argument considers those sins which are
venial from their cause.
venial from their cause.
Summa Theologica
But when the stain has been removed, the
debt of punishment does not remain in the same way, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment
simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue
demands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or
man.
Reply to Objection 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is
healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order
that the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so
disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be
remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment
is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove
the scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at the
sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of
David quoted above.
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Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a
sin. For it is written (Jn. 9:3, 2) about the man born blind: "Neither
hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born
blind. " In like manner we see that many children, those also who have
been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance,
diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them
after they have been baptized. Moreover before they are baptized, there
is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer
such things. Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
Objection 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent
should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of these
is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the
wicked (Ps. 72:5): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall
they be scourged like other men"; and (Job 21:7): "[Why then do] the
wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches"
(? )[*The words in brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and (Hab.
1:13): "Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg. : 'them that do
unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man oppresseth
[Vulg. : 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than himself? "
Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pet. 2:22) that "He
did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth. " And yet it is said (1
Pet. 2:21) that "He suffered for us. " Therefore punishment is not
always inflicted by God for sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 4:7, seqq. ): "Who ever perished
innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen
those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God"; and
Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is
inflicted for a sin. "
I answer that, As already stated [1903](A[6]), punishment can be
considered in two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A
satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who
differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of
love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the
punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the
debts of another upon themselves. If, however, we speak of punishment
simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a
relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a relation to
actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed
by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and this, either
principally or consequently---principally, the punishment of original
sin is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original
justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result from this
defect in human nature.
Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and
yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as
stated in the [1904]FP, Q[48], A[5]. Now evil is privation of good. And
since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body,
and external goods, it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a
lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers
loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these,
for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases
the loss is an evil to man, not simply but relatively; wherefore it
does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal
punishment, because a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his
patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such like are
not punishments properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as
their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact that
human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the
corruption of nature which is itself the punishment of original sin.
For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises
in order to make progress in virtue; so that whatever is penal in the
exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause.
Reply to Objection 1: Such like defects of those who are born with
them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the
punishments of original sin, as stated above ([1905]Q[85], A[5]); and
they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above
([1906]Q[85], A[5], ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due
to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above
([1907]Q[85], A[5], ad 1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine
providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of
others who are admonished by their means---and also to the glory of
God.
Reply to Objection 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of
man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's
chief goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give
spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal
goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude of the
virtuous man, by material gifts. " The very fact that others receive
temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the
psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath held them
fast. "
Reply to Objection 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for
His, but for our sins.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin.
For it is written (Ex. 20:5): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting
the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and
fourth generation of them that hate Me"; and (Mat. 23:35): "That upon
you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth. "
Objection 2: Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now,
according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their
parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to
Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin.
Objection 3: Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not
for the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his
father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than
of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes
they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for
their own sins, but for those of their parents.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear
the iniquity of the father. "
I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one
takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, in
so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above [1908](A[7]). If,
however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch
as it is penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, because
the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment
that is medicinal, in this way it does happen that one is punished for
another's sin. For it has been stated [1909](A[7]) that ills sustained
in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments
intended for the health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why
one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for
another's sin, either by God or by man; e. g. on children for their
parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their
property so to speak; in such a way, however, that, if the children or
the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of
punishment in regard to both the one punished and the one he is
punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the
character of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is
borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely
medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's sin),
since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he bears it
patiently.
With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal,
because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good.
Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some
fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit. ) [*Ep. ad
Auxilium, ccl. ], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for
another's sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the
father's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying
(Ezech. 18:4): "All souls are Mine. "
Reply to Objection 1: Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be
referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are
the property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers.
Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must be
understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus
these words are added, "Of them that hate Me," and in the chapter
quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: "Fill ye up then the measure of
your fathers. " The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their
children, because the latter are the more prone to sin through being
brought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to
them, and by imitating their parents' example, conforming to their
authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if,
seeing the punishment of their parents, they fail to mend their ways.
The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are
wont to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so
that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to imitate
them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so as to
grieve for them.
Reply to Objection 2: The punishments which human justice inflicts on
one for another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies
or medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are
punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who are near of kin are said to be
punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because
the punishment of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as
stated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and
because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own
household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought up amid
the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is
not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more
obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)
In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of
the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall consider
venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider
venial sin in itself.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
(2) Whether they differ generically?
(3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
(4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
(5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating
circumstance?
(6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
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Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided
with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin is a
word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law. " But the fact of
being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently
every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Whether you eat
or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God. " Now
whoever sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for God's
glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal
sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves
either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good
as using it: because he does not refer it to that good which gives us
happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine
(De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore whoever sins enjoys a mutable
good. Now "to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness," as
Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since
"perverseness" [*The Latin 'pervertere' means to overthrow, to destroy,
hence 'perversion' of God's law is a mortal sin. ] denotes a mortal sin,
it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
Objection 4: Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact
turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable
good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he
sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan. ), that "a crime is
one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not. " But a
crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly
condivided with mortal sin.
I answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if
taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken
metaphorically: thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if
we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and
fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if
mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it
does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. But
if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to
that which is venial.
For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above ([1910]Q[71],
A[1], ad 3;[1911] Q[72], A[5];[1912] Q[74], A[9], ad 2), is said to be
mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal,
through causing an irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a
principle, as stated above ([1913]Q[72], A[5]). Now the principle of
the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order
to the last end, as stated above ([1914]Q[72], A[5];[1915] Q[87],
A[3]): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any
intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated above
([1916]Q[87], A[3]), because disorders in things referred to the end,
are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be
repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order
to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a higher
principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such
sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins
which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to the
end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called
venial: because a sin receives its acquittal [veniam] when the debt of
punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as
explained above ([1917]Q[87], A[6]).
Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and
irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle,
but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of
the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided
with mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not
a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the
generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its
parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other
afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine
gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called a
sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to
mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to
substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not
"against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law
forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts
"beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the
law intends.
Reply to Objection 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and
so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not
actually refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore
act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each
time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is
enough to refer oneself and all that one has to God habitually. Now
venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human act to God's
glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity,
which refers man to God habitually. Therefore it does not follow that
he who sins venially, sins mortally.
Reply to Objection 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good,
not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using
it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually.
Reply to Objection 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in
contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed
therein: because what is referred to the end has not the character of
finality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ
generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some
generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically
good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above
([1918]Q[18], A[2]). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed
in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good,
either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God,
which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ
generically.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1919](A[1]; Q[72], A[5]; Q[87],
A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it
can be repaired. Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of
malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability
belongs to sins committed through weakness or ignorance, which are
remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed
through malice differs from sin committed through weakness or
ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause,
as stated above (Q[77], A[8], ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do
not differ generically.
Objection 3: Further, it was stated above ([1920]Q[74], A[3], ad 3;
A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason
are venial sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin.
Therefore no sins are generically venial.
On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm.
xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic
mortal sins.
I answer that, Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon].
Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has
been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial":
and this is called venial "from the result. " Secondly, a sin is called
venial because it does not contain anything either partially or
totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin
contains something diminishing its guilt, e. g. a sin committed through
weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause":
totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, wherefore it
deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial
sin that we wish to speak now.
For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no
determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can
have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically,
and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an
act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a
thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to
his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently
it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of
God, e. g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of
one's neighbor, e. g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such
sins are mortal by reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the
sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain
inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and one's
neighbor, e. g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such
sins are venial by reason of their genus.
Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and
malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of
the agent, as stated above ([1921]Q[18], AA[4],6), it happens sometimes
that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes
mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end
therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in
its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the
commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of
the agent, that a sin generically mortal becomes venial, by reason of
the act being imperfect, i. e. not deliberated by reason, which is the
proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to
sudden movements of unbelief.
Reply to Objection 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that
is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of
God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence
it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves contrary
to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are
mortal by reason of their genus.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers those sins which are
venial from their cause.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers those sins which are
venial by reason of the imperfection of the act.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to
mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial
and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated
above [1922](A[1]). Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species,
wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like
dispositions and habits are engendered. " But mortal and venial sin
differ in genus or species, as stated above [1923](A[2]). Therefore
venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to
mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial
sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine
says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies in wait for good works
that it may destroy them. " Therefore even good works would be venial
sins, which is absurd.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): "He that contemneth
small things shall fall by little and little. " Now he that sins
venially seems to contemn small things. Therefore by little and little
he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin.
I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is
a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition.
For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the
effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which moves
indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is
said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an act of sin
disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it
disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically
venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin
generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this
same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin
which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or
habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin, that the lust
of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin:
since the end for one who has a habit, as such, is to work according to
that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often
venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act
disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this way a
sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because
he that commits a sin generically venial, turns aside from some
particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to
the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject his will
even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a
mortal sin in its genus.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in
contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus,
as stated above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with
substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial
form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal.
Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but
it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order,
albeit in different ways, as stated ([1924]AA[1],2).
Reply to Objection 3: A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to
mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin
accidentally; whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to
mortal sin, as stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin.
For Augustine in explaining the words of Jn. 3:36: "He that believeth
not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan. ): "The
slightest," i. e. venial, "sins kill if we make little of them. " Now a
sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul.
Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
Objection 2: Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent
of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as
stated above ([1925]Q[74], A[8], ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can
become mortal.
Objection 3: Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and
incurable disease, as stated above [1926](A[1]). But a curable disease
may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.
Objection 4: Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin
is a disposition to mortal, as stated [1927](A[3]). Therefore a venial
sin can become mortal.
I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be
understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at
first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a
sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so
that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the
act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it
is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.
Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial,
becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end in
that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated
above [1928](A[2]).
Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins
constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many
venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because
all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment
equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the
duration of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal
punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as
stated above ([1929]Q[87], AA[3],5). It is also evident as regards the
pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the
privation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as
Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth. ). It is also evident as regards
the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the
pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate to one
another.
If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one
mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above [1930](A[3])
with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial
sin disposes to mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial
sins making one mortal sin dispositively.
Reply to Objection 2: The same movement of the sensuality which
preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the
movement of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding
disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may
undergo change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which
cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an
imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being
perfected, becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a
disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident
which disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed.
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Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin
mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm.
xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be
frequent, they become mortal sins. " But anger and drunkenness are not
mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal
sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Objection 2: Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that
delectation, if morose [*See[1931] Q[74], A[6]], is a mortal sin, but
that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a
circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Objection 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal
sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a
good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much
more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.
On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity
cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus,
because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act
be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of
an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the
quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said
([1932]Q[72], A[5], ad 1;[1933] Q[87], A[5], ad 1).
I answer that, As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; AA[10]
,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such,
is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to
be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses
its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral
act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of
another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his
wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this
other be another man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed
to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and
accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as
adultery.
It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin
become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For it
has been stated above [1934](A[1]) that the deformity of a venial sin
consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end,
whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the
last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a
venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only
when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were,
the specific difference of the moral act.
Reply to Objection 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a
sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by
something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new
species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something
supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e. g.
disobedience, contempt, or the like.
We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is
a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if the
angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such
as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and
if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act,
in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it
last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent
of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement
tends, is a sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry
with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that
would hurt him a little, the anger will not be mortal sin, however long
it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give
rise to great scandal or something of the kind.
With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason
of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere
lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is
directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary
to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or
weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of
his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, for in
that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the
excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance
no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way
to drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore
the sin returns to its specific nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in
those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if
the delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through
imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1):
because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on
account of the approval of the deliberating reason.
Reply to Objection 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be
evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated
above ([1935]Q[18], A[5] , ad 4).
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Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
Objection 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because
venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from
venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above
[1936](A[5]). Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial.
Objection 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this,
that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he who
sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that
a person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less
than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple
fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, commits
the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of God, to
refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting
counter to the love of God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and
accordingly a mortal sin can become venial.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more
distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is
evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of
justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore
can a mortal sin become venial.
On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal
sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal
punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.
I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the
genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can
become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial
sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to
the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the
purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become
imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by
the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for
the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter
an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.
Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by
reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not
completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a
deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said
above [1937](A[2]). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of
deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from
deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the species
of the act is destroyed.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from
perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man
and not vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin
altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that
commits fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either
mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the
ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the
love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby
he can safeguard himself in the love of God.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those
things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good
end. " Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be
well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), the judge
who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of
the common weal, are not murderers.
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OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?
(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay,"
"stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12);
(3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?
(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?
(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
For Augustine says (De Poenit. ) [*Hom. 50, inter. L. , 2], that if
venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as
to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of
sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial
sins cause a stain in the soul.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account
of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But,
in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the
affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a
temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above ([1938]Q[86],
A[1]). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing
through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the
soul.
On the contrary, it is written, (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present it
to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the
gloss says: "i. e. , some grievous sin. " Therefore it seems proper to
mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.
I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of
comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal
matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way
of similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness,
one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors,
the other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the
soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak,
intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial
sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual
comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of
charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show further on
([1939]SS, Q[24], A[10]; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their
acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the
thing stained, wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual
rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial
sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated
anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in
so far as it hinders the comeliness that results from acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many
venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they
would not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse.
Reply to Objection 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act
destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.
Reply to Objection 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a
temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace,
which accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last
end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not
cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.
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Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated
as "wood," "hay," and "stubble. " Because wood hay and stubble are said
( 1 Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins
are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions
are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not
suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble.
Objection 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be
saved yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who
commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e. g. when a man
dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial
sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who
build "gold, silver, precious stones," i. e. love of God and our
neighbor, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay,
and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do
good works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. " Therefore venial sins
are not suitably designated by these three.
Objection 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and
degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under
these three.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds
up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that
he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of
temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above
([1940]Q[87], A[5]). Therefore these three signify venial sins.
I answer that, Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith,
upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and
precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to
them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves
of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says
(Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the
kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says
that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by
fire. " Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote
mortal sins.
Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are
indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial
sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a
good thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his
possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so
that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do
anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be
reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the
love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are designated by
"gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by
"wood," "hay," and "stubble.
debt of punishment does not remain in the same way, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment
simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue
demands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or
man.
Reply to Objection 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is
healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order
that the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so
disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be
remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment
is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove
the scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at the
sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of
David quoted above.
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Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a
sin. For it is written (Jn. 9:3, 2) about the man born blind: "Neither
hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born
blind. " In like manner we see that many children, those also who have
been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance,
diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them
after they have been baptized. Moreover before they are baptized, there
is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer
such things. Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
Objection 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent
should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of these
is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the
wicked (Ps. 72:5): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall
they be scourged like other men"; and (Job 21:7): "[Why then do] the
wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches"
(? )[*The words in brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and (Hab.
1:13): "Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg. : 'them that do
unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man oppresseth
[Vulg. : 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than himself? "
Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pet. 2:22) that "He
did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth. " And yet it is said (1
Pet. 2:21) that "He suffered for us. " Therefore punishment is not
always inflicted by God for sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 4:7, seqq. ): "Who ever perished
innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen
those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God"; and
Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is
inflicted for a sin. "
I answer that, As already stated [1903](A[6]), punishment can be
considered in two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A
satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who
differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of
love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the
punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the
debts of another upon themselves. If, however, we speak of punishment
simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a
relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a relation to
actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed
by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and this, either
principally or consequently---principally, the punishment of original
sin is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original
justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result from this
defect in human nature.
Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and
yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as
stated in the [1904]FP, Q[48], A[5]. Now evil is privation of good. And
since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body,
and external goods, it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a
lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers
loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these,
for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases
the loss is an evil to man, not simply but relatively; wherefore it
does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal
punishment, because a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his
patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such like are
not punishments properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as
their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact that
human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the
corruption of nature which is itself the punishment of original sin.
For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises
in order to make progress in virtue; so that whatever is penal in the
exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause.
Reply to Objection 1: Such like defects of those who are born with
them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the
punishments of original sin, as stated above ([1905]Q[85], A[5]); and
they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above
([1906]Q[85], A[5], ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due
to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above
([1907]Q[85], A[5], ad 1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine
providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of
others who are admonished by their means---and also to the glory of
God.
Reply to Objection 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of
man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's
chief goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give
spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal
goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude of the
virtuous man, by material gifts. " The very fact that others receive
temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the
psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath held them
fast. "
Reply to Objection 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for
His, but for our sins.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin.
For it is written (Ex. 20:5): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting
the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and
fourth generation of them that hate Me"; and (Mat. 23:35): "That upon
you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth. "
Objection 2: Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now,
according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their
parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to
Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin.
Objection 3: Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not
for the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his
father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than
of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes
they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for
their own sins, but for those of their parents.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear
the iniquity of the father. "
I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one
takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, in
so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above [1908](A[7]). If,
however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch
as it is penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, because
the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment
that is medicinal, in this way it does happen that one is punished for
another's sin. For it has been stated [1909](A[7]) that ills sustained
in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments
intended for the health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why
one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for
another's sin, either by God or by man; e. g. on children for their
parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their
property so to speak; in such a way, however, that, if the children or
the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of
punishment in regard to both the one punished and the one he is
punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the
character of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is
borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely
medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's sin),
since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he bears it
patiently.
With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal,
because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good.
Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some
fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit. ) [*Ep. ad
Auxilium, ccl. ], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for
another's sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the
father's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying
(Ezech. 18:4): "All souls are Mine. "
Reply to Objection 1: Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be
referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are
the property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers.
Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must be
understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus
these words are added, "Of them that hate Me," and in the chapter
quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: "Fill ye up then the measure of
your fathers. " The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their
children, because the latter are the more prone to sin through being
brought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to
them, and by imitating their parents' example, conforming to their
authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if,
seeing the punishment of their parents, they fail to mend their ways.
The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are
wont to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so
that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to imitate
them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so as to
grieve for them.
Reply to Objection 2: The punishments which human justice inflicts on
one for another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies
or medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are
punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who are near of kin are said to be
punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because
the punishment of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as
stated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and
because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own
household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought up amid
the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is
not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more
obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)
In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of
the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall consider
venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider
venial sin in itself.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
(2) Whether they differ generically?
(3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
(4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
(5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating
circumstance?
(6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided
with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin is a
word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law. " But the fact of
being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently
every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Whether you eat
or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God. " Now
whoever sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for God's
glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal
sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves
either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good
as using it: because he does not refer it to that good which gives us
happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine
(De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore whoever sins enjoys a mutable
good. Now "to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness," as
Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since
"perverseness" [*The Latin 'pervertere' means to overthrow, to destroy,
hence 'perversion' of God's law is a mortal sin. ] denotes a mortal sin,
it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
Objection 4: Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact
turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable
good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he
sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan. ), that "a crime is
one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not. " But a
crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly
condivided with mortal sin.
I answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if
taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken
metaphorically: thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if
we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and
fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if
mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it
does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. But
if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to
that which is venial.
For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above ([1910]Q[71],
A[1], ad 3;[1911] Q[72], A[5];[1912] Q[74], A[9], ad 2), is said to be
mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal,
through causing an irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a
principle, as stated above ([1913]Q[72], A[5]). Now the principle of
the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order
to the last end, as stated above ([1914]Q[72], A[5];[1915] Q[87],
A[3]): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any
intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated above
([1916]Q[87], A[3]), because disorders in things referred to the end,
are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be
repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order
to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a higher
principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such
sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins
which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to the
end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called
venial: because a sin receives its acquittal [veniam] when the debt of
punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as
explained above ([1917]Q[87], A[6]).
Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and
irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle,
but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of
the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided
with mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not
a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the
generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its
parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other
afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine
gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called a
sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to
mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to
substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not
"against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law
forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts
"beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the
law intends.
Reply to Objection 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and
so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not
actually refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore
act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each
time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is
enough to refer oneself and all that one has to God habitually. Now
venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human act to God's
glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity,
which refers man to God habitually. Therefore it does not follow that
he who sins venially, sins mortally.
Reply to Objection 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good,
not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using
it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually.
Reply to Objection 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in
contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed
therein: because what is referred to the end has not the character of
finality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ
generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some
generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically
good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above
([1918]Q[18], A[2]). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed
in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good,
either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God,
which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ
generically.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1919](A[1]; Q[72], A[5]; Q[87],
A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it
can be repaired. Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of
malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability
belongs to sins committed through weakness or ignorance, which are
remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed
through malice differs from sin committed through weakness or
ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause,
as stated above (Q[77], A[8], ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do
not differ generically.
Objection 3: Further, it was stated above ([1920]Q[74], A[3], ad 3;
A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason
are venial sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin.
Therefore no sins are generically venial.
On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm.
xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic
mortal sins.
I answer that, Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon].
Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has
been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial":
and this is called venial "from the result. " Secondly, a sin is called
venial because it does not contain anything either partially or
totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin
contains something diminishing its guilt, e. g. a sin committed through
weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause":
totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, wherefore it
deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial
sin that we wish to speak now.
For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no
determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can
have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically,
and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an
act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a
thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to
his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently
it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of
God, e. g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of
one's neighbor, e. g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such
sins are mortal by reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the
sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain
inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and one's
neighbor, e. g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such
sins are venial by reason of their genus.
Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and
malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of
the agent, as stated above ([1921]Q[18], AA[4],6), it happens sometimes
that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes
mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end
therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in
its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the
commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of
the agent, that a sin generically mortal becomes venial, by reason of
the act being imperfect, i. e. not deliberated by reason, which is the
proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to
sudden movements of unbelief.
Reply to Objection 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that
is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of
God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence
it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves contrary
to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are
mortal by reason of their genus.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers those sins which are
venial from their cause.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers those sins which are
venial by reason of the imperfection of the act.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to
mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial
and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated
above [1922](A[1]). Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species,
wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like
dispositions and habits are engendered. " But mortal and venial sin
differ in genus or species, as stated above [1923](A[2]). Therefore
venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to
mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial
sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine
says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies in wait for good works
that it may destroy them. " Therefore even good works would be venial
sins, which is absurd.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): "He that contemneth
small things shall fall by little and little. " Now he that sins
venially seems to contemn small things. Therefore by little and little
he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin.
I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is
a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition.
For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the
effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which moves
indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is
said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an act of sin
disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it
disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically
venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin
generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this
same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin
which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or
habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin, that the lust
of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin:
since the end for one who has a habit, as such, is to work according to
that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often
venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act
disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this way a
sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because
he that commits a sin generically venial, turns aside from some
particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to
the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject his will
even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a
mortal sin in its genus.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in
contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus,
as stated above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with
substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial
form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal.
Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but
it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order,
albeit in different ways, as stated ([1924]AA[1],2).
Reply to Objection 3: A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to
mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin
accidentally; whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to
mortal sin, as stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin.
For Augustine in explaining the words of Jn. 3:36: "He that believeth
not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan. ): "The
slightest," i. e. venial, "sins kill if we make little of them. " Now a
sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul.
Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
Objection 2: Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent
of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as
stated above ([1925]Q[74], A[8], ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can
become mortal.
Objection 3: Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and
incurable disease, as stated above [1926](A[1]). But a curable disease
may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.
Objection 4: Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin
is a disposition to mortal, as stated [1927](A[3]). Therefore a venial
sin can become mortal.
I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be
understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at
first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a
sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so
that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the
act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it
is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.
Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial,
becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end in
that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated
above [1928](A[2]).
Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins
constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many
venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because
all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment
equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the
duration of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal
punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as
stated above ([1929]Q[87], AA[3],5). It is also evident as regards the
pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the
privation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as
Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth. ). It is also evident as regards
the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the
pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate to one
another.
If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one
mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above [1930](A[3])
with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial
sin disposes to mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial
sins making one mortal sin dispositively.
Reply to Objection 2: The same movement of the sensuality which
preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the
movement of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding
disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may
undergo change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which
cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an
imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being
perfected, becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a
disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident
which disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin
mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm.
xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be
frequent, they become mortal sins. " But anger and drunkenness are not
mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal
sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Objection 2: Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that
delectation, if morose [*See[1931] Q[74], A[6]], is a mortal sin, but
that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a
circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Objection 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal
sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a
good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much
more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.
On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity
cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus,
because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act
be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of
an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the
quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said
([1932]Q[72], A[5], ad 1;[1933] Q[87], A[5], ad 1).
I answer that, As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; AA[10]
,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such,
is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to
be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses
its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral
act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of
another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his
wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this
other be another man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed
to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and
accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as
adultery.
It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin
become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For it
has been stated above [1934](A[1]) that the deformity of a venial sin
consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end,
whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the
last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a
venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only
when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were,
the specific difference of the moral act.
Reply to Objection 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a
sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by
something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new
species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something
supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e. g.
disobedience, contempt, or the like.
We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is
a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if the
angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such
as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and
if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act,
in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it
last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent
of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement
tends, is a sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry
with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that
would hurt him a little, the anger will not be mortal sin, however long
it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give
rise to great scandal or something of the kind.
With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason
of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere
lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is
directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary
to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or
weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of
his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, for in
that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the
excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance
no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way
to drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore
the sin returns to its specific nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in
those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if
the delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through
imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1):
because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on
account of the approval of the deliberating reason.
Reply to Objection 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be
evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated
above ([1935]Q[18], A[5] , ad 4).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
Objection 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because
venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from
venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above
[1936](A[5]). Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial.
Objection 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this,
that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he who
sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that
a person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less
than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple
fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, commits
the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of God, to
refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting
counter to the love of God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and
accordingly a mortal sin can become venial.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more
distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is
evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of
justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore
can a mortal sin become venial.
On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal
sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal
punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.
I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the
genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can
become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial
sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to
the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the
purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become
imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by
the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for
the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter
an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.
Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by
reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not
completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a
deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said
above [1937](A[2]). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of
deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from
deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the species
of the act is destroyed.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from
perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man
and not vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin
altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that
commits fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either
mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the
ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the
love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby
he can safeguard himself in the love of God.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those
things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good
end. " Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be
well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), the judge
who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of
the common weal, are not murderers.
__________________________________________________________________
OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?
(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay,"
"stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12);
(3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?
(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?
(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
For Augustine says (De Poenit. ) [*Hom. 50, inter. L. , 2], that if
venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as
to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of
sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial
sins cause a stain in the soul.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account
of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But,
in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the
affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a
temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above ([1938]Q[86],
A[1]). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing
through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the
soul.
On the contrary, it is written, (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present it
to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the
gloss says: "i. e. , some grievous sin. " Therefore it seems proper to
mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.
I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of
comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal
matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way
of similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness,
one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors,
the other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the
soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak,
intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial
sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual
comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of
charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show further on
([1939]SS, Q[24], A[10]; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their
acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the
thing stained, wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual
rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial
sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated
anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in
so far as it hinders the comeliness that results from acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many
venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they
would not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse.
Reply to Objection 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act
destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.
Reply to Objection 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a
temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace,
which accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last
end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not
cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.
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Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated
as "wood," "hay," and "stubble. " Because wood hay and stubble are said
( 1 Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins
are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions
are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not
suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble.
Objection 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be
saved yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who
commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e. g. when a man
dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial
sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who
build "gold, silver, precious stones," i. e. love of God and our
neighbor, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay,
and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do
good works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. " Therefore venial sins
are not suitably designated by these three.
Objection 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and
degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under
these three.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds
up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that
he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of
temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above
([1940]Q[87], A[5]). Therefore these three signify venial sins.
I answer that, Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith,
upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and
precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to
them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves
of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says
(Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the
kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says
that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by
fire. " Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote
mortal sins.
Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are
indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial
sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a
good thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his
possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so
that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do
anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be
reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the
love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are designated by
"gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by
"wood," "hay," and "stubble.
