,buttell
me ; do you think there aue some justthings which are useful, and others which are not so >
Alcib.
me ; do you think there aue some justthings which are useful, and others which are not so >
Alcib.
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
"?
'?
.
.
-,.
-.
-v-.
r.
-.
* .
-'?
'
'" *
that
? ? OftheNatureofMan. 183
that again atthe*Battle cAECoronea where your Fa ther was kill'd ?
Alcib. Who candeny thisi
Socrat. Shallwethendaretofaythepeopleknows a thing well, about which they dispute with so much Animosity, that they are carried to the most fatal Extremities ?
Alcib. No certainly*
Socrat. Very good ! And yet arenot thesetheMas tersyoucite, whenatthefametimeyouacknowledge their Ignorance ?
Alcib. I confess it.
Socrat. What Probability then is there that you shouldknowwhatisJustandUnjust,aboutwhich youappearsouncerlpnandfluctuating-y andwhich you confess you have neither learn'd of others, nor found out your self?
Alcib. According to what you say there is no Pro bability of it at all.
Socrat. How! accordingtowhatIfay> Youspeak not right, Alcibiades, say rather 'tis according to what you fay your self
Alcib. How ! isitnotyou thatfay,Iknow nothing at all of what belongs to Justiceand Injustice ?
Socrat. No, indeed,'tisnotI. Alcib. Whothen? IsitI? Socrat. Yes, 'tisyour self. Alcib. How so?
S o c r a t . I ' l l t e l l y o u h o w s o ? , a n d y o u w i l l a g r e e
withme. IfIshouldaskyouwhichisthegrea testNumber, one, ortwo ? ,youwould immediatly
answer two ;and ifIshould againaskyou how much greaterthisNumberisthantheother;youwould likewiseanswer, that'tisgreaterbyone.
,Alcib. Very true.
, *,ThisBattleofCormta. vcasfought thesecondyearofthe
LXXXIIIOlymp. HerethebraveTolmidtsvvjskill'd;after
whichtheAtheniansweredrivenoutofBeotia. Socrateswas then22yearsofA^e. ThisBatdeofCormiYv*octenthrough
mistake,beenccnfpuadcdwiththatofCbirpnea. M. LeFtvre.
N 4 Socrat.
? ? ffT
Alcib. Thismustbegranted. '? ? '
Socrat. 'Tis your self that have laid that the fine Alcibiades the Son of G//h<w, not knowing what is ^ust and Unjust, and yet thinking he knows it very well, is going to the Assembly of the Athenians to
give them hisAdvice about such things as he knows nothing of ; Isitnot so ? ? ;
Alcib. "Tis even so.
Socrat. One may then apply to you, Alcibiades,
j84
'TheFirstAlcibiacksj or,
Socrat. Which of us two would it be then that wouldfaytwoismotethanonejwoulditbeI? j
Alcib. No, 'twould be I.
Socrat. For it was I that ask'd, and you that an-
swer'd. IsitnotthesamethinginthepresentQues tion? Alc'ib. That'scertain.
Socrat If I should ask you what Letters compose
SocrateshisName,andyoushouldtell'emme one^f- ter another, which of us two would tell them ? ?
'-. ' A l c i b , I s h o u l d d o i t w i t h o u t d o u b t .
Socrat. ForinaDiscoursewhich isspentinQues
tions and Answers ; he that asks never affirms, but
Thisprovesalwayshethatanswers. "TisIthathaveask'dyou, thevfefd-. and 'tisyou that have answer'd, 'tisyou therefore *? u! iks tnat nave affirm'd the things fbw have said.
'Tkhthe,thatsayingofEuripides. Tisthyselfthathasna- tragedyofmej-;>. YoxitisnotIthathavespokenit,butyour H'PPy- self-,andyouaretoblametochargeitonme.
'? ;'? ?
Alcib. YouhaveReason.
Socrat. Believe me, Alcibiades, 'tisa wild Enter- prize to have amind to go teach the Athenians that which you do not know your self, and about which you have neglected to inform your self.
Alcib. I fancy, Socrates, the Athenians, and all the reft of the Greeks very rarely examine in thek C o u n s e l , w h a t i s m o s t J u s t o r U n j u s t -, f o r t h e y a r e satisfiedthatisvery evident. Andthereforewith out amusing themselves with this vain Enquiry they only consider what is most advantageous . ana useful ; and Utility and Justiceare,:very, different
things ; since there'have always been people in the t ? - :-. . ,. ;-. , World
? ? OftheNatureofMan. 18y
World that have found themselves very prosperous inthe Commission ofgreatInjustice$and otherswho have succeeded very ill, in the exercise of Justice.
Spcrat. What do you * think then that, ifwhat isUseful and what isJust are very different, as you faytheyare,youknowwhatisusefultoMen,and
whyitisso>
' Alcib. W h a t should hinder me, Socrates? ? Unless
youwouldaskmeofwhomIlearn'dthistoo;or howIfounditoutmyself>
Socrat. Is your proceeding just, Alcibiades, sup posing what you say is not right, as that may very well be ; and that 'tisvery easy to refute you by the
same Reasons which I haye already employ'd > You
would have new Proofs, and fresh Demonstrations,
and treat the former as old Clothes, which you are
not willing to wear any longer. You arestillfor
having something entirely new -,but for my part,
without following you in your Stragglings and Es
capes,Ishallaskyou, asIhavealreadydone,whence y o u c a m e t o k n o w w h a t U t i l i t y i s ? , a n d w h o w ? i s
your Instructor : In a word I ask you all I have ask'd youbefore. - 'Tisverycertainyoullanswermetoo after the same manner you have done, and that you'll not be able to shew m e either that you have learn'd ofothers, to know what isuseful, or that you have found it out yOur self. But because you are very nice, and don't love to hear the same thing twice,
I am willing to drop this Question whether you
knowwhatisusefultotheAtheniansorno, "But
ifwhatisjustandwhatisusefulareoneandthe
same thing ; or ifthey are very different asyou fay,
w h y h a v e y o u n o t p r o v ' d it t o m e ? P r o v e it m e ,
e i t h e r b y i n t e r r o g a t i n g m e a s I h a v e d e a l t w i t h y o u -,
orinmakingme afineDiscoursewhich may set the Matter in a clear Light. ?
* If what isuseful, and what isjust, wered'fferentthiags,yet if one knew what is Useful, one nvght also know what isJust : ForweknowContrariesbytheirContraries. Buttheyarenot different,andSocratesisgoingtoproveit. Alcibiadesknowsno
more what is useful thsn what isjust.
'(? -'? ? - '- ,, . . (. . . : . '-. ";-" Alcik
? ? 1 8 6
T h e F i r s t A l c i b i a d e s ,? o r ,
Alcib. But, SocratesIknownotwhetherIamca pable of speaking before you.
Socrat. My dearAlcibiades, imagineme tobethe Assembly,supposemetobethePeople:When you are among them, must you not endeavour to perswade every one of 'em?
Alcib. Yes.
S0cr. 1t. And when a Man knows a thing well, is
it not equal to him to demonstrate to this and that Person one after another ; or to prove it to divers Personsallatonce; asonethatteachesReadingor Arithmetick can equally instruct one or more Scholars together ?
Alcib. That's certain.
Socrat. And consequently of whatsoever you are capable of persuading many you may very easily persuade one single Person. But of what can a Man persuade others, isitnotof thatwhich he
knows himself? . .
Mcib. Without doubt.
Socrat. What otherdifferenceistherebetweenan
Oratorthatspeaks toamultitudeofPeople, anda
Man thatdiscourseswithhisFriendinfamiliarCon- - versation,butthattheformerpersuadesagreatNum
berofPeopleatonce, andthelatterpersuadesbut one ? , .
Alcib. Tis likelytheremay beno other difference.
S o c r a t . C o m e t h e n ; S i n c e h e w h o is c a p a b l e o f p r o vingwhatheknowstomany,isbyamuchstrong er Reason capable of proving it to one single per s o n -, d i s p l a y h e r e a l l y o u r E l o q u e n c e t o m e , a n d . e n deavourtollicvvme thatwhatisjustisnotalways useful. . . /? ? /'. si\
Alcib. You are very urgent, Socrates.
Socrat. I a m so urgent, that I'll presently prove to you the contrary of that which you refuse to prove to me.
Alcib. Do so.
Socrat. Only answer me. '
Alcib. Ha! NothingbutQuestions; le'trheintreat
you to speak your selfalone. Socr. it.
? ? OftheNatureofMa,u 187
Socrat. W h a t are you not willing to be convinc'd ? AIc5y d Mcib. Yes with allmy heart. is^firlidlf Socrat. Whenyouyourself(hallgrant, andas-Socratesbis
firmtome thatwhatladvanceistrue,willyounotQa'P"*** be convinc'd? g j '
Alcib. I think I (hall. tobethe'
Socrat. Answer me then t And if you your M s bestmethod. don't say that what isjust is always useful, nevert0<<>>w'>><<1
believeanyMan livingthatshalltellyouso.
Alcib. Agreed, I am ready to answer you, for I
shall receive no damage by it.
Socrat. You are a Prophet, Alcibiades?
,buttell
me ; do you think there aue some justthings which are useful, and others which are not so >
Alcib. Yes certainly.
Socrat. Do youthinktoothatsomeofthemare comely and honorable, and others the quite contrary ?
Alcib. Howdoyoufay?
Socrat. Iaskyouforinstance, ifaMan who does an Action that isshameful, does an Action that isjust >
Alcib. Iamveryfarfromsuchathought.
Socrat. You believethenthat whatsoever isjust is comely.
Alcib. Iam entirely convinc'd of that.
Socrat. Butiseverythingthatiscomelyandhono rable good ? or do you think there are some comely and honorable things that are Good, and others that are Evil ?
Alsib. Formypart,SocratesIthinktherearesome honorable things that are Evil.
Socrat. And by consequence that there are some shameful things that are Good ?
Alcib. Yes.
undrtjute.
Socrat. SeeifIunderstandyouwell. Ithasoften happen'd in Battles, that one M a n in attempting to. succour his Friend, or Relation, has receiv'd a gtcat manyWounds, orhasbeenkill'd;andanother,by abandoning his Relation, or Friend, has lav'd his
Life : Is not this your meaning ?
? Alcib. "Tis the very thing I would fay.
. **'? ? ' "'? <. Socrat,
? ? i88
The FirstAlcibiades] o^
Socrat. The succouraMan gives tohisFriendis a comely and honourable thing, in that he endea vourstosaveone whom heisohlig'dtosave-,and is not this what we callValour,
Alclb. Yes.
Socrat. And this very Succour is an evil thing, in thatitisthe cause ofaMan'sreceivingWounds, or of being kill'd ?
Alcib. Yes, without doubt.
Socrat. * But isnot Valour one thing,and Death another ?
Alcib. Yes certainly.
Socrat. ThisSuccourthenwhichaMangivesto his Friend, is not at the fame time an honourable and an evil thing in the lame respect.
Alcib. So I think.
Socrat. But observe, if that which renders this Action comely, is not that which also, renders it good : for you have your self acknowledg'd that in respectofValourthisActionwascomely. Letus now examine whether ValourisaGood oranEvil. AndI'llshewyouthewaytomakethisExamena- right. DoyoudesireforyourselfGoodsorEvils?
Alcib. Goods without doubt.
Socrat. And the greatest?
Alcib. Yes, you may besure on't.
Socrat. And would you not suffer any one to de
prive you of 'em >
Alcib. Why shouldIsufferthat?
Socrat. What do you think of Valour ? at what
rate do you value it ? is there any good in the Worldforwhichyouwouldbedepriv'dofit>
Alcib. No, not Life it self. What to be a Coward ? I would a thousand times rather choose to dye.
* Socratesmeans, thatValourandDeathbeing twoverydiffe rentthings, 'tisridiculoustojudgof onebytheother:Buteach, of 'em ought to be examin'd by it self. The former of these is; thethingunderdebate, andnotthelatter. This lsextreamly in genious j and Aktiudis. did not expect such a very quick Re partee.
Socrat.
? ? Of theNature osMan.
Socrat. ThenCowardiseseemstoyouthegreat est of allEvils?
Alcib. Yes.
Socrat. And more to be fearM than Death it self >
Alcib. Most certainly.
Socrat. ArenotLifeandValourtheContrariesto Death and Cowardise ?
Alcib. Whodoubtsit?
Socrat. You desire the former, and by no means
w i s h f o r t h e l a t t e r -, i s i t n o t b e c a u s e y o u f i n d t h o s e very good, and these very evil?
Alcib. Yes doubtless.
Socrat. You have your self acknowledg'd, that theSuccouraMan givesto hisFriendinBattleis a comely and honourable Action ; ifitbe confider'd with respect to the good that is in it, which is Valour.
Alcib. Ihaveacknowledg'dit.
Socrat. And that 'tis an evil Action, when con fider'd with respect to the Evil that attends it, that isWounds and Death.
Alcib. Iconfessit.
Socrat. * Then it hence follows, that we ought to call each Action according to what it produces ?
weoughttocallitGood,ifGoodspringsfromitj and Evil, if Evil arise out of it?
Alcib. So itseems tome.
Socrat. Is not an Action comely in that it isGood, andshameful inthatitisEvil?
Alcib. That's beyond (Contradiction.
Socrat. When you fay then that the Succour a M a n gives his Friend in a Battle is a comely Action, and at the iame time an evil Action, 'tis as if you should say, 'tis Evil tho itbe Good.
Alcib. IndeedIthinkwhatyoufayistrue. Socrat. Then there is nothing comely and honour-
* ThisMaximisfalseinAlcibiadeshis fense, butverytruein that of Soctmis: for nothing can ever spring from a good Action butGood, asnothingbutEvilcanspringfromanevilone.
able
? ? tpo she First Alcibiades ; or,
able which is Evil so far as itiscomely and honour able;norisanythingwhichisshamefulgood, so far as it is shameful.
Alcih. So Ithink.
mppimfs Socrat. LetusseekforanotherProofofthis
haiJays Truth. ArenotallthatdogoodActionshappy? tbtfruitof Can they be happy, unless itbe by the Possession of good Atli- G o o d ? Is not this Possession o f G o o d the fruit o f a ons.
good Lite ? And consequently is not Happiness ne cessarily for them that do good Actions ?
Alcib. Whocandenyit?
Socrat. * Then Happiness is a comely and honora blething. Henceitfollowsthatwhatiscomelyand what is good are never two different things, as we :ust now agreed, and that whatsoever we ,take td
'? ecomely, weshallalsotaketobegood; ifwe '. o o k n a r r o w l y i n t o i t .
Alcib. This is absolutely necessary.
Socrat. What do you saythen, isthatwhich is good useful, or not ?
Alcib. Yes, itis useful.
Socrat. Doyourememberwhatwesaidwhenwe ipoke of Justice, and about what we agreed ?
Alcib. Ithink we agreedthatallMen that dojust A c t i o n s , m u s t n e e d s d o w h a t is c o m e l y a n d h o n o r a b l e ;
Socrat. Then that which is comely is good ? Alcib. Yes.
Socrat. Then that which is good is useful ? Alcib. That's certain.
Socrat: And consequently whatsoever 'isjust is useful ? . Alcib. So^t seems.
Socrat. Take good Notice that 'tis your self who affirmthese Truths; fcfIformy part, onlyask Questions. Alcib. Iacknowledge it.
Socrat. Ifany one then thinking he well under stood theNatme ofJustice should go into theAssem- bly-of the Athenian^ or Parthians ifyou please, (to lay the Scene more remote) and should tell 'em he
* A n d c o n s e q u e n t l y H a p p i n e s s c a n ' t b e t h e f r u i t o f a n il l L i f e afidof illActions. "
? ? Os theNatureof. Man. ipf
certainly knows that just Actions are sometimes E- vil ; would not you laugh at him, who have just now granted and acknowledg'd that Justice and U-
tility are one and the fame thing ? <
Alcib. I solemnly protest to you Socrates, that 1knownotwhatIsay,norwhereIam? ,forthese
things appear to me sometimes one way and some times another, according as you interrogate me.
Socrat. DontyouknowtheCauseofthisdisorder? Alcib. No, I know nothing at all ofit.
Socrat. And ifany one should ask you ifyou have
threeEyesorfourHands,doyouthinkyoushould answer sometimes after one manner and sometimes
aster another ? or would you not answer him always ' after the fame manner ?
Alcib. Tho I begin to be diffident of my self, yet I think I should always answer the same thing. Socrat. Andisnotthisbecauseyouknowverywell
you have but two Eyes and two Hands ?
Alcib. I think so.
Socrat. Sincethenyouanswersodifferentlywhe
ther you will or no about the same thing, 'tisa cer tain sign that you are ignorant of it.
Alcib. So one would think.
Sotrat. You confessthenthatyourthoughtsareun-Vnaminij certainand fluctuatingaboutwhatisjustandunjust;alwap- honorable or dishonorable, good or evil, useful or comsfrm thecontrary. Andisitnotevidentfromhencethat*zmm"'
this uncertainty springs only from your ignorance ? AlciB. 'Tis evident.
Socrat. Then'tisacertainMaximthat theMind
isalways fluctuatingand uncertainabout everything itdoesnotknow?
Alcib. It cannot be otherwise.
Socrat * But do you know how to mount up to
Heaven ?
* AfterhehadsliownAlcibiades,thatIgnoranceisthecauseof
all the Errors of Mankind ; he goes about to prove to him, that Men ought not to be accus'd of Ignorance in general, for if one kindofitisEvil,thereisanotherkindGood, andthishemain- uinsverysolidly.
'" *
that
? ? OftheNatureofMan. 183
that again atthe*Battle cAECoronea where your Fa ther was kill'd ?
Alcib. Who candeny thisi
Socrat. Shallwethendaretofaythepeopleknows a thing well, about which they dispute with so much Animosity, that they are carried to the most fatal Extremities ?
Alcib. No certainly*
Socrat. Very good ! And yet arenot thesetheMas tersyoucite, whenatthefametimeyouacknowledge their Ignorance ?
Alcib. I confess it.
Socrat. What Probability then is there that you shouldknowwhatisJustandUnjust,aboutwhich youappearsouncerlpnandfluctuating-y andwhich you confess you have neither learn'd of others, nor found out your self?
Alcib. According to what you say there is no Pro bability of it at all.
Socrat. How! accordingtowhatIfay> Youspeak not right, Alcibiades, say rather 'tis according to what you fay your self
Alcib. How ! isitnotyou thatfay,Iknow nothing at all of what belongs to Justiceand Injustice ?
Socrat. No, indeed,'tisnotI. Alcib. Whothen? IsitI? Socrat. Yes, 'tisyour self. Alcib. How so?
S o c r a t . I ' l l t e l l y o u h o w s o ? , a n d y o u w i l l a g r e e
withme. IfIshouldaskyouwhichisthegrea testNumber, one, ortwo ? ,youwould immediatly
answer two ;and ifIshould againaskyou how much greaterthisNumberisthantheother;youwould likewiseanswer, that'tisgreaterbyone.
,Alcib. Very true.
, *,ThisBattleofCormta. vcasfought thesecondyearofthe
LXXXIIIOlymp. HerethebraveTolmidtsvvjskill'd;after
whichtheAtheniansweredrivenoutofBeotia. Socrateswas then22yearsofA^e. ThisBatdeofCormiYv*octenthrough
mistake,beenccnfpuadcdwiththatofCbirpnea. M. LeFtvre.
N 4 Socrat.
? ? ffT
Alcib. Thismustbegranted. '? ? '
Socrat. 'Tis your self that have laid that the fine Alcibiades the Son of G//h<w, not knowing what is ^ust and Unjust, and yet thinking he knows it very well, is going to the Assembly of the Athenians to
give them hisAdvice about such things as he knows nothing of ; Isitnot so ? ? ;
Alcib. "Tis even so.
Socrat. One may then apply to you, Alcibiades,
j84
'TheFirstAlcibiacksj or,
Socrat. Which of us two would it be then that wouldfaytwoismotethanonejwoulditbeI? j
Alcib. No, 'twould be I.
Socrat. For it was I that ask'd, and you that an-
swer'd. IsitnotthesamethinginthepresentQues tion? Alc'ib. That'scertain.
Socrat If I should ask you what Letters compose
SocrateshisName,andyoushouldtell'emme one^f- ter another, which of us two would tell them ? ?
'-. ' A l c i b , I s h o u l d d o i t w i t h o u t d o u b t .
Socrat. ForinaDiscoursewhich isspentinQues
tions and Answers ; he that asks never affirms, but
Thisprovesalwayshethatanswers. "TisIthathaveask'dyou, thevfefd-. and 'tisyou that have answer'd, 'tisyou therefore *? u! iks tnat nave affirm'd the things fbw have said.
'Tkhthe,thatsayingofEuripides. Tisthyselfthathasna- tragedyofmej-;>. YoxitisnotIthathavespokenit,butyour H'PPy- self-,andyouaretoblametochargeitonme.
'? ;'? ?
Alcib. YouhaveReason.
Socrat. Believe me, Alcibiades, 'tisa wild Enter- prize to have amind to go teach the Athenians that which you do not know your self, and about which you have neglected to inform your self.
Alcib. I fancy, Socrates, the Athenians, and all the reft of the Greeks very rarely examine in thek C o u n s e l , w h a t i s m o s t J u s t o r U n j u s t -, f o r t h e y a r e satisfiedthatisvery evident. Andthereforewith out amusing themselves with this vain Enquiry they only consider what is most advantageous . ana useful ; and Utility and Justiceare,:very, different
things ; since there'have always been people in the t ? - :-. . ,. ;-. , World
? ? OftheNatureofMan. 18y
World that have found themselves very prosperous inthe Commission ofgreatInjustice$and otherswho have succeeded very ill, in the exercise of Justice.
Spcrat. What do you * think then that, ifwhat isUseful and what isJust are very different, as you faytheyare,youknowwhatisusefultoMen,and
whyitisso>
' Alcib. W h a t should hinder me, Socrates? ? Unless
youwouldaskmeofwhomIlearn'dthistoo;or howIfounditoutmyself>
Socrat. Is your proceeding just, Alcibiades, sup posing what you say is not right, as that may very well be ; and that 'tisvery easy to refute you by the
same Reasons which I haye already employ'd > You
would have new Proofs, and fresh Demonstrations,
and treat the former as old Clothes, which you are
not willing to wear any longer. You arestillfor
having something entirely new -,but for my part,
without following you in your Stragglings and Es
capes,Ishallaskyou, asIhavealreadydone,whence y o u c a m e t o k n o w w h a t U t i l i t y i s ? , a n d w h o w ? i s
your Instructor : In a word I ask you all I have ask'd youbefore. - 'Tisverycertainyoullanswermetoo after the same manner you have done, and that you'll not be able to shew m e either that you have learn'd ofothers, to know what isuseful, or that you have found it out yOur self. But because you are very nice, and don't love to hear the same thing twice,
I am willing to drop this Question whether you
knowwhatisusefultotheAtheniansorno, "But
ifwhatisjustandwhatisusefulareoneandthe
same thing ; or ifthey are very different asyou fay,
w h y h a v e y o u n o t p r o v ' d it t o m e ? P r o v e it m e ,
e i t h e r b y i n t e r r o g a t i n g m e a s I h a v e d e a l t w i t h y o u -,
orinmakingme afineDiscoursewhich may set the Matter in a clear Light. ?
* If what isuseful, and what isjust, wered'fferentthiags,yet if one knew what is Useful, one nvght also know what isJust : ForweknowContrariesbytheirContraries. Buttheyarenot different,andSocratesisgoingtoproveit. Alcibiadesknowsno
more what is useful thsn what isjust.
'(? -'? ? - '- ,, . . (. . . : . '-. ";-" Alcik
? ? 1 8 6
T h e F i r s t A l c i b i a d e s ,? o r ,
Alcib. But, SocratesIknownotwhetherIamca pable of speaking before you.
Socrat. My dearAlcibiades, imagineme tobethe Assembly,supposemetobethePeople:When you are among them, must you not endeavour to perswade every one of 'em?
Alcib. Yes.
S0cr. 1t. And when a Man knows a thing well, is
it not equal to him to demonstrate to this and that Person one after another ; or to prove it to divers Personsallatonce; asonethatteachesReadingor Arithmetick can equally instruct one or more Scholars together ?
Alcib. That's certain.
Socrat. And consequently of whatsoever you are capable of persuading many you may very easily persuade one single Person. But of what can a Man persuade others, isitnotof thatwhich he
knows himself? . .
Mcib. Without doubt.
Socrat. What otherdifferenceistherebetweenan
Oratorthatspeaks toamultitudeofPeople, anda
Man thatdiscourseswithhisFriendinfamiliarCon- - versation,butthattheformerpersuadesagreatNum
berofPeopleatonce, andthelatterpersuadesbut one ? , .
Alcib. Tis likelytheremay beno other difference.
S o c r a t . C o m e t h e n ; S i n c e h e w h o is c a p a b l e o f p r o vingwhatheknowstomany,isbyamuchstrong er Reason capable of proving it to one single per s o n -, d i s p l a y h e r e a l l y o u r E l o q u e n c e t o m e , a n d . e n deavourtollicvvme thatwhatisjustisnotalways useful. . . /? ? /'. si\
Alcib. You are very urgent, Socrates.
Socrat. I a m so urgent, that I'll presently prove to you the contrary of that which you refuse to prove to me.
Alcib. Do so.
Socrat. Only answer me. '
Alcib. Ha! NothingbutQuestions; le'trheintreat
you to speak your selfalone. Socr. it.
? ? OftheNatureofMa,u 187
Socrat. W h a t are you not willing to be convinc'd ? AIc5y d Mcib. Yes with allmy heart. is^firlidlf Socrat. Whenyouyourself(hallgrant, andas-Socratesbis
firmtome thatwhatladvanceistrue,willyounotQa'P"*** be convinc'd? g j '
Alcib. I think I (hall. tobethe'
Socrat. Answer me then t And if you your M s bestmethod. don't say that what isjust is always useful, nevert0<<>>w'>><<1
believeanyMan livingthatshalltellyouso.
Alcib. Agreed, I am ready to answer you, for I
shall receive no damage by it.
Socrat. You are a Prophet, Alcibiades?
,buttell
me ; do you think there aue some justthings which are useful, and others which are not so >
Alcib. Yes certainly.
Socrat. Do youthinktoothatsomeofthemare comely and honorable, and others the quite contrary ?
Alcib. Howdoyoufay?
Socrat. Iaskyouforinstance, ifaMan who does an Action that isshameful, does an Action that isjust >
Alcib. Iamveryfarfromsuchathought.
Socrat. You believethenthat whatsoever isjust is comely.
Alcib. Iam entirely convinc'd of that.
Socrat. Butiseverythingthatiscomelyandhono rable good ? or do you think there are some comely and honorable things that are Good, and others that are Evil ?
Alsib. Formypart,SocratesIthinktherearesome honorable things that are Evil.
Socrat. And by consequence that there are some shameful things that are Good ?
Alcib. Yes.
undrtjute.
Socrat. SeeifIunderstandyouwell. Ithasoften happen'd in Battles, that one M a n in attempting to. succour his Friend, or Relation, has receiv'd a gtcat manyWounds, orhasbeenkill'd;andanother,by abandoning his Relation, or Friend, has lav'd his
Life : Is not this your meaning ?
? Alcib. "Tis the very thing I would fay.
. **'? ? ' "'? <. Socrat,
? ? i88
The FirstAlcibiades] o^
Socrat. The succouraMan gives tohisFriendis a comely and honourable thing, in that he endea vourstosaveone whom heisohlig'dtosave-,and is not this what we callValour,
Alclb. Yes.
Socrat. And this very Succour is an evil thing, in thatitisthe cause ofaMan'sreceivingWounds, or of being kill'd ?
Alcib. Yes, without doubt.
Socrat. * But isnot Valour one thing,and Death another ?
Alcib. Yes certainly.
Socrat. ThisSuccourthenwhichaMangivesto his Friend, is not at the fame time an honourable and an evil thing in the lame respect.
Alcib. So I think.
Socrat. But observe, if that which renders this Action comely, is not that which also, renders it good : for you have your self acknowledg'd that in respectofValourthisActionwascomely. Letus now examine whether ValourisaGood oranEvil. AndI'llshewyouthewaytomakethisExamena- right. DoyoudesireforyourselfGoodsorEvils?
Alcib. Goods without doubt.
Socrat. And the greatest?
Alcib. Yes, you may besure on't.
Socrat. And would you not suffer any one to de
prive you of 'em >
Alcib. Why shouldIsufferthat?
Socrat. What do you think of Valour ? at what
rate do you value it ? is there any good in the Worldforwhichyouwouldbedepriv'dofit>
Alcib. No, not Life it self. What to be a Coward ? I would a thousand times rather choose to dye.
* Socratesmeans, thatValourandDeathbeing twoverydiffe rentthings, 'tisridiculoustojudgof onebytheother:Buteach, of 'em ought to be examin'd by it self. The former of these is; thethingunderdebate, andnotthelatter. This lsextreamly in genious j and Aktiudis. did not expect such a very quick Re partee.
Socrat.
? ? Of theNature osMan.
Socrat. ThenCowardiseseemstoyouthegreat est of allEvils?
Alcib. Yes.
Socrat. And more to be fearM than Death it self >
Alcib. Most certainly.
Socrat. ArenotLifeandValourtheContrariesto Death and Cowardise ?
Alcib. Whodoubtsit?
Socrat. You desire the former, and by no means
w i s h f o r t h e l a t t e r -, i s i t n o t b e c a u s e y o u f i n d t h o s e very good, and these very evil?
Alcib. Yes doubtless.
Socrat. You have your self acknowledg'd, that theSuccouraMan givesto hisFriendinBattleis a comely and honourable Action ; ifitbe confider'd with respect to the good that is in it, which is Valour.
Alcib. Ihaveacknowledg'dit.
Socrat. And that 'tis an evil Action, when con fider'd with respect to the Evil that attends it, that isWounds and Death.
Alcib. Iconfessit.
Socrat. * Then it hence follows, that we ought to call each Action according to what it produces ?
weoughttocallitGood,ifGoodspringsfromitj and Evil, if Evil arise out of it?
Alcib. So itseems tome.
Socrat. Is not an Action comely in that it isGood, andshameful inthatitisEvil?
Alcib. That's beyond (Contradiction.
Socrat. When you fay then that the Succour a M a n gives his Friend in a Battle is a comely Action, and at the iame time an evil Action, 'tis as if you should say, 'tis Evil tho itbe Good.
Alcib. IndeedIthinkwhatyoufayistrue. Socrat. Then there is nothing comely and honour-
* ThisMaximisfalseinAlcibiadeshis fense, butverytruein that of Soctmis: for nothing can ever spring from a good Action butGood, asnothingbutEvilcanspringfromanevilone.
able
? ? tpo she First Alcibiades ; or,
able which is Evil so far as itiscomely and honour able;norisanythingwhichisshamefulgood, so far as it is shameful.
Alcih. So Ithink.
mppimfs Socrat. LetusseekforanotherProofofthis
haiJays Truth. ArenotallthatdogoodActionshappy? tbtfruitof Can they be happy, unless itbe by the Possession of good Atli- G o o d ? Is not this Possession o f G o o d the fruit o f a ons.
good Lite ? And consequently is not Happiness ne cessarily for them that do good Actions ?
Alcib. Whocandenyit?
Socrat. * Then Happiness is a comely and honora blething. Henceitfollowsthatwhatiscomelyand what is good are never two different things, as we :ust now agreed, and that whatsoever we ,take td
'? ecomely, weshallalsotaketobegood; ifwe '. o o k n a r r o w l y i n t o i t .
Alcib. This is absolutely necessary.
Socrat. What do you saythen, isthatwhich is good useful, or not ?
Alcib. Yes, itis useful.
Socrat. Doyourememberwhatwesaidwhenwe ipoke of Justice, and about what we agreed ?
Alcib. Ithink we agreedthatallMen that dojust A c t i o n s , m u s t n e e d s d o w h a t is c o m e l y a n d h o n o r a b l e ;
Socrat. Then that which is comely is good ? Alcib. Yes.
Socrat. Then that which is good is useful ? Alcib. That's certain.
Socrat: And consequently whatsoever 'isjust is useful ? . Alcib. So^t seems.
Socrat. Take good Notice that 'tis your self who affirmthese Truths; fcfIformy part, onlyask Questions. Alcib. Iacknowledge it.
Socrat. Ifany one then thinking he well under stood theNatme ofJustice should go into theAssem- bly-of the Athenian^ or Parthians ifyou please, (to lay the Scene more remote) and should tell 'em he
* A n d c o n s e q u e n t l y H a p p i n e s s c a n ' t b e t h e f r u i t o f a n il l L i f e afidof illActions. "
? ? Os theNatureof. Man. ipf
certainly knows that just Actions are sometimes E- vil ; would not you laugh at him, who have just now granted and acknowledg'd that Justice and U-
tility are one and the fame thing ? <
Alcib. I solemnly protest to you Socrates, that 1knownotwhatIsay,norwhereIam? ,forthese
things appear to me sometimes one way and some times another, according as you interrogate me.
Socrat. DontyouknowtheCauseofthisdisorder? Alcib. No, I know nothing at all ofit.
Socrat. And ifany one should ask you ifyou have
threeEyesorfourHands,doyouthinkyoushould answer sometimes after one manner and sometimes
aster another ? or would you not answer him always ' after the fame manner ?
Alcib. Tho I begin to be diffident of my self, yet I think I should always answer the same thing. Socrat. Andisnotthisbecauseyouknowverywell
you have but two Eyes and two Hands ?
Alcib. I think so.
Socrat. Sincethenyouanswersodifferentlywhe
ther you will or no about the same thing, 'tisa cer tain sign that you are ignorant of it.
Alcib. So one would think.
Sotrat. You confessthenthatyourthoughtsareun-Vnaminij certainand fluctuatingaboutwhatisjustandunjust;alwap- honorable or dishonorable, good or evil, useful or comsfrm thecontrary. Andisitnotevidentfromhencethat*zmm"'
this uncertainty springs only from your ignorance ? AlciB. 'Tis evident.
Socrat. Then'tisacertainMaximthat theMind
isalways fluctuatingand uncertainabout everything itdoesnotknow?
Alcib. It cannot be otherwise.
Socrat * But do you know how to mount up to
Heaven ?
* AfterhehadsliownAlcibiades,thatIgnoranceisthecauseof
all the Errors of Mankind ; he goes about to prove to him, that Men ought not to be accus'd of Ignorance in general, for if one kindofitisEvil,thereisanotherkindGood, andthishemain- uinsverysolidly.
