No More Learning

Much was done
during his term of office to improve the administration and to in-
crease the economic prosperity of the people. But meanwhile the rise
of English power constituted a menace against which nothing availed.
In 1781, the king of Kandi appeared to be unwilling to support the
English in their enterprise against Dutch rule on the island. In 1796,
his aloofness no longer mattered: Dutch power, as we shall see,
collapsed at the first touch.
In the seventeenth century, the Dutch Company's position in
India rested on sea-power. While the English made of Surat, where
they were dependent on friendly relations with the Moghul, the
centre of their Indian system and obtained a footing at Goa itself by
an amicable arrangement with the Portuguese, the Dutch broke down


## p. 56 (#84) ##############################################

66
THE DUTCH IN INDIA
1
the Portuguese monopoly by the open and persistent use of force,
capturing their ships and supplanting them as the actual rulers of one
stronghold after another. Even in their relations with the Moghul they
occasionally brought their naval superiority into play. So conscious
were they of their naval supremacy that in 1652 the outbreak of war
with both England and Portugal was welcomed at Batavia as likely
to turn to the Company's advantage. The advantage, as against
England at any rate, was confined to the occasional capture of prizes.
The factories of the English Company were protected by the Moghul's
peace. In the third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-4) communications
between Surat and the new English settlement of Bombay were
constantly threatened, and three home-bound English ships were
captured in the Bay of Bengal. France was England's ally in that
war, and in 1671 Louis XIV had already dispatched to India a fleet
of twelve sail under the command of Admiral de la Haye. Even
before war had been declared in Europe, the French occupied some
abandoned forts in the bay of Trinkomali, Van Goens, who was then
governor of Ceylon, without losing time, collected such ships as were
available and attacked the intruders. Soon reinforcements arrived
from Batavia, and de la Haye was forced to leave Ceylon with the loss
uf several of his ships. With the remainder he sailed for St Thomé
and captured that town. Van Goens was soon on the spot and
blockaded the town from the sea side, while the king of Golconda, its
rightful sovereign, invested it by land. The English and the French
were too jealous of each other to co-operate, and an English fleet
of ten sail allowed itself to be beaten separately off Petapoli. About
a year afterwards, 6 September, 1674, de la Haye capitulated. He had
lost all his ships, and the 900 men left to him out of the 2000 with
whom he had started, were transported to Europe in Dutch vessels.
While the naval power of the Dutch was the despair of their
rivals, they themselves often were inclined to envy the English, who
were able to carry on their trade without incurring the vast expenses
for the upkeep of any navy and of fortresses and garrisons which
burdened the budget of the Dutch Company. The recollection that it
was the Dutch attacks on the Spanish-Portuguese monopoly which
had opened the Indian trade to their rivals as well as to themselves
added bitterness to these feelings. In fact, the settlements where they
had not taken up the responsibilities of sovereignty were by far the
most profitable in the eyes of the Company, which never learnt to
separate its purely trading accounts from its political budgets. In the
years 1683-1757, therefore, the only period for which these figures are
4
1 Aalbers, Rijklof van Goens, p. 81.
2 De Jonge, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsch zeewezen, 1. 768.
3 Shafaat Ahmed Khan, Sources for the History of British India in the
Seventeenth Century, pp. 245-6.


## p. 57 (#85) ##############################################

FINANCE AND ORGANISATION
67
3
available, Surat, Bengal and Coromandel figure in the Company's
books with annual profits of hundreds of thousands of guilders each,
although Bengal, after 1720, very frequently shows a loss. Ceylon
and Malabar on the other hand constantly showed heavy losses,
although we know from other sources that Malabar ceased to be
"a bad post" towards the end of the eighteenth century. In these
figures profit and loss made by commercial transactions are lumped
together with the yield of taxation and tributes and the expenses of
administration, and no account is taken of profits made in Holland
by the sale of merchandise,
All through the eighteenth century the Company's commitments
as a sovereign power increased: garrisons became more numerous,
the expenses of administration grew. As a result, although its trade
continued to prosper, the Company's finances became more and more
involved. Something like 50 per cent. profit was regularly made on
the Company's turnover even as late as the seventies of the eighteenth
century, very largely owing to the enormously profitable trade of
Surat, Bengal and Ceylon. At the same time the general balance-
sheet showed a steady decline. In 1700 there were still 21,000,000
guilders on the credit side; in 1724 the zero point was passed, and
the deficit grew uninterruptedly until in the eighties of the eighteenth
century it surpassed 100,000,000 guilders.
Obviously the Company's system suffered from graye defects.
Great as it had been as an empire-builder, able as it still was as a
merchant, it failed as a colonial ruler. Its strict adherence, against the
advice of all its ablest governors-general, to the policy of commercial
monopoly was perhaps its gravest mistake. The settlement of “free
burghers," which might have brought in its train a much more inten-
sive economic development of countries like the Malay Archipelago
and Ceylon, was consistently discouraged by the directors at home.
Another defect, and one which more nearly concerns the Company's
possessions in India, was the severe subordination of the whole of its
system to the administrative and commercial centre at Batavia.
Ceylon was the only place whence direct communications with
Holland were more or less regularly conducted, and its governors
were allowed to correspond with the Seventeen, while the chiefs of
all other settlements could only correspond with the governor-general
and his council. One unfortunate result of the distance of the central
authority was the prevalence of corruption. No posts in the Com-
pany's employ were considered so lucrative as those in what were
called “the Western Quarters”. 5
1 G. C. Klerk de Reus, Geschichtlicher Ueberblick, Beilage ex.
2 See above, p. 36, note 2.
3 Klerk de Reus, Geschichtlicher Ueberblick, p. 193.
4 Klerk de Reus, op. cit. Beilage VIII.
8 This term in the early days was applied more particularly to Surat and
the Persian and Arabian factories.


## p. 58 (#86) ##############################################

68
THE DUTCH IN INDIA
The commonest form of peculation was private trading. While
the Company jealously suppressed the rise of a class of independent
traders within its sphere of influence, it was powerless to prevent
its own servants from infringing its monopoly to their own private
advantage. As early as 1609 the directors bitterly complained of the
prevalence of the abuse, but while they continued grievously to under-
pay their employees, the constantly reiterated edicts prohibiting the
practice, threatening penalties, prescribing oaths, remained entirely
without effect. In 1626, the directors resolved that all the establīsh-
ments in the East were to be visited every year by two inspectors, to
one of whom "the Western Quarters" were allotted; they were to
report both to Batavia and to the Seventeen themselves. In spite of
another resolution to the same effect in 1632, nothing came of this
annual inspection, and even requests, made by the directors in 16502
and repeated afterwards, that an inspection should be held every
two years had no result. The Batavia government excused themselves
by the difficulty of finding suitable men for so arduous a task, but no
doubt they were themselves lukewarm in the cause of integrity.
Inspections were actually ordered only when there were special
reasons to suspect mismanagement, but even then an energetic and
honest man like Van Goens, who inspected Surat in 1654, had to
confess 3 that it was difficult to bring the wrong-doers to book, as
they knew well how to escape detection. In 1684 the Seventeen, de-
spairing of ever getting the Batavia government to act with requisite
firmness, themselves appointed a commissioner-general to inspect the
Western Quarters, Hendrik Adriaan van Reede tot Drakensteyn,
formerly commandeur of Malabar, whom we have met on the Coro-
mandel Coast. For seven years Van Reede laboured at his herculean
task; when he died in 1691, it was still far from being completed, and
the results of the inspections actually carried out soon vanished. From
then onwards no serious attempts were made to put down the evil,
and it grew steadily. So much had it become an accepted thing that
directors themselves began to traffic in appointments, and about 1720
an Amsterdam burgomaster accepted 3500 guilders for conferring on
a candidate the post of under-merchant, the official salary for which
was only 480 guilders a year. 4
As in course of time the Company, from being a purely trading
body, became the sovereign of many Eastern lands, its servants could
enrich themselves in other ways than by infringing its monopoly or
embezzling its money. Oppressions and exactions at the expense of
the subject populations were no less lucrative and no less common.
We have seen in the case of Vuyst and Versluys that the supreme
authorities were not prepared to countenance the worst excesses.
1 J. A. van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakkaatboek, I, 188.
2 Aalbers. Rijklof van Goens, p. 30.
8 Op. cit. p. 107.
4 Colenbrander, Koloniale Geschiedenis, u, 219.


## p. 59 (#87) ##############################################

ATTEMPTED REFORM
59
.
Vuyst's judicial murders even caused them to introduce a general
reform. Governors and directors had until then always presided over
the Council of Justice in their governments. In 1738 this function
was transferred to the second. Nor are these cases the only ones to
show that the growth of humanitarian ideas during the eighteenth
century occasionally inspired the authorities at Batavia or at home to
energetic interference on behalf of the Company's wronged native
subjects. In 1765, for instance, the Seventeen ordered action to be
taken against the governor of Coromandel, Christiaan van Teylingen,
on the strength of serious charges which a minister of the king of
Tanjore, Paw Idde Naiker, had succeeded in bringing directly to
their knowledge.
If the directors occasionally exerted themselves to put down some
crying abuse; if now and again an able and energetic man rose to
some high executive post in the Indies; no radical reform of the
Company's defective system was ever attempted. Van Imhoff, whom
We have met as governor of Ceylon, became governor-general in 1743,
and high expectations were founded on him, which were hardly
realised. He attempted, among other things, to put down the illicit
trade in Bengal opium by allowing officials to form an "Opium
Society. " among themselves, thus legalising private trade in this one
instance. When, however, another generation of officials had arisen
who did not own any shares in the "Society", matters were as bad
as ever. In 1747, again, the Orangist restoration at home seemed to
offer better prospects, but the new stadtholder, William IV, for whom
in 1748, under the direct pressure of public opinion, the office of
director-general of the Company was created, did not effect any
essential or permanent changes.
At the same time circumstances had arisen which made the need
for reform more urgent. Towards the close of the seventeenth century,
the English Company, realising the insecurity of its position in the
troubled Moghul Empire, had copied from the wise Dutch" their
policy of the strong arm. The first attempts ended in failure, but, as
the eighteenth century proceeded, just when the Dutch had allowed
their navy hopelessly to decay, and in their relations with native
rulers trusted to flattery and presents, it became clearer that the
position of the European nations in India had no solid basis except
in naval and military power. The rise of French influence in the
southern part of the peninsula caused the Dutch many alarms. Par-
ticularly obnoxious was Dupleix's capture of Masulipatam in 1750.
In the War of the Austrian Succession, the Dutch Republic, althougn
technically neutral, had in fact sided with England. In the Seven
Years' War, on the other hand, its neutrality was real, with, if any.
1 A. K. A. Gysberti Hodenpyl, De Gouverneurs van Koromandel: Christiaan
van Teylingen (1761-65) en Pieter Haksteen (1765-71), Bijdragen voor Vader-
landsche Geschiedenis, v, X (1923), 136 sqq.


## p. 60 (#88) ##############################################

60
THE DUTCH IN INDIA
thing, a bias against England. Clive's successes in Bengal were viewed
by the authorities at Batavia with deep suspicion. It was felt that the
power to which the English, through their ally and tool Mir Ja'far,
had now attained, threatened the prosperity, if not the existence,
of establishments which were looked upon as constituting one of the
Dutch Company's main supports. Immediately after Plassey, Dutch
trade on the Hugli was reported to be suffering, and exactions on the
part of the Indian authorities became more unbearable. So the
governor-general and his council resolved to make an attempt to
retrieve the position. It only served to make it apparent to all the
world how far the Dutch Company had left the days of Coen and of
Van Goens behind it. The ships sent up the Hugli were captured,
the troops cut to pieces. Nothing remained but to make a speedy
submission, and the Dutch retained their factories, but had to promise
not to garrison them with more than a small number of troops. They
were now worse off than before, but the next crisis, in 1781, was to
leave them even more helpless.
In the American War the Dutch Republic, tossed by violent party
struggles, recklessly provoked England, and when England, at the
end of 1780 declared war, the republic proved entirely incapable of
defending its own interests. Its trade came to a dead stop. In the
colonial world, the English took Negapatam, which in spite of its
large garrison offered little resistance. Trinkomali was lost, and
regained only by the efforts of the French. But ai the peace congress
Holland could not be saved from all loss by its ally. Negapatam had
to be given up, and free access to the waters of the Archipelago had
to be granted to English commerce.
The war, moreover, had revealed the Company's financial distress
The state had had to assist it when it proved unable to raise the money
needed for its own armaments and for the reimbursement of the
French. In 1783 only a public guarantee of the Company's shares
enabled it to carry on. Everybody realised that the state must take
in hand the reform of a body which had the care of such important
national interests. Unfortunately, the state was too much shaken by
internal dissensions to be capable of energetic action. When in 1787
the Orangist régime was restored by England and Prussia, still very
little was done. In 1793 the republic was involved in the Revolu-
tionary War, and only in 1795, when the Batavian Republic was
established under French influence, did the state formally take over
the administration of the Company's possessions. But at the same
time these were exposed to the attacks of England, with whom the
Batavian Republic found itself automatically at war.
1G. C. Klerk de Reus, “De expeditie naar Bengale in 1759", De Indische
Gids, 1889 and 1890.


## p. 61 (#89) ##############################################

CHAPTER III
THE FRENCH FACTORIES IN INDIA
THE French appeared in India long before the time of Louis XIV.
In the second quarter of the sixteenth century, about thirty years
after the Portuguese had reached the Malabar Coast by way of the
Cape, in July, 1527, a Norman ship belonging to the Rouen merchants
appeared, according to the Portuguese João de Barros, at Diu. In the
next year the Marie de Bon Secours, also called the Grand Anglais,
was seized by the Portuguese, at the very time when one of Jean
Ange's most famous captains was proposing to that famous merchant
to sail to Sumatra and even to the Moluocas. In 1530 the Sacre and the
Pensée actually reached the west coast of Sumatra; but they did su
without touching at any intermediate point on the shores of Asia;
and contemporary documents do not indicate the arrival of any other
French ships in Indian harbours in the later years of the sixteenth
century or the earlier ones of the seventeenth.
However, many facts show at the beginning of the latter a desire
to open maritime and commercial relations with India. In 1601 we
have the equipment by a conipany of St Malo merchants, de Laval
and de Vitré, of the two ships, the Croissant and the Corbin, the
voyages of which have been related by François Pyrard de Laval as
far as the Maldives, and by François Martin de Vitré to Sumatra by
way of Ceylon and the Nicobars; in 1604-9 came the attempts of
Henry IV to set up a French East India Company, like those just
established in the Netherlands and England; then in 1616 a fleet sailed
from St Malo for the Moluccas, while in that year and 1619 the two
so-called "fleets of Montmorency" sailed from Honfleur for Malaya and
Japan. But the scanty success of these enterprises, and the violence
of the Dutch, eager to keep for themselves the monopoly of that
profitable trade with the Far East, soon checked these bold attempts
of the French sailors. In 1625 Isaac de Razilly declared that "as
regards Asia and the East Indies there is no hope of planting colonjes,
for the way is too long, and the Spaniards and Dutch are too strong
to suffer it". 1 A little later Richelieu observes in his Testament
Politique that “the temper of the French being so hasty as to wish the
accomplishment of their desires in the moment of their conception,
long voyages are not proper for them"; but nevertheless he admits
that "the trade that could be done with the East Indies and Persia
. . . ought not to be neglected”. 2
1 Léon Deschamps, “Un Colonisk teur: au temps de Richelieu", Rev. de
Geographie, XIX, 460, December, 1886.
2 Ed. Amsterdam, 1708, pr 134-5.


## p. 62 (#90) ##############################################

62
THE FRENCH FACTORIES IN INDIA
However, some captains, especially the Normans, attempted,
though their accomplishment is on many points obscure, if not to
reach India itself, at least to make it easier of attainment by securing
near the Cape of Good Hope a place of refreshment, whence they
could make their way to Arabia, Persia, the Deccan ports, Bengal,
or the Malayan Islands. Such were Gilles de Rezimont and Rigault,
the latter of whom obtained in 1642 from Richelieu for himself and
his associates the privilege of sailing to Madagascar and the neigh-
bouring islands, to establish colonies and trade there. Indeed the
French almost at once established themselves on the south-east coast
of Madagascar, setting up their first post at Fort Dauphin, easily
reached by ships coming from or going to India. Moreover, some of
their ships or smaller vessels between 1650 and 1660 proceeded to the
Arabian or Indian coasts. Thus was confirmed the opinion expressed
some years earlier by the navigator, Augustin de Beaulieu, who had
commanded one of the Montmorency fleets, in a memoir of 1631-2,
still unpublished:
I find the said island (Madagascar) proper, once we are established there, for
adventures to any place whatever in the East Indies . . . for from the said place
at the due season Persia can be reached . . . where a very useful and important
trade can be established. . . . And when the said trade with Persia is inconvenient,
that with the countries of the Great Moghul, Ceylon, Masulipatam, Bengal.
Pegu, Kedda, Achin, Tiku and Bantam, can easily be followed.
By way of Persia, which Beaulieu recognises as a valuable market,
it was easy to reach India. While French sailors were exploring the
sea-route by the Cape, various travellers and merchants were exploring
the much shorter land-route, which leads from the shores of the
Levant through Asia Minor right on to the valleys of the Indus and
the Ganges. After the Italian, Pietro della Valle and the Englishman,
Thomas Herbert (only to mention the most recent) several French-
men tried this way, such as Capuchin missionaries, including Father
Raphael du Mans in 1643, inspired by the ideas of Father Joseph du
Tremblay (the famous Eminence Grise), and before him the well-
known traveller Tavernier who thus began in 1632-3 his numerous
journeys in the East, and who on his return became controller oi
the household to the Duke of Orleans, brother of Louis XIII. Soon
afterwards (1642-8) he returned eastwards, and reached India by
way of Ispahan, followed speedily by the Angevin noble La Boullaye
le Gouz, whose travels were so popular when they were published in
1653. Thus was heightened the eager desire felt in France on the eve
and at the beginning of the personal reign of Louis XIV to share with
Dutch and English in bringing to Europe the precious goods of India.
Neither Fouquet, superintendent of finances, whose father had been
1 Flacourt, Relation de la Grande Ile Madagascar, ed. 1658, p. 193. Cf. "Les
Documents inédits relatifs à la Constitution de la Campagnie des Indes de 1648",
Bull. du comité de. Madagascar, October, 1898, pp. 481-503.


## p. 63 (#91) ##############################################

COLBERT'S COMPANY
63
concerned in all the maritime enterprises of Richelieu, nor Colbert,
who had been employed in the private business of Mazarin before
coming to play his great part under Louis XIV, were unaware of
these travels, and sometimes even received direct reports. Thus the
latter became the interpreter of the unanimous desire of the merchants
and mariners of the kingdom, as well as of all those who desired its
economic development, when he proposed to his master the creation
of “a French company for the trade of the East Indies". 1
His personal convictions even more than public opinion had led
Colbert to regard the establishment of a company of this kind as
likely to render the greatest services to and powerfully to aid the
development of French maritime trade, on condition that it should be
strong in a very different way from the numerous associations of a like
nature that had formerly sprung up throughout the kingdom. Those
had hardly been more than municipal, such as the Company of St
Malo, the de Laval and de Vitré Company, or the coral companies •
of Marseilles; or provincial, such as the Company de Morbihan,
and had never included more than a small number of shareholders.
Their financial resources had always been limited, and their influence
and prestige alike slight. No attempt had been yet made to create a
national association, uniting the whole forces of the country. But that
was just what Colbert desired the new Compagnie des Indes Orientales
to do. He laboured therefore in every way before constituting it to
educate public opinion, and, when it had been formed, to secure it
full success. Hence the publication in April, 1664, of a Discourse of
a faithful subject of the Ring touching the establishment of a French
company for the East India trade addressed to all Frenchmen, prepared
by François Charpentier, the Academician, and printed at the king's
expense; hence a little later the formation of a company to which
Louis XIV not only gave his full approval, but also advanced 3,000,000
livres free of interest, from which were to be deducted all losses that
the company might incur for the first ten years; moreover he made
the members of the royal family subscribe, and displayed his interest
strongly enough to make the courtiers follow his example. Hence also
Colbert's own subscription to the new Compagnie des Indes Orientales,
and the campaign which he conducted throughout the country to
induce the officials and merchants of the chief towns to prove their
real interest in a project thus royally patronised.
By letters-patent in the form of an edict the Compagnie was placed
under the management of a general chamber of twenty-one directors
(twelve for the capital and nine for the provinces) and received for
a term of fifty years an exclusive privilege of trade from the Cape of
Good Hope to India and the South Seas. It also received a perpetual
grant of Madagascar and the neighbouring islands, on condition of
promoting Christianity there, a perpetual grant with all rights of
1 Souches de Rennefort, Hiscoire des Indes Orientales, p. 2.


## p. 64 (#92) ##############################################

84
THE FRENCH FACTORIES IN INDIA
1
seigneurie of all lands and places conquered from its enemies, and
ownership of all mines and slaves which it might take. The king was
to supply the Company at cost price with all the salt required for its
fleets, to pay it a bounty of fifty livres on every ton of goods exported
from France and seventy-five on every ton imported into the country,
to allow the Company to establish a free port on the French coast,
with a reduction of duties on the articles of trade with France, and
a special exemption of duties on all stores needed for the building of
ships. The General Chamber, which was to be renewed one-third
every year and to prepare accounts every six months, was entrusted
with the duty of appointing governors of its possessions, and the
king limited himself to giving them their formal investiture. The
chamber was , also to give account of its management every year
to an assembly of shareholders each possessing at least six shares.
The capital of the Company was divided into 15,000 shares of 1000
livres each.
The privileges thus granted were very considerable. But in order
to form a complete idea of them it is necessary also to take account of
certain other privileges, also of value, enumerated in the forty-eight
articles of the charter establishing the Company as an official body
and confirming at once its rights and duties. On his part the king
promised to protect the new Company and to escort its ships with his
own men-of-war; he allowed the Company to send ambassadors to
make treaties with, and declare war on, the sovereigns of India; and,
at the same time as he allowed it to fly the royal flag, he granted it
arms and a motto-Florebo quocumque ferar. -signifying the great
hopes placed by both him and Colbert in the new association.
If the country had responded with enthusiasm to the appeals made
to it, the Company would doubtless have realised those hopes and
become that "mighty company to carry on the trade of the East
Indies" anticipated in the preamble of the letters-patent. But nothing
of the sort happened. For various reasons—lack of enterprise among
the trading classes and the lesser noblesse de robe outside the ports
and a few great cities; dislike of most wealthy men for distant expe-
ditions; losses of the war with Spain still not made good; revival of
the frondeur spirit in the face of an admittedly official propaganda;
fear lest the subscription should be merely a device to tax the nobles
and other exempt persons the king's appeal addressed to the mayors
and bailiffs of the principal towns in the form of a lettre de cachet,
was unheeded and the royal example followed by few. So that of the
15,000,000 livres of which the capital was to have consisted, only about
8,200,000 livres were actually subscribed, and of that only a third was
called up when the letters-patent of August, 1664, had given legal
existence to the new Company. Thus the Compagnie des Indes
>
1 Unsigned letter to Colbert (Depping, Correspondance administrative sous
de règne de Louis XIV; 103, 476).


## p. 65 (#93) ##############################################

INITIAL PLANS
65
Orientales began its existence with a capital of about 5,500,000 livres.
including the 3,000,000 advanced by the king.
Colbert in fact was in haste to secure for France a share in the
considerable profits which foreigners were then drawing from the
East India trade, and which were rendering the Dutch, as Charpentier
said, the wealthiest people in Europe. So from October, 1664, ne
sought to prepare the way for the traders whom the new Company
was meaning to send as soon as possible to the most distant shores
of the Indian seas. To the shah of Persia and to the Great Moghul
he sent by way of Aleppo representatives of the king and agents of
the Company with orders to secure the favour of those princes and
to hold preliminary discussions for the conclusion of real treaties
of commerce. At the same time he was busy with the preparation
of the first fleet. After passing the Cape the Company's ships were
to put into Madagascar® to strengthen the position of the French
colonists already settled on the east and south-east coasts of the Ile
Dauphine, as the island was now officially called, and to set up a post
for victualling and refreshment for French vessels on their way to
India; they would then push up the East African coast to Arabia,
leaving it to a later fleet to reach the Deccan ports and establish
factories there.
At first sight the plan seems wise and well concerted. Was it not
wise in fact to secure to French vessels a good port of call on the long
voyage to India, and to place it at a point from which the Company's
ships could easily push on in all directions? By establishing them:
celves at Table Bay in 1652, by seeking to establish themselves at
Mauritius from 1638, by trying to form a colony on the west coast of
Madagascar at St Augustine's Bay, both the Dutch and English had in
a way imposed this policy on Colbert, rendering it the more necessary
by the jealousy which they displayed of the young French Company.
His real error, explained, however, by his love for his country and
his master, by the ambition of Louis XIV, and the devotion of France
to the king at the outset of his personal rule, lay in not discerning
sharply enough how the position of the French Company differed
from tha' of the Dutch in the East; the result was that he imposed on
the former from the first the task of conducting at the same time
two distinct enterprises—a considerable colonising effort as well as
the establishment of a commerce full of risks; perhaps also he
reckoned too lightly the mishaps and successive disappointments of
every new enterprise, especially in a field so remote from the seat
of control. In point of fact the Company escaped no kind of misfor-
tune, so that Colbert's elaborate plans were hardly realisable. Even
if any of the five nobles and merchants who set out for the Middle
East at the end of 1664 had been able to fulfil their instructions, none
of the four ships that made up the first fleet sailing in March, 1665,
>
1 Discours d'un fidèle sujet du roi.
5


## p. 66 (#94) ##############################################

66
THE FRENCH FACTORIES IN INDIA
got further than Madagascar. The second fleet of ten vessels that
sailed a year later, made, like the first, a very long voyage to Fort
Dauphin; so that, only at the beginning of 1668, nearly four years
after the formation of the Company, did any of its qualified repre-
sentatives arrive by the sea-route in the Swally Roads on the coast
of Gujarat.
There one of the agents sent in 1664 had long been awaiting his
chiefs. Béber (for so he was named), after accompanying La Boullaye
le Gouz to Agra in August-September, 1666, had returned to Surat,
where he proceeded to act on a farman of Aurangzib granting the
French a site and factory at Swally and permission to trade in the
neighbouring town on the same terms as the Dutch and the English.
A man of zeal and ability, as one of his chiefs testifies, Béber had so
well prepared for the new arrivals that they were able to establish
themselves at once, purchase a certain quantity of goods, and send
them back by one of the ships that had accompanied them from
Madagascar.
Unluckily there, as at Madagascar, jealousies and misunderstand-
ings between the directors themselves, and between them and their
subordinates, led to disastrous results. A good beginning had been
made; from Surat several of the Company's ships had sailed up the
Fersian Gulf, visiting Bandar Abbas (where Mariage, who had set
out from France with Béber, had a short time before established a
factory), and even reaching Basra; a footing had been also secured
on the Malabar Coast as a stage on the way to Ceylon and Malaya.
But François Caron, an old servant of the Dutch Company and a man
of experience and intelligence whoin Colbert had engaged in the
French service, relying on his knowledge, tried to keep all business
in his own hands, while he was also influenced by his personal sympa-
thies and dislikes. Hence resulted many differences, of which the
Dutch, irreconcilable enemies of the French establishment in India,
took advantage the more easily because Caron had quarrelled with
the Moghul governor of Surat.
Meanwhile many events had induced Colbert to modify his
original project. In France what enthusiasm had at first been aroused
by the formation of the Company had quite disappeared; many share-
holders, who had only subscribed in order to pay their court to the
king and minister, preferred to lose what they had already paid than
to meet the demand for the second instalment, called up in December,
1665, and it was still worse with the demand for the remaining third
a year later; so that the king had had to promise (September, 1668)
two more millions to the company to enable it to carry on. Moreover,
the reports from the Ile Dauphine had shown Coibert that matters
there were going ill. that, as he said, considerable sums had been
absolutely squandered. Witnout yet deciding to give up the Mada-
gascar project, the minister agreed for the present to relieve the


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LA HAYE'S SQUADRON
67
Company of the task of planting that great unsettled island, in order
to employ all its resources in the eastern trade, and, as the directors
demanded, go straight to India. " But on the advice of La Boullaye
le Gouz and Caron, who from their knowledge of the country had
urged him "to show a little sample of his master's power” to the
princes of Asia, Colbert resolved early in 1669 to send a considerable
fleet into the Indian seas. It was to display the fleurs de lys, to give
the native sovereigns "a high opinion of the justice and goodness inf
His Majesty, at the same time that they learnt his power", and to
disprove the assertions of the Dutch who had never ceased attempting
to ruin the French réputation among the people of India. Accordingly
a squadron of ten vessels, under the command of Jacob Blanquet
de la Haye, "governor and Lieutenant-general for the King in the
Ile Dauphine and in all India", sailed from La Rochelle 30 March, 1670.
The “squadron of Persia", as it was called to show the public, and
especially the shareholders of the Company, the new direction of
policy, took no less than eighteen months to reach Surat, instead of
the six or seven months Colbert had expected. When it arrived at
last, in the middle of October, 1671, Caron was no longer there. In
spite of the divisions among the tiny group of Frenchmen, he had
succeeded in the preceding months in founding certain factories on
the Malabar Coast and another at Masulipatam, and had then set
out to establish yet another at Bantam, in the extreme west of Java.
Thus the directors charged by Colbert with the restoration of amity
in the French factory, and de la Haye's great squadron, arrived
during his absence. De la Haye, who had taken the title of viceroy on
his arrival in India, had been instructed above all "to establish the
company so strongly and powerfully that it shall be able to maintain
itself and to increase and augment itself in the course of time by its
own power". Such was the "sole and single purpose" of this important
squadron in Indian waters. De la Haye was to effect it by establishing
fortified posts at points reckoned most favourable for trade, in
Ceylon especially, and by force if necessary.
Doubtless such an
enterprise would injure the European peoples already established in
India, especially the Dutch; but such a consideration would weigh
little with Louis XIV or Colbert, who could not forgive the United
Provinces for their manifestations of political and economic hostility.
Colbert wrote to de la Haye, "The Dutch, though powerful, will not
dare to prevent the execution of His Majesty's designs; but it will be
necessary to be on your guard against any surprise on their part".
And in this connection, as in all others, de la Haye was "to act in
concert with, and even follow the views and orders of, the directors
of the company who are in India;. . . and even though the Sieur de
i Dernis. Recueil et collection des titres concernant la Compagnie des Inde:
Orientales, 1, 187


## p. 68 (#96) ##############################################

68
THE FRENCH FACTORIES IN INDIA
la Haye knows that they are doing ill, [he should) after representing
his opinions to them, exactly follow their judgment”. 1
In the face of instructions so formal and even imperative, what
could de la Haye do but await the return of Caron, whom Colbert
had mentioned by name as “having a profound knowledge, by reason
of his twenty-two years' service with the Dutch, of all that can and
ought to be done in India for the profit of the company"? He there-
fore awaited his return from Bantam. Hence followed a delay by
which the Dutch profited, strengthening their defences, especially as
at the end of 1671, in India as in Europe, war had been expected
between France and the republic. To crown this, even when Caron
and the newly arrived directors had met, they could not agree, which
added to the delay in the sailing of the squadron. Not until the
beginning of January, 1672, could de la Haye and his ships leave
Swally Roads “to carry into the Indies the first knowledge of the
arms and might of His Majesty".
The viceroy's instructions ordered him to neglect no means of
attaining this end. He spent, therefore, six weeks sailing down the
Malabar Coası, trying "to show 'it off, and to display to advantage its
beauty, power, guns, and crews”, firing numberless salutes in every
port he visited-Daman, Bombay, Goa, Calicut, Kranganur, Cochin,
etc. Just as he was about to quit the coast and make for Ceylon, he
learnt of the approach of a Dutch fleet; on 21 February he sighted
twelve ships out to sea off Cape Comorin. He desired to approach
them, and even to attack; but "M. Caron was as displeased [de la
Haye wrote to Louis XIV some months later] as if I had proposed to
him a crime. How often [he adds with some bitterness and not a
little reason] have I regretted my express orders to follow the
opinions of the directors”. He was indeed right; and Caron, over-
whelmed as he had been with benefits by Colbert, was already
beginning to exhibit a strange, dubious conduct, which later
developments were to prove still more dubious.
Leaving then with great regret his enemies to sail away, de la
Haye coasted round the south and west of Ceylon, where the Dutch
were already established, and then ran up the east coast as his
instructions directed. Soon he was off Trinkomali Bay, the one
natural harbour of the island, which he entered at once, but only to
find that the Dutch had been beforehand with him, and had impro-
vised, if not solidly built, various defences. Thus the position reckoned
on by Colbert in December, 1669, had totally changed by March, 1672.
Was he then to give up that considerable settlement on Ceylon,
which the minister's instructions said was to open the cinnamon
trade to the Company? Was he to disregard the king's view, that
nothing could be more for the benefit of the Company? De la Haye
1 Clément, Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert, III(2), 461-70.


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SIEGE OF ST THOME
69
thought not. Since then he was sent to choose a site, build a post
there, put it in a state of defence, and provide it with every necessity,
he paid no heed to “the insolent orders” of the Dutch to leave the
harbour. But he went no further. Once more at the repeated
instances of Caron he abandoned his project, which was to fight the
fleet of the Admiral Rijckloff van Goens, and contented himself with
procuring from the king of Kandi a grant of the bay of Trinkomali,
with the country of Kutiari and its dependencies, taking possession
in the king's name, and building a little fort there. He did not know
that the Dutch had told the natives that he had not dared to fight
them, that they were isolating him, and that they were about to
deprive his crews and sick of victuals. A victory would have estab-
lished the prestige of the "squadron of Persia", and made the French
undisputed masters of Trinkomali, if not of India ; but on 9 July
de la Haye quitted the bay without having given battle, merely
leaving on one of the little islands within it a handful of men whom
the Dutch seized a few days later, thus justifying in the eyes of all
the assertions of his enemies.
A little later, on his arrival before St Thomé (or Mailapur, as the
Indians called it) on the Coromandel Coast, de la Haye reaped the
fruits of his error; the officers sent to ask for victuals met with an
unreasonable refusal from the Muhammadan officials and insults
from the populace. On the advice of Caron, who was certainly the
evil genius of this campaign, and who may with cause be suspected
of treason, the viceroy resolved to strike a blow; on 25 July, 1672,
five days after dropping anchor before the place, he carried it by
escalade, to the great alarm of the Muhammadans and even of the
Europeans scattered along the coast in the various factories.
Ten years earlier the king of Golconda had conquered St Thomé
from the Portuguese, and had also occupied the neighbouring part
of the Carnatic. The loss of the place irritated this sovereign; he at
once set to work to recover it, and quickly surrounded it with horse
and foot, elephants, and work-people with everything needed for a
blockade. 2 In spite of the diligence with which he had sought to
consolidate his position, de la Haye had had no time in which to lay
in provisions; and from the beginning of October he had to revictual
himself by sea. As yet the Dutch had not joined the Muhammadans,
although they had learnt a month earlier of the outbreak of war
between France and England on the one side and the Netherlands
on the other. By dint of his own energy, the bravery and spirit of
his troops, the zeal and intelligence of his subordinates, volunteers or
agents of the company, the French leader held St Thomé for two
years against the king of Golconda and the Dutch, with no help
from the English. But courage and good will themselves are not
1 Mémoires de Bellanger de Lespinay, p. 143.
2 Carré, Voyage des Indes Orientales, f. 289.


## p. 70 (#98) ##############################################

70
THE FRENCH FACTORIES IN INDIA
always enough; and even after Caron's departure for France (October,
1672), de la Haye failed to make the most of his opportunities. Even
when he had obliged the Muhammadans once to raise the siege
(March, 1673), he failed either to make peace with the king or to
prevent him from allying with his European enemies; so that his
position became entirely unfavourable when the Muhaminadans and
the Dutch joined against him. Little by little his army had melted
away, and his ships had either been captured by the enemy or become
unserviceable for want of repairs. De la Haye sadly admits this when,
after a few weeks' absence, the Muhammadans began to press him
again, and especially when the Dutch admiral, Rijckloff, lent them
help ashore and blockaded the place by sea (September, 1673). His
stubborn spirit still prolonged resistance for another year. In fact he
did not sign the capitulation till 6 September, 1674, and then the
honour of the defenders was fully safeguarded, for the town was
only to be occupied by the Dutch in case the French received no
succour within the next fifteen days.
Among the causes permitting this prolonged resistance to be made
must be set in the front rank the activity displayed by several of the
French Company's agents-François Baron, one of the directors in
India and formerly French Consul at Aleppo; and François Martin,
director of the Masulipatam factory. Bellanger de Lespinay, one of
,
the volunteers who accompanied de la Haye, should also be men-
tioned. Sent in November, 1672, to Porto Novo to seek from the
governors of the rival kingdom of Bijapur the provisions needed by
the defenders of St Thomé, the young Vendômois had performed his
mission with much skill. It is true that the governor of Valikondapu-
ram had already sent to François Martin favourable proposals, to
which Caron, the misguided or, more probably, treacherous adviser
of de la Haye, had prevented him from replying. But the latter's
departure now left Bellanger de Lespinay free to act. He obtained
from the governor, Sher Khan Lodi, not only munitions and victuals,
but also a site for a factory. Just as Lespinay was about to take
leave, 2 January, 1673, an agent of the Dutch Company arrived in
order to prejudice Sher Khan Lodi against the French. But he received
a sharp answer. The other said "loudly that merchants were not
soldiers, and that he knew the difference between the Dutch and the
French". He concluded, to the great surprise and joy of his guest,
by declaring that “as the Dutch and French were neighbours in
Europe, so they should be in India, and therefore he gave up Pondi-
chery as a place where our nation might settle". I
Sher Khan Lodi's gift was a little village near the borders of the
hostile kingdom of Golconda, on the coast, and well placed for the
assistance of the besieged in St Thomé. “Indeed it was a most con-
venient place for me”, wrote Lespinay in his Mémoires. By order of
1 Mémoires de Lespinay, pp. 203-4.


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PONDICHERY
71
his leader, he established himself there on 4 February, 1673, and, as
long as his countrymen held out, he did not cease to send them, with
the constant help of Sher Khan, supplies of victuals, munitions, and
even men. Thus began in modest fashion the historic rôle of
Pondichery.
When on the morrow of the capitulation Bellanger de Lespinay
quitted the few fishers' and traders' huts that surrounded the French
factory, he did not suspect what a future awaited the tiny place. But
he left there François Martin, the man whose great courage, intelli-
gence, and perseverance were to develop it, transform it, and render
it the capital of the French settlements in India.
At the beginning of 1674 Martin had been sen by the viceroy to
second Lespinay, and this he had done effectively, thanks to his intelli-
gence, knowledge of affairs, and patriotism. From 21 September,
1674, he was left at Pondichery with six Frenchmen “to act as affairs
may require”. At first, together with Baron, he sought to obtain
from Golconad the grant of St Thomé. But though under pressure
from Dutch and English alike the place was demolished, neither lost
heart. Perceiving clearly that the Company could drive a profitable
trade with two well-esíablished factories, one on the Malabar and
one on the Coromandel Coast, and deeming that Surat would serve
for one of the two, they set to work to procure the other, though they
had to surmount many difficulties merely to secure the maintenance
of a French factory at Pondichery, while in Europe the war between
the Great King and his enemies was going forward. Sivaji's defeat
of Sher Khan Lodi, the persistent jealousy of the Dutch, the Com-
pany's neglect of its agents in India, all added to their difficulties.
Martin however maintained the position. When Baron recalled him
to Surat, he convinced Colbert of the commercial value of Pondichery,
and, after the Peace of Nimweguen, succeeded in carrying through
a little business for the Company. But would he be able to secure all
that was needed, and make good the complete lack of goods and
money in which he was left by the Company, at a time when the
Company was in great straits and obliged to abandon not only Caron's
factory at Bantam but also its new factory in Tonkin? Or would he
be able with so few people to survive the political and economic crisis
through which the Moghul Empire was passing in spite of Aurangzih's.
early conquests? Pondichery was, indeed, falling into that stagnation
which precedes decay, but though Martin knew it, he did not hesitate
to return thither in 1686 and to make it again the centre of his
activities.
At the moment Colbert's son and successor at the ministry of
marine, the Marquis de Seignelay, had just procured for the Company
new capital, reorganised its directorate, and restored it to greater
activity than it had long known. As, besides, there was peace in
Europe, there was at least officially peace also among the European
nations in India. Of these favourable circumstances, though counter-


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72
THE FRENCH FACTORIES IN INDIA
acted by war, famine and pestilence in the country itself, Martin
made good use. Not content with enlarging the trade of Pondichery
and its dependencies, he laboured to consolidate and extend the
French factories. The re-establishment of the French at Masulipatam,
the dispatch of Deslandes to Bengal, where a French agent had
appeared so early as 1674, and co-operation with the great Siam
enterprise which was for a while at this time the pet scheme of the
royal government, form the chief evidences of Martin's activity,
though they were not all equally successful.
But soon again the outbreak of war in Europe threatened the
fruit of his labours. Though the trade of Pondichery was not much
hurt by the complete failure of the Siam expedition, it was brought
into grave danger by the war between the French and Dutch, and
soon after by the close union between the Dutch and English resulting
from the Revolution of 1688.
The decay of trade and the abandonment of the project to set up
a factory near Cape Comorin were the first fruits of the renewal of
the war, although the English governor of Fort St David expressed
his desire to maintain peace in India. But soon Dutch hostility took
shape in action. When in January, 1691, the French squadron sent
out by Seignelay the year before quitted the Bay of Bengal, for lack
of a port where the vessels could be repaired, the enemies of France,
who had been much alarmed, sought at once to crush this rivalry
which they deemed a political danger and an economic injury. Martin
had long been endeavouring, in the face of great difficulties, to fortify
Pondichery, to make up a little garrison for it, and had procured,
though at a high rate, from the court of Jinji the grant of almost all
rights of sovereignty; but with all his efforts he could not repel the
attack of the Dutch when (23 August, 1693) they besieged the place
bcth by land and sea. Deserted by the natives, and unable to answer
the fire of the enemy, on 6 September he had to sign a capitulation,
honourable indeed, but one article of which seemed to rob him of all
hope of ever making the place a French settlement.
But the event turned out otherwise. Inspired by their Indian
servants, the Company desired the king, in the negotiations ending
in the Treaty of Ryswick (21 September, 1697), to procure the ren-
dition of "the fort and settlement of Pondichery"; and with some
difficulty it was secured. Further negotiations, patiently followed, in
the next year ensured to the Company the restoration of the place
with "all the additions and improvements made by the Dutch com-
pany both in the place and in the neighbourhood". But in India
Martin only obtained full execution of this agreement after long
discussions, and had to wait till 3 October, 1699, for the Dutch garrison
to take its departure.
But thenceforward he was free to act and possessed the base of
operations, without which, since 1693, the French had been reduced


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DECADENCE OF THE COMPANY
73
to a state of complete impotence. Since the Company, radically
reformed once more in 1697, had recovered some activity, and was
able to send one after another several fleets into the Indian seas, to
which indeed its privileges were now limited, Martin took advantage
of this appearance of French vessels to demonstrate to all how brief
had been the duration of Dutch naval supremacy; and when a final
attempt at diplomatic intervention in Siam had met with a final
failure, he sought to develop and strengthen the Company's position
at Pondichery, at Chandernagore, where Deslandes had established
himself in 1690, and even at Surat, the importance of which factory
was, however, daily declining.
For now he saw clearly the situation of the country and discerned
the essential conditions for the complete success of the French enter-
prise, foreseeing the approaching decadence of the Moghul Empire,
and planning for the French the acquisition of a political predomi- .
nance as the essential condition of free commercial development.
“Prosperous settlements and a few well-fortified places will give
[the Company] a great position among these people”, he wrote on
]
15 December, 1700, to Jérôme Pontchartrain, the new minister of
marine. Martin therefore surrounded Pondichery with the solid
walls that had hitherto been wanting; and at the same time under
his vigorous lead the company's trade made real progress in Bengal,
while even the Surat factory itself seemed about to shake off its
ever-growing torpor.
Unluckily this promising situation did not last. In 1701 the War
of the Spanish Succession broke out, and round the Grand Alliance
grouped themselves all who disliked the thought of a son of Louis
XIV succeeding to the throne of Spain. The effects of the new war
were soon felt in India. Trade was once more interrupted; the
factories of Bengal and Surat fell back into inactivity; while at Pondi-
chery the preparation for defence (now completed by the building
of Fort St Louis), and the need of checking Dutch intrigue, fully
occupied the aged but still active Martin, left to his own resources
without the least help from Europe.
Long after the death (31 December, 1706) of the founder of the
first French settlements in India, this wretched situation continued
and actually grew worse, more owing to the distress of the Company
than the events of the war or the worthless nature of Martin's suc-
cessors. The failure of a fleet sent in 1706 to the western coasts of
South America in defiance of the monopoly granted to another
Company in 1697 for the trade of the South Seas, the difficulties of
meeting the Company's obligations, and at last the cession of its
privileges to the Malouins in 1712, were the real, essential causes of
the languor of the French factories in India in the early years of
the eighteenth century. That condition persisted until the death of
Louis XIV (1 September, 1715), or rather till May, 1719, when a
famous edict united the Company of the East Indies and China with


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74
THE FRENCH FACTORIES IN INDIA
the Company of the West founded by Jean Law a little earlier
(August, 1717), giving to the united body the name of the Compagnie
des Indes and confiding to it the whole of French colonial trade.
In Law's mind it was to have been even more than that-the
single trading body of the kingdom, and perhaps the most important
of the institutions by means of which he hoped to restore French
finance. Thus the privileges granted to the great Company which it
had just absorbed were extended for fifty years; and besides this it
received so many other privileges and so wide an extension of its
domain that, as has been said with truth, it became not so much a
colonial enterprise as a sort of farm general of the state.
But could even so powerful a Compagnie des Indes transform into
realities the fair dreams of Colbert? By no means. In fact the speedy
bankruptcy of the System ruined all hopes. In order not to burden
the state with the shares issued on different occasions, first by the
Company of the West, and then by the Company of the Indies itself,
the liquidators named by the king (10 April, 1721) had to re-establish
the Company in its original form. Two years later (23 March, 1723)
its administration was confided to a council of the Indies consisting
of a chief, a president, and twenty councillors nominated by the
crown; but, soon after, to enable shareholders to have representatives,
there were introduced, besides twelve directors and four inspectors
named by the crown, eight syndics appointed by the shareholders.
Such was in its main lines the home administration of the Com-
pany which, as in the time of Louis XIV, held the exclusive privilege
of trade from the west coast of Africa round the Cape up to the Red
Sea, the islands of the Indian seas of which two had already been
occupied by the French (the Isle of Bourbon in 1664 and the Isle
of France in 1721), and finally India itself and the Further East.
For various reasons deriving from the general history of the time
and the particular history of the Company, the French had made no
progress in India since 1706. No doubt the governors who succeeded
Martin were less able than he; but it must also be remembered that
from 1707 to 1720 no less than five governors ruled in succession at
Pondichery. Each in turn adopted a line of policy different from that
of his predecessor, until, in 1720, the new Compagnie des Indes put
an end to this series of conflicts and inconsistencies by taking posses-
sion of the existing factories and imposing an active and coherent
policy. Masulipatam, Calicut, Mahé, and Yanam were occupied
between 1721 and 1723. Although the attempt to found a settlement
on Pulo Kondor-the Iles d'Orléans—south of the Mekong delta
failed altogether, the Company was able to take vengeance for the
insult of the prince Bayanor in driving the French from Mahé. It
re-established itself there by force, for ten months its troops
1 Cultru, Dupleix, p. 2


## p. 75 (#103) #############################################

LATER POLICY
76
3
victoriously met the attempts of Bayanor and four other rajahs to
expel them, obliged them to make peace, first in 1726,1 and later, after
a blockade of eighteen months, in 1741. Clearly there was a change
in the attitude of the Compagnie des Indes.
It must, however, be observed, that the two governors who held
office from 1720 to 1742 (Lenoir till 1735 and then Benoist Dumas 2)
had none but commercial objects in mind. It was with a purely
commercial object, the protection of a factory expected to yield a
profitable pepper trade, that the Company in 1724 built a fort at
Mahé, which was long a source of great expense; it was with a purely
commercial object too that Dumas brought to reason by a show of
force the governor of Mokha where the French had a factory, and
occupied in February, 1739, Karikal at the request of a native prince.
There was nothing in this exclusively interested conduct that allows
us to credit the Company with political views and still less ideas of
conquest; its factories were more or less fortified, but for motives of
simple security; and although it enlisted troops, it used them only for
purposes of police. In 1664 perhaps Louis XIV ana Colbert dreant
of securing conquests in the Indies; but in 1730 none of the Company's
servants dreamt of supplying funds for trade out of the regular
revenues of territorial possessions, or conceived the idea of obtaining
them by interfering in the lawless conflicts that arose out of th3
decadence of the Moghul Empire, or attempted to interfere in any
persistent, methcdical way in the affairs of native princes. Only in
the period that begins in 1740 does this notion first germinate and
then begin to develop in the admirable brain of Dupleix.
1 Martineau, Les Origines de Mahé. Cf. Les Mémoires du Chevalier de in
Farelle sur la prise de Mahé.
2 Martineau, "Benoist Dumas”, Rev. de l'hist. des col. fr. IX, 145 sqq.
8 Martineau, "La politique de Dumas”, Rev. de l'hist. des col. fr. XIV, 1 sqq.


## p. 76 (#104) #############################################

CHAPTER IV
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600—1740
THE success of the Portuguese in establishing a lucrative commerce
with the East naturally excited a desire among the other nations of
Western Europe to follow so tempting an example. The Portuguese,
however, had a long start, and it was nearly a century before any
rival made an effective entry into the field.