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would have associated with it a revisionary council, to be
formed of the national judiciary, having a qualified nega-
tive.
THE LIFE OF
would have associated with it a revisionary council, to be
formed of the national judiciary, having a qualified nega-
tive.
Hamilton - 1834 - Life on Hamilton - v2
If
several are admitted, as there will be many competitors of
equal merit, they may be all included--contention pre-
vented, and the republican genius consulted. "*
Randolph followed. He remarked, that "the situation
of this country was peculiar. The people were taught an
aversion to monarchy; all their constitutions were opposed
to it. The fixed character of the people was opposed to
it. If proposed, it will prevent a fair discussion of the
plan. Why cannot three execute? Great exertions were
only requisite on particular occasions. Safety to liberty
was the great object; legislatures may appoint a dictator.
He spoke of the seeds of destruction; slaves might be ea-
sily enlisted. The executive may appoint men devoted to
them, and even bribe the legislature by offices. The chief
magistrate will also be free from impeachment. "
Wilson answered, alleging that the extent of the coun-
try, and the diversity of manners, precluded the dangers
alluded to. "A confederated republic," he observed," unites
the advantages and banishes the disadvantages of other
kinds of government. Rendering the executive ineligible,*
he declared," was an infringement of the right of election. "
Bedford concurred in the opinion, that the executive
should be re-eligible. He remarked, that " peculiar talents
were requisite for the executive; therefore, there ought to
be an opportunity of ascertaining his talents, and therefore
frequent change. "
* Hamilton's MSS. notes, vol. 1, p. 74. --Madison does not give these
remarks. --Reports of 1st and 2d June, vol. 2, Madison Papers, p. 762--783.
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? HAMILTON.
473
The question being taken, seven states voted in favour
of a single executive. New-York, (Yates and Lansing
giving the vote,) Delaware, and Maryland in the negative.
The eighth resolve proposed a council of revision, to be
composed of the executive and of a part of the judiciary.
It was to be empowered to revise every act of the national
legislature before it should operate, and of the particular
legislatures of each state, before a negative thereon should
be final. The dissent of the council to amount to a rejec-
tion, unless the act of the national legislature was again
passed, or that of a particular state should be again ne-
gatived by the vote of a certain number of the members
of each branch. Madison was zealous for this revisionary
council. Hamilton was averse to it, from the "danger
that the executive, by too frequent communication with the
judicial, may corrupt it. " As to the argument that this
negative would not be used, he remarked, " it would go
so far as to prove that the revisionary power would not
be exercised, and therefore was useless. " He seconded a
motion of Wilson to vest an unqualified negative in the
executive. This proposal was rejected, but a modified
provision passed, giving this negative to the executive, un-
less two-thirds of the legislature should concur, thus dis-
pensing with the council of revision.
The ninth resolve contemplated a national judiciary, to
hold during good behaviour, to receive a compensation not
to be increased or diminished so as to affect the incum-
bents. It was to consist of a supreme appellate, and infe-
rior tribunals, whose jurisdiction was to extend to pira-
cies and felonies on the seas, and captures from an enemy;
to cases in which foreigners or citizens of other states
might be interested, or which respected the collection of the
revenue; to impeachments of any national officer, and
questions involving the national peace and harmony. Wil-
son moved that the judiciary should be appointed by the
60
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? 474
THE LIFE OF
executive. Madison was opposed to this. He thought
that the executive should by no means make the appoint-
ment, and pursuing the policy of Virginia, which gave the
appointment to the legislature, he proposed to vest it in
the second branch.
A provision for the admission of new states, was in the
next place adopted. On the sixth of June, proposals to
give the election of the first branch of the national legisla-
ture to those of the several states, and to annex a council
of revision to the executive, to be composed of the nation-
al judiciary, were renewed, and failed. It was urged in
favour of the first proposition, that if " the legislatures did
not partake in the appointment, they would be more jeal-
ous of the general government; and that the state legisla-
tures ought also to elect the senators, so as to bring into
it the sense of the state governments," and thus "lead to a
more respectable choice. "
Madison contended, that at least one branch should be
chosen by the people. He stated that* there were "two
principles on which republics ought to be constituted.
One, that they should have such an extent as to render
combinations on the ground of interest difficult. The
other, by a process of election calculated to refine the rep-
resentation of the people. "f
* Hamilton MSS. v. l,p. 75.
t In reference to these principles, this comment by Hamilton is preserved.
"Maddison's theory. Answer:--There is truth in both these principles, but
they do not conclude as strongly as he supposes. The assembly, when cho-
sen, will meet in one room, if they are drawn from half the globe, and will
be liable to all the passions of popular assemblies.
"If more minute links are wanting, others will supply them. Distinctions
of eastern, middle, and southern states, will come into view, between com.
mcrcial and non-commercial states. Imaginary lines will influence, &c.
"The human mind is prone to limit its view to near and local objects. Pa-
per money is capable of giving a general impulse. It is easy to conceive a
popular sentiment pervading the eastern states. " Madison also observed,
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? HAMILTON. 475 I
The election of the second branch by the state legisla-
tures was proposed, and, after the rejection of a motion
that it should be chosen by the people, was passed unani-
mously.
The term of service of the first branch was fixed at
three, that of the second branch at seven years. The
members were to receive fixed stipends out of the national
treasury, and to be ineligible to any office established by
a state, or by the United States, (except those peculiarly
belonging to the functions of the respective branch,) du-
ring the term of service, and under the national govern-
ment for one year after its expiration. The restriction on
their re-eligibility, and the right to recall those of the se-
cond branch, were expunged. An important motion was
now made as to the power to be confided to the legisla-
ture. It was proposed by Charles Pinckney, and second-
ed by Madison, that it should have a negative on all laws
of the states which to it shall appear improper. This was
sustained by only three states--Massachusetts, Pennsyl-
vania, and Virginia.
After some discussion of the mode of appointing the
executive, the rule of suffrage now existing as to the choice
of the first branch of the legislature was adopted, and a
proposal was made to give to each state an equal vote in
the second branch.
Wilson and Hamilton urged that the rule adopted as to
"that large districts are less liable to be influenced by factious demagogues
than small. " "This," Hamilton noted, "is in some degree true, but not so
generally as may be supposed. Frequently small portions of large districts
carry elections. An influential demagogue will give an impulse to the
whole. Demagogues are not always inconsiderable persons. Patricians
were frequently demagogues. In large districts, characters are less known,
and a less active interest is taken in them. "
"One great defect of our state governments is, that they do not present ob-
jects sufficiently interesting to the human mind. "
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? 476
THE LIFE OF
the first should govern in the choice of the second branch.
They prevailed for the moment. A guarantee of a repub-
lican constitution, and of its existing laws to each state,
was unanimously approved. It was declared that a pro-
vision ought to be made for the amendment of the consti-
tution; and that the legislative, executive, and judiciary
of each state ought to be bound by oath to support the
articles of union. After an approval of the fifteenth re-
solve, that the amendments to the confederation with the
approbation of congress should be submitted to an assem-
bly, or assemblies, elected by the people, the Virginia reso-
lutions were reported to the house on the thirteenth of
June.
During the discussion of these resolutions, such of the
delegates from Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Dela-
ware, and Maryland, as were in favour of a larger reten-
tion of power in the states, prepared a series of resolves,
which were on the fifteenth of June submitted by Pater-
son. They were designated "the Jersey plan. " This
plan contemplated an enlargement of the powers of con-
gress, without any change in the structure of the gov-
ernment--an apportionment of the ratio of contribution
to the population--the election by congress of a plural
federal executive--a federal judiciary to be appointed by
the executive, to hold during good behaviour--a provision
rendering the acts of congress and treaties the supreme
law, with compulsory authority over the states by the
national force.
This scheme being referred to a committee of the
whole house, with a view to bring the respective systems
into full contrast, it was moved by Rutledge, seconded by
Hamilton, that the amended resolutions from Virginia be
recommitted. The broad question, whether a national
government, or mere articles of confederation were to be
recommended, was now presented. The debate was open-
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? HAMILTON.
ed on the sixteenth of June, by Lansing. He stated, that
the national system proposed to draw the representation
from the whole body of the people, without regard to the
state sovereignties. That the substitute proposed to pre-
serve the state sovereignties. What were the powers
under which the convention acted ? " Different legislatures
had a different object," but the general purpose was to
"revise the confederation. " "Independent states cannot
be supposed to be willing to annihilate the states. " "The
state of New-York would not have agreed to send mem-
bers on this ground. "
It is "in vain," he said, "to devise systems, however
good, which will not be adopted. " "If convulsions hap-
pen, nothing we can do will give them a direction. The
legislatures cannot be expected to make such a sacrifice. "
"The wisest men in forming a system from theory are
apt to be mistaken. " "The present national government
has no precedent, or experience to support it," and the
"general opinion was, that certain additional powers ought
to be given to congress. "
He was followed by Patterson, who observed, first, that
their plan accorded with their powers; second, that it ac-
cords with the "sentiments of the people. If the confed-
eration was radically defective, we ought to return to our
states and tell them so. He came not here to sport senti-
ments of his own, but to speak the sense of his constitu-
ents. " The "states treat as equal; the present compact
gives one vote to each state. By the articles of the con-
federation, 'alterations are to be made by congress, and all
the legislatures. ' All the parties to a contract must as-
sent to its dissolution. The states collectively have advan-
tages, in which the smaller states do not participate; there-
fore individual rules do not apply. "
The "force of government," he observed, "will not de-
pend on the proportion of representation, but on the quan-
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? 478 THE LIFE OF
tity of power. " "A check is not necessary in a general
government of communities, but in an individual state the
spirit of faction is to be checked. " "How have congress
hitherto conducted themselves? The people approve of
congress, but think they have not power enough. "
On a comparison of the different schemes of govern-
ment then before the convention, it is seen that Pinckney
would have clothed the legislature with the powers vested
in congress by the confederation, and also with the regu-
lation of commerce, the raising money by impost, and with
the control of the national force. The Virginia plan
would have conferred on the government powers supreme
in all questions of national interest; a negative on the laws
of the states, with an express declaration of a power to
exert the common force against a delinquent state.
Pinckney also proposed a single executive, while the
Virginia plan, having confided unlimited powers to the
legislature, would have vested the execution of those pow-
ers in a plural magistracy, ineligible a second time, con-
trolled by a council of revision constituted from the judi-
ciary, which would thus have become a political agent--
those powers to be exercised by a resort to force; to ob-
viate which, Madison is seen to have proposed a negative
on the laws of the states.
The Jersey plan was more objectionable. It created a
single legislative body, with the command of the purse and
the sword; derived its authority from the states; estab-
lished an equality of suffrage; proposed that a minority
should govern; contemplated partial objects of legisla-
tion ;* gave no negative upon that of the states; created
a plural executive, removable on the application of a ma-
jority of the executives of the states, without any negative
on the national legislature; and a judiciary, to be appoint-
* The revenue was to be derived from imposts, stamps, and postage.
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? HAMILTON.
479
ed by the executive, with power to try impeachments of
federal officers, but without any other original jurisdiction,
and without inferior tribunals.
Such were the forms of government in contemplation
for an empire of almost boundless territory, and destined
to contain a countless population.
As neither of these forms was adopted, and as the final
result was a compromise, it becomes necessary, in order
to judge correctly of the extent of Hamilton's influence
upon the character of that compromise, to trace the suc-
cessive opinions of leading members of the convention.
With this view, it will be remarked, while the plan of
Madison and Randolph submitted it as an open question,
whether " the right of suffrage in the national legislature
ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or
to the number of free inhabitants," that Hamilton was the
first to urge the latter as the true basis of a republican
government. *
Both Hamilton and Madison agreed that the choice of
the first branch of it should be by the people; but while
Hamilton would have derived the second branch, or senate,
also from the people. f Madison preferred that it should be
chosen by the first branch.
The proposition of Virginia gave the choice of the ex-
ecutive department of the government to the national
legislature. Hamilton, pursuing the great principle of a
popular government, was in favour of an executive to be
chosen by the people in districts through the medium of
electors.
Madison was the advocate of a plural executive, and
* Journal of Fed. Con. , pp. 67-83. "It was moved by Mr. Hamilton,
seconded by Mr. Spaight, that the resolution be altered so as to read: Re-
solved, that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be pro-
portioned to the number of free inhabitants. "
t Journal, 112. ,
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?
,180
THE LIFE OF
would have associated with it a revisionary council, to be
formed of the national judiciary, having a qualified nega-
tive. Hamilton, on the other hand, would have imposed
on a single executive an undivided responsibility, without
a council of revision. He would have given the appoint-
ment of the judiciary to the executive, and would have
charged it solely with judicial duties. The judiciary of
Madison was to be appointed by the second branch, to be
connected with the executive, to act politically as its con-
trolling council, and also as the court of impeachments on
the national officers.
Passing from the structure to the powers of the govern-
ment--while Hamilton would have provided that the ex-
ecutive should take care that the laws were faithfully ex-
ecuted, Madison would have authorized the legislature to
delegate to it, from time to time, such other powers, not le-
gislative or judiciary in their nature, as it might choose ;*
and would have given it a negative on the laws of the
states.
As to the national legislature, he would have empowered
it to "negative all laws" of the states " which to them shall
appear improper. "f has been seen that while he thought
that perhaps this negative "might create a mutual depen-
dence between the general and particular authorities," and
thus " that the necessity of operating by force on the col-
lective will of a state might be precluded," he said, " the
right of coercion should be expressly declared. " This was
by far the highest toned form of government submitted to
the convention, and as it intermingled injuriously the dif-
ferent departments, and derived them all from the first le-
gislative branch, would have resulted in an odious and in-
tolerable tyrarny, in which the executive and senate
would have been the creatures and mere instruments
? Journal, p. 89. t Ibid. p. 107.
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? HAMILTON.
481
of the arbitrary will of the popular branch of the legisla-
ture.
In two most important particulars, a common sentiment
is seen in the convention: the determination to lay a re-
publican basis, in the pledge by an unanimous vote to
"guarantee to each state a republican constitution, and its
existing laws;" and that the national judiciary should hold
their offices during good behaviour.
To establish a stable and enduring government of com-
petent powers, founded on the consent of the people, and
to combine a vigorous execution of the laws with a due
regard to liberty, by a judicious application of a system of
checks as far as was practicable, consistently with the ge-
nius of a republic, were the great objects to be sought.
Neither of the plans before the convention promised to
effect these objects.
During its sitting, Hamilton had been engaged in framing
a plan of government, in which, while he adhered strictly
to the republican theory, he sought to blend with that form
the advantages of a monarchy.
On the eighteenth of June, upon a resolution of Dickin-
son, " that the articles of confederation ought to be revised
and amended, so as to render the government of the United
States adequate to the exigencies, the preservation, and
prosperity of the union," Hamilton addressed the com-
mittee. As no report approaching to accuracy has been
given of this memorable speech, it is deemed expedient to
publish the brief as it exists among his manuscripts.
INTRODUCTION.
I. Importance of the occasion.
II. A solid plan, without regard to temporary opinions.
III. If an ineffectual plan be again proposed, it will beget
despair, and no government will grow out of con-
sent.
01
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? 482
THE LIFE OF
IV. There seem to be but three lines of conduct.
I. A league offensive, treaty of commerce, and appor-
tionment of the public debt.
II. An amendment of the present confederation, by add-
ing such powers as the public mind seems nearest
being matured to grant.
III. The forming a new government to pervade the whole,
with decisive powers; in short, with complete
sovereignty.
Last seems to be the prevailing sentiment.
I. Its practicability to be examined.
Immense extent unfavourable to representation.
Vast expense.
Double sets of officers.
Difficulty of judging of local circumstances.
Distance has a physical effect on men's minds.
Difficulty of drawing proper characters from home.
Execution of laws, feeble at a distance from govern-
ment--particularly in the collection of revenue.
Sentiment of obedience-- )
opinion. >
I. Objections to the present confederation.
Intrusts the great interests of the nation to hands
incapable of managing them.
All matters in which foreigners are concerned.
The care of the public peace--debts.
Power of treaty, without power of execution.
Common defence, without power to raise troops--
have a fleet--raise money.
Power to contract debts, without the power to pay.
These great interests of the state must be well man-
aged, or the public prosperity must be the victim.
Legislates upon communities.
Where the legislatures are to act, they will delib-
erate.
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? HAMILTON. 483
To ask money, not to collect it, and by an unjust
measure.
No sanction! !
Amendment of confederation according to present
ideas.
1. Difficult because not agreed upon any thing. Ex--
Impost.
Commerce--different theories.
To ascertain the practicability of this, let us examine
the principles of civil obedience.
SUPPORTS OF GOVERNMENT.
I. Interest to support it.
II. Opinion of utility and necessity.
III. Habitual sense of obligation.
IV. Force.
V. Influence.
I. Interest--particular and general interests.
Esprit de corps.
Vox populi, Vox Dei.
II. Opinion of utility and necessity.
First will decrease with the growth of the states.
Necessity.
This does not apply to federal government.
This may dissolve, and yet the order of the commu-
nity continue.
Anarchy not a necessary consequence.
III. Habitual sense of obligation.
This results from administration of private justice.
Demand of service or money odious.
IV. Force--of two kinds.
Coercion of laws--Coercion of arms.
First does not exist--and the last useless.
Attempt to use it, a war between the states.
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? 484
THE LIFE OF
Foreign aid.
Delinquency not confined to one.
V. Influence--
1. From municipal jurisdiction.
2. Appointment of officers.
3. Military jurisdiction.
4. Fiscal jurisdiction.
All these now reside in (the) particular states.
Their governments are the chief sources of hon-
our and emolument.
AMBITION AVARICE.
To effect any thing, passions must be turned towards
the general government.
Present confederation cannot be amended, unless the
most important powers be given to congress constituted
as they are.
This would be liable to all (the) objections against any
form of general government, with the addition of the want
of checks.
Perpetual effort in each member.
Influence of individuals in office to excite jealousy and
clamour--state leaders.
Experience corresponds.
Grecian republics.
Demosthenes says--Athens seventy-three years--Lace-
dsemon twenty-seven--Thebans after battle of Leuctra.
Phocions--consecrated ground--Philip, &c.
Germanic empire.
Charlemagne and his successors.
-Diet--recesses.
Electors now seven, excluding others.
Swiss Cantons.
Two diets.
Opposite alliances.
Berne--Lucerne.
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? HAMILTON. 485
To strengthen the federal government, powers too great
must be given to a single hand.
League offensive and defensive, &c.
Particular governments might exert themselves, &c.
But liable to usual vicissitudes. )
Internal peace affected.
Proximity of situation--natural enemies.
Partial confederacies from unequal extent.
Power inspires ambition.
Weakness begets jealousy.
Western territory.
Objn. --Genius of republics pacific.
Answer. Jealousy of commerce as well as jealousy of
power, begets war.
Sparta--Athens--Thebes--Rome--Carthage--Venice
--Hanseatic League.
England as many popular as royal wars.
Lewis the XIV. --Austria--Bourbons--William and
Anne.
Wars depend upon trifling circumstances.
Where--Dutchess of Marlborough's glove.
Foreign conquest.
Dismemberment--Poland.
Foreign influence.
Distractions set afloat vicious humours.
Standing armies by dissensions.
Domestic factions--Montesquieu.
Monarchy in southern states.
DCr* Federal rights--Fisheries.
Wars--destructive.
Loss of advantages.
several are admitted, as there will be many competitors of
equal merit, they may be all included--contention pre-
vented, and the republican genius consulted. "*
Randolph followed. He remarked, that "the situation
of this country was peculiar. The people were taught an
aversion to monarchy; all their constitutions were opposed
to it. The fixed character of the people was opposed to
it. If proposed, it will prevent a fair discussion of the
plan. Why cannot three execute? Great exertions were
only requisite on particular occasions. Safety to liberty
was the great object; legislatures may appoint a dictator.
He spoke of the seeds of destruction; slaves might be ea-
sily enlisted. The executive may appoint men devoted to
them, and even bribe the legislature by offices. The chief
magistrate will also be free from impeachment. "
Wilson answered, alleging that the extent of the coun-
try, and the diversity of manners, precluded the dangers
alluded to. "A confederated republic," he observed," unites
the advantages and banishes the disadvantages of other
kinds of government. Rendering the executive ineligible,*
he declared," was an infringement of the right of election. "
Bedford concurred in the opinion, that the executive
should be re-eligible. He remarked, that " peculiar talents
were requisite for the executive; therefore, there ought to
be an opportunity of ascertaining his talents, and therefore
frequent change. "
* Hamilton's MSS. notes, vol. 1, p. 74. --Madison does not give these
remarks. --Reports of 1st and 2d June, vol. 2, Madison Papers, p. 762--783.
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? HAMILTON.
473
The question being taken, seven states voted in favour
of a single executive. New-York, (Yates and Lansing
giving the vote,) Delaware, and Maryland in the negative.
The eighth resolve proposed a council of revision, to be
composed of the executive and of a part of the judiciary.
It was to be empowered to revise every act of the national
legislature before it should operate, and of the particular
legislatures of each state, before a negative thereon should
be final. The dissent of the council to amount to a rejec-
tion, unless the act of the national legislature was again
passed, or that of a particular state should be again ne-
gatived by the vote of a certain number of the members
of each branch. Madison was zealous for this revisionary
council. Hamilton was averse to it, from the "danger
that the executive, by too frequent communication with the
judicial, may corrupt it. " As to the argument that this
negative would not be used, he remarked, " it would go
so far as to prove that the revisionary power would not
be exercised, and therefore was useless. " He seconded a
motion of Wilson to vest an unqualified negative in the
executive. This proposal was rejected, but a modified
provision passed, giving this negative to the executive, un-
less two-thirds of the legislature should concur, thus dis-
pensing with the council of revision.
The ninth resolve contemplated a national judiciary, to
hold during good behaviour, to receive a compensation not
to be increased or diminished so as to affect the incum-
bents. It was to consist of a supreme appellate, and infe-
rior tribunals, whose jurisdiction was to extend to pira-
cies and felonies on the seas, and captures from an enemy;
to cases in which foreigners or citizens of other states
might be interested, or which respected the collection of the
revenue; to impeachments of any national officer, and
questions involving the national peace and harmony. Wil-
son moved that the judiciary should be appointed by the
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? 474
THE LIFE OF
executive. Madison was opposed to this. He thought
that the executive should by no means make the appoint-
ment, and pursuing the policy of Virginia, which gave the
appointment to the legislature, he proposed to vest it in
the second branch.
A provision for the admission of new states, was in the
next place adopted. On the sixth of June, proposals to
give the election of the first branch of the national legisla-
ture to those of the several states, and to annex a council
of revision to the executive, to be composed of the nation-
al judiciary, were renewed, and failed. It was urged in
favour of the first proposition, that if " the legislatures did
not partake in the appointment, they would be more jeal-
ous of the general government; and that the state legisla-
tures ought also to elect the senators, so as to bring into
it the sense of the state governments," and thus "lead to a
more respectable choice. "
Madison contended, that at least one branch should be
chosen by the people. He stated that* there were "two
principles on which republics ought to be constituted.
One, that they should have such an extent as to render
combinations on the ground of interest difficult. The
other, by a process of election calculated to refine the rep-
resentation of the people. "f
* Hamilton MSS. v. l,p. 75.
t In reference to these principles, this comment by Hamilton is preserved.
"Maddison's theory. Answer:--There is truth in both these principles, but
they do not conclude as strongly as he supposes. The assembly, when cho-
sen, will meet in one room, if they are drawn from half the globe, and will
be liable to all the passions of popular assemblies.
"If more minute links are wanting, others will supply them. Distinctions
of eastern, middle, and southern states, will come into view, between com.
mcrcial and non-commercial states. Imaginary lines will influence, &c.
"The human mind is prone to limit its view to near and local objects. Pa-
per money is capable of giving a general impulse. It is easy to conceive a
popular sentiment pervading the eastern states. " Madison also observed,
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? HAMILTON. 475 I
The election of the second branch by the state legisla-
tures was proposed, and, after the rejection of a motion
that it should be chosen by the people, was passed unani-
mously.
The term of service of the first branch was fixed at
three, that of the second branch at seven years. The
members were to receive fixed stipends out of the national
treasury, and to be ineligible to any office established by
a state, or by the United States, (except those peculiarly
belonging to the functions of the respective branch,) du-
ring the term of service, and under the national govern-
ment for one year after its expiration. The restriction on
their re-eligibility, and the right to recall those of the se-
cond branch, were expunged. An important motion was
now made as to the power to be confided to the legisla-
ture. It was proposed by Charles Pinckney, and second-
ed by Madison, that it should have a negative on all laws
of the states which to it shall appear improper. This was
sustained by only three states--Massachusetts, Pennsyl-
vania, and Virginia.
After some discussion of the mode of appointing the
executive, the rule of suffrage now existing as to the choice
of the first branch of the legislature was adopted, and a
proposal was made to give to each state an equal vote in
the second branch.
Wilson and Hamilton urged that the rule adopted as to
"that large districts are less liable to be influenced by factious demagogues
than small. " "This," Hamilton noted, "is in some degree true, but not so
generally as may be supposed. Frequently small portions of large districts
carry elections. An influential demagogue will give an impulse to the
whole. Demagogues are not always inconsiderable persons. Patricians
were frequently demagogues. In large districts, characters are less known,
and a less active interest is taken in them. "
"One great defect of our state governments is, that they do not present ob-
jects sufficiently interesting to the human mind. "
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? 476
THE LIFE OF
the first should govern in the choice of the second branch.
They prevailed for the moment. A guarantee of a repub-
lican constitution, and of its existing laws to each state,
was unanimously approved. It was declared that a pro-
vision ought to be made for the amendment of the consti-
tution; and that the legislative, executive, and judiciary
of each state ought to be bound by oath to support the
articles of union. After an approval of the fifteenth re-
solve, that the amendments to the confederation with the
approbation of congress should be submitted to an assem-
bly, or assemblies, elected by the people, the Virginia reso-
lutions were reported to the house on the thirteenth of
June.
During the discussion of these resolutions, such of the
delegates from Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Dela-
ware, and Maryland, as were in favour of a larger reten-
tion of power in the states, prepared a series of resolves,
which were on the fifteenth of June submitted by Pater-
son. They were designated "the Jersey plan. " This
plan contemplated an enlargement of the powers of con-
gress, without any change in the structure of the gov-
ernment--an apportionment of the ratio of contribution
to the population--the election by congress of a plural
federal executive--a federal judiciary to be appointed by
the executive, to hold during good behaviour--a provision
rendering the acts of congress and treaties the supreme
law, with compulsory authority over the states by the
national force.
This scheme being referred to a committee of the
whole house, with a view to bring the respective systems
into full contrast, it was moved by Rutledge, seconded by
Hamilton, that the amended resolutions from Virginia be
recommitted. The broad question, whether a national
government, or mere articles of confederation were to be
recommended, was now presented. The debate was open-
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? HAMILTON.
ed on the sixteenth of June, by Lansing. He stated, that
the national system proposed to draw the representation
from the whole body of the people, without regard to the
state sovereignties. That the substitute proposed to pre-
serve the state sovereignties. What were the powers
under which the convention acted ? " Different legislatures
had a different object," but the general purpose was to
"revise the confederation. " "Independent states cannot
be supposed to be willing to annihilate the states. " "The
state of New-York would not have agreed to send mem-
bers on this ground. "
It is "in vain," he said, "to devise systems, however
good, which will not be adopted. " "If convulsions hap-
pen, nothing we can do will give them a direction. The
legislatures cannot be expected to make such a sacrifice. "
"The wisest men in forming a system from theory are
apt to be mistaken. " "The present national government
has no precedent, or experience to support it," and the
"general opinion was, that certain additional powers ought
to be given to congress. "
He was followed by Patterson, who observed, first, that
their plan accorded with their powers; second, that it ac-
cords with the "sentiments of the people. If the confed-
eration was radically defective, we ought to return to our
states and tell them so. He came not here to sport senti-
ments of his own, but to speak the sense of his constitu-
ents. " The "states treat as equal; the present compact
gives one vote to each state. By the articles of the con-
federation, 'alterations are to be made by congress, and all
the legislatures. ' All the parties to a contract must as-
sent to its dissolution. The states collectively have advan-
tages, in which the smaller states do not participate; there-
fore individual rules do not apply. "
The "force of government," he observed, "will not de-
pend on the proportion of representation, but on the quan-
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? 478 THE LIFE OF
tity of power. " "A check is not necessary in a general
government of communities, but in an individual state the
spirit of faction is to be checked. " "How have congress
hitherto conducted themselves? The people approve of
congress, but think they have not power enough. "
On a comparison of the different schemes of govern-
ment then before the convention, it is seen that Pinckney
would have clothed the legislature with the powers vested
in congress by the confederation, and also with the regu-
lation of commerce, the raising money by impost, and with
the control of the national force. The Virginia plan
would have conferred on the government powers supreme
in all questions of national interest; a negative on the laws
of the states, with an express declaration of a power to
exert the common force against a delinquent state.
Pinckney also proposed a single executive, while the
Virginia plan, having confided unlimited powers to the
legislature, would have vested the execution of those pow-
ers in a plural magistracy, ineligible a second time, con-
trolled by a council of revision constituted from the judi-
ciary, which would thus have become a political agent--
those powers to be exercised by a resort to force; to ob-
viate which, Madison is seen to have proposed a negative
on the laws of the states.
The Jersey plan was more objectionable. It created a
single legislative body, with the command of the purse and
the sword; derived its authority from the states; estab-
lished an equality of suffrage; proposed that a minority
should govern; contemplated partial objects of legisla-
tion ;* gave no negative upon that of the states; created
a plural executive, removable on the application of a ma-
jority of the executives of the states, without any negative
on the national legislature; and a judiciary, to be appoint-
* The revenue was to be derived from imposts, stamps, and postage.
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? HAMILTON.
479
ed by the executive, with power to try impeachments of
federal officers, but without any other original jurisdiction,
and without inferior tribunals.
Such were the forms of government in contemplation
for an empire of almost boundless territory, and destined
to contain a countless population.
As neither of these forms was adopted, and as the final
result was a compromise, it becomes necessary, in order
to judge correctly of the extent of Hamilton's influence
upon the character of that compromise, to trace the suc-
cessive opinions of leading members of the convention.
With this view, it will be remarked, while the plan of
Madison and Randolph submitted it as an open question,
whether " the right of suffrage in the national legislature
ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or
to the number of free inhabitants," that Hamilton was the
first to urge the latter as the true basis of a republican
government. *
Both Hamilton and Madison agreed that the choice of
the first branch of it should be by the people; but while
Hamilton would have derived the second branch, or senate,
also from the people. f Madison preferred that it should be
chosen by the first branch.
The proposition of Virginia gave the choice of the ex-
ecutive department of the government to the national
legislature. Hamilton, pursuing the great principle of a
popular government, was in favour of an executive to be
chosen by the people in districts through the medium of
electors.
Madison was the advocate of a plural executive, and
* Journal of Fed. Con. , pp. 67-83. "It was moved by Mr. Hamilton,
seconded by Mr. Spaight, that the resolution be altered so as to read: Re-
solved, that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be pro-
portioned to the number of free inhabitants. "
t Journal, 112. ,
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?
,180
THE LIFE OF
would have associated with it a revisionary council, to be
formed of the national judiciary, having a qualified nega-
tive. Hamilton, on the other hand, would have imposed
on a single executive an undivided responsibility, without
a council of revision. He would have given the appoint-
ment of the judiciary to the executive, and would have
charged it solely with judicial duties. The judiciary of
Madison was to be appointed by the second branch, to be
connected with the executive, to act politically as its con-
trolling council, and also as the court of impeachments on
the national officers.
Passing from the structure to the powers of the govern-
ment--while Hamilton would have provided that the ex-
ecutive should take care that the laws were faithfully ex-
ecuted, Madison would have authorized the legislature to
delegate to it, from time to time, such other powers, not le-
gislative or judiciary in their nature, as it might choose ;*
and would have given it a negative on the laws of the
states.
As to the national legislature, he would have empowered
it to "negative all laws" of the states " which to them shall
appear improper. "f has been seen that while he thought
that perhaps this negative "might create a mutual depen-
dence between the general and particular authorities," and
thus " that the necessity of operating by force on the col-
lective will of a state might be precluded," he said, " the
right of coercion should be expressly declared. " This was
by far the highest toned form of government submitted to
the convention, and as it intermingled injuriously the dif-
ferent departments, and derived them all from the first le-
gislative branch, would have resulted in an odious and in-
tolerable tyrarny, in which the executive and senate
would have been the creatures and mere instruments
? Journal, p. 89. t Ibid. p. 107.
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? HAMILTON.
481
of the arbitrary will of the popular branch of the legisla-
ture.
In two most important particulars, a common sentiment
is seen in the convention: the determination to lay a re-
publican basis, in the pledge by an unanimous vote to
"guarantee to each state a republican constitution, and its
existing laws;" and that the national judiciary should hold
their offices during good behaviour.
To establish a stable and enduring government of com-
petent powers, founded on the consent of the people, and
to combine a vigorous execution of the laws with a due
regard to liberty, by a judicious application of a system of
checks as far as was practicable, consistently with the ge-
nius of a republic, were the great objects to be sought.
Neither of the plans before the convention promised to
effect these objects.
During its sitting, Hamilton had been engaged in framing
a plan of government, in which, while he adhered strictly
to the republican theory, he sought to blend with that form
the advantages of a monarchy.
On the eighteenth of June, upon a resolution of Dickin-
son, " that the articles of confederation ought to be revised
and amended, so as to render the government of the United
States adequate to the exigencies, the preservation, and
prosperity of the union," Hamilton addressed the com-
mittee. As no report approaching to accuracy has been
given of this memorable speech, it is deemed expedient to
publish the brief as it exists among his manuscripts.
INTRODUCTION.
I. Importance of the occasion.
II. A solid plan, without regard to temporary opinions.
III. If an ineffectual plan be again proposed, it will beget
despair, and no government will grow out of con-
sent.
01
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? 482
THE LIFE OF
IV. There seem to be but three lines of conduct.
I. A league offensive, treaty of commerce, and appor-
tionment of the public debt.
II. An amendment of the present confederation, by add-
ing such powers as the public mind seems nearest
being matured to grant.
III. The forming a new government to pervade the whole,
with decisive powers; in short, with complete
sovereignty.
Last seems to be the prevailing sentiment.
I. Its practicability to be examined.
Immense extent unfavourable to representation.
Vast expense.
Double sets of officers.
Difficulty of judging of local circumstances.
Distance has a physical effect on men's minds.
Difficulty of drawing proper characters from home.
Execution of laws, feeble at a distance from govern-
ment--particularly in the collection of revenue.
Sentiment of obedience-- )
opinion. >
I. Objections to the present confederation.
Intrusts the great interests of the nation to hands
incapable of managing them.
All matters in which foreigners are concerned.
The care of the public peace--debts.
Power of treaty, without power of execution.
Common defence, without power to raise troops--
have a fleet--raise money.
Power to contract debts, without the power to pay.
These great interests of the state must be well man-
aged, or the public prosperity must be the victim.
Legislates upon communities.
Where the legislatures are to act, they will delib-
erate.
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? HAMILTON. 483
To ask money, not to collect it, and by an unjust
measure.
No sanction! !
Amendment of confederation according to present
ideas.
1. Difficult because not agreed upon any thing. Ex--
Impost.
Commerce--different theories.
To ascertain the practicability of this, let us examine
the principles of civil obedience.
SUPPORTS OF GOVERNMENT.
I. Interest to support it.
II. Opinion of utility and necessity.
III. Habitual sense of obligation.
IV. Force.
V. Influence.
I. Interest--particular and general interests.
Esprit de corps.
Vox populi, Vox Dei.
II. Opinion of utility and necessity.
First will decrease with the growth of the states.
Necessity.
This does not apply to federal government.
This may dissolve, and yet the order of the commu-
nity continue.
Anarchy not a necessary consequence.
III. Habitual sense of obligation.
This results from administration of private justice.
Demand of service or money odious.
IV. Force--of two kinds.
Coercion of laws--Coercion of arms.
First does not exist--and the last useless.
Attempt to use it, a war between the states.
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THE LIFE OF
Foreign aid.
Delinquency not confined to one.
V. Influence--
1. From municipal jurisdiction.
2. Appointment of officers.
3. Military jurisdiction.
4. Fiscal jurisdiction.
All these now reside in (the) particular states.
Their governments are the chief sources of hon-
our and emolument.
AMBITION AVARICE.
To effect any thing, passions must be turned towards
the general government.
Present confederation cannot be amended, unless the
most important powers be given to congress constituted
as they are.
This would be liable to all (the) objections against any
form of general government, with the addition of the want
of checks.
Perpetual effort in each member.
Influence of individuals in office to excite jealousy and
clamour--state leaders.
Experience corresponds.
Grecian republics.
Demosthenes says--Athens seventy-three years--Lace-
dsemon twenty-seven--Thebans after battle of Leuctra.
Phocions--consecrated ground--Philip, &c.
Germanic empire.
Charlemagne and his successors.
-Diet--recesses.
Electors now seven, excluding others.
Swiss Cantons.
Two diets.
Opposite alliances.
Berne--Lucerne.
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? HAMILTON. 485
To strengthen the federal government, powers too great
must be given to a single hand.
League offensive and defensive, &c.
Particular governments might exert themselves, &c.
But liable to usual vicissitudes. )
Internal peace affected.
Proximity of situation--natural enemies.
Partial confederacies from unequal extent.
Power inspires ambition.
Weakness begets jealousy.
Western territory.
Objn. --Genius of republics pacific.
Answer. Jealousy of commerce as well as jealousy of
power, begets war.
Sparta--Athens--Thebes--Rome--Carthage--Venice
--Hanseatic League.
England as many popular as royal wars.
Lewis the XIV. --Austria--Bourbons--William and
Anne.
Wars depend upon trifling circumstances.
Where--Dutchess of Marlborough's glove.
Foreign conquest.
Dismemberment--Poland.
Foreign influence.
Distractions set afloat vicious humours.
Standing armies by dissensions.
Domestic factions--Montesquieu.
Monarchy in southern states.
DCr* Federal rights--Fisheries.
Wars--destructive.
Loss of advantages.
