Objection
2: Further, "A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and
renders its action good also" (Ethic.
renders its action good also" (Ethic.
Summa Theologica
Therefore the
goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.
I answer that, The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act
of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following [*Leonine
edn. : 'accompanying'] it. The intention precedes the act of the will
causally, when we will something because we intend a certain end. And
then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness
of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast for God's
sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good from the very
fact that it is done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the goodness of
the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as stated above
([1175]AA[1],2), it must, of necessity, depend on the intention of the
end.
On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is
added to a preceding act of the will; for instance, a man may will to
do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness
of the previous act of the will does not depend on the subsequent
intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent
intention.
Reply to Objection 1: When the intention is the cause of the act of
willing, the order to the end is considered as the reason of the
goodness of the object, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if
an evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give
an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in
itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is
evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is
subsequent to the act of the will, then the latter may be good: and the
intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but that
which is repeated.
Reply to Objection 3: As we have already stated (A[6], ad 1), "evil
results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire
cause. " Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even
under the species of good; or to the good under the species of evil, it
will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it
must tend to the good under the species of good; in other words, it
must will the good for the sake of the good.
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Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree
of good or evil in the intention?
Objection 1: It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will
depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on Mat. 12:35,
"A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that
which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as much good as he intends. "
But the intention gives goodness not only to the external action, but
also to the act of the will, as stated above [1176](A[7]). Therefore
the goodness of a man's will is according to the goodness of his
intention.
Objection 2: Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect.
But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will.
Therefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is good.
Objection 3: Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his
intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous
intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same
reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good
intended.
On the contrary, The intention can be good, while the will is evil.
Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the
will less good.
I answer that, In regard to both the act, and the intention of the end,
we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the object, by
reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other,
taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts
intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view
of the object, it is evident that the quantity in the act does not
depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the external
act this may happen in two ways. First, through the object that is
ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for
instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not realize his
intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds.
Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to
the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to remove: for
instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which
prevent him from going. On the other hand, with regard to the interior
act of the will, this happens in only one way: because the interior
acts of the will are in our power, whereas the external actions are
not. But the will can will an object that is not proportionate to the
intended end: and thus the will that tends to that object considered
absolutely, is not so good as the intention. Yet because the intention
also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it
is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity of goodness
in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, in
so far as the will wills some great good for an end, although that by
which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that
good.
But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act,
according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the
intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the
will: since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form,
as is clear from what has been said above ([1177]Q[12], A[4];[1178]
Q[18], A[6]). And yet considered materially, while the intention is
intense, the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially
speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity
to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very
fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle,
upon the intense volition of medicine.
We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or
exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object: as when a
man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And yet it
does not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because the quantity
of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the
quantity of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence it is that
a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because the
quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall
show later on ([1179]Q[20] , A[4];[1180] Q[114], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of
God, Who considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore
another gloss says on the same passage that "the treasure of the heart
is the intention, according to which God judges our works. " For the
goodness of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon
the goodness of the will, which makes even the external act to be
meritorious in God's sight.
Reply to Objection 2: The goodness of the intention is not the whole
cause of a good will. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: The mere malice of the intention suffices to make
the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention
is evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated
above (ad 2).
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Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine
will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not
depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is impossible
for man's will to be conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the
word of Isa. 55:9: "As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are
My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts. "
If therefore goodness of the will depended on its conformity to the
Divine will, it would follow that it is impossible for man's will to be
good. Which is inadmissible.
Objection 2: Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so
does our knowledge flow from the Divine knowledge. But our knowledge
does not require to be conformed to God's knowledge; since God knows
many things that we know not. Therefore there is no need for our will
to be conformed to the Divine will.
Objection 3: Further, the will is a principle of action. But our action
cannot be conformed to God's. Therefore neither can our will be
conformed to His.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as
Thou wilt": which words He said, because "He wishes man to be upright
and to tend to God," as Augustine expounds in the Enchiridion [*Enarr.
in Ps. 32, serm. i. ]. But the rectitude of the will is its goodness.
Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the
Divine will.
I answer that, As stated above [1181](A[7]), the goodness of the will
depends on the intention of the end. Now the last end of the human will
is the Sovereign Good, namely, God, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[3],
A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to be
ordained to the Sovereign Good, that is, to God.
Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared to the Divine will,
as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any genus is the
measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover,
everything attains to rectitude and goodness, in so far as it is in
accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will be
good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will.
Reply to Objection 1: The human will cannot be conformed to the will of
God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner
human knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it
knows truth: and human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as
it is becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way
of equality.
From the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third
Objections.
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Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be
conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will need not always be
conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we
cannot will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object
of the will. But in many things we know not what God wills. Therefore
the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing
willed.
Objection 2: Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about
to die in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his will
to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow
that a man is bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible.
Objection 3: Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial
piety. But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes be
contrary to filial piety: for instance, when God wills the death of a
father: if his son were to will it also, it would be against filial
piety. Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine
will, as to the thing willed.
On the contrary, (1) On Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," a
gloss says: "That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills. "
But everyone is bound to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is
bound to will what God wills.
(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every
act. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will,
it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.
(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different
things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine will, has an
evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the Divine
will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will.
I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above
([1182]AA[3],5), the will tends to its object, according as it is
proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways
by the reason, so as to appear good from one point of view, and not
good from another point of view. And therefore if a man's will wills a
thing to be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and
the will of another man, who wills that thing not to be, according as
it appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing
a thief to be put to death, because this is just: while the will of
another---e. g. the thief's wife or son, who wishes him not to be put to
death, inasmuch as killing is a natural evil, is also good.
Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect;
the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the more
universal the good to which the will tends. This is evident in the
example given above: because the judge has care of the common good,
which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief's death, which has
the aspect of good in relation to the common estate; whereas the
thief's wife has to consider the private, the good of the family, and
from this point of view she wishes her husband, the thief, not to be
put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is that which is
apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: hence
whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of the common good;
this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. On
the other hand, the apprehension of a creature, according to its
nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to that nature. Now a
thing may happen to be good under a particular aspect, and yet not good
under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above. And therefore
it comes to pass that a certain will is good from willing something
considered under a particular aspect, which thing God wills not, under
a universal aspect, and vice versa. And hence too it is, that various
wills of various men can be good in respect of opposite things, for as
much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular thing to be or
not to be.
But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he
refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite
of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the
end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is
directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some
particular good with a right will, he must will that particular good
materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally. Therefore the
human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that
which is willed formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and
universal good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the
reason given above.
At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed to
the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch as it is conformed to
the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, it is
conformed thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch as it
is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it
is conformed to that will considered as efficient cause; since the
proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the particular
apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing from God as its
efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that a man's will, in
this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what
God wishes him to will.
There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal cause,
consisting in man's willing something from charity, as God wills it.
And this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is
in respect of the last end, which is the proper object of charity.
Reply to Objection 1: We can know in a general way what God wills. For
we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good.
Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will
conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed. But
we know not what God wills in particular: and in this respect we are
not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.
But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he
wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that particular
matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not
only formally, but also materially.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not will the damnation of a man,
considered precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered
precisely as death, because, "He wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim.
2:4); but He wills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore
in regard to such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of
God's justice and of the natural order.
Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said
that a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect of reason of
the thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who conforms
his will to God's, in the point of the very thing willed; because the
will tends more to the end, than to that which is on account of the
end.
To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act
are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the
object considered materially.
To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when
several people desire different things, but not under the same aspect:
but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect,
one man wills a thing which another wills not. But there is no question
of this here.
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OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)
We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under
which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in
the external action?
(2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends
on the goodness of the will?
(3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as
those of the external action?
(4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of
the interior act?
(5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its
goodness or malice?
(6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
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Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the
external action?
Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil are in the external
action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives
goodness from its object, as stated above ([1183]Q[19], AA[1],2). But
the external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for
a man is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in
the act of the will.
Objection 2: Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end:
since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its
relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end,
as stated above ([1184]Q[1], A[1], ad 2), the act of another power can
be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to
being in the act of the will.
Objection 3: Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation
to the external action, as stated above ([1185]Q[18], A[6]). But that
which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in
the act of the will.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will
that we sin, and that we behave aright. " Therefore moral good and evil
are first in the will.
I answer that, External actions may be said to be good or bad in two
ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances connected
with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be
observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or
evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for
vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the will's proper
object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the
external action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found
first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the external
action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external
action has of itself, on account of its being about due matter and its
being attended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will, but
rather from the reason. Consequently, if we consider the goodness of
the external action, in so far as it comes from reason's ordination and
apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will: but
if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution of the action
done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its
principle.
Reply to Objection 1: The exterior action is the object of the will,
inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good
apprehended and ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the
good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the
execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent
to the will.
Reply to Objection 2: The end precedes in the order of intention, but
follows in the order of execution.
Reply to Objection 3: A form as received into matter, is subsequent to
matter in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order
of nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in
every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its
efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as
existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action.
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Whether the whole goodness and malice of the external action depends on the
goodness of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the
external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written
(Mat. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an
evil tree bring forth good fruit. " But, according to the gloss, the
tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is
impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and the
external action evil, or vice versa.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no
sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will, there
will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or
malice of the external action depends on the will.
Objection 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now
are differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential
division in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12).
Since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that
goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are
some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good. "
I answer that, As stated above [1186](A[1]), we may consider a twofold
goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter
and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end. And
that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on
the will: while that which is in respect of due matter or
circumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the
goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends towards it.
Now it must be observed, as was noted above ([1187]Q[19], A[6], ad 1),
that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for
it to be good simply, it is not enough for it to be good in one point
only, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be good,
both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that the
external action is good. But if the will be good from its intention of
the end, this is not enough to make the external action good: and if
the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end, or by
reason of the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil.
Reply to Objection 1: If the good tree be taken to signify the good
will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act
willed and from the end intended.
Reply to Objection 2: A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an
evil end; but also when he wills an evil act.
Reply to Objection 3: Voluntariness applies not only to the interior
act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed
from the will and the reason. Consequently the difference of good and
evil is applicable to both the interior and external act.
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Whether the goodness and malice of the external action are the same as those
of the interior act?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness and malice of the interior
act of the will are not the same as those of the external action. For
the principle of the interior act is the interior apprehensive or
appetitive power of the soul; whereas the principle of the external
action is the power that accomplishes the movement. Now where the
principles of action are different, the actions themselves are
different. Moreover, it is the action which is the subject of goodness
or malice: and the same accident cannot be in different subjects.
Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot be the same as that
of the external action.
Objection 2: Further, "A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and
renders its action good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective
virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in the
power commanded, as is declared in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the goodness
of the interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, is distinct
from the goodness of the external action, which belongs to the power
commanded.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect; since
nothing is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act is the
cause of the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as stated
above ([1188]AA[1],2). Therefore it is not the same goodness in each.
On the contrary, It was shown above ([1189]Q[18], A[6]) that the act of
the will is the form, as it were, of the external action. Now that
which results from the material and formal element is one thing.
Therefore there is but one goodness of the internal and external act.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[4]), the interior act of the
will, and the external action, considered morally, are one act. Now it
happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has several
aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes that it has but one. Hence
we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the interior act
is the same as that of the external action, and sometimes not. For as
we have already said ([1190]AA[1],2), these two goodnesses or malices,
of the internal and external acts, are ordained to one another. Now it
may happen, in things that are subordinate to something else, that a
thing is good merely from being subordinate; thus a bitter draught is
good merely because it procures health. Wherefore there are not two
goodnesses, one the goodness of health, and the other the goodness of
the draught; but one and the same. On the other hand it happens
sometimes that that which is subordinate to something else, has some
aspect of goodness in itself, besides the fact of its being subordinate
to some other good: thus a palatable medicine can be considered in the
light of a pleasurable good, besides being conducive to health.
We must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness or
malice from its relation to the end only, then there is but one and the
same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards the end,
and of the external action, which regards the end through the medium of
the act of the will. But when the external action has goodness or
malice of itself, i. e. in regard to its matter and circumstances, then
the goodness of the external action is distinct from the goodness of
the will in regarding the end; yet so that the goodness of the end
passes into the external action, and the goodness of the matter and
circumstances passes into the act of the will, as stated above
([1191]AA[1],2).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that the internal and
external actions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as
they are in that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral
order, as stated above ([1192]Q[17], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a moral virtue is
ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were,
of that virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained
to things directed to the end. For this reason various virtues are
necessary. But right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has
no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far as the
goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: When a thing is derived by one thing from
another, as from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in
both: thus when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct
from the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same
specifically. But when a thing is derived from one thing from another,
according to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in
both: thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived
from the healthiness of the animal's body; nor is health as applied to
urine and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the body of an
animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It
is in this way that the goodness of the external action is derived from
the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the order
of one to the other.
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Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the
interior act?
Objection 1: It would seem that the external action does not add any
goodness or malice to that of the interior action. For Chrysostom says
(Hom. xix in Mat. ): "It is the will that is rewarded for doing good, or
punished for doing evil. " Now works are the witnesses of the will.
Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account, in order to know
how to judge; but for the sake of others, that all may understand how
just He is. But good or evil is to be estimated according to God's
judgment rather than according to the judgment of man. Therefore the
external action adds no goodness or malice to that of the interior act.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and
external acts are one and the same, as stated above [1193](A[3]). But
increase is the addition of one thing to another. Therefore the
external action does not add to the goodness or malice of the interior
act.
Objection 3: Further, the entire goodness of created things does not
add to the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely derived therefrom.
But sometimes the entire goodness of the external action is derived
from the goodness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely, as
stated above ([1194]AA[1],2). Therefore neither of them adds to the
goodness or malice of the other.
On the contrary, Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil. If
therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be
added, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, does
a good deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.
I answer that, If we speak of the goodness which the external action
derives from the will tending to the end, then the external action adds
nothing to this goodness, unless it happens that the will in itself is
made better in good things, or worse in evil things. This, seemingly,
may happen in three ways. First in point of number; if, for instance, a
man wishes to do something with a good or an evil end in view, and does
not do it then, but afterwards wills and does it, the act of his will
is doubled and a double good, or a double evil is the result. Secondly,
in point of extension: when, for instance, a man wishes to do something
for a good or an evil end, and is hindered by some obstacle, whereas
another man perseveres in the movement of the will until he accomplish
it in deed; it is evident that the will of the latter is more lasting
in good or evil, and in this respect, is better or worse. Thirdly, in
point of intensity: for these are certain external actions, which, in
so far as they are pleasurable, or painful, are such as naturally to
make the will more intense or more remiss; and it is evident that the
more intensely the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it
is.
On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which the external
action derives from its matter and due circumstances, thus it stands in
relation to the will as its term and end. And in this way it adds to
the goodness or malice of the will; because every inclination or
movement is perfected by attaining its end or reaching its term.
Wherefore the will is not perfect, unless it be such that, given the
opportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove impossible,
as long as the will is perfect, so as to realize the operation if it
could; the lack of perfection derived from the external action, is
simply involuntary. Now just as the involuntary deserves neither
punishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or evil deeds, so
neither does it lessen reward or punishment, if a man through simple
involuntariness fail to do good or evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is speaking of the case where a man's
will is complete, and does not refrain from the deed save through the
impossibility of achievement.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to that goodness which the
external action derives from the will as tending to the end. But the
goodness which the external action takes from its matter and
circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end; but
it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act willed, to
which it stands in the relation of measure and cause, as stated above
([1195]AA[1],2).
From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
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Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or
malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the consequences of the external action
increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists virtually in
its cause. But the consequences result from the action as an effect
from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually in actions. Now a
thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since a
virtue "makes that which has it to be good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore
the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action.
Objection 2: Further, the good actions of his hearers are consequences
resulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these redound
to the merit of the preacher, as is evident from Phil. 4:1: "My dearly
beloved brethren, my joy and my crown. " Therefore the consequences of
an action increase its goodness or malice.
Objection 3: Further, punishment is not increased, unless the fault
increases: wherefore it is written (Dt. 25:2): "According to the
measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be. " But the
punishment is increased on account of the consequences; for it is
written (Ex. 21:29): "But if the ox was wont to push with his horn
yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did
not shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a woman, then the ox shall
be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death. " But he would not
have been put to death, if the ox, although he had not been shut up,
had not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase the goodness
or malice of an action.
Objection 4: Further, if a man do something which may cause death, by
striking, or by sentencing, and if death does not ensue, he does not
contract irregularity: but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore
the consequence of an action increase its goodness or malice.
On the contrary, The consequences do not make an action that was evil,
to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if a man
give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by committing
a sin, this does not undo the good done by the giver; and, in like
manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the wrongdoer is
not thereby excused. Therefore the consequences of an action doe not
increase its goodness or malice.
I answer that, The consequences of an action are either foreseen or
not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the
goodness or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow
from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom, this
shows his will to be all the more inordinate.
But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction.
Because if they follow from the nature of the action and in the
majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the
goodness or malice of that action: for it is evident that an action is
specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and
specifically worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results. On
the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then
they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action: because we
do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by
accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.
Reply to Objection 1: The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect
that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by
accident.
Reply to Objection 2: The good actions done by the hearers, result from
the preacher's words, as an effect that flows from their very nature.
Hence they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such
is his intention.
Reply to Objection 3: The consequences for which that man is ordered to
be punished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed
to be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable.
Reply to Objection 4: This argument would prove if irregularity were
the result of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of
the fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament.
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Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that one and the same external action can be
both good and evil. For "movement, if continuous, is one and the same"
(Phys. v, 4). But one continuous movement can be both good and bad: for
instance, a man may go to church continuously, intending at first
vainglory, and afterwards the service of God. Therefore one and the
same action can be both good and bad.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3),
action and passion are one act. But the passion may be good, as
Christ's was; and the action evil, as that of the Jews. Therefore one
and the same act can be both good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, since a servant is an instrument, as it were, of
his master, the servant's action is his master's, just as the action of
a tool is the workman's action. But it may happen that the servant's
action result from his master's good will, and is therefore good: and
from the evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore the
same action can be both good and evil.
On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries.
But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be
both good and evil.
On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries.
But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be
both good and evil.
I answer that, Nothing hinders a thing from being one, in so far as it
is in one genus, and manifold, in so far as it is referred to another
genus. Thus a continuous surface is one, considered as in the genus of
quantity; and yet it is manifold, considered as to the genus of color,
if it be partly white, and partly black. And accordingly, nothing
hinders an action from being one, considered in the natural order;
whereas it is not one, considered in the moral order; and vice versa,
as we have stated above (A[3], ad 1;[1196] Q[18], A[7], ad 1). For
continuous walking is one action, considered in the natural order: but
it may resolve itself into many actions, considered in the moral order,
if a change take place in the walker's will, for the will is the
principle of moral actions. If therefore we consider one action in the
moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good and evil.
Whereas if it be one as to natural and not moral unity, it can be both
good and evil.
Reply to Objection 1: This continual movement which proceeds from
various intentions, although it is one in the natural order, is not one
in the point of moral unity.
Reply to Objection 2: Action and passion belong to the moral order, in
so far as they are voluntary. And therefore in so far as they are
voluntary in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct
things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other.
Reply to Objection 3: The action of the servant, in so far as it
proceeds from the will of the servant, is not the master's action: but
only in so far as it proceeds from the master's command. Wherefore the
evil will of the servant does not make the action evil in this respect.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE
(FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of
their goodness and malice: and under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being
good or evil?
(2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame?
(3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious?
(4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?
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Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil?
Objection 1: It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in so
far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of nature" (Phys.
ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things engendered outside the
order of nature. Now things that are produced according to art and
reason imitate those that are produced according to nature (Phys. ii,
8). Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being inordinate
and evil.
Objection 2: Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 occurs in nature
and art, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained. But
the goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the
intention of the end, and on its achievement. Therefore it seems that
the malice of an action does not make it sinful.
Objection 3: Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it
follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is false:
since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an
action is not sinful by reason of its being evil.
On the contrary, As shown above ([1197]Q[19], A[4]), the goodness of a
human action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and consequently
its malice consists in its being in disaccord with the Eternal Law. But
this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii,
27) that "sin is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the Eternal
Law. " Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its being evil.
I answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good
than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an
evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain
end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order to an end is
measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this
rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When
therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the
natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right:
since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action does not
swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an
action strays from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin.
Now in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is
the human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal Law. When,
therefore, a human action tends to the end, according to the order of
reason and of the Eternal Law, then that action is right: but when it
turns aside from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it is
evident from what has been said ([1198]Q[19], AA[3],4) that every
voluntary action that turns aside from the order of reason and of the
Eternal Law, is evil, and that every good action is in accord with
reason and the Eternal Law. Hence it follows that a human action is
right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they result
from a sin in nature's action.
Reply to Objection 2: The end is twofold; the last end, and the
proximate end. In the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in
respect of the last end, which is the perfection of the thing
generated; but it does not fail in respect of any proximate end
whatever; since when nature works it forms something. In like manner,
the sin of the will always fails as regards the last end intended,
because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to happiness, which is
the last end: and yet it does not fail in respect of some proximate
end: intended and achieved by the will. Wherefore also, since the very
intention of this end is ordained to the last end, this same intention
may be right or sinful.
Reply to Objection 3: Each thing is ordained to its end by its action:
and therefore sin, which consists in straying from the order to the
end, consists properly in an action. On the other hand, punishment
regards the person of the sinner, as was stated in the [1199]FP, Q[48],
A[5], ad 4; A[6], ad 3.
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Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good
or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that a human action does not deserve praise
or blame by reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens even in
things done by nature" (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not
deserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5). Therefore a human action
does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and,
consequently, neither does it deserve praise, by reason of its being
good.
Objection 2: Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so does it
happen in the productions of art: because as stated in Phys. ii, 8 "it
is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to give the
wrong medicine. " But the artist is not blamed for making something bad:
because the artist's work is such, that he can produce a good or a bad
thing, just as he lists. Therefore it seems that neither is there any
reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact that it is evil.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is "weak
and incapable. " But weakness or inability either takes away or
diminishes guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from
being evil.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that
"virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue
deserve censure and blame. " But good actions are virtuous; because
"virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action good"
(Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. Therefore
a human action deserves praise or blame, through being good or evil.
I answer that, Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin
more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise
or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to
blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or
goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it
is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is through
his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made clear
above ([1200]Q[1], AA[1],2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in
voluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and in
such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing.
Reply to Objection 1: Natural actions are not in the power of the
natural agent: since the action of nature is determinate. And,
therefore, although there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason stands in different relations to the
productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is
directed to a particular end, which is something devised by reason:
whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all
human life. Now a particular end is subordinate to the general end.
goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.
I answer that, The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act
of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following [*Leonine
edn. : 'accompanying'] it. The intention precedes the act of the will
causally, when we will something because we intend a certain end. And
then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness
of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast for God's
sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good from the very
fact that it is done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the goodness of
the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as stated above
([1175]AA[1],2), it must, of necessity, depend on the intention of the
end.
On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is
added to a preceding act of the will; for instance, a man may will to
do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness
of the previous act of the will does not depend on the subsequent
intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent
intention.
Reply to Objection 1: When the intention is the cause of the act of
willing, the order to the end is considered as the reason of the
goodness of the object, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if
an evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give
an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in
itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is
evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is
subsequent to the act of the will, then the latter may be good: and the
intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but that
which is repeated.
Reply to Objection 3: As we have already stated (A[6], ad 1), "evil
results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire
cause. " Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even
under the species of good; or to the good under the species of evil, it
will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it
must tend to the good under the species of good; in other words, it
must will the good for the sake of the good.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree
of good or evil in the intention?
Objection 1: It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will
depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on Mat. 12:35,
"A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that
which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as much good as he intends. "
But the intention gives goodness not only to the external action, but
also to the act of the will, as stated above [1176](A[7]). Therefore
the goodness of a man's will is according to the goodness of his
intention.
Objection 2: Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect.
But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will.
Therefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is good.
Objection 3: Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his
intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous
intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same
reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good
intended.
On the contrary, The intention can be good, while the will is evil.
Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the
will less good.
I answer that, In regard to both the act, and the intention of the end,
we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the object, by
reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other,
taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts
intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view
of the object, it is evident that the quantity in the act does not
depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the external
act this may happen in two ways. First, through the object that is
ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for
instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not realize his
intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds.
Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to
the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to remove: for
instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which
prevent him from going. On the other hand, with regard to the interior
act of the will, this happens in only one way: because the interior
acts of the will are in our power, whereas the external actions are
not. But the will can will an object that is not proportionate to the
intended end: and thus the will that tends to that object considered
absolutely, is not so good as the intention. Yet because the intention
also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it
is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity of goodness
in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, in
so far as the will wills some great good for an end, although that by
which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that
good.
But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act,
according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the
intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the
will: since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form,
as is clear from what has been said above ([1177]Q[12], A[4];[1178]
Q[18], A[6]). And yet considered materially, while the intention is
intense, the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially
speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity
to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very
fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle,
upon the intense volition of medicine.
We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or
exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object: as when a
man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And yet it
does not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because the quantity
of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the
quantity of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence it is that
a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because the
quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall
show later on ([1179]Q[20] , A[4];[1180] Q[114], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of
God, Who considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore
another gloss says on the same passage that "the treasure of the heart
is the intention, according to which God judges our works. " For the
goodness of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon
the goodness of the will, which makes even the external act to be
meritorious in God's sight.
Reply to Objection 2: The goodness of the intention is not the whole
cause of a good will. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: The mere malice of the intention suffices to make
the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention
is evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated
above (ad 2).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine
will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not
depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is impossible
for man's will to be conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the
word of Isa. 55:9: "As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are
My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts. "
If therefore goodness of the will depended on its conformity to the
Divine will, it would follow that it is impossible for man's will to be
good. Which is inadmissible.
Objection 2: Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so
does our knowledge flow from the Divine knowledge. But our knowledge
does not require to be conformed to God's knowledge; since God knows
many things that we know not. Therefore there is no need for our will
to be conformed to the Divine will.
Objection 3: Further, the will is a principle of action. But our action
cannot be conformed to God's. Therefore neither can our will be
conformed to His.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as
Thou wilt": which words He said, because "He wishes man to be upright
and to tend to God," as Augustine expounds in the Enchiridion [*Enarr.
in Ps. 32, serm. i. ]. But the rectitude of the will is its goodness.
Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the
Divine will.
I answer that, As stated above [1181](A[7]), the goodness of the will
depends on the intention of the end. Now the last end of the human will
is the Sovereign Good, namely, God, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[3],
A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to be
ordained to the Sovereign Good, that is, to God.
Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared to the Divine will,
as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any genus is the
measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover,
everything attains to rectitude and goodness, in so far as it is in
accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will be
good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will.
Reply to Objection 1: The human will cannot be conformed to the will of
God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner
human knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it
knows truth: and human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as
it is becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way
of equality.
From the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third
Objections.
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Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be
conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will need not always be
conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we
cannot will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object
of the will. But in many things we know not what God wills. Therefore
the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing
willed.
Objection 2: Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about
to die in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his will
to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow
that a man is bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible.
Objection 3: Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial
piety. But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes be
contrary to filial piety: for instance, when God wills the death of a
father: if his son were to will it also, it would be against filial
piety. Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine
will, as to the thing willed.
On the contrary, (1) On Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," a
gloss says: "That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills. "
But everyone is bound to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is
bound to will what God wills.
(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every
act. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will,
it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.
(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different
things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine will, has an
evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the Divine
will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will.
I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above
([1182]AA[3],5), the will tends to its object, according as it is
proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways
by the reason, so as to appear good from one point of view, and not
good from another point of view. And therefore if a man's will wills a
thing to be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and
the will of another man, who wills that thing not to be, according as
it appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing
a thief to be put to death, because this is just: while the will of
another---e. g. the thief's wife or son, who wishes him not to be put to
death, inasmuch as killing is a natural evil, is also good.
Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect;
the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the more
universal the good to which the will tends. This is evident in the
example given above: because the judge has care of the common good,
which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief's death, which has
the aspect of good in relation to the common estate; whereas the
thief's wife has to consider the private, the good of the family, and
from this point of view she wishes her husband, the thief, not to be
put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is that which is
apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: hence
whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of the common good;
this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. On
the other hand, the apprehension of a creature, according to its
nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to that nature. Now a
thing may happen to be good under a particular aspect, and yet not good
under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above. And therefore
it comes to pass that a certain will is good from willing something
considered under a particular aspect, which thing God wills not, under
a universal aspect, and vice versa. And hence too it is, that various
wills of various men can be good in respect of opposite things, for as
much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular thing to be or
not to be.
But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he
refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite
of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the
end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is
directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some
particular good with a right will, he must will that particular good
materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally. Therefore the
human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that
which is willed formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and
universal good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the
reason given above.
At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed to
the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch as it is conformed to
the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, it is
conformed thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch as it
is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it
is conformed to that will considered as efficient cause; since the
proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the particular
apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing from God as its
efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that a man's will, in
this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what
God wishes him to will.
There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal cause,
consisting in man's willing something from charity, as God wills it.
And this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is
in respect of the last end, which is the proper object of charity.
Reply to Objection 1: We can know in a general way what God wills. For
we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good.
Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will
conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed. But
we know not what God wills in particular: and in this respect we are
not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.
But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he
wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that particular
matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not
only formally, but also materially.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not will the damnation of a man,
considered precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered
precisely as death, because, "He wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim.
2:4); but He wills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore
in regard to such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of
God's justice and of the natural order.
Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said
that a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect of reason of
the thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who conforms
his will to God's, in the point of the very thing willed; because the
will tends more to the end, than to that which is on account of the
end.
To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act
are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the
object considered materially.
To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when
several people desire different things, but not under the same aspect:
but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect,
one man wills a thing which another wills not. But there is no question
of this here.
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OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)
We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under
which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in
the external action?
(2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends
on the goodness of the will?
(3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as
those of the external action?
(4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of
the interior act?
(5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its
goodness or malice?
(6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
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Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the
external action?
Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil are in the external
action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives
goodness from its object, as stated above ([1183]Q[19], AA[1],2). But
the external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for
a man is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in
the act of the will.
Objection 2: Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end:
since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its
relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end,
as stated above ([1184]Q[1], A[1], ad 2), the act of another power can
be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to
being in the act of the will.
Objection 3: Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation
to the external action, as stated above ([1185]Q[18], A[6]). But that
which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in
the act of the will.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will
that we sin, and that we behave aright. " Therefore moral good and evil
are first in the will.
I answer that, External actions may be said to be good or bad in two
ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances connected
with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be
observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or
evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for
vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the will's proper
object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the
external action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found
first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the external
action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external
action has of itself, on account of its being about due matter and its
being attended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will, but
rather from the reason. Consequently, if we consider the goodness of
the external action, in so far as it comes from reason's ordination and
apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will: but
if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution of the action
done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its
principle.
Reply to Objection 1: The exterior action is the object of the will,
inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good
apprehended and ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the
good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the
execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent
to the will.
Reply to Objection 2: The end precedes in the order of intention, but
follows in the order of execution.
Reply to Objection 3: A form as received into matter, is subsequent to
matter in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order
of nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in
every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its
efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as
existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action.
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Whether the whole goodness and malice of the external action depends on the
goodness of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the
external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written
(Mat. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an
evil tree bring forth good fruit. " But, according to the gloss, the
tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is
impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and the
external action evil, or vice versa.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no
sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will, there
will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or
malice of the external action depends on the will.
Objection 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now
are differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential
division in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12).
Since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that
goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are
some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good. "
I answer that, As stated above [1186](A[1]), we may consider a twofold
goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter
and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end. And
that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on
the will: while that which is in respect of due matter or
circumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the
goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends towards it.
Now it must be observed, as was noted above ([1187]Q[19], A[6], ad 1),
that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for
it to be good simply, it is not enough for it to be good in one point
only, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be good,
both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that the
external action is good. But if the will be good from its intention of
the end, this is not enough to make the external action good: and if
the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end, or by
reason of the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil.
Reply to Objection 1: If the good tree be taken to signify the good
will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act
willed and from the end intended.
Reply to Objection 2: A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an
evil end; but also when he wills an evil act.
Reply to Objection 3: Voluntariness applies not only to the interior
act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed
from the will and the reason. Consequently the difference of good and
evil is applicable to both the interior and external act.
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Whether the goodness and malice of the external action are the same as those
of the interior act?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness and malice of the interior
act of the will are not the same as those of the external action. For
the principle of the interior act is the interior apprehensive or
appetitive power of the soul; whereas the principle of the external
action is the power that accomplishes the movement. Now where the
principles of action are different, the actions themselves are
different. Moreover, it is the action which is the subject of goodness
or malice: and the same accident cannot be in different subjects.
Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot be the same as that
of the external action.
Objection 2: Further, "A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and
renders its action good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective
virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in the
power commanded, as is declared in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the goodness
of the interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, is distinct
from the goodness of the external action, which belongs to the power
commanded.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect; since
nothing is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act is the
cause of the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as stated
above ([1188]AA[1],2). Therefore it is not the same goodness in each.
On the contrary, It was shown above ([1189]Q[18], A[6]) that the act of
the will is the form, as it were, of the external action. Now that
which results from the material and formal element is one thing.
Therefore there is but one goodness of the internal and external act.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[4]), the interior act of the
will, and the external action, considered morally, are one act. Now it
happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has several
aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes that it has but one. Hence
we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the interior act
is the same as that of the external action, and sometimes not. For as
we have already said ([1190]AA[1],2), these two goodnesses or malices,
of the internal and external acts, are ordained to one another. Now it
may happen, in things that are subordinate to something else, that a
thing is good merely from being subordinate; thus a bitter draught is
good merely because it procures health. Wherefore there are not two
goodnesses, one the goodness of health, and the other the goodness of
the draught; but one and the same. On the other hand it happens
sometimes that that which is subordinate to something else, has some
aspect of goodness in itself, besides the fact of its being subordinate
to some other good: thus a palatable medicine can be considered in the
light of a pleasurable good, besides being conducive to health.
We must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness or
malice from its relation to the end only, then there is but one and the
same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards the end,
and of the external action, which regards the end through the medium of
the act of the will. But when the external action has goodness or
malice of itself, i. e. in regard to its matter and circumstances, then
the goodness of the external action is distinct from the goodness of
the will in regarding the end; yet so that the goodness of the end
passes into the external action, and the goodness of the matter and
circumstances passes into the act of the will, as stated above
([1191]AA[1],2).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that the internal and
external actions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as
they are in that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral
order, as stated above ([1192]Q[17], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a moral virtue is
ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were,
of that virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained
to things directed to the end. For this reason various virtues are
necessary. But right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has
no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far as the
goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: When a thing is derived by one thing from
another, as from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in
both: thus when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct
from the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same
specifically. But when a thing is derived from one thing from another,
according to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in
both: thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived
from the healthiness of the animal's body; nor is health as applied to
urine and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the body of an
animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It
is in this way that the goodness of the external action is derived from
the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the order
of one to the other.
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Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the
interior act?
Objection 1: It would seem that the external action does not add any
goodness or malice to that of the interior action. For Chrysostom says
(Hom. xix in Mat. ): "It is the will that is rewarded for doing good, or
punished for doing evil. " Now works are the witnesses of the will.
Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account, in order to know
how to judge; but for the sake of others, that all may understand how
just He is. But good or evil is to be estimated according to God's
judgment rather than according to the judgment of man. Therefore the
external action adds no goodness or malice to that of the interior act.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and
external acts are one and the same, as stated above [1193](A[3]). But
increase is the addition of one thing to another. Therefore the
external action does not add to the goodness or malice of the interior
act.
Objection 3: Further, the entire goodness of created things does not
add to the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely derived therefrom.
But sometimes the entire goodness of the external action is derived
from the goodness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely, as
stated above ([1194]AA[1],2). Therefore neither of them adds to the
goodness or malice of the other.
On the contrary, Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil. If
therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be
added, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, does
a good deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.
I answer that, If we speak of the goodness which the external action
derives from the will tending to the end, then the external action adds
nothing to this goodness, unless it happens that the will in itself is
made better in good things, or worse in evil things. This, seemingly,
may happen in three ways. First in point of number; if, for instance, a
man wishes to do something with a good or an evil end in view, and does
not do it then, but afterwards wills and does it, the act of his will
is doubled and a double good, or a double evil is the result. Secondly,
in point of extension: when, for instance, a man wishes to do something
for a good or an evil end, and is hindered by some obstacle, whereas
another man perseveres in the movement of the will until he accomplish
it in deed; it is evident that the will of the latter is more lasting
in good or evil, and in this respect, is better or worse. Thirdly, in
point of intensity: for these are certain external actions, which, in
so far as they are pleasurable, or painful, are such as naturally to
make the will more intense or more remiss; and it is evident that the
more intensely the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it
is.
On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which the external
action derives from its matter and due circumstances, thus it stands in
relation to the will as its term and end. And in this way it adds to
the goodness or malice of the will; because every inclination or
movement is perfected by attaining its end or reaching its term.
Wherefore the will is not perfect, unless it be such that, given the
opportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove impossible,
as long as the will is perfect, so as to realize the operation if it
could; the lack of perfection derived from the external action, is
simply involuntary. Now just as the involuntary deserves neither
punishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or evil deeds, so
neither does it lessen reward or punishment, if a man through simple
involuntariness fail to do good or evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is speaking of the case where a man's
will is complete, and does not refrain from the deed save through the
impossibility of achievement.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to that goodness which the
external action derives from the will as tending to the end. But the
goodness which the external action takes from its matter and
circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end; but
it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act willed, to
which it stands in the relation of measure and cause, as stated above
([1195]AA[1],2).
From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
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Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or
malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the consequences of the external action
increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists virtually in
its cause. But the consequences result from the action as an effect
from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually in actions. Now a
thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since a
virtue "makes that which has it to be good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore
the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action.
Objection 2: Further, the good actions of his hearers are consequences
resulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these redound
to the merit of the preacher, as is evident from Phil. 4:1: "My dearly
beloved brethren, my joy and my crown. " Therefore the consequences of
an action increase its goodness or malice.
Objection 3: Further, punishment is not increased, unless the fault
increases: wherefore it is written (Dt. 25:2): "According to the
measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be. " But the
punishment is increased on account of the consequences; for it is
written (Ex. 21:29): "But if the ox was wont to push with his horn
yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did
not shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a woman, then the ox shall
be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death. " But he would not
have been put to death, if the ox, although he had not been shut up,
had not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase the goodness
or malice of an action.
Objection 4: Further, if a man do something which may cause death, by
striking, or by sentencing, and if death does not ensue, he does not
contract irregularity: but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore
the consequence of an action increase its goodness or malice.
On the contrary, The consequences do not make an action that was evil,
to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if a man
give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by committing
a sin, this does not undo the good done by the giver; and, in like
manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the wrongdoer is
not thereby excused. Therefore the consequences of an action doe not
increase its goodness or malice.
I answer that, The consequences of an action are either foreseen or
not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the
goodness or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow
from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom, this
shows his will to be all the more inordinate.
But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction.
Because if they follow from the nature of the action and in the
majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the
goodness or malice of that action: for it is evident that an action is
specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and
specifically worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results. On
the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then
they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action: because we
do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by
accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.
Reply to Objection 1: The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect
that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by
accident.
Reply to Objection 2: The good actions done by the hearers, result from
the preacher's words, as an effect that flows from their very nature.
Hence they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such
is his intention.
Reply to Objection 3: The consequences for which that man is ordered to
be punished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed
to be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable.
Reply to Objection 4: This argument would prove if irregularity were
the result of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of
the fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament.
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Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that one and the same external action can be
both good and evil. For "movement, if continuous, is one and the same"
(Phys. v, 4). But one continuous movement can be both good and bad: for
instance, a man may go to church continuously, intending at first
vainglory, and afterwards the service of God. Therefore one and the
same action can be both good and bad.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3),
action and passion are one act. But the passion may be good, as
Christ's was; and the action evil, as that of the Jews. Therefore one
and the same act can be both good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, since a servant is an instrument, as it were, of
his master, the servant's action is his master's, just as the action of
a tool is the workman's action. But it may happen that the servant's
action result from his master's good will, and is therefore good: and
from the evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore the
same action can be both good and evil.
On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries.
But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be
both good and evil.
On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries.
But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be
both good and evil.
I answer that, Nothing hinders a thing from being one, in so far as it
is in one genus, and manifold, in so far as it is referred to another
genus. Thus a continuous surface is one, considered as in the genus of
quantity; and yet it is manifold, considered as to the genus of color,
if it be partly white, and partly black. And accordingly, nothing
hinders an action from being one, considered in the natural order;
whereas it is not one, considered in the moral order; and vice versa,
as we have stated above (A[3], ad 1;[1196] Q[18], A[7], ad 1). For
continuous walking is one action, considered in the natural order: but
it may resolve itself into many actions, considered in the moral order,
if a change take place in the walker's will, for the will is the
principle of moral actions. If therefore we consider one action in the
moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good and evil.
Whereas if it be one as to natural and not moral unity, it can be both
good and evil.
Reply to Objection 1: This continual movement which proceeds from
various intentions, although it is one in the natural order, is not one
in the point of moral unity.
Reply to Objection 2: Action and passion belong to the moral order, in
so far as they are voluntary. And therefore in so far as they are
voluntary in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct
things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other.
Reply to Objection 3: The action of the servant, in so far as it
proceeds from the will of the servant, is not the master's action: but
only in so far as it proceeds from the master's command. Wherefore the
evil will of the servant does not make the action evil in this respect.
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OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE
(FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of
their goodness and malice: and under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being
good or evil?
(2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame?
(3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious?
(4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?
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Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil?
Objection 1: It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in so
far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of nature" (Phys.
ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things engendered outside the
order of nature. Now things that are produced according to art and
reason imitate those that are produced according to nature (Phys. ii,
8). Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being inordinate
and evil.
Objection 2: Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 occurs in nature
and art, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained. But
the goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the
intention of the end, and on its achievement. Therefore it seems that
the malice of an action does not make it sinful.
Objection 3: Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it
follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is false:
since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an
action is not sinful by reason of its being evil.
On the contrary, As shown above ([1197]Q[19], A[4]), the goodness of a
human action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and consequently
its malice consists in its being in disaccord with the Eternal Law. But
this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii,
27) that "sin is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the Eternal
Law. " Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its being evil.
I answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good
than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an
evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain
end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order to an end is
measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this
rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When
therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the
natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right:
since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action does not
swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an
action strays from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin.
Now in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is
the human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal Law. When,
therefore, a human action tends to the end, according to the order of
reason and of the Eternal Law, then that action is right: but when it
turns aside from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it is
evident from what has been said ([1198]Q[19], AA[3],4) that every
voluntary action that turns aside from the order of reason and of the
Eternal Law, is evil, and that every good action is in accord with
reason and the Eternal Law. Hence it follows that a human action is
right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they result
from a sin in nature's action.
Reply to Objection 2: The end is twofold; the last end, and the
proximate end. In the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in
respect of the last end, which is the perfection of the thing
generated; but it does not fail in respect of any proximate end
whatever; since when nature works it forms something. In like manner,
the sin of the will always fails as regards the last end intended,
because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to happiness, which is
the last end: and yet it does not fail in respect of some proximate
end: intended and achieved by the will. Wherefore also, since the very
intention of this end is ordained to the last end, this same intention
may be right or sinful.
Reply to Objection 3: Each thing is ordained to its end by its action:
and therefore sin, which consists in straying from the order to the
end, consists properly in an action. On the other hand, punishment
regards the person of the sinner, as was stated in the [1199]FP, Q[48],
A[5], ad 4; A[6], ad 3.
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Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good
or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that a human action does not deserve praise
or blame by reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens even in
things done by nature" (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not
deserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5). Therefore a human action
does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and,
consequently, neither does it deserve praise, by reason of its being
good.
Objection 2: Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so does it
happen in the productions of art: because as stated in Phys. ii, 8 "it
is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to give the
wrong medicine. " But the artist is not blamed for making something bad:
because the artist's work is such, that he can produce a good or a bad
thing, just as he lists. Therefore it seems that neither is there any
reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact that it is evil.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is "weak
and incapable. " But weakness or inability either takes away or
diminishes guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from
being evil.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that
"virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue
deserve censure and blame. " But good actions are virtuous; because
"virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action good"
(Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. Therefore
a human action deserves praise or blame, through being good or evil.
I answer that, Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin
more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise
or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to
blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or
goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it
is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is through
his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made clear
above ([1200]Q[1], AA[1],2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in
voluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and in
such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing.
Reply to Objection 1: Natural actions are not in the power of the
natural agent: since the action of nature is determinate. And,
therefore, although there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason stands in different relations to the
productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is
directed to a particular end, which is something devised by reason:
whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all
human life. Now a particular end is subordinate to the general end.
