No More Learning

? 45 derrida, ? donner la mort', p. 66; The gift of death, p. 67.
46 Cf. James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy, 2e ed. , New york: mcgraw Hill 1993, pp. 9-14; 44-50.
Hegel and tHe Roman Religion:
tHe Religion of expediency and puRposiveness
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1. introduction
already in the title of the chapter in which he deals with the Roman reli- gion, Hegel indicates that he considers this religion as a religion of 'expe- diency,' (Zweckma? ? igkeit) or--in the introductory remarks--as a religion of 'purposiveness. '1 as will be become clear in this contribution, Hegel actually in doing so captured the essence of the Roman religion quite well, this being acknowledged by subsequent modern Roman religious scholar- ship. 2 Hegel devotes the entire first section of his treatment of the Roman religion to this concept of purposiveness. gods are reduced to means, whereby the purposes for which the gods are served fall entirely within the human sphere. in Roman religion, the principle Do ut des prevails.
intertwined with this notion of expediency and purposiveness, Hegel treats the Roman religion as the religion in which the two previously discussed determinate religions, the greek and the Jewish religion, are united. Roman religion "comprised the religion of beauty and the religion of sublimity. " (l2 27, 687/579) in this unification, that obviously did not succeed very well, the ground is prepared for the christian religion: the
1 the term Zweckma? ? igkeit is translated both as 'expediency' and 'purposiveness. ' When used as a title for his treatment of Roman religion, it is translated by Hodgson as 'expedi- ency,' but in the textual exposition it is more commonly referred to as 'purposiveness' (and zweckma? ? ich as 'purposive'), thus preserving the affinity with 'purpose' (Zweck). literally, Zweckma? ? igkeit means 'conformity to an end or purpose. ' Hegel's use of the term is directly influenced by Kant's discussion of extrinsic purposiveness and natural teleology in The Cri- tique of Judgement, trans. J. c. meredith (oxford: oxford university press 2007), ? ? 63, 66, 79-86. since, in the context of Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion, Zweckma? ? igkeit refers to extrinsic rather than intrinsic purposiveness, 'expediency' is an appropriate trans- lation for it (cf. Hodgson in an editorial footnote in l2 m, 190; footnote 229).
2 Reinhard leuze, Die au? erchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel, go? ttingen: vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1975, p. 228 mentions g. mensching, Die Religion, Erscheinungsformen, Struk- turtypen und Lebensgesetze, stuttgart: schwab 1959, pp. 23-25, K. latte, Ro? mische Reli- gionsgeschichte, mu? nchen: Beck 19672, p. 47. all these authors refer positively to Hegel's characterization of the Roman religion as one of Zweckerfu? llung, that is: as a fulfilment of an aim.
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consummate (or revelatory, revealed, absolute) religion, in Hegel's view. this second major characteristic of the Roman religion as the breeding ground of christianity appears here, in that it produced a "monstrous mis- ery and a universal sorrow, a sorrow that prepared the birth pangs of the religion of truth. "3 in Hegel's view, the Roman religion as such served a higher purpose: a function that has to do with the world-historical role the Roman religion has played as the context in which christianity came to birth. 'purposiveness' gains therefore a much deeper meaning, that is: not only is purposiveness a central characteristic of the creed and the codes of Roman religion in which Do ut des prevails, but the Roman reli- gion as such served a higher meaning, a higher purpose: that of being the deliverer of the religion of true freedom and reconciliation between man and god.
in this contribution, an analysis will be made of the textual material that has come to us. Because Hegel never published a treatise--but undoubt- edly planned to, until his sudden death in november 1831--we can only construct his views from the text of Hegel's original (unpublished) manu- script of 1821, which served as the basis for his lectures, and from the transcriptions of the several lectures Hegel delivered on the philosophy of religion in the years 1824, 1827 and 1831. 4 although Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion remained relatively constant through the period in which Hegel lectured on the subject than that of any other religion, its exact rela- tion and function with regard to the previous determinate religions (espe- cially the greek and the Jewish) differed significantly. How this should be interpreted and understood, is our first task to be undertaken (2). next, an analysis is made of the content of Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion in these lectures (3). finally, a conclusion is reached in which the results of this inquiry into Hegel's view of the Roman religion are briefly summarized, in light of a reflection on the meaning of Hegel's perceptions for our present age (4).
3 l2 27, 699/591, footnote 544, which indicates that this text stems from the transcripts of Hegel's lecture of 1831, the last he was to give on the philosophy of religion. in this contribution, i will pay attention to the problem of the discrepancies between the several versions of Hegel's lectures; they have no serious consequences for Hegel's treatment-- and our understanding of it--of the Roman religion.
4 see for an extensive treatment of this problem: peter c. Hodgson, 'editorial introduc- tion', in: Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The Lectures of 1827, one-volume edition, ed. by peter c. Hodgson, oxford: clarendon press, 2006, pp. 7 ff.
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2. the formal treatment of the Roman Religion in the texts of 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831
The Manuscript of 1821
in part ii of the Manuscript of 1821, titled: Determinate Religion, Hegel describes the ways in which the concept of religion (as it was treated in part i, the Concept of Religion) is to be "grasped in its determinate aspects," that is: how these aspects constitute the "forms of consciousness of the absolute idea. "5 in fact, this part ii can be read as a phenomenology of religion, of how the concept actually took shape in concrete, historical religions. two sets of categorical principles were applied by Hegel to order these determinate religions, one internal and analytical, and one exter- nal. the internal set identifies three moments of religion: aspects that can be discerned in every historical religion under scrutiny. these are 1) the abstract or metaphysical concept of divinity, 2) the ways in which the divine is known representationally in concrete texts and symbols of the religion concerned and 3) the practical relationship in which communion with the divinity is established: the cultus of this religion. this division is applied more or less consequently in Hegel's treatment of all determinate religions; the passages on the Roman religion are also arranged in this threefold, internal classification: the first part bears the title The Concept of Purposiveness, the second part The Configuration of Gods and finally the third part The Cultus.
the external set, on the other side, arranges the whole part of the Deter- minate Religion into a triad corresponding to the fundamental moments of logic, these being: being, essence, and concept. 6 However, in the case of the determinate religions, these categories are applied in the mode of determinateness and finitude. these two are the key in which the moments of logic are tuned. the result is that the logical triad is oper- ated in the following way: 1) pre-reflective immediacy or undifferentiated substance (the oriental religions of nature), 2) differentiation in the form of particularity (the Jewish religion) and necessity (greek religion),7 and
5 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', p. 17.
6 this according to the structure of Hegel's Kleine Logik (the 'smaller logic', laid down in Hegel's Enzyklopa? die der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, Berlin 1831). see more on these fundamental notions the next paragraph, where we will discuss this Hegelian logic more extensively.
7 the title of this second part of the Determinate religion in the Manuscript however is The Religion of Sublimity and Beauty, but the themes of particularity and necessity are treated extensively in it.
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finally 3) external purposiveness (Roman religion). in contrast to Hegel's treatment of the oriental religions of nature, to which Hegel actually did pay not very much attention, his treatment of the Roman religion is quite extensive. under the title of The Religion of Expediency or Understanding, this religion is represented as the apotheosis of finitude, and thus pre- pares the transition from all the finite religions to the christian religion. 8
The Lectures of 1824
part ii of the 1824 lectures is rearranged and has gained a considerable volume, both in scope and content in comparison to the Manuscript. the most obvious structural difference is that Determinate religion is divided into two rather than three main sections. Jewish, greek, and Roman reli- gion are all included now in the second main part, which bears the title The Religions of Spiritual Individuality (leaving Immediate Religion, or Nature Religion under the practically same heading as he did previously), distin- guished according to the diverse ways in which divine purpose actualises itself in relation to finite spirit: as particular (Jewish), plural (greek) and universal (Roman). determinate religion no longer consists of an inner triad, as in: the nature religions, finite spirit, and external purposiveness, but now forms the first two parts of a much larger triad: nature religions, the religions of spiritual individuality, and consummate religion that cul- minates in christianity. 9 interesting to note is that this culmination does not take the shape of a progressive advancement, since finite religion ends in total decay, degeneration and death. the Roman religion is, in this scheme, exactly this ultimate, finite religion par excellence.
at the same time, however, Hegel altered the internal set of categori- cal principles significantly. Hegel drops entirely the analytical scheme of 'abstract concept', 'concrete representation' and 'community / cultus'-- obviously for the reason that it did not work out very well for the christian religion. He altered the inner triad that he used in the Manuscript into genuinely trinitarian moments, which can be identified as three elements of the self-development of the idea of god: a) the idea of god in and for itself (in the immanent trinity: symbolized by the figure 'father'), b) rep- resentation and appearance (creation, fall, and reconciliation, the work of the 'son'), c) the communion of faith among the believers (its origin, subsistence, and worldly actualization, which is the work of the 'spirit').
8 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', p. 17. 9 idem, p. 20.
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as far as the Roman religion is concerned, the internal structure of the chapter dealing with it assumed its definitive form, returning in all subse- quent lectures: a) The Concept of Necessity and External Purpose, b) The Configuration of the Gods, and c) The Cultus. However, Hegel's treatment of the actual content of the Roman religion did not change very much, as was the case with the greek religion. 10
The Lectures of 1827
Remarkably, a threefold distinction among the several forms of the Deter- minate Religion reminiscent of the Manuscript seemed to return in the lectures of 1827. However, the basis of the division is not any longer the logical categories of being, essence and concept, but rather the interplay of nature and spirit. Hegel was obviously unable to provide a convinc- ing justification for this logic-inspired categorization, and resorted to a structure in which the Roman religion gained once again a moment of its own. the three stages that Hegel now presents in these 1827 lectures are: 1) religion as the unity of the spiritual and the natural (Immediate or Nature Religion), 2) the elevation of the spiritual above the natural (The religion of the Greeks and the Jews),11 and 3) the religion in which purposiveness is not yet spiritual (The Religion of Expediency: Roman Religion). this last religion can also be labelled the religion of fate or destiny, because it is devoid of any spirit whatsoever. 12 this aspect is reminiscent of the title under which the Roman religion was treated in the Manuscript, that is: The Religion of Expediency and Understanding.
The Lectures of 1831
many more innovations occurred in part ii, due to the fact that Hegel was obviously not satisfied with his treatment of the Determinate Religion. the threefold division of the Manuscript and and the lectures of 1827 was retained, although no longer based either on the dialectic of being, essence and concept or on the interplay between nature and spirit. Rather the operative triad is based on a new paradigm, that of immediacy, rupture, and reconciliation. these categories are less based on typically
10 idem, p. 21.
11 actually, the title as a whole is: The Elevation of the Spiritual above the Natural: the Religion of the Greeks and the Jews. note that the sequence of the treatment of the Jewish and the greek religion is reversed.
12 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', p. 23.
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logic concepts, but rather descriptive of the general life of the concept and of the dialectic of consciousness--a dialectic that is taken into the divine life as it unfolds phenomenologically in the apparition of deter- minate religions and becomes genuinely trinitarian only in the christian religion. first, as natural religion, there exists a relationship of immediacy between consciousness and its object. in fact, according to Hegel, this is only the case in magic, which is not yet properly religious. Religion only emerges with the inward cleavage or rupture of consciousness, so that consciousness is aware of the gulf between its own transitory being and that of god as absolute power. the third stage entails the overcoming of this cleavage by way of a reconciliation of consciousness and its object in a higher, more mediated level. moreover, it is on this level that freedom becomes actual for the first time.
in this phase, the subject knows himself to be free in relation to the divine object. 13 this is the religion of freedom proper or greek religion. However, since the subject has not yet passed through the infinite antith- esis between good and evil, and since the gods are not yet infinite spirit, the reconciliation that is tried here, is not complete. nor is it completed by Roman religion, which results instead in infinite unhappiness, anguish and servitude--indeed the birth pangs of the religion of true freedom and true reconciliation. interesting to note is that the Roman religion is included under the category of 'freedom'--which is a definitely more benevolent characterisation than earlier ones: as a religion of the under- standing, of finitude, ending in total decay, degeneration, death, fate and destiny, devoid of spirit. 14
With regard to the Roman religion, our conclusion so far should be that only the formal place and role of the Roman religion as a transi- tional religion between all other determinate religions and christianity has remained constant. in all texts, Roman religion is the last and ultimate representative of the determinate religion as such.
13 a more precursory, transitional phase occurs as one in which, in reaction against the confusion of the natural and the spiritual in the previous, unmediated phase, subjectivity seeks to establish itself in its unity and universality. Hegel here discusses the religion of the good (persian and Jewish), the religion of anguish (phoenician), and the religion of ferment (egyptian).
14 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', pp. 24, 25.
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3. an analysis of the content of Hegel's treatment of the Roman Religion in the texts of 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831
Introduction
as already has been said, Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion in all texts is quite steady, with the exception of the Manuscript of 1821, which is much more elaborated. the subsequent texts are much briefer, and only highlight the main points discussed in the Manuscript. in fact, Hegel's interpretation of the Roman religion remained more constant through the eleven-year period of his lectures than that of any other religion. Hegel was thoroughly familiar with Roman authors and draws a great deal on them. among the secondary sources, he relied mostly on Karl philipp moritz's Anthousia; oder, Roms Alterthu? mer (part i 1791, part ii 1796),15 although he was in fundamental disagreement with it. Hegel worked out his own vision in great detail in the Manuscript, and in the subsequent lectures simply summarized the essential aspects. 16 therefore, we will concentrate ourselves on the Manuscript first, as well as on the other sub- sequent lectures.
The Manuscript of 1821
Hegel devoted some fourteen sheets on the Roman religion in the manu- script, which is nearly half the number used for the whole of part iii on the christian religion. He seemed to have been preoccupied in 1821 with the decadence of the Roman religion and empire, to which he compared his own age in rather apocalyptical tones at the end of his lectures. 17 more importantly was, however, that he was working out for the first time his own interpretation of this religion, especially of the fundamental differ- ences between greek and Roman religion. Hegel opposed the commonly held view that the two were essentially similar. in fact, his most important secondary source, moritz's Anthousia, in which this view was condensed, was used by Hegel as his primary target. Hegel used the detailed informa- tion on the Roman gods and festivals provided by moritz to refute moritz. finally, Hegel took a great deal of effort to understand the transition from
15 yvonne pauly (ed. ), Sa? mtliche Werke; kritische und kommentierte Ausgabe, tu? bingen: niemeyer 2005.
16 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', loc. cit.
17 Reference to these apocalyptical tones is made in l3 m, 159-160/95-96.
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the Roman to the christian religion, and in what way it closes the cycle of the finite religions.
the transition from greek (and Jewish) religion to Roman religion, with which Hegel's analysis starts, represents for Hegel the transition from essence to concept, and more specifically, from necessity to pur- pose. necessity, according to Hegel, has no inner purpose, but only the formal requirement that there be some content, outcome or activity. the coherence of necessity is merely that of an external cause-effect relation- ship, whereas the coherence of the concept (to which the transition is made in this part) is that of internal purposiveness or intentionality. 18 With inwardly purposive action "nothing is produced that is not already there beforehand. " (l2 m, 192/98) Hence, purposive action is free action, action in which consciousness is at home with itself. such action presup- poses a distinction between purpose and reality--that is, between end and means--but also an inner connection or coherence. 19 "purpose is the power to dispose of means, the power that has at the same time an initial content determined in and for itself, a content that is both starting point and goal, the mode of necessity that has taken the external, particular content into itself and holds it fast against reality, which is defined in a negative manner, and reduced to the rank of means. " (l2 m, 192/98)
in Hegel's view, this distinction between purpose and reality, end and means, did not fully emerge in greek religion: the gods there are the powers of reality, not a purpose. in Roman religion however, purpose and reality stood in unresolved contradiction, while in the christian religion the distinction has been overcome and sublated. 20 in other words, the purposiveness that is found in Roman religion is finite and external in character. the purpose is realized or carried out through something alien to it; a means is utilized that has no intrinsic connection with the end, with the intentional act. this is the sort of relationship that is grasped by the "understanding" (Verstand), as opposed to the concept. "But, to begin with, the purpose itself is still immediate, formal. its first categorical determination is that what is thus inwardly determinate should exist on its own account, initially in opposition to reality, and that it should real- ize itself in reality as something that resists. in other words it is initially a finite purpose, and the relationship [of divine purpose to the world] is
18 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction' to l2, 26. 19 idem, p. 27.
20 idem.
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a relationship of the understanding, and the religion that has this kind of foundation is the religion of the understanding. " (l2 m, 194/100)
Hegel then asks, of what kind are these finite purposes? "they are to be sought in the natural and spiritual world, not in the nature of god himself, because they are finite. and for this reason the definition of them lies outside of god, and god is seen as an understanding, operating in nature, that orders and regulates them. " (l2 m, 195/101) Roman gods are expedi- ents that oversee, regulate, and protect the full range of human activities and purposes, especially those of a political and commercial character. this is the utterly utilitarian, practical, prosaic religion; specific human needs, such as happiness, satisfaction, self-seeking, define the content of the Roman gods. in this respect, the Roman religion is fundamentally different from the greek, which exists in "the realm of free beauty, joy- ous festival, and the enjoyment of divinity. " (l2 m, 207/113) the greeks worship their gods for the sake of the gods, the Romans for the sake of humanity. the Roman attitude of consciousness is not theoretical, i. e. "it does not consist in a free intuition of objectivity, or free veneration of the divine powers, but in practical self-seeking, the quest for the fulfilment of the singularity of this life. (. . . ) Here [we find] on the contrary a preoccu- pation with finite purposes, an earthbound religion of [finite purposes]. " (l2 m, 207/113) in other words, it consists only of a practical assessment of their own subjective, contingent needs. "every human final end, no mat- ter how inwardly insignificant it may be (to feed oneself, make life more agreeable, etc.
), gives one the right to sacrifice natural things or animal life as much as one will without ado; (. . . . ). " (l2 m, 208/113-114) the objec- tive of Roman cultus lies entirely in the subjective sphere. it regards only subjective interests. "the worshippers' needs and requirements and the dependence that they create are what make them pious, and their cultus consists in positing a power to help them in their need. " (l2 m, 210/116)
Hegel then moves on to a more detailed analysis of the cultus of the religion of expediency, especially with regard to two spheres of human interests: the state and politics on the one hand, and agriculture and gen- eral welfare on the other. the purpose of the Roman cultus is, first and foremost, political: it serves the interests of the Roman empire. "in regard to the state, concrete cases, singular actual [fortunes play the same role] as a prosperous harvest in regard to nature. " (l2 m, 211-212/117) in fact, Hegel contends that this religion contains within it the more specific aspects "needed to become a political religion. " (l2 m, 211/117) a principal goal of such a religion is the state and its fortune and well-being. "(t)he worship of the gods and thanksgiving is prosaically attached to partly to singular
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determinate situations (salvation in cases of need) and actual events" the Roman deity above all others, the deity par excellence is the goddess fortuna; not necessity, nor chance, nor providence, but instead universal prosperity (Glu? ck) of the Roman empire. Hegel devotes an entire section to this goddess. (l2 m, 212-215/118-121)
Beyond this are the general human requirements and activities that make human life prosper, such as harvest, fertility, crafts, trade, travel etc. in all these domains a host of deities appear, who are worshipped in special festivals. "of this kind was the worship accorded to ops con- siva, the consort of saturn, a mysterious goddess who stores within herself the seeds from which all plants come, and ripens them. (. . . ) the bounte- ous fruitfulness of nature in all its manifold aspects [gave rise to] a large number of fertility and crafts festivals. " (l2 m, 217/122) Hegel mentions several examples, e. g. Jupiter, who had a special altar on the capitoline hill as Jupiter pistor ("the baker"), or fornax, the goddess of the oven, who presided over the parching of the corn in the ovens. in addition, there were festivals of vesta, to ensure that the fire should serve for the bak- ing of the bread, of the ambarvalia, a procession around the fields, of the suovetaurilia (festival of swine, sheep, and bulls), and so on. all these were regarded by Hegel as a matter of utility, of prosaic powers.
However, beneath all this is a fundamental fear of harm and disaster: "there are times of prosperity, but equally there are times of disaster. in this prosaic awareness of the antithesis and of finitude, the harmful just as much as the useful takes on a fixed shape (. . . ). it takes the form of something fearful (the powers of evil). " (l2 m, 218/123) this is why Hegel asserts--in a strained but unmistakable allusion to schleiermacher--that Roman religion is based on a "feeling of dependence," which, in developed form, leads to veneration of the power of evil and worship of the devil. However, "(i)t is only particular kinds of harm that one is frightened of at this stage, particular evils to which one bows the knee. inasmuch as it is a negative, this concrete outcome is a situation; it exists as a concrete negative without any inner substantive content, without inward univer- sality. " (l2 m, 219/124) allegorical, prosaic essences of this kind, however, are primarily and essentially those which are characterised by a short- coming, harm, or damage. "for example, the Romans dedicated altars to the plague, and also to fever, febris, and the goddess angerona, care and woe. they venerated hunger, fames, and Robigo, wheat rust. " moreover, he continues to wonder, "(it) is hard to grasp that things of this kind are worshipped as divine. in such images every proper aspect of divinity is lost; it is only the feeling of dependence and fear that can turn them into
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something objective. " (m219/124) and finally: "(o)nly the total loss of all idea, the evaporation of all truth, can hit upon such way of representing divinity, and they can be comprehended only [through the recognition] that spirit has come to dwell entirely in [the realm of ] the finite, of what is immediately useful. " (l2 m, 219-220/124) interesting to note is that Hegel concludes the section on this negativity "that this is where the roots of superstition are to be found. generally speaking, superstition consists in treating something finite and external, some ordinary actuality just as it stands, as a power, a substance. superstition stems from the oppressed state of the spirit, from a feeling of dependence in its purposes; it cannot free itself from its purposes and as a logical consequence defines the nega- tive upon which they are dependent as something that is as temporal and finite as they are. " (l2 m, 220/125) in contrast, other religions (such as the persian, Hindu and greek religion) are free in the presence of their god, and it is only outside religion that they are dependent.
the Romans have made of their religion a thing of enslavement. enslavement to finitude and death, in fact. this becomes clear when we look at the Roman festivals and spectacles, which consisted in large-scale slaughter of beasts and men, a massacre that was purposeless and staged merely for the entertainment of the spectators. "the spilling of rivers of real blood and battles to the death were the spectacles the Romans loved best. (. . . ) they wanted this external, simple story of death, without mean- ing, the quintessence of everything external, the arid process of a natural death by violence of natural means, not death produced by an ethical power. " (l2 m, 222/127) moreover: "(f)or the Romans this prosaic pattern of spiritless butchery, cold and arid, constituted the supreme event of his- tory, the highest manifestation of the fate which for the greeks [had been] essentially an ethical transformation. to die imperturbably, through an irrational caprice having the force of necessity, (. . . ) was the ultimate and unique virtue that Roman patricians could exercise, (. . . ). " (l2 m, 223/127) the gods warded off death as long as possible, but in the end, death ulti- mately prevails. death is the one true divinity for the Romans, "the final mark of finitude for the religion that venerates 'unbounded finitude,' 'spu- riously infinite' finitude. "21
in the last section, Hegel analyses the role of the emperors in the Roman religion and how this final and ultimate determinate religion prepared the ground for christianity. Hegel notices that the Romans worshiped their
21 idem.
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emperors almost as gods, or at least as if they were gods. "inasmuch as the content of the divine purpose consisted for them in finite human pur- poses, and the power over such purposes and the directly actual external circumstances was what made up the good fortune of the Roman empire, the obvious next step was to worship the present power over such a pur- pose, the individual presence of that good fortune, as a god in whose hands it rested. " (l2 m, 223/128) especially the role of the emperor, as an exceptional individual, could be described as an "arbitrary power over the life and happiness of individuals and whole cities. " together with the imperial guard, the imperial will constituted the goddess fortuna.
for the Romans, immersed as they were in finitude, "there was nothing higher that this individual, this power over their finite purposes. " (l2 m, 224/129) in fact, the finite determinate purpose, together with its power, is concentrated and determined in the present, actual will of one individual human being. "since all are in bondage to life, one person's will is in fact the power over finite purposes, over the world; the Roman emperor is lord over the world, as long as he has guards to be the tool of this indi- viduality; but he has only to offend these guards, and he is lost. His vio- lent power is the death of individuality (. . . ). " (l2 m, 225/130) further on Hegel remarks: "power is completely determined, as singularity, but the universal moment has escaped. What is present is the world of outward happiness and the power over it--a monstrous unhappiness. What is lacking is that power should be completely determined in such a way as to make it determinately determinate, in other words that the individual should become subjectivity, actually present, should become something inward, something inwardly substantive. " (l2 m, 225/130) in this respect, the Roman world is the most important point of transition to the chris- tian religion; in fact, it is the indispensable link to it. (l2 m, 226/130)
the religion of external purposiveness closes the cycle of the finite reli- gions. the step of which the Roman religion consists of before the transi- tion to the christian religion is not a positive, but a negative step. finite religion does not evolve progressively into infinite religion, but cycles back upon it. "the 'necessity' of Roman religion is that the highest form of fini- tude is the worst, issuing in the absolute unhappiness and grief of spirit, despite the Romans' constant preoccupation with happiness, gratification, success. "22 this is what happens when the slogan of protagoras 'man is the measure of all things', the human being with his immediate wishes,
22 idem, p. 29.
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desires, purposes, interests, feelings etcetera, is elevated to a universal standard. "We behold the complete disappearance of all beautiful, ethi- cal organic life and the crumbling away into finitude of all desires, pur- poses, and interests--a crumbling away into momentary enjoyment and pleasure, a human animal kingdom from which all higher elements have been abstracted. " (l2 m, 229/134) moreover: "[i]t is a crumbling away into mere finitudes--finite existences, wishes and interests--which for that very reason are held together only by the inwardly boundless violence of the despot, the singular will whose instrument is the cold-blooded, spir- itless death of individual citizens, the negative that is as immediate as their wishes, brought to bear upon them and holding them in fear of him. He is the one, the actually present god--himself the singularity of the divine will as the power over all the other infinitely many singular wills. " (l2 m, 229/134)
it is only when finitude has played itself out to the end that god and the world can be reconciled through god in the shape of a single human being. god acquires present actuality, and the world is transfigured in its finitude. However, the religion in which this occurred could not arise in the greco-Roman world. although this world discovered the unity of thought, it did not know it in the form of a "community principle," (l2 m, 231/136) that is, while there might have been philosophical intuitions of the one, they were incapable of taking on the concrete life of a religious community and cultus. "thus christianity arose among the Jewish people when that people encountered the 'finitude of the West' and the age-old grief of the world. "23
The Lectures of 1824
compared to the lengthy treatment of the Roman religion in the Manu- script, its treatment here in the 1824 lectures is relatively short. due to the entirely different structure of the Determinate religion, the Roman religion no longer comprises in its own, separate treatment in a chap- ter, but is now treated as a mere appendage to section B, The Religions of Spiritual Individuality, as the third in a row, after the Jewish and the greek religion. the concept of purposiveness is no longer reserved exclu- sively for the Roman religion, but is attributed to the Jewish and greek as well. these two religions are now also considered under the category
23 idem, p. 30, Hegel, loc. cit.
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of purposiveness. no longer is the movement from Jewish and greek to Roman religion viewed as a transition from power to necessity to purpose (as in the Manuscript), but as a movement from exclusive (or singular) to plural to universal (though external and finite) purposiveness. that is: from exclusive purposiveness, where the Jewish god is one and almighty but confined to a particular people, to a plurality of purposes in greek religion where the gods express a multitude of purposes (and where in fact necessity is purposeless), to a universal purpose--a purpose that is as universal as necessity itself but at the same time empirical, external, and political in character, namely: world dominion of the Roman empire. and because of its finitude and externality, it becomes necessity itself, or better: fate (Fatum). the holiness and transcendence of Jewish faith is lost, as well as the beauty and freedom of the greek religion. Roman reli- gion is the religion of "unfreedom" because human beings have become dependent on a host of finite deities that control every facet of human life, these deities being abstractions, and in fact not spiritual individualities. 24 Hence, Roman religion actually does not fit properly under the category of the title of this second section of the Determinate Religion, namely The Religions of Spiritual Individuality, but because Hegel envisaged only two moments before dealing with the christian religion, the Roman religion had to be treated there as the last station, providing a transition to chris- tianity by depicting the collapse of finite religion in and upon itself.
after a short introduction, Hegel discusses in section a) the concept of necessity and external purpose. stress is laid on the externality of the purpose, even on its empirical content: "What makes it empirical is its content; and this next mode of universality--incomplete, abstract universality--is where the empirical purpose is extended to embrace [the whole of] external reality. this purpose thus becomes a universal condi- tion of the world, world dominion, universal monarchy. (. . . ) the inherent purpose is one that is external to the individual, and it becomes ever more so the more that it is realized and externalized, so that the individual is merely subordinated to the purpose, merely serves it. " (l2 24, 500/399)25 this implies a unification of universal power and singularity, but a raw one, devoid of all spirit. "it is not in the realm of thought that this fulfil- ment is posited; it is worldly power, mere lordship, worldliness merely
24 idem, p. 55 and l2 24, 498/397, footnote 701.
25 islamic religion, Hegel tells here, also has world dominion as its purpose, but of a predominantly spiritual rather than a political one, as is the case in the Roman empire.
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as lordship. (the particular) lies outside the posited unity, it is a content that lacks divinity--it is the egoism of the individual, seeking satisfac- tion apart from god, in particular interests. it lies outside reason; lordship stands cold and egoistic on one side, and the individual equally on the other. " (l2 24, 50-501/399-400)
the discussion of the configuration of this god (imperial authority) and the gods in the second subsection (b) and the cultus in the third (c) in these 1824 lectures is taken from the Manuscript but condensed. emphasis is laid on the seriousness and functionality of the Roman reli- gion, in contrast to the cheerfulness and serenity of the greek religion, which was essentially free. the two necessities it serves are world domin- ion and the exigencies of everyday life. "thus everyday requirements, the arts of understanding, were viewed as something essential, as gods, even though they are concerned with wholly subordinate matters, relating to everyday life, in which the only religious aspect is the formal one that these purposes have now achieved the empty shape of essentialities. " (l2 24, 504/403) again, Hegel mentions many of these gods in the texts, and wonders: "(i)t is hard for us to grasp how such things can be vener- ated as gods. the content can be anything, provided it appears essential for the common needs; it can be any situation, which is then compre- hended without phantasy and on its own, all idealization and all living phantasy being excluded. it is consistent with this prosaic situation in regard to power that the Romans later came to worship their emperors too as gods. " new gods are introduced whenever particular needs arise, be it relief from the plague, be it public sanitation, victory in battle, etc. in a word: Roman worship is a "theogony in progress. " (l2 24, 509/407) moreover, "(w)e see the Romans conquering magna graecia, sicily, plun- dering and destroying the temples and carrying off whole shiploads of gods to Rome. in Rome there is toleration: the syrian, egyptian, Jewish, christian, greek, persian religions, mithraism--the Romans seize on all of them, and precisely in this fusion what gives each religion its shape, the particularity that pertains to art and phantasy, is lost. " (l2 24, 507/405) in fact, "Rome becomes the pantheon in which all the gods of all the peoples are set up side by side, so that they extinguish one another; and they are all subject to the one Jupiter capitolinus, the one necessity, or to the one Rome and her fortuna. " (l2 24, 506/404)
in discussing the cultus, Hegel first mentions the religious disposition of the believer, which amounts according to him to a political disposition: "the religious disposition as such means in Rome that lordship or the universal in general is owed to the gods; it belongs to fortuna, to Juno or
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Jupiter, to a power that is in and for itself, and which is recognized and venerated in Rome's dominion. " (l2 24, 507-508/405) on the subjective side the religious pathos here is what is called Roman virtue. subjective consciousness has only value, insofar as it concentrates itself on the sal- vation of the state. the second aspect of this disposition is that human beings, as concrete, have many other purposes, interests, wishes. imagi- nation equates real worldly purposes with the infinite. therefore, "(t)his religion is consequently one of dependence; the prevailing feeling is one of dependence, of unfreedom. " (l2 24, 508/406) according to Hegel, this dependence leads to superstition, but he does not go that far as to con- tend, as he did in the Manuscript, that this feeling of dependence ulti- mately leads to the veneration of evil and the worship of the devil. this indirect charge to schleiermacher he made then, obviously could not be sustained. (l2 24, 508/406, footnote 723) the second moment of the cul- tus proper is characterized by the fact that the gods are recognized and reverenced in regard to the purposes that the believers want to achieve. "the Romans worship the gods because they need them, in other words primarily at times of stress and anxiety, i. e. , because they wish to have their own narrow interests maintained as essential. " (l2 24, 509/407) lordship of power exists only as the successful accomplishment of par- ticular purposes. Hegel closes this description, again, with an analysis of the Roman spectacles, games and festivals. in fact, nothing more than a process of death devoid of spirit, a murder game, willed by irrational caprice, serving only to give the spectators something to feast their eyes on. "this is a necessity that is mere caprice, murder without content, or having only itself for content. this and the envisagement of fate are the acme of experience, to die imperturbably through an empty caprice, not from natural causes, nor through the external force of circumstances, nor in consequence of offending against something ethical. thus dying is the only virtue a Roman patrician could exercise, and it is one he has in com- mon with slaves and with condemned criminals. " (l2 24, 510/408)
after having briefly mentioned, again, the role of the emperor ("an individual, whose wilful caprice is inevitably devoid of right and of ethi- cal life"), (l2 24, 511/408) Hegel concludes his treatment of the Roman religion, as a transition to the next stage, rather differently from the Manuscript. What we find in the Roman religion is an infinitization and universalization of the finite; the finite subject as a matter of fact. "this infinitude of subjectivity as such can be expressed more precisely as per- sonality, the category into which a human being enters as a person in the realm of right. as a person a human being owns property, has the right
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of possession. it is the person who enjoys recognition as such, but only the abstract person, the abstractly juridical person capable of ownership. it goes no further than that, and i count as infinite in this sphere only; as the infinite reference of myself to myself, i am the absolute, self-sustaining atom. " (l2 24, 511-512/409)26 in Roman religion there appears thus for the first time an infinitude of subjectivity, but only as empirical, immediate, untrue, which cannot be maintained. in this sense, there is still after all place for the Roman religion in this section B. The Religions of Spiritual Individuality, albeit a very abstract and limited one. in the next stage, infi- nite subjectivity will be taken in a much higher sense, as pertaining to the idea, to absolute spirit as it mediates itself with itself. this is the true infinite as opposed to the spurious deification of the finite ego, the most blatant form of which is worship of the Roman emperors. "the stage has been set for the confrontation between christ and caesar. "27
The Lectures of 1827
Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion in the 1827 lectures differed not much from that of 1824, both in content and length. the only remark- able differences are the transitions. now that the religion of expediency has regained an independent status again (as section c. ), just behind B. The Elevation of the Spiritual above the Natural, as the religion in which purposiveness is not yet spiritual. as a matter of fact, what is still lack- ing here, is a divine purposiveness that is holy, universal, and concrete at once. By contrasting it with the greek and Jewish religion, Hegel once again attempts to find a proper place for the Roman religion in his phe- nomenology (or typology) of determinate religions. in greek religion, con- creteness in ethical content of their gods was achieved, but what was still lacking was holiness. moreover, universality was sacrificed to multiplicity. on the other hand, the god of israel was one and holy, but was asserted as the god of a particular people, whose laws were abstract. Roman reli- gion, according to Hegel, was a relative totality, in which the greek and Jewish religions "indeed loose their one-sidedness, but both of the prin- ciples perish conjointly, each by means of assimilation into its opposite; still, it is this very homogeneity that interests us in them. the religion of
26 note that this concept of the person, as bearer of rights such as property, is treated extensively by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right (1821). the entire first section of it, Abstract Right, deals with it. the Roman origin of this concept is convincingly accounted for.
27 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', l2, 56.
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beauty loses the concrete individuality of its gods and hence also their ethical, independent content; the gods are reduced to means. the religion of sublimity loses the orientation toward the one, the eternal, the tran- scendent. " (l2 27, 688/580) due to its external, empirical, finite, utilitarian character, the universal purposiveness of the Romans is flawed. "Religion, when reduced to a means to extrinsic, worldly ends, is finally destroyed. Roman religion is the religion to end all religion--a fact symbolized by collecting the gods of all the religions into a single pantheon, where they are subjected to Jupiter capitolinus and destroy one another, a veritable Go? tterda? mmerung. "28
the conclusion of this section is very elliptical, and therefore the tran- sition to the next and final stage of religion, christian religion, is very difficult to reconstruct. it reads that when the moments which subsist in contradiction and in a spiritless way are unified in Roman religion, then we shall have advanced to the "next and final stage of religion. " (l2 27, 699/591) presumably these very moments are the authentic moments of the religions of beauty and sublimity, as well as the heritage of the reli- gions of nature--moments that have been "homogenized" in Roman reli- gion, but not truly unified. 29 it is not for determinate religion to truly unify preceding moments.
The Lectures of 1831
the text of 1831 on the Roman religion is very short and fragmented, and consists mainly of excerpts made by david friedrich strauss. it need not be summarized again, because the content is virtually identical with that of the preceding lectures, apart from some transitional nuances that will be discussed here.
Hegel makes the transition from greek to Roman religion as follows. 30 free spirit must come to recognize that "its value no longer consists in its being merely the free spirit of the greeks, of the citizens of this or that state, but humanity must be known freely as humanity, and god is the god of all humanity, the comprehensive, universal spirit.