No More Learning

Hence if a bishop or cleric wish to deprive himself of that
which is assigned to his own use, and give it to his relations or
others, he sins not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit, that
they cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby. Hence
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "It is a commendable liberality if you
overlook not your kindred when you know them to be in want; yet not so
as to wish to make them rich with what you can give to the poor. "

Reply to Objection 3: The goods of churches should not all be given to
the poor, except in a case of necessity: for then, as Ambrose says (De
Offic. ii, 28), even the vessels consecrated to the divine worship are
to be sold for the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the poor. In
such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to maintain
himself on the goods of the Church, always supposing him to have a
patrimony of his own on which to support himself.

Reply to Objection 4: The goods of the churches should be employed for
the good of the poor. Consequently a man is to be commended if, there
being no present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the surplus
from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays it by for some
future use connected with the Church or the needs of the poor. But if
there be a pressing need for helping the poor, to lay by for the future
is a superfluous and inordinate saving, and is forbidden by our Lord
Who said (Mat. 6:34): "Be . . . not solicitous for the morrow. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether religious who are raised to the episcopate are bound to religious
observances?

Objection 1: It would seem that religious who are raised to the
episcopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said
(XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that a "canonical election loosens a monk
from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic profession, and the
holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop. " Now the regular observances
pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore religious who are appointed
bishops are not bound to religious observances.

Objection 2: Further, he who ascends from a lower to a higher degree is
seemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower degree:
thus it was stated above ([3777]Q[88], A[12], ad 1) that a religious is
not bound to keep the vows he made in the world. But a religious who is
appointed to the episcopate ascends to something greater, as stated
above (Q[84], A[7]). Therefore it would seem that a bishop is not bound
to those things whereto he was bound in the state of religion.

Objection 3: Further, religious would seem to be bound above all to
obedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious who
are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of their
order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound to
poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (OBJ[1]) "when the
holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the right, as the
lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance. " Moreover they are
sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less therefore are they bound to
other regular observances.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De
Monachis): "With regard to those who after long residence in a
monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside
their former purpose. "

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2) the religious state
pertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while the
episcopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of
perfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal
state, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to
perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of
perfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with
perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with perfection,
it is confirmed the more. Thus when the scholar has become a professor
it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it becomes him to read
and meditate even more than before. Accordingly we must assert that if
there be among religious observances any that instead of being an
obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard of perfection, such
as continence, poverty, and so forth, a religious, even after he has
been made a bishop, remains bound to observe these, and consequently to
wear the habit of his order, which is a sign of this obligation.

On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious
observances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for
instance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or watchings
and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the episcopal
office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them, according to
the needs of his person or office, and the manner of life of those
among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious superiors dispense
themselves in such matters.

Reply to Objection 1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is
loosened from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything,
but in those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated
above.

Reply to Objection 2: The vows of those who are living in the world are
compared to the vows of religion as the particular to the universal, as
stated above ([3778]Q[88], A[12], ad 1). But the vows of religion are
compared to the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now the
particular is superfluous when one has the universal, whereas the
disposition is still necessary when perfection has been attained.

Reply to Objection 3: It is accidental that religious who are bishops
are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, because, to wit,
they have ceased to be their subjects; even as those same religious
superiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains virtually, so
that if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be bound to
obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both the statutes of
their rule in the way mentioned above, and their superiors if they have
any.

As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal
inheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is
added (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that after he has been ordained
bishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed according
to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire.

Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with the
sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with his
death, after which a testament comes into force according to the
Apostle (Heb. 9:17). If, however, by the Pope's permission he make a
will, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but
we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power of his
administration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his
death.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS STATE PROPERLY CONSISTS (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which
consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider
those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly,
those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the
different kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the
religious state.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the religious state is perfect?

(2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels?

(3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state?

(4) Whether continency is necessary?

(5) Whether obedience is necessary?

(6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow?

(7) Of the sufficiency of these vows;

(8) Of their comparison one with another;

(9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a
statute of his rule?

(10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more
grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether religion implies a state of perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of
perfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not
seemingly pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for
salvation, whether because "thereby we are bound [religamur] to the one
almighty God," as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because it
takes its name from "our returning [religimus] to God Whom we had lost
by neglecting Him" [*Cf. [3779] Q[81], A[1]], according to Augustine (De
Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote
the state of perfection.

Objection 2: Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
53) is that "which offers worship and ceremony to the Divine nature. "
Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain
to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of states,
as stated above ([3780]Q[40], A[2];[3781] Q[183], A[3]). Therefore it
would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.

Objection 3: Further, the state of perfection is distinct from the
state of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also
some are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does
not denote the state of perfection.

Objection 4: Further, religion would seem a place of repentance; for it
is said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy
synod orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal
dignity to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no
means rise again to the episcopate. " Now a place of repentance is
opposed to the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi)
places penitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be
cleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of
perfection.

On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. i, 7) abbot
Moses speaking of religious says: "We must recognize that we have to
undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil, privation,
reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these degrees to mount
to the perfection of charity. " Now things pertaining to human acts are
specified and denominated from the intention of the end. Therefore
religious belong to the state of perfection.

Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those who are called
servants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and
subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him.

I answer that, As stated above ([3782]Q[141], A[2]) that which is
applicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to
that to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of
"fortitude" is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of
the mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of
"temperance," by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures. Now
religion as stated above ([3783]Q[81] , A[2]; A[3], ad 2) is a virtue
whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of God.
Wherefore those are called religious antonomastically, who give
themselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust
to God. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech. ): "Some there are who
keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their
tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess. " Now
the perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated
above ([3784]Q[184], A[2]), and in this sense religion denotes the
state of perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: To offer something to the worship of God is
necessary for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one's
possessions to the worship of God belongs to perfection.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3785]Q[81], A[1], ad 1; A[4],
ad 1,2;[3786] Q[85], A[3]) when we were treating of the virtue of
religion, religion has reference not only to the offering of sacrifices
and other like things that are proper to religion, but also to the acts
of all the virtues which in so far as these are referred to God's
service and honor become acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes
his whole life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to
religion, and thus by reason of the religious life that they lead,
those who are in the state of perfection are called religious.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3787]Q[184], AA[4],6) religion
denotes the state of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it
does not follow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already
perfect, but that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on
Mat. 19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect," etc. , says (Tract. viii in
Matth. ) that "he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to
become perfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his
goods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will
begin to lead him to all the virtues. " Thus all are not perfect in
religion, but some are beginners, some proficient.

Reply to Objection 4: The religious state was instituted chiefly that
we might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the
obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the
obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut
off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs to
penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the religious
state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII, qu. ii, cap.
Admonere) a man who had killed his wife is counseled to enter a
monastery which is described as "better and lighter," rather than to do
public penance while remaining in the world.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether every religious is bound to keep all the counsels?

Objection 1: It would seem that every religious is bound to keep all
the counsels. For whoever professes a certain state of life is bound to
observe whatever belongs to that state. Now each religious professes
the state of perfection. Therefore every religious is bound to keep all
the counsels that pertain to the state of perfection.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech. ) that "he who
renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who has
gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness. " Now it
belongs specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it
belongs to them also to do all the good they can. and so it would seem
that each of them is bound to fulfil all the counsels.

Objection 3: Further, if it is not requisite for the state of
perfection to fulfil all the counsels, it would seem enough to fulfil
some of them. But this is false, since some who lead a secular life
fulfil some of the counsels, for instance those who observe continence.
Therefore it would seem that every religious who is in the state of
perfection is bound to fulfil whatever pertains to perfection: and such
are the counsels.

On the contrary, one is not bound, unless one bind oneself, to do works
of supererogation. But every religious does not bind himself to keep
all the counsels, but to certain definite ones, some to some, others to
others. Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them.

I answer that, A thing pertains to perfection in three ways. First,
essentially, and thus, as stated above ([3788]Q[184], A[3]) the perfect
observance of the precepts of charity belongs to perfection. Secondly,
a thing belongs to perfection consequently: such are those things that
result from the perfection of charity, for instance to bless them that
curse you (Lk. 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like kind, which though
they be binding as regards the preparedness of the mind, so that one
has to fulfil them when necessity requires; yet are sometimes
fulfilled, without there being any necessity, through superabundance of
charity. Thirdly, a thing belongs to perfection instrumentally and
dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence, and the like.

Now it has been stated [3789](A[1]) that the perfection of charity is
the end of the religious state. And the religious state is a school or
exercise for the attainment of perfection, which men strive to reach by
various practices, just as a physician may use various remedies in
order to heal. But it is evident that for him who works for an end it
is not necessary that he should already have attained the end, but it
is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. Hence he who
enters the religious state is not bound to have perfect charity, but he
is bound to tend to this, and use his endeavors to have perfect
charity.

For the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those things that result
from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend to
fulfil them: against which intention he acts if he contemns them,
wherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them.

In like manner he is not bound to observe all the practices whereby
perfection may be attained, but only those which are definitely
prescribed to him by the rule which he has professed.

Reply to Objection 1: He who enters religion does not make profession
to be perfect, but he professes to endeavor to attain perfection; even
as he who enters the schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to
study in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to profess to be a wise
man, but acknowledged himself, "a lover of wisdom. " Hence a religious
does not violate his profession if he be not perfect, but only if he
despises to tend to perfection.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as, though all are bound to love God with
their whole heart, yet there is a certain wholeness of perfection which
cannot be omitted without sin, and another wholeness which can be
omitted without sin ([3790]Q[184], A[2], ad 3), provided there be no
contempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious and
seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do whatever good they
can, for to all without exception it is said (Eccles. 9:10):
"Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly. " Yet there is a
way of fulfilling this precept, so as to avoid sin, namely if one do
what one can as required by the conditions of one's state of life:
provided there be no contempt of doing better things, which contempt
sets the mind against spiritual progress.

Reply to Objection 3: There are some counsels such that if they be
omitted, man's whole life would be taken up with secular business; for
instance if he have property of his own, or enter the married state, or
do something of the kind that regards the essential vows of religion
themselves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such like
counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about certain particular
better actions, which can be omitted without one's life being taken up
with secular actions; wherefore there is no need for religious to be
bound to fulfil all of them.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether poverty is required for religious perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that poverty is not required for religious
perfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently
belong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful for
a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor. 8:12) lays
down the way in which the faithful are to give alms saying: "If the
will be forward, it is accepted according to that which a man hath,"
i. e. "you should keep back what you need," and afterwards he adds (2
Cor. 8:13): "For I mean not that others should be eased, and you
burthened," i. e. "with poverty," according to a gloss. Moreover a gloss
on 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered," says:
"Though we brought nothing, and will carry nothing away, we must not
give up these temporal things altogether. " Therefore it seems that
voluntary poverty is not requisite for religious perfection.

Objection 2: Further, whosoever exposes himself to danger sins. But he
who renounces all he has and embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself
to danger---not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, "Lest perhaps
. . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name
of my God," and Ecclus. 27:1, "Through poverty many have sinned"---but
also corporal, for it is written (Eccles. 7:13): "As wisdom is a
defense, so money is a defense," and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
1) that "the waste of property appears to be a sort of ruining of one's
self, since thereby man lives. " Therefore it would seem that voluntary
poverty is not requisite for the perfection of religious life.

Objection 3: Further, "Virtue observes the mean," as stated in Ethic.
ii, 6. But he who renounces all by voluntary poverty seems to go to the
extreme rather than to observe the mean. Therefore he does not act
virtuously: and so this does not pertain to the perfection of life.

Objection 4: Further, the ultimate perfection of man consists in
happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; for it is written (Ecclus.
31:8): "Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish," and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that "riches contribute instrumentally
to happiness. " Therefore voluntary poverty is not requisite for
religious perfection.

Objection 5: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the
religious state. But bishops may have property, as stated above
([3791]Q[185], A[6]). Therefore religious may also.

Objection 6: Further, almsgiving is a work most acceptable to God, and
as Chrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep. ad Hebr. ) "is a most effective
remedy in repentance. " Now poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it
would seem that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. viii, 26): "There are some of the
righteous who bracing themselves up to lay hold of the very height of
perfection, while they aim at higher objects within, abandon all things
without. " Now, as stated above, ([3792]AA[1],2), it belongs properly to
religious to brace themselves up in order to lay hold of the very
height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them to abandon all
outward things by voluntary poverty.

I answer that, As stated above [3793](A[2]), the religious state is an
exercise and a school for attaining to the perfection of charity. For
this it is necessary that a man wholly withdraw his affections from
worldly things; since Augustine says (Confess.
x, 29), speaking to God:
"Too little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee, which he
loveth not for Thee. " Wherefore he says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that
"greater charity means less cupidity, perfect charity means no
cupidity. " Now the possession of worldly things draws a man's mind to
the love of them: hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi ad Paulin. et Theras. )
that "we are more firmly attached to earthly things when we have them
than when we desire them: since why did that young man go away sad,
save because he had great wealth? For it is one thing not to wish to
lay hold of what one has not, and another to renounce what one already
has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter are cut off
as a limb. " And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in Matth. ) that "the
possession of wealth kindles a greater flame and the desire for it
becomes stronger. "

Hence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of charity the
first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby a man lives without
property of his own, according to the saying of our Lord (Mat. 19:21),
"If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all [Vulg. : 'what'] thou hast, and
give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me. "

Reply to Objection 1: As the gloss adds, "when the Apostle said this
(namely "not that you should be burthened," i. e. with poverty)," he did
not mean that "it were better not to give: but he feared for the weak,
whom he admonished so to give as not to suffer privation. " Hence in
like manner the other gloss means not that it is unlawful to renounce
all one's temporal goods, but that this is not required of necessity.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "Our Lord does not wish,"
namely does not command us "to pour out our wealth all at once, but to
dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his oxen, and fed
the poor with that which was his own so that no household care might
hold him back. "

Reply to Objection 2: He who renounces all his possessions for Christ's
sake exposes himself to no danger, neither spiritual nor corporal. For
spiritual danger ensues from poverty when the latter is not voluntary;
because those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire of
money-getting, fall into many sins, according to 1 Tim. 6:9, "They that
will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the
devil. " This attachment is put away by those who embrace voluntary
poverty, but it gathers strength in those who have wealth, as stated
above. Again bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on
following Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust themselves
to divine providence. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,
17): "Those who seek first the kingdom of God and His justice are not
weighed down by anxiety lest they lack what is necessary. "

Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), the
mean of virtue is taken according to right reason, not according to the
quantity of a thing. Consequently whatever may be done in accordance
with right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the
quantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however, be against
right reason to throw away all one's possessions through intemperance,
or without any useful purpose; whereas it is in accordance with right
reason to renounce wealth in order to devote oneself to the
contemplation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are said to have
done this; for Jerome says (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin. ): "The famous Theban,
Crates, once a very wealthy man, when he was going to Athens to study
philosophy, cast away a large amount of gold; for he considered that he
could not possess both gold and virtue at the same time. " Much more
therefore is it according to right reason for a man to renounce all he
has, in order perfectly to follow Christ. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep.
cxxv ad Rust. Monach. ): "Poor thyself, follow Christ poor. "

Reply to Objection 4: Happiness or felicity is twofold. One is perfect,
to which we look forward in the life to come; the other is imperfect,
in respect of which some are said to be happy in this life. The
happiness of this life is twofold, one is according to the active life,
the other according to the contemplative life, as the Philosopher
asserts (Ethic. x, 7,8). Now wealth conduces instrumentally to the
happiness of the active life which consists in external actions,
because as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) "we do many things by
friends, by riches, by political influence, as it were by instruments. "
On the other hand, it does not conduce to the happiness of the
contemplative life, rather is it an obstacle thereto, inasmuch as the
anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet of the soul, which is most
necessary to one who contemplates. Hence it is that the Philosopher
asserts (Ethic. x, 8) that "for actions many things are needed, but the
contemplative man needs no such things," namely external goods, "for
his operation; in fact they are obstacles to his contemplation. "

Man is directed to future happiness by charity; and since voluntary
poverty is an efficient exercise for the attaining of perfect charity,
it follows that it is of great avail in acquiring the happiness of
heaven. Wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "Go, sell all [Vulg. :
'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure
in heaven. " Now riches once they are possessed are in themselves of a
nature to hinder the perfection of charity, especially by enticing and
distracting the mind. Hence it is written (Mat. 13:22) that "the care
of this world and the deceitfulness of riches choketh up the word" of
God, for as Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ev. ) by "preventing the good
desire from entering into the heart, they destroy life at its very
outset. " Consequently it is difficult to safeguard charity amidst
riches: wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 19:23) that "a rich man shall
hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven," which we must understand as
referring to one who actually has wealth, since He says that this is
impossible for him who places his affection in riches, according to the
explanation of Chrysostom (Hom. lxiii in Matth. ), for He adds (Mat.
19:24): "It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle,
than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven. " Hence it is
not said simply that the "rich man" is blessed, but "the rich man that
is found without blemish, and that hath not gone after gold," and this
because he has done a difficult thing, wherefore the text continues
(Mat. 19:9): "Who is he? and we will praise him; for he hath done
wonderful things in his life," namely by not loving riches though
placed in the midst of them.

Reply to Objection 5: The episcopal state is not directed to the
attainment of perfection, but rather to the effect that, in virtue of
the perfection which he already has, a man may govern others, by
administering not only spiritual but also temporal things. This belongs
to the active life, wherein many things occur that may be done by means
of wealth as an instrument, as stated (ad 4). Wherefore it is not
required of bishops, who make profession of governing Christ's flock,
that they have nothing of their own, whereas it is required of
religious who make profession of learning to obtain perfection.

Reply to Objection 6: The renouncement of one's own wealth is compared
to almsgiving as the universal to the particular, and as the holocaust
to the sacrifice. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech. ) that those who
assist "the needy with the things they possess, by their good deeds
offer sacrifice, since they offer up something to God and keep back
something for themselves; whereas those who keep nothing for themselves
offer a holocaust which is greater than a sacrifice. " Wherefore Jerome
also says (Contra Vigilant. ): "When you declare that those do better
who retain the use of their possessions, and dole out the fruits of
their possessions to the poor, it is not I but the Lord Who answers
you; If thou wilt be perfect," etc. , and afterwards he goes on to say:
"This man whom you praise belongs to the second and third degree, and
we too commend him: provided we acknowledge the first as to be
preferred to the second and third. " For this reason in order to exclude
the error of Vigilantius it is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xxxviii): "It is a
good thing to give away one's goods by dispensing them to the poor: it
is better to give them away once for all with the intention of
following the Lord, and, free of solicitude, to be poor with Christ. "
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Whether perpetual continence is required for religious perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that perpetual continence is not required
for religious perfection. For all perfection of the Christian life
began with Christ's apostles. Now the apostles do not appear to have
observed continence, as evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we
read Mat. 8:14. Therefore it would seem that perpetual continence is
not requisite for religious perfection.

Objection 2: Further, the first example of perfection is shown to us in
the person of Abraham, to whom the Lord said (Gn. 17:1): "Walk before
Me, and be perfect. " Now the copy should not surpass the example.
Therefore perpetual continence is not requisite for religious
perfection.

Objection 3: Further, that which is required for religious perfection
is to be found in every religious order. Now there are some religious
who lead a married life. Therefore religious perfection does not
require perpetual continence.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse
ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit,
perfecting sanctification in the fear of God. " Now cleanness of flesh
and spirit is safeguarded by continence, for it is said (1 Cor. 7:34):
"The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord
that she may be holy both in spirit and in body [Vulg. : 'both in body
and in spirit']. " Therefore religious perfection requires continence.

I answer that, The religious state requires the removal of whatever
hinders man from devoting himself entirely to God's service. Now the
use of sexual union hinders the mind from giving itself wholly to the
service of God, and this for two reasons. First, on account of its
vehement delectation, which by frequent repetition increases
concupiscence, as also the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 12): and
hence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind from that perfect
intentness on tending to God. Augustine expresses this when he says
(Solil. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind
from its height as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts
which belong to the married state. " Secondly, because it involves man
in solicitude for the control of his wife, his children, and his
temporalities which serve for their upkeep. Hence the Apostle says (1
Cor. 7:32,33): "He that is without a wife is solicitous for the things
that belong to the Lord, how he may please God: but he that is with a
wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his
wife. "

Therefore perpetual continence, as well as voluntary poverty, is
requisite for religious perfection. Wherefore just as Vigilantius was
condemned for equaling riches to poverty, so was Jovinian condemned for
equaling marriage to virginity.

Reply to Objection 1: The perfection not only of poverty but also of
continence was introduced by Christ Who said (Mat. 19:12): "There are
eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs, for the kingdom of heaven,"
and then added: "He that can take, let him take it. " And lest anyone
should be deprived of the hope of attaining perfection, he admitted to
the state of perfection those even who were married. Now the husbands
could not without committing an injustice forsake their wives, whereas
men could without injustice renounce riches. Wherefore Peter whom He
found married, He severed not from his wife, while "He withheld from
marriage John who wished to marry" [*Prolog. in Joan. among the
supposititious works of St. Jerome].

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxii), "the
chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage, one of
which Abraham had in use, both of them in habit. For he lived chastely,
and he might have been chaste without marrying, but it was not
requisite then. " Nevertheless if the patriarchs of old had perfection
of mind together with wealth and marriage, which is a mark of the
greatness of their virtue, this is no reason why any weaker person
should presume to have such great virtue that he can attain to
perfection though rich and married; as neither does a man unarmed
presume to attack his enemy, because Samson slew many foes with the
jaw-bone of an ass. For those fathers, had it been seasonable to
observe continence and poverty, would have been most careful to observe
them.

Reply to Objection 3: Such ways of living as admit of the use of
marriage are not the religious life simply and absolutely speaking, but
in a restricted sense, in so far as they have a certain share in those
things that belong to the religious state.
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Whether obedience belongs to religious perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that obedience does not belong to religious
perfection. For those things seemingly belong to religious perfection,
which are works of supererogation and are not binding upon all. But all
are bound to obey their superiors, according to the saying of the
Apostle (Heb. 13:17), "Obey your prelates, and be subject to them. "
Therefore it would seem that obedience does not belong to religious
perfection.

Objection 2: Further, obedience would seem to belong properly to those
who have to be guided by the sense of others, and such persons are
lacking in discernment. Now the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong
meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses
exercised to the discerning of good and evil. " Therefore it would seem
that obedience does not belong to the state of the perfect.

Objection 3: Further, if obedience were requisite for religious
perfection, it would follow that it is befitting to all religious. But
it is not becoming to all; since some religious lead a solitary life,
and have no superior whom they obey. Again religious superiors
apparently are not bound to obedience. Therefore obedience would seem
not to pertain to religious perfection.

Objection 4: Further, if the vow of obedience were requisite for
religion, it would follow that religious are bound to obey their
superiors in all things, just as they are bound to abstain from all
venery by their vow of continence. But they are not bound to obey them
in all things, as stated above ([3794]Q[104], A[5]), when we were
treating of the virtue of obedience. Therefore the vow of obedience is
not requisite for religion.

Objection 5: Further, those services are most acceptable to God which
are done freely and not of necessity, according to 2 Cor. 9:7, "Not
with sadness or of necessity. " Now that which is done out of obedience
is done of necessity of precept. Therefore those good works are more
deserving of praise which are done of one's own accord. Therefore the
vow of obedience is unbecoming to religion whereby men seek to attain
to that which is better.

On the contrary, Religious perfection consists chiefly in the imitation
of Christ, according to Mat. 19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell
all [Vulg. : 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow Me. "
Now in Christ obedience is commended above all according to Phil. 2:8,
"He became [Vulg. : 'becoming'] obedient unto death. " Therefore
seemingly obedience belongs to religious perfection.

I answer that, As stated above ([3795]AA[2],3) the religious state is a
school and exercise for tending to perfection. Now those who are being
instructed or exercised in order to attain a certain end must needs
follow the direction of someone under whose control they are instructed
or exercised so as to attain that end as disciples under a master.
Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction and command of
someone as regards things pertaining to the religious life; wherefore
it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The monastic life denotes
subjection and discipleship. " Now one man is subjected to another's
command and instruction by obedience: and consequently obedience is
requisite for religious perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: To obey one's superiors in matters that are
essential to virtue is not a work of supererogation, but is common to
all: whereas to obey in matters pertaining to the practice of
perfection belongs properly to religious. This latter obedience is
compared to the former as the universal to the particular. For those
who live in the world, keep something for themselves, and offer
something to God; and in the latter respect they are under obedience to
their superiors: whereas those who live in religion give themselves
wholly and their possessions to God, as stated above ([3796]AA[1],3).
Hence their obedience is universal.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1,2), by
performing actions we contract certain habits, and when we have
acquired the habit we are best able to perform the actions. Accordingly
those who have not attained to perfection, acquire perfection by
obeying, while those who have already acquired perfection are most
ready to obey, not as though they need to be directed to the
acquisition of perfection, but as maintaining themselves by this means
in that which belongs to perfection.

Reply to Objection 3: The subjection of religious is chiefly in
reference to bishops, who are compared to them as perfecters to
perfected, as Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi), where he also says
that the "monastic order is subjected to the perfecting virtues of the
bishops, and is taught by their godlike enlightenment. " Hence neither
hermits nor religious superiors are exempt from obedience to bishops;
and if they be wholly or partly exempt from obedience to the bishop of
the diocese, they are nevertheless bound to obey the Sovereign Pontiff,
not only in matters affecting all in common, but also in those which
pertain specially to religious discipline.

Reply to Objection 4: The vow of obedience taken by religious, extends
to the disposition of a man's whole life, and in this way it has a
certain universality, although it does not extend to all individual
acts. For some of these do not belong to religion, through not being of
those things that concern the love of God and of our neighbor, such as
rubbing one's beard, lifting a stick from the ground and so forth,
which do not come under a vow nor under obedience; and some are
contrary to religion. Nor is there any comparison with continence
whereby acts are excluded which are altogether contrary to religion.

Reply to Objection 5: The necessity of coercion makes an act
involuntary and consequently deprives it of the character of praise or
merit; whereas the necessity which is consequent upon obedience is a
necessity not of coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is
willing to obey, although perhaps he would not be willing to do the
thing commanded considered in itself. Wherefore since by the vow of
obedience a man lays himself under the necessity of doing for God's
sake certain things that are not pleasing in themselves, for this very
reason that which he does is the more acceptable to God, though it be
of less account, because man can give nothing greater to God, than by
subjecting his will to another man's for God's sake. Hence in the
Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xviii, 7) it is stated that "the
Sarabaitae are the worst class of monks, because through providing for
their own needs without being subject to superiors, they are free to do
as they will; and yet day and night they are more busily occupied in
work than those who live in monasteries. "
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Whether it is requisite for religious perfection that poverty, continence,
and obedience should come under a vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for religious
perfection that the three aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and
obedience, should come under a vow. For the school of perfection is
founded on the principles laid down by our Lord. Now our Lord in
formulating perfection (Mat. 19:21) said: "If thou wilt be perfect, go,
sell all [Vulg. : 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor," without any
mention of a vow. Therefore it would seem that a vow is not necessary
for the school of religion.

Objection 2: Further, a vow is a promise made to God, wherefore
(Eccles. 5:3) the wise man after saying: "If thou hast vowed anything
to God, defer not to pay it," adds at once, "for an unfaithful and
foolish promise displeaseth Him. " But when a thing is being actually
given there is no need for a promise. Therefore it suffices for
religious perfection that one keep poverty, continence, and obedience
without. vowing them.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Ad Pollent. , de Adult. Conjug. i,
14): "The services we render are more pleasing when we might lawfully
not render them, yet do so out of love. " Now it is lawful not to render
a service which we have not vowed, whereas it is unlawful if we have
vowed to render it. Therefore seemingly it is more pleasing to God to
keep poverty, continence, and obedience without a vow. Therefore a vow
is not requisite for religious perfection.

On the contrary, In the Old Law the Nazareans were consecrated by vow
according to Num. 6:2, "When a man or woman shall make a vow to be
sanctified and will consecrate themselves to the Lord," etc.