Jinnah pressed for a
plebiscite
under the joint con-
trol and supervision of the Governors-General of India and Pakis-
tan.
trol and supervision of the Governors-General of India and Pakis-
tan.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
When Laik Ali, the new Prime Minister
of Hyderabad, met Sardar Patel, the latter referred to the speech
of Kasim Razvi and asserted that such things could not be tolerated.
To quote Sardar Patel, “You know as well as I do where power
resides and with whom the fate of the negotiations must finally lie
in Hyderabad. The gentleman (Kasim Razvi) who seems to
dominate Hyderabad has given his answer. He has categorically
stated that if the Indian Dominion comes to Hyderabad it will find
nothing but the bones and ashes of one and a half crores of Hindus.
If that is the position, then it seriously undermines the whole future
of the Nizam and his dynasty. I am speaking to you plainly be-
cause I do not want you to be under any misapprehension. The
Hyderabad problem will have to be settled as has been done in the
case of other States. No other way is possible.
No other way is possible. We cannot agree
to the continuance of an isolated spot which would destroy the
very Union which we have built up with our blood and toil. At
our fifth
## p. 926 (#970) ############################################
926
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
the same time, we do wish to maintain friendly relations and to seek
a friendly solution. That does not mean that we shall ever agree to
Hyderabad's independence. If its demand to maintain an inde-
pendent status is persisted in, it is bound to fail. ”
The view of Lord Mountbatten was that if he could persuade the
Nizam to visit Delhi, it would be possible to bring him round and
with that object in view, he sent him an invitation to visit Delhi.
However, that invitation was refused by the Nizam. Lord Mount-
batten sent his Press Attache to Hyderabad to meet the Nizam,
study the situation and make a report to him. The report sub-
mitted by the Press Attache was that the Nizam was the keyman
in the situation and nothing was being done without his approval.
He also reported that the Nizam was in a mood of aggressive
fatalism.
The situation on the border began to worsen. On the evening
of 22 May, 1948, the mail train from Madras to Bombay was
attacked at Gangapur Station inside the Hyderabad State. The
attack was made by a party of men equipped with daggers, hockey
sticks and lathis. The Government of India took a very serious
view of the matter.
Lord Mountbatten made very serious efforts to settle the matter
before his departure in June, 1948. He put personal pressure on
Sardar Patel to agree to the four changes suggested by the Hydera-
bad delegation. In spite of that, the Nizam put forward other
demands which were not acceptable to the Government of India
and the result was that in spite of his best efforts, Lord Mountbatten
left India on 21 June, 1948 without solving the Hyderabad problem.
After the departure of Lord Mountbatten, the relations between
India and Hyderabad began to worsen. Charges of border raids
and breaches of the Stand-still Agreement were made on both sides.
Sidney Cotton, an Australian, was employed by the Hyderabad
Government to smuggle arms and ammunitions into Hyderabad.
The Government of Pakistan began to cash a portion of the Rs. 20
crores of the Government of India Securities which the Govern-
ment of Hyderabad had offered to the Government of Pakistan as
a loan. There was a reign of terror. People were being killed and
their eyes were being taken out. Women were being raped and
houses were being burnt down in large numbers. The situation
was becoming intolerable. Both the press and the public opinion
in India accused the Government of India of inaction in the face
of repeated violations of Indian territory. The stories brought by
the evacuees from Hyderabad made the people indignant. Attacks
on the through trains created panic. It was under these circum-
stances that the Government of India decided to take action.
## p. 927 (#971) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
927
In the early hours of 13 September, 1948, Indian forces com-
manded by Major-General J. N. Chaudhuri under the direction of
Lt. General Maharaj Shri Rajendrasinhji who was then the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command, entered the
Hyderabad State. There was some stiff resistance on the first
and second day and after that the same collapsed. On the evening
of 17 September, 1948, the Hyderabad Army surrendered. On
18 September, 1948, the Indian troops entered Hyderabad city.
The police action lasted for 108 hours. It was learnt that if action
had not been taken on 13 September, 1948, Lt. T. T. Moore who
was captured with his jeep full of explosives, would have destroyed
all the important bridges in the State and it would have been very
difficult for the Indian army to move forward.
On 18 September, 1948, Major-General Chaudhuri took charge
as Military Governor. On 19 September, Kasim Razvi
arrested. The Razakars were disbanded and many of them were
detained under the Public Safety Regulations. Strong action was
taken against the Communists and their resistance was crushed.
The administration under Major-General Chauduri lasted up to
December, 1949 when Shri M. K. Vellodi, I. C. S. , took over as
Chief Minister. In 1950, four representatives of the Hyderabad
State Congress were appoined as Ministers. In March, 1952,
general elections were held and a Congress Ministry was installed
with the Nizam as a constitutional head. In 1956 was passed the
States Reorganisation Act by which the State of Hyderabad was
split up and it ceased to exist. Most of its territories went to the
State of Andhra Pradesh.
was
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
The State of Jammu and Kashmir had strategic importance on
account of its international boundaries. To the East was Tibet,
to the North-East was the Sinkiang province of China and to the
North-West was Afghanistan. Gilgit was a part of the territory
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The majority of the popu-
lation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir consisted of Muslims
although the Buddhists were in majority in Ladakh. At the be-
ginning of 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh was the ruler of the State
and Pt. Ram Chandra Kak was its Prime Minister.
After the announcement of June 3 Plan, Lord Mountbatten
visited Kashmir and for four days discussed the question of acces-
sion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with Maharaja Hari
Singh. He told him that independence was not practicable and
the State would not be recognised as a Dominion by the British
## p. 928 (#972) ############################################
928
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
Government. He gave an assurance to the Maharaja that up to
15 August, 1947, he could join any Dominion and there would be
no difficulty. Even if he acceded to Pakistan, India would not
raise any objection. However, it was desirable to ascertain the
wishes of the people before acceding to any Dominion as the
majority of its people were Muslims. Lord Mountbatten failed in
his mission as the Maharaja refused to commit himself. After 15
August, 1947, Lord Ismay went to Srinagar and tried to persuade
the Maharaja to join one Dominion or the other but his mission
also failed.
It cannot be denied that it was not easy for the Maharaja to
make a decision. He was himself a Hindu and he would not like
to join Pakistan at once. Moreover, he was not sure of the fate
of his Hindu subjects in the event of his joining Pakistan. There
was also the possibility of the opposition from the National Con-
ference which was the most powerful and vocal organisation in the
State. If he acceded to India, there was also the possibility of ad-
verse reactions in Gilgit and certain other areas which were contigu-
ous to Pakistan. Moreover, the road communications were with
Pakistan. Till the declaration of the Radcliffe Award, there was
no land communication between India and the State of Jammu
and Kashmir. Moreover, Maharaja Hari Singh was thinking in
terms of becoming an independent ruler.
Shortly before 15 August, 1947, Pt. Ram Chandra Kak was re-
placed by Major-General Janak Singh as Prime Minister. The
Government of Jammu and Kashmir announced its intention of
entering into Stand-still Agreements both with India and Pakistan.
India was not enthusiastic about it even after the announcement of
the Radcliffe Award which connected India with the State by road.
Pakistan signed a Stand-still Agreement but with an ulterior motive.
In spite of the Agreement, the Pakistan authorities cut off the sup-
ply of food, petrol and other essential commodities. Restrictions
were put on the transit of travel between Kashmir and Pakistan.
Goods belonging to the State lying in the towns of Pakistan were
not allowed to be transported to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
The State had practically no petrol for its transport organisation.
Military pressure was put on Jammu and Kashmir to accede to
Pakistan. Mr. M. A. Jinnah sent his British Military Secre-
tary thrice to Srinagar to bring about Kashmir's accession to
Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah also wrote to Maharaja to allow him to
spend the summer in Kashmir on account of his bad health and
offered to make his own arrangements. Major Shah was sent to
Kashmir to arouse the people in favour of Pakistan and also to
intimidate the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. There were hit
## p. 929 (#973) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
929
o
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a
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in
and run border raids on the State. It was under these circum-
stances that Mr. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan took over as the
Prime Minister of the State.
On 15 October, 1947, the new Prime Minister complained to the
British Prime Minister that the Government of Pakistan had broken
the Stand-still Agreement by discontinuing the supply of essential
articles and by stopping, without any reason, the railway service
from Sialkot to Jammu. He also pointed out that the whole of
the State border from Gurdaspur to Gilgit was threatened with
invasion and the same had already started in Poonch. He request-
ed the British Prime Minister to advise the Government of Pakistan
to deal fairly with the State of Jammu and Kashmir. However,
he got no reply. On 18 October, 1947, a protest was sent to the
Governor-General and the Prime Minister of Pakistan against the
breaches of the Stand-still Agreement and the raids on the State.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan, sent a reply on
20 October, 1947 in which he protested against the tone and langu-
age of the communication.
The all-out invasion of Kashmir started on 22 October, 1947.
The raiders included Afridis, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Swathis and the
soldiers of the Pakistan Army on leave. They were led by regular
officers who knew Kashmir well. They advanced from Abbottabad
in North-Western Frontier Province along the Jhelum Valley Road.
They captured Garhi and Domel and arrived at the gates of
Muzaffarabad. All the Muslims in the State Battalion at Muzaffara-
bad deserted and acted as advance guard to the raiders' column.
They marched towards Baramula, along the road leading to Srinagar.
All the Muslims in the State Forces deserted and joined the raiders.
Brigadier Rajinder Singh, Chief of Staff of the State Forces, gather-
ed together about 150 men and proceeded towards Uri. He en-
gaged the raiders for two days and in the rear-guard action destroy-
ed the Uri Bridge. Not only the Brigadier himself but all his men
were cut to pieces in the battle. On 24 October, 1947, the raiders
captured the Mahura Power House which supplied electricity to
Srinagar, and that plunged Srinagar in darkness. The raiders de-
clared that they would reach Srinagar on 26 October, 1947 and
celebrate the Id celebrations in the Srinagar mosque.
Such was the critical situation when the Government of India
received an appeal for help from the Maharaja of Jammu and
Kashmir on 24 October, 1947. Even earlier than that, Field
Marshal Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander, had received a
message from Pakistan Army Headquarters giving information
about the advance of the raiders and their probable destination.
Although the information was passed on to the Government of
b
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C.
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12
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## p. 930 (#974) ############################################
930
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
India, no action was taken on it. Even when the appeal came
from the Maharja on 24 October, no immediate action was taken.
On the morning of 25 October, 1947, a meeting of the Defence
Committee was held under the presidentship of Lord Mountbatten.
It was decided that no immediate action be taken by the Govern-
ment of India and Shri V. P. Menon be sent to Srinagar immediate-
ly to study the situation on the spot and report to the Government
of India. Shri V. P. Menon immediately left by plane and reached
Srinagar. From the aerodrome, he went straight to the residence
of Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan. The latter put all the
facts before Shri V. P. Menon about the situation at that time. It
was decided to send immediately the Maharaja from Srinagar to
Jammu. There were rumours at night that the raiders had infiltrat-
ed into Srinagar and hence it was not considered safe to remain in
the city for the night and hence, Shri V. P. Menon and Prime
Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan immediately went to the aerodrome
and early in the morning of 26 October the plane left Srinagar
and reached Delhi. Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan met
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Deputy Prime Minister
Sardar Patel and apprised them of the serious and dangerous situ-
ation in the State. He solicited army help and made it clear that
the army must be flown at once, otherwise the whole town of
Srinagar would be completely destroyed. He was told that it was
not possible to send the army at a moment's notice but that did
not impress him. Prime Minister Mahajan put his case in these
words to the Indian leaders: “Give army, take accession and give
whatever powers you want to the popular party, but the army
must fly to Srinagar this evening, otherwise I will go and negotiate
terms with Mr. Jinnah, as the city must be saved”. On this Prime
Minister Nehru flew into a rage and asked Prime Minister Mahajan
to go away. It was at this moment that Sheikh Abdullah who
was staying in the Prime Minister's house and was over-hearing
the talks, sent a slip of paper to Prime Minister Nehru. Prime
Minister Nehru read that slip of paper and his attitude was com-
pletely changed. Sheikh Abdullah was against the accession of
Kashmir to Pakistan and there was no love last between him and
Mr. Jinnah. He wanted, as desired by his party, the accession of
the State to India, but he was also keen that power should go in
his hands and the Maharaja should become a constitutional head.
The result of the negotiations on the morning of 26 October, 1947
was that at the persistent request of Prime Minister Mahajan, the
Indian Cabinet agreed to accept the accession of the State and send
its army to Srinagar on the morning of 27 October, 1947 to defend
the State. Shri V. P. Menon again went to Jammu accompanied
## p. 931 (#975) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
931
by Prime Minister Mahajan and after getting the Instrument of
Accession from the Maharaja, he flew back to Delhi. Sardar Patel
was waiting at the aerodrome and both of them went straight to a
meeting of the Defence Committee which was arranged for that
evening. There was a long discussion and ultimately it was decided
that the Accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be accepted,
subject to the proviso that a plebiscite would be held in the State
when the law and order situation allowed. It was also decided
that an infantry battalion should be flown to Srinagar the next day.
This decision had the fullest support of Sheikh Abdullah. It must
be pointed out that Lord Mountbatten and the 3 British Chiefs of
Staff of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force pointed out the risks
involved in the operation for which there was hardly any pre-
paration.
In the early hours of the morning of 27 October, 1947, more
than 100 civilian aircraft and Royal Indian Air Force planes were
mobilised to fly troops, equipment and supplies to Srinagar. It
must be admitted that it was the heroism and enthusiasm shown
by the civilian and Royal Indian Air Force pilots and the ground
ciews that made the air-lift a success. Some of the pilots did
several sorties in the course of the day. It was in this way that the
timely arrival of the Indian forces in the morning of 27 October,
1947 saved Srinagar.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah was impatient with what was happening in
Kashmir. His Private Secretary, Khurshid Ahmed, was already
in Srinagar but after the arrival of the Indian troops, he was arrest-
ed and sent back to Pakistan. When Mr. M. A. Jinnah heard
about the acceptance of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir by
India and the arrival of the Indian troops in Srinagar, he gave
orders to General Gracey, the Acting Commanding-in-Chief of the
Pakistan Army, to send Pak troops to Kashmir but the General re-
fused to do so without the approval of Field Marshal Auchinleck.
The Field Marshal also flew to Lahore on the morning of 28
October, 1947 and explained to Mr. Jinnah that the State of Jammu
and Kashmir had acceded to India and if Pak troops entered
Kashmir, there was every likelihood of a war between the two
countries and if that happened, all British Officers serving in the
Pakistan Army would be automatically and immediately with-
drawn. It was under these circumstances that Mr. Jinnah can-
celled his previous order for Pakistan troops to march into Kashmir.
On 30 October, 1947, a statement was issued by the Govern-
ment of Pakistan in which it was stated that the accession of
Kashmir to India was "based on fraud and violence and as such
cannot be recognised”. It was also stated therein that the State
## p. 932 (#976) ############################################
932
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
troops were the first to attack the Muslims in the State and the
Muslim villages on the Pakistan border and that provoked the
raiders to attack the State. It was also at this time that Pakistan
established her control over Gilgit which was a part of the State
of Jammu and Kashmir.
On 1st November, 1947, Lord Mountbatten and Lord Ismay
flew to Lahore and had a long conference with Mr. M. A. Jinnah.
The latter contended that the accession of Kashmir to India was
brought about by violence and the reply of Lord Mountbatten was
that the violence had come from the tribal raiders. Lord Mount-
batten suggested a plebiscite under the auspices of the United
Nations but Mr.
Jinnah pressed for a plebiscite under the joint con-
trol and supervision of the Governors-General of India and Pakis-
tan. Many other things were discussed at the meeting but nothing
came out of it and Lord Mountbatten came back to Delhi. On
4 November, 1947, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan broadcast from
Lahore in which he said that the accession of Kashmir to India
was a fraud perpetrated on its people by its cowardly ruler with
the aggressive help of the Government of India.
Major-General Kalwant Singh was put in charge of the Military
operations in Kashmir. On 8 November, 1947, his forces occupied
Baramula. When the Indian troops entered the city, it was found
that the tribesmen had taken away all its wealth and women. Out
of the female population of 14,000, only about 1,000 were left.
The destruction of Baramula could be compared with the sacking
of Delhi by Nadir Shah in 1739. By 11 November, 1947, Indian
troops reached the heights of Uri and the tribesmen were in so great
hurry that they gave up Tangmarg and Gulmarg without firing a
shot. One cannot help admiring the courage with which Air
Commodore Mehr Singh flew Major-General Thimmayya over an
unchartered mountainous route more than 23,000 feet above the
sea level and landed him safely at Leh on an improvised air strip.
It was in this way that Leh and Ladakh valleys were cleared from
the raiders by Major-General Thimmayya. The credit of recover-
ing Poonch goes to Major-General Atma Singh.
It was on the persuasion of Lord Mountbatten that the Govern-
ment of India took their complaint to the United Nations against
the Pak invasion of Jammu and Kashmir. A cease-fire was order-
ed with effect from 1st January, 1949. Many efforts were made
by the United Nations to resolve the dispute between India and
Pakistan but they have not succeeded.
In 1965, Pakistan sent her infiltrators into the Kashmir Valley
and then attacked the Chhamb area. That resulted in a war bet-
ween India and Pakistan not only in the State of Jammu and
## p. 933 (#977) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
933
а
Kashmir but also in East Punjab. As a result of the good offices
of the Soviet Union, the war was brought to an end and the famous
Tashkent Declaration was issued in January 1966, but in spite of
this the relations between the two countries are bitter on account of
the question of Kashmir.
The accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been
criticised by Pakistan on many grounds. It is pointed out that the
State of Jammu and Kashmir had an overwhelming population of
Muslims and hence the State ought to have acceded to Pakistan.
However, the fact must not be ignored that the partition of the
country had not taken place on the two-nation theory. If that had
been so, there was no necessity of holding a plebiscite in the North-
West Frontier Province with its 90 per cent Muslim population.
There was also no necessity of consulting the legislatures in Bengal
and the Punjab. The separation of the predominantly Muslim
areas from the rest of India was in the nature of a political division.
Moreover, it must not be forgotten that Muslims are even today
the citizens of India and occupy the highest positions in the coun-
try and that also proves that the partition of the country did not
take place on the basis of the two-nation theory.
It is well known that Mr. M. A. Jinnah did his level best to
secure the accession of the predominantly Hindu States of Jodhpur
and Jaisalmer to Pakistan and offered tempting terms for that pur-
pose.
It is a different matter that he failed but it could not be
denied that Mr. Jinnah did his best to secure their accession to
Pakistan. Moreover, the Muslim ruler of the State of Junagadh
actually acceded to Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan ac-
cepted it. That also contradicts the two-nation theory as the
population of Junagadh was over 85 per cent Hindu.
It must be observed that the Government of India was not en-
thusiastic about the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir
to India. Nothing was done by the Government of India to force
the hands of the Maharaja. As a matter of fact, her attitude was
one of indifference. It is possible that if the raiders had not attack-
ed the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India
which had her hands otherwise full, would not have bothered about
the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It was only when the raiders
attacked the State of Jammu and Kashmir and there was the im-
mediate danger of the fall of Srinagar into their hands that the
Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir requested the Government of
India to come to his help and as that help could be given only if
that State acceded to India, the Government of India was forced to
send her troops into the State of Jammu and Kashmir. If the
attitude of India was one of indifference, it is well-known that
## p. 934 (#978) ############################################
934
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
Pakistan adopted all kinds of tactics to put pressure on the Maharaja
to accede to Pakistan. It is also known that the leader of the
raiders was one General Tariq who was later on identified as
Major-General Akbar Khan of the Pakistan Army. It is
this
Akbar Khan who later on became the Commanding-in-Chief of
Pakistan.
INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRATISATION OF STATES
The accession of States was only a partial solution of the pro-
blem of the States. The people of the States were restive and
wanted to have a share in the administration. The Government
of India was also favourably inclined towards their aspirations.
The administration of the Indian States required to be modernised.
The work of integration, democratisation and modernisation of the
Indian States was done simultaneously. Integration involved the
elimination of the small States by their merger with the neighbour-
ing Provinces or States, or their consolidation into larger political
units by means of the Unions of the States. By those means a few
viable and sizeable units were to be created. Integration also in-
volved the establishment of “a common Centre in the whole of
India, able to function efficiently in the Provinces and States alike
in matters requiring all-India action. ” In the words of the White
Paper on the States, “The aim was the integration of all elements
in the country in a free, united and democratic India. "
(1) As regards the merger of the smallest States into the neigh-
bouring States or Provinces, the Orissa and Chattisgarh States were
the first to be merged. Those States were 39 in number and had a
population of 70 lakhs and an area of 56,000 sq. miles. Individual-
ly those States were too small for a modern system of adminis-
tration. Their mergers were negotiated by Sardar Patel on 14
and 15 December, 1947. According to the Merger Agreements,
the ruling Princes surrendered to the Dominion Government "full
and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and power for and in relation
to the governance” of their States and agreed to transfer their ad-
ministration on 1st January, 1948. On 1st January, 1948, these
States became parts of Orissa and Central Provinces. On 16
December, 1947, Sardar Patel observed thus: “It should be obvious
to everyone, however, that even democracy and democratic institu-
tions can function efficiently only where the units to which these
are applied can subsist in a fairly autonomous existence. Where,
on account of smallness of its size, isolation of its situation, the
inseparable link with a neighbouring autonomous territory, be it a
Province or a bigger State, in practically all economic matters of
## p. 935 (#979) ############################################
INTEGRATION OF STATES
935
everyday life, the inadequacy of the resources to open up its econo-
mic potentialities, the backwardness of its people and sheer incapa-
city to shoulder a self-contained administration, a State is unable
to afford a modern system of Government, both democratisation
and integration are clearly and unmistakably indicated. ”
The next merger was that of the Deccan States numbering 17.
They were merged with Bombay in March 1948. Kolhapur was
merged later on. In this way, an area of 10,860 sq. miles and a
population of 27 lakhs was merged in the Bombay Presidency. In
June 1948, the Gujarat States numbering 289 were merged in
Bombay Presidency. These States covered an area of 17,680 sq.
miles and had a population of 27 lakhs. In May 1949, Baroda
was merged in Bombay Presidency. It had an area of 8,236 sq.
miles and population of 30 lakhs. A few small States in the
Punjab, the States of Banganapalli, Pudukotti and Sandur in
Madras, Cooch-Behar in West Bengal, the Khasi Hills States in
Assam and Tehri-Garhwal, Banaras and Rampur in U. P. were
merged in the surrounding Provinces in 1948 and 1949.
The Merger Agreements of practically all the States were in
identical terms. The merged States became parts and parcel of
the Provinces into which they were included. The people of the
merged States were given representation in the Provincial Legis-
latures. The Government of India Act, 1935, as amended, was
applied to them in the same way as was done to other Provinces of
India.
(2) Another form of integration of States was the consolidation
of States into Centrally administered areas. This was done in the
case of Himachal Pradesh, Vindhya Pradesh, Kutch, Bilaspur,
Bhopal, Tripura and Manipur. 21 States in East Punjab covering
an area of 10,600 sq. miles with a population of about 10 lakhs
were consolidated into the Union of Himachal Pradesh. This
Union was inaugurated on 15 April, 1948. Vindhya Pradesh was
created by consolidating the Bundelkhand and Bhagelkhand States
numbering 35 with an area of 24,600 sq. miles and a population of
36 lakhs. Vindhya Pradesh was created into a States Union in
April 1948 with a responsible ministry but later on its Govern-
ment was taken over by the Government of India on 1st January,
1950. Kutch with an area of 17,249 sq. miles and a population
of 5 lakhs was made a Chief Commissioner's Province in May,
1948. The State of Bilaspur in the Punjab was taken over by the
Government of India on 12 October, 1948. The State of Bhopal
was taken over by the Government of India on 1st June, 1949.
The State of Tripura was taken over by the Government of India
on 15 October, 1949,
## p. 936 (#980) ############################################
936
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
(3) Another form of integration of States was the formation of
the States Unions. These Unions were created "with due regard
to geographical, linguistic, social and cultural affinities” of the
people living in the States. Their rulers came to be known as
Rajpramukhs.
On 15 February, 1948, the United States of Kathiwar
(Saurashtra) was inaugurated. This Union had 222 States, estates
and talukas. Its area was 21,451 sq. miles and its population was
41 lakhs. The important States of the Union were Nawanagar
and Bhavanagar. According to the terms of the covenant, the
States agreed to unite and integrate their territories into one State
with a common executive, legislature and judiciary. There was to
be a Council of Rulers with a Presidium of five members. The
rulers were to elect the President and Vice-President of the
Presidium. The President was to be the Rajpramukh of the Union.
All the executive powers were put in the hands of the Rajpramukh
but he was to be aided and advised by a Council of Ministers. In
other words, he was to act as a constitutional head. The covenant
fixed the privy purses of the rulers and guaranteed their private
property, personal privileges and the right of succession.
On 18 March, 1948 was created the United States of Matsya
consisting of Alwar, Bharatpur, etc. The Union of Vindhya Pra-
desh was created on 4 April, 1948. The United States of Gwalior,
Indore and Malwa or Madhya Bharat was inaugurated on 28 May,
1948. It had an area of 46,710 sq. miles and a population of 80
lakhs. The Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) con-
sisting of 7 big States such as Patiala, Nabha, Kapurthala, etc. was
inaugurated on 20 August, 1948. It had an area of 10,999 sq.
miles and a population of 35 lakhs. The United States of Rajas-
than was created in three stages. The first United States of Rajas-
than consisting of Mewar and nine other smaller Rajputana States
was inaugurated on 18 April, 1948. The State was reconstituted
to include Jaipur, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer and Bikaner. On 15 May,
1949, the United State of Matsya was incorporated into Rajasthan.
The United State of Travancore-Cochin came into being on 1st
July, 1949. Its total area was 9,155 sq. miles and its population
was 93 lakhs.
Under the Indian Princes, the States had autocratic governments.
The people had absolutely no voice in the administration of the
States. The Princes did whatever they pleased. There was prac-
.
tically no distinction between the public revenues and the private
revenues of the ruling Princes.
However, such a state of things could not exist after the inde-
pendence of India and the integration of the States. The people
## p. 937 (#981) ############################################
THE STATES REORGANISATION ACT
937
of the States were demanding a share in the administration and
the Government of India had full sympathy with them. No won-
der, when the Indian States were merged into the Provinces, the
people of those States were put on the same footing as the people
of the provinces concerned. When the Government of India creat-
ed Centrally administered areas, the people of those States were also
associated with the administration. When the Unions of the States
were created, full-fledged responsible government was established
in them. It is true that the people living within the Centrally-
administered areas were not given full control over their administra-
tion, but the people of other Indian States were given responsible
government. Legislatures were set up in the States and the Minis-
tries were made responsible to them. The Rajpramukhs were made
constitutional heads.
THE STATES REORGANISATION COMMISSION
For a long time, there was a demand for the reorganisation of
the provinces of India on linguistic lines. It was contended that
the existing provinces were not created by the British Government
on any scientific principle. Those were set up from time to time
on grounds of expediency. In 1948, the Linguistic Provinces Com-
mittee known as the Dar Committee was set up to go into the mat-
ter. The Committee reported against the proposition. Its view
was that nationalism and sub-nationalism were two emotional
experiences which grew at the expense of each other. A Commit-
tee consisting of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel
and Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya was set up to examine the findings
of the Dar Committee. As a result of the death of Sriramulu,
the situation in Andhra became very tense and the Government of
India appointed Mr. Justice Wanchoo (as he then was) to report
on the matter. It was under these circumstances that the first lin-
guistic State was set up in Andhra. This gave an impetus to the
supporters of the idea of linguistic States and ultimately Prime
Minister Nehru made a statement in Parliament on 22 December,
1953, to the effect that a Commission would be appointed to exa-
mine “objectively and dispassionately” the question of the reorgan-
isation of the States of the Indian Union "so that the welfare of the
people of each constituent unit as well as the nation as a whole is
promoted. ” The Commission was appointed under a resolution of
the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs. Mr.
Fazl Ali was appointed the Chairman of the Commission and its
two other members were Pandit Hridayanath Kunzru and Sardar
K. M. Panikkar.
## p. 938 (#982) ############################################
938
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
Para 7 of the resolution mentioned above runs thus: “The Com-
mission will investigate the conditions of the problem, the historical
background, the existing situation and the bearing of all important
and relevant factors thereon. They will be free to consider any
proposal relating to such reorganisation. The Government expects
that the Commission would, in the first instance, not go into the
details, but make recommendations in regard to the broad princi-
ples which should govern the solution of this problem. The langu-
age and culture of an area have an undoubted importance as they
represent a pattern of living which is common in that area. In
considering a reorganisation of States, however, there are other im-
portant factors which have also to be borne in mind. The first
essential consideration is the preservation and strengthening of the
unity and security of India. Financial, economic and administra-
tive considerations are almost equally important, not only from
the point of view of each State, but for the whole nation. India is
embarked upon a great ordered plan for the economic, cultural
and moral progress. Changes which interfere with the successful
prosecution of such a national plan would be harmful to the
national interest. "
The Commission submitted its report to the Government of India
on 30 September, 1955 and it was released to the public on 10
October, 1955. According to the recommendations of the Com-
mission, the Indian Union was to consist of 16 States as against the
existing 27 and
27 and three Centrally-administered territories. The
States that were to disappear were those of Travancore-Cochin,
Mysore, Coorg, Saurashtra, Kutch, Madhya Bharat, Bhopal,
Vindhya Pradesh, PEPSU, Himachal Pradesh, Ajmer and Tripura.
In certain cases, the whole of the State and in certain others only a
part was to be merged in a neighbouring State or States. PEPSU
and Himachal Pradesh were to form part of the Punjab. All the
Part 'C' States were to be abolished. The distinction between Part
‘A’ and Part 'B' States was to be done away with.
The Commission recommended the abolition of the institution
of Rajpramukhs. Special safeguards were recommended for lin-
guistic minorities. The minorities were given the right to have
instruction in their mother-tongue at the primary school stage. In
the interests of national unity and good administration, the Com-
mission recommended the reconstitution of certain All-India Servi-
ces, viz. , the Indian Medical and Health Services. With the same
object in view, the Commission recommended that as a general
rule, 50% of the new entrants in the All-India Services should be
from outside the State concerned and regular transfers to and from
the Centre and the States should be arranged. At least one-third
## p. 939 (#983) ############################################
THE STATES REORGANISATION ACT
939
of the number of judges in a High Court should consist of persons
recruited from outside that State so that the administration might
inspire confidence and help in arresting parochial trends. The
Commission put emphasis on the need for encouraging the study of
Indian languages other than Hindi. It also recommended that for
some time to come, English should continue to occupy an important
place in universities and institutions of higher learning, even after
the adoption of Hindi and the regional languages for official and
educational purposes.
According to the Commission, the linguistic complexion and the
communicational needs of the Punjab did not justify the creation
of a Punjabi-speaking State. The creation of such a State was
likely to disrupt the economic life of the area. There was no case
for a Punjabi-speaking State because it lacked the general support
of the people inhabiting the area, and because it was not to elimi-
nate any of the causes of friction from which the demand for a
separate Punjabi-speaking State had arisen. The Punjabi Suba
was to solve neither the language nor the communal problem. On
the other hand, it might further exacerbate the existing feelings.
PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh were too small to continue by
themselves. Having regard to the economic and administrative
links between PEPSU and the Himachal Pradesh on the one hand
and the present Punjab State on the other, the merger of these two
States in the Punjab was justified.
During its inquiry, the Commission received 152,250 memo-
randa, petitions and communications, travelled 38,000 miles and
interviewed over 9,000 persons in an effort to get a complete cross-
section of public opinion. The report of the Commission com-
prises 267 printed pages, including two minutes of dissent by Sir
Fazl Ali and Sardar K. M. Panikkar. The first opposed the mer-
ger of Himachal Pradesh in the new Punjab and the second object-
ed to the retention of U. P. in undivided form.
There was a lot of agitation against the recommendations of the
Commission. The interested parties tried to create a sort of chaos
in the country. The Maharashtrians raised a lot of hue and cry
over the city of Bombay. The Congress High Command declared
that it was willing to make alterations in the recommendations of
the Commission if all the interested parties agreed upon any alter-
native. Prolonged negotiations were held and many changes were
made in the recommendations of the Commission but the problem
of Bombay City gave headache to all.
of Hyderabad, met Sardar Patel, the latter referred to the speech
of Kasim Razvi and asserted that such things could not be tolerated.
To quote Sardar Patel, “You know as well as I do where power
resides and with whom the fate of the negotiations must finally lie
in Hyderabad. The gentleman (Kasim Razvi) who seems to
dominate Hyderabad has given his answer. He has categorically
stated that if the Indian Dominion comes to Hyderabad it will find
nothing but the bones and ashes of one and a half crores of Hindus.
If that is the position, then it seriously undermines the whole future
of the Nizam and his dynasty. I am speaking to you plainly be-
cause I do not want you to be under any misapprehension. The
Hyderabad problem will have to be settled as has been done in the
case of other States. No other way is possible.
No other way is possible. We cannot agree
to the continuance of an isolated spot which would destroy the
very Union which we have built up with our blood and toil. At
our fifth
## p. 926 (#970) ############################################
926
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
the same time, we do wish to maintain friendly relations and to seek
a friendly solution. That does not mean that we shall ever agree to
Hyderabad's independence. If its demand to maintain an inde-
pendent status is persisted in, it is bound to fail. ”
The view of Lord Mountbatten was that if he could persuade the
Nizam to visit Delhi, it would be possible to bring him round and
with that object in view, he sent him an invitation to visit Delhi.
However, that invitation was refused by the Nizam. Lord Mount-
batten sent his Press Attache to Hyderabad to meet the Nizam,
study the situation and make a report to him. The report sub-
mitted by the Press Attache was that the Nizam was the keyman
in the situation and nothing was being done without his approval.
He also reported that the Nizam was in a mood of aggressive
fatalism.
The situation on the border began to worsen. On the evening
of 22 May, 1948, the mail train from Madras to Bombay was
attacked at Gangapur Station inside the Hyderabad State. The
attack was made by a party of men equipped with daggers, hockey
sticks and lathis. The Government of India took a very serious
view of the matter.
Lord Mountbatten made very serious efforts to settle the matter
before his departure in June, 1948. He put personal pressure on
Sardar Patel to agree to the four changes suggested by the Hydera-
bad delegation. In spite of that, the Nizam put forward other
demands which were not acceptable to the Government of India
and the result was that in spite of his best efforts, Lord Mountbatten
left India on 21 June, 1948 without solving the Hyderabad problem.
After the departure of Lord Mountbatten, the relations between
India and Hyderabad began to worsen. Charges of border raids
and breaches of the Stand-still Agreement were made on both sides.
Sidney Cotton, an Australian, was employed by the Hyderabad
Government to smuggle arms and ammunitions into Hyderabad.
The Government of Pakistan began to cash a portion of the Rs. 20
crores of the Government of India Securities which the Govern-
ment of Hyderabad had offered to the Government of Pakistan as
a loan. There was a reign of terror. People were being killed and
their eyes were being taken out. Women were being raped and
houses were being burnt down in large numbers. The situation
was becoming intolerable. Both the press and the public opinion
in India accused the Government of India of inaction in the face
of repeated violations of Indian territory. The stories brought by
the evacuees from Hyderabad made the people indignant. Attacks
on the through trains created panic. It was under these circum-
stances that the Government of India decided to take action.
## p. 927 (#971) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
927
In the early hours of 13 September, 1948, Indian forces com-
manded by Major-General J. N. Chaudhuri under the direction of
Lt. General Maharaj Shri Rajendrasinhji who was then the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command, entered the
Hyderabad State. There was some stiff resistance on the first
and second day and after that the same collapsed. On the evening
of 17 September, 1948, the Hyderabad Army surrendered. On
18 September, 1948, the Indian troops entered Hyderabad city.
The police action lasted for 108 hours. It was learnt that if action
had not been taken on 13 September, 1948, Lt. T. T. Moore who
was captured with his jeep full of explosives, would have destroyed
all the important bridges in the State and it would have been very
difficult for the Indian army to move forward.
On 18 September, 1948, Major-General Chaudhuri took charge
as Military Governor. On 19 September, Kasim Razvi
arrested. The Razakars were disbanded and many of them were
detained under the Public Safety Regulations. Strong action was
taken against the Communists and their resistance was crushed.
The administration under Major-General Chauduri lasted up to
December, 1949 when Shri M. K. Vellodi, I. C. S. , took over as
Chief Minister. In 1950, four representatives of the Hyderabad
State Congress were appoined as Ministers. In March, 1952,
general elections were held and a Congress Ministry was installed
with the Nizam as a constitutional head. In 1956 was passed the
States Reorganisation Act by which the State of Hyderabad was
split up and it ceased to exist. Most of its territories went to the
State of Andhra Pradesh.
was
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
The State of Jammu and Kashmir had strategic importance on
account of its international boundaries. To the East was Tibet,
to the North-East was the Sinkiang province of China and to the
North-West was Afghanistan. Gilgit was a part of the territory
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The majority of the popu-
lation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir consisted of Muslims
although the Buddhists were in majority in Ladakh. At the be-
ginning of 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh was the ruler of the State
and Pt. Ram Chandra Kak was its Prime Minister.
After the announcement of June 3 Plan, Lord Mountbatten
visited Kashmir and for four days discussed the question of acces-
sion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with Maharaja Hari
Singh. He told him that independence was not practicable and
the State would not be recognised as a Dominion by the British
## p. 928 (#972) ############################################
928
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
Government. He gave an assurance to the Maharaja that up to
15 August, 1947, he could join any Dominion and there would be
no difficulty. Even if he acceded to Pakistan, India would not
raise any objection. However, it was desirable to ascertain the
wishes of the people before acceding to any Dominion as the
majority of its people were Muslims. Lord Mountbatten failed in
his mission as the Maharaja refused to commit himself. After 15
August, 1947, Lord Ismay went to Srinagar and tried to persuade
the Maharaja to join one Dominion or the other but his mission
also failed.
It cannot be denied that it was not easy for the Maharaja to
make a decision. He was himself a Hindu and he would not like
to join Pakistan at once. Moreover, he was not sure of the fate
of his Hindu subjects in the event of his joining Pakistan. There
was also the possibility of the opposition from the National Con-
ference which was the most powerful and vocal organisation in the
State. If he acceded to India, there was also the possibility of ad-
verse reactions in Gilgit and certain other areas which were contigu-
ous to Pakistan. Moreover, the road communications were with
Pakistan. Till the declaration of the Radcliffe Award, there was
no land communication between India and the State of Jammu
and Kashmir. Moreover, Maharaja Hari Singh was thinking in
terms of becoming an independent ruler.
Shortly before 15 August, 1947, Pt. Ram Chandra Kak was re-
placed by Major-General Janak Singh as Prime Minister. The
Government of Jammu and Kashmir announced its intention of
entering into Stand-still Agreements both with India and Pakistan.
India was not enthusiastic about it even after the announcement of
the Radcliffe Award which connected India with the State by road.
Pakistan signed a Stand-still Agreement but with an ulterior motive.
In spite of the Agreement, the Pakistan authorities cut off the sup-
ply of food, petrol and other essential commodities. Restrictions
were put on the transit of travel between Kashmir and Pakistan.
Goods belonging to the State lying in the towns of Pakistan were
not allowed to be transported to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
The State had practically no petrol for its transport organisation.
Military pressure was put on Jammu and Kashmir to accede to
Pakistan. Mr. M. A. Jinnah sent his British Military Secre-
tary thrice to Srinagar to bring about Kashmir's accession to
Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah also wrote to Maharaja to allow him to
spend the summer in Kashmir on account of his bad health and
offered to make his own arrangements. Major Shah was sent to
Kashmir to arouse the people in favour of Pakistan and also to
intimidate the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. There were hit
## p. 929 (#973) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
929
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in
and run border raids on the State. It was under these circum-
stances that Mr. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan took over as the
Prime Minister of the State.
On 15 October, 1947, the new Prime Minister complained to the
British Prime Minister that the Government of Pakistan had broken
the Stand-still Agreement by discontinuing the supply of essential
articles and by stopping, without any reason, the railway service
from Sialkot to Jammu. He also pointed out that the whole of
the State border from Gurdaspur to Gilgit was threatened with
invasion and the same had already started in Poonch. He request-
ed the British Prime Minister to advise the Government of Pakistan
to deal fairly with the State of Jammu and Kashmir. However,
he got no reply. On 18 October, 1947, a protest was sent to the
Governor-General and the Prime Minister of Pakistan against the
breaches of the Stand-still Agreement and the raids on the State.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan, sent a reply on
20 October, 1947 in which he protested against the tone and langu-
age of the communication.
The all-out invasion of Kashmir started on 22 October, 1947.
The raiders included Afridis, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Swathis and the
soldiers of the Pakistan Army on leave. They were led by regular
officers who knew Kashmir well. They advanced from Abbottabad
in North-Western Frontier Province along the Jhelum Valley Road.
They captured Garhi and Domel and arrived at the gates of
Muzaffarabad. All the Muslims in the State Battalion at Muzaffara-
bad deserted and acted as advance guard to the raiders' column.
They marched towards Baramula, along the road leading to Srinagar.
All the Muslims in the State Forces deserted and joined the raiders.
Brigadier Rajinder Singh, Chief of Staff of the State Forces, gather-
ed together about 150 men and proceeded towards Uri. He en-
gaged the raiders for two days and in the rear-guard action destroy-
ed the Uri Bridge. Not only the Brigadier himself but all his men
were cut to pieces in the battle. On 24 October, 1947, the raiders
captured the Mahura Power House which supplied electricity to
Srinagar, and that plunged Srinagar in darkness. The raiders de-
clared that they would reach Srinagar on 26 October, 1947 and
celebrate the Id celebrations in the Srinagar mosque.
Such was the critical situation when the Government of India
received an appeal for help from the Maharaja of Jammu and
Kashmir on 24 October, 1947. Even earlier than that, Field
Marshal Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander, had received a
message from Pakistan Army Headquarters giving information
about the advance of the raiders and their probable destination.
Although the information was passed on to the Government of
b
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12
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## p. 930 (#974) ############################################
930
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
India, no action was taken on it. Even when the appeal came
from the Maharja on 24 October, no immediate action was taken.
On the morning of 25 October, 1947, a meeting of the Defence
Committee was held under the presidentship of Lord Mountbatten.
It was decided that no immediate action be taken by the Govern-
ment of India and Shri V. P. Menon be sent to Srinagar immediate-
ly to study the situation on the spot and report to the Government
of India. Shri V. P. Menon immediately left by plane and reached
Srinagar. From the aerodrome, he went straight to the residence
of Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan. The latter put all the
facts before Shri V. P. Menon about the situation at that time. It
was decided to send immediately the Maharaja from Srinagar to
Jammu. There were rumours at night that the raiders had infiltrat-
ed into Srinagar and hence it was not considered safe to remain in
the city for the night and hence, Shri V. P. Menon and Prime
Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan immediately went to the aerodrome
and early in the morning of 26 October the plane left Srinagar
and reached Delhi. Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan met
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Deputy Prime Minister
Sardar Patel and apprised them of the serious and dangerous situ-
ation in the State. He solicited army help and made it clear that
the army must be flown at once, otherwise the whole town of
Srinagar would be completely destroyed. He was told that it was
not possible to send the army at a moment's notice but that did
not impress him. Prime Minister Mahajan put his case in these
words to the Indian leaders: “Give army, take accession and give
whatever powers you want to the popular party, but the army
must fly to Srinagar this evening, otherwise I will go and negotiate
terms with Mr. Jinnah, as the city must be saved”. On this Prime
Minister Nehru flew into a rage and asked Prime Minister Mahajan
to go away. It was at this moment that Sheikh Abdullah who
was staying in the Prime Minister's house and was over-hearing
the talks, sent a slip of paper to Prime Minister Nehru. Prime
Minister Nehru read that slip of paper and his attitude was com-
pletely changed. Sheikh Abdullah was against the accession of
Kashmir to Pakistan and there was no love last between him and
Mr. Jinnah. He wanted, as desired by his party, the accession of
the State to India, but he was also keen that power should go in
his hands and the Maharaja should become a constitutional head.
The result of the negotiations on the morning of 26 October, 1947
was that at the persistent request of Prime Minister Mahajan, the
Indian Cabinet agreed to accept the accession of the State and send
its army to Srinagar on the morning of 27 October, 1947 to defend
the State. Shri V. P. Menon again went to Jammu accompanied
## p. 931 (#975) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
931
by Prime Minister Mahajan and after getting the Instrument of
Accession from the Maharaja, he flew back to Delhi. Sardar Patel
was waiting at the aerodrome and both of them went straight to a
meeting of the Defence Committee which was arranged for that
evening. There was a long discussion and ultimately it was decided
that the Accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be accepted,
subject to the proviso that a plebiscite would be held in the State
when the law and order situation allowed. It was also decided
that an infantry battalion should be flown to Srinagar the next day.
This decision had the fullest support of Sheikh Abdullah. It must
be pointed out that Lord Mountbatten and the 3 British Chiefs of
Staff of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force pointed out the risks
involved in the operation for which there was hardly any pre-
paration.
In the early hours of the morning of 27 October, 1947, more
than 100 civilian aircraft and Royal Indian Air Force planes were
mobilised to fly troops, equipment and supplies to Srinagar. It
must be admitted that it was the heroism and enthusiasm shown
by the civilian and Royal Indian Air Force pilots and the ground
ciews that made the air-lift a success. Some of the pilots did
several sorties in the course of the day. It was in this way that the
timely arrival of the Indian forces in the morning of 27 October,
1947 saved Srinagar.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah was impatient with what was happening in
Kashmir. His Private Secretary, Khurshid Ahmed, was already
in Srinagar but after the arrival of the Indian troops, he was arrest-
ed and sent back to Pakistan. When Mr. M. A. Jinnah heard
about the acceptance of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir by
India and the arrival of the Indian troops in Srinagar, he gave
orders to General Gracey, the Acting Commanding-in-Chief of the
Pakistan Army, to send Pak troops to Kashmir but the General re-
fused to do so without the approval of Field Marshal Auchinleck.
The Field Marshal also flew to Lahore on the morning of 28
October, 1947 and explained to Mr. Jinnah that the State of Jammu
and Kashmir had acceded to India and if Pak troops entered
Kashmir, there was every likelihood of a war between the two
countries and if that happened, all British Officers serving in the
Pakistan Army would be automatically and immediately with-
drawn. It was under these circumstances that Mr. Jinnah can-
celled his previous order for Pakistan troops to march into Kashmir.
On 30 October, 1947, a statement was issued by the Govern-
ment of Pakistan in which it was stated that the accession of
Kashmir to India was "based on fraud and violence and as such
cannot be recognised”. It was also stated therein that the State
## p. 932 (#976) ############################################
932
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
troops were the first to attack the Muslims in the State and the
Muslim villages on the Pakistan border and that provoked the
raiders to attack the State. It was also at this time that Pakistan
established her control over Gilgit which was a part of the State
of Jammu and Kashmir.
On 1st November, 1947, Lord Mountbatten and Lord Ismay
flew to Lahore and had a long conference with Mr. M. A. Jinnah.
The latter contended that the accession of Kashmir to India was
brought about by violence and the reply of Lord Mountbatten was
that the violence had come from the tribal raiders. Lord Mount-
batten suggested a plebiscite under the auspices of the United
Nations but Mr.
Jinnah pressed for a plebiscite under the joint con-
trol and supervision of the Governors-General of India and Pakis-
tan. Many other things were discussed at the meeting but nothing
came out of it and Lord Mountbatten came back to Delhi. On
4 November, 1947, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan broadcast from
Lahore in which he said that the accession of Kashmir to India
was a fraud perpetrated on its people by its cowardly ruler with
the aggressive help of the Government of India.
Major-General Kalwant Singh was put in charge of the Military
operations in Kashmir. On 8 November, 1947, his forces occupied
Baramula. When the Indian troops entered the city, it was found
that the tribesmen had taken away all its wealth and women. Out
of the female population of 14,000, only about 1,000 were left.
The destruction of Baramula could be compared with the sacking
of Delhi by Nadir Shah in 1739. By 11 November, 1947, Indian
troops reached the heights of Uri and the tribesmen were in so great
hurry that they gave up Tangmarg and Gulmarg without firing a
shot. One cannot help admiring the courage with which Air
Commodore Mehr Singh flew Major-General Thimmayya over an
unchartered mountainous route more than 23,000 feet above the
sea level and landed him safely at Leh on an improvised air strip.
It was in this way that Leh and Ladakh valleys were cleared from
the raiders by Major-General Thimmayya. The credit of recover-
ing Poonch goes to Major-General Atma Singh.
It was on the persuasion of Lord Mountbatten that the Govern-
ment of India took their complaint to the United Nations against
the Pak invasion of Jammu and Kashmir. A cease-fire was order-
ed with effect from 1st January, 1949. Many efforts were made
by the United Nations to resolve the dispute between India and
Pakistan but they have not succeeded.
In 1965, Pakistan sent her infiltrators into the Kashmir Valley
and then attacked the Chhamb area. That resulted in a war bet-
ween India and Pakistan not only in the State of Jammu and
## p. 933 (#977) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
933
а
Kashmir but also in East Punjab. As a result of the good offices
of the Soviet Union, the war was brought to an end and the famous
Tashkent Declaration was issued in January 1966, but in spite of
this the relations between the two countries are bitter on account of
the question of Kashmir.
The accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been
criticised by Pakistan on many grounds. It is pointed out that the
State of Jammu and Kashmir had an overwhelming population of
Muslims and hence the State ought to have acceded to Pakistan.
However, the fact must not be ignored that the partition of the
country had not taken place on the two-nation theory. If that had
been so, there was no necessity of holding a plebiscite in the North-
West Frontier Province with its 90 per cent Muslim population.
There was also no necessity of consulting the legislatures in Bengal
and the Punjab. The separation of the predominantly Muslim
areas from the rest of India was in the nature of a political division.
Moreover, it must not be forgotten that Muslims are even today
the citizens of India and occupy the highest positions in the coun-
try and that also proves that the partition of the country did not
take place on the basis of the two-nation theory.
It is well known that Mr. M. A. Jinnah did his level best to
secure the accession of the predominantly Hindu States of Jodhpur
and Jaisalmer to Pakistan and offered tempting terms for that pur-
pose.
It is a different matter that he failed but it could not be
denied that Mr. Jinnah did his best to secure their accession to
Pakistan. Moreover, the Muslim ruler of the State of Junagadh
actually acceded to Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan ac-
cepted it. That also contradicts the two-nation theory as the
population of Junagadh was over 85 per cent Hindu.
It must be observed that the Government of India was not en-
thusiastic about the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir
to India. Nothing was done by the Government of India to force
the hands of the Maharaja. As a matter of fact, her attitude was
one of indifference. It is possible that if the raiders had not attack-
ed the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India
which had her hands otherwise full, would not have bothered about
the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It was only when the raiders
attacked the State of Jammu and Kashmir and there was the im-
mediate danger of the fall of Srinagar into their hands that the
Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir requested the Government of
India to come to his help and as that help could be given only if
that State acceded to India, the Government of India was forced to
send her troops into the State of Jammu and Kashmir. If the
attitude of India was one of indifference, it is well-known that
## p. 934 (#978) ############################################
934
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
Pakistan adopted all kinds of tactics to put pressure on the Maharaja
to accede to Pakistan. It is also known that the leader of the
raiders was one General Tariq who was later on identified as
Major-General Akbar Khan of the Pakistan Army. It is
this
Akbar Khan who later on became the Commanding-in-Chief of
Pakistan.
INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRATISATION OF STATES
The accession of States was only a partial solution of the pro-
blem of the States. The people of the States were restive and
wanted to have a share in the administration. The Government
of India was also favourably inclined towards their aspirations.
The administration of the Indian States required to be modernised.
The work of integration, democratisation and modernisation of the
Indian States was done simultaneously. Integration involved the
elimination of the small States by their merger with the neighbour-
ing Provinces or States, or their consolidation into larger political
units by means of the Unions of the States. By those means a few
viable and sizeable units were to be created. Integration also in-
volved the establishment of “a common Centre in the whole of
India, able to function efficiently in the Provinces and States alike
in matters requiring all-India action. ” In the words of the White
Paper on the States, “The aim was the integration of all elements
in the country in a free, united and democratic India. "
(1) As regards the merger of the smallest States into the neigh-
bouring States or Provinces, the Orissa and Chattisgarh States were
the first to be merged. Those States were 39 in number and had a
population of 70 lakhs and an area of 56,000 sq. miles. Individual-
ly those States were too small for a modern system of adminis-
tration. Their mergers were negotiated by Sardar Patel on 14
and 15 December, 1947. According to the Merger Agreements,
the ruling Princes surrendered to the Dominion Government "full
and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and power for and in relation
to the governance” of their States and agreed to transfer their ad-
ministration on 1st January, 1948. On 1st January, 1948, these
States became parts of Orissa and Central Provinces. On 16
December, 1947, Sardar Patel observed thus: “It should be obvious
to everyone, however, that even democracy and democratic institu-
tions can function efficiently only where the units to which these
are applied can subsist in a fairly autonomous existence. Where,
on account of smallness of its size, isolation of its situation, the
inseparable link with a neighbouring autonomous territory, be it a
Province or a bigger State, in practically all economic matters of
## p. 935 (#979) ############################################
INTEGRATION OF STATES
935
everyday life, the inadequacy of the resources to open up its econo-
mic potentialities, the backwardness of its people and sheer incapa-
city to shoulder a self-contained administration, a State is unable
to afford a modern system of Government, both democratisation
and integration are clearly and unmistakably indicated. ”
The next merger was that of the Deccan States numbering 17.
They were merged with Bombay in March 1948. Kolhapur was
merged later on. In this way, an area of 10,860 sq. miles and a
population of 27 lakhs was merged in the Bombay Presidency. In
June 1948, the Gujarat States numbering 289 were merged in
Bombay Presidency. These States covered an area of 17,680 sq.
miles and had a population of 27 lakhs. In May 1949, Baroda
was merged in Bombay Presidency. It had an area of 8,236 sq.
miles and population of 30 lakhs. A few small States in the
Punjab, the States of Banganapalli, Pudukotti and Sandur in
Madras, Cooch-Behar in West Bengal, the Khasi Hills States in
Assam and Tehri-Garhwal, Banaras and Rampur in U. P. were
merged in the surrounding Provinces in 1948 and 1949.
The Merger Agreements of practically all the States were in
identical terms. The merged States became parts and parcel of
the Provinces into which they were included. The people of the
merged States were given representation in the Provincial Legis-
latures. The Government of India Act, 1935, as amended, was
applied to them in the same way as was done to other Provinces of
India.
(2) Another form of integration of States was the consolidation
of States into Centrally administered areas. This was done in the
case of Himachal Pradesh, Vindhya Pradesh, Kutch, Bilaspur,
Bhopal, Tripura and Manipur. 21 States in East Punjab covering
an area of 10,600 sq. miles with a population of about 10 lakhs
were consolidated into the Union of Himachal Pradesh. This
Union was inaugurated on 15 April, 1948. Vindhya Pradesh was
created by consolidating the Bundelkhand and Bhagelkhand States
numbering 35 with an area of 24,600 sq. miles and a population of
36 lakhs. Vindhya Pradesh was created into a States Union in
April 1948 with a responsible ministry but later on its Govern-
ment was taken over by the Government of India on 1st January,
1950. Kutch with an area of 17,249 sq. miles and a population
of 5 lakhs was made a Chief Commissioner's Province in May,
1948. The State of Bilaspur in the Punjab was taken over by the
Government of India on 12 October, 1948. The State of Bhopal
was taken over by the Government of India on 1st June, 1949.
The State of Tripura was taken over by the Government of India
on 15 October, 1949,
## p. 936 (#980) ############################################
936
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
(3) Another form of integration of States was the formation of
the States Unions. These Unions were created "with due regard
to geographical, linguistic, social and cultural affinities” of the
people living in the States. Their rulers came to be known as
Rajpramukhs.
On 15 February, 1948, the United States of Kathiwar
(Saurashtra) was inaugurated. This Union had 222 States, estates
and talukas. Its area was 21,451 sq. miles and its population was
41 lakhs. The important States of the Union were Nawanagar
and Bhavanagar. According to the terms of the covenant, the
States agreed to unite and integrate their territories into one State
with a common executive, legislature and judiciary. There was to
be a Council of Rulers with a Presidium of five members. The
rulers were to elect the President and Vice-President of the
Presidium. The President was to be the Rajpramukh of the Union.
All the executive powers were put in the hands of the Rajpramukh
but he was to be aided and advised by a Council of Ministers. In
other words, he was to act as a constitutional head. The covenant
fixed the privy purses of the rulers and guaranteed their private
property, personal privileges and the right of succession.
On 18 March, 1948 was created the United States of Matsya
consisting of Alwar, Bharatpur, etc. The Union of Vindhya Pra-
desh was created on 4 April, 1948. The United States of Gwalior,
Indore and Malwa or Madhya Bharat was inaugurated on 28 May,
1948. It had an area of 46,710 sq. miles and a population of 80
lakhs. The Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) con-
sisting of 7 big States such as Patiala, Nabha, Kapurthala, etc. was
inaugurated on 20 August, 1948. It had an area of 10,999 sq.
miles and a population of 35 lakhs. The United States of Rajas-
than was created in three stages. The first United States of Rajas-
than consisting of Mewar and nine other smaller Rajputana States
was inaugurated on 18 April, 1948. The State was reconstituted
to include Jaipur, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer and Bikaner. On 15 May,
1949, the United State of Matsya was incorporated into Rajasthan.
The United State of Travancore-Cochin came into being on 1st
July, 1949. Its total area was 9,155 sq. miles and its population
was 93 lakhs.
Under the Indian Princes, the States had autocratic governments.
The people had absolutely no voice in the administration of the
States. The Princes did whatever they pleased. There was prac-
.
tically no distinction between the public revenues and the private
revenues of the ruling Princes.
However, such a state of things could not exist after the inde-
pendence of India and the integration of the States. The people
## p. 937 (#981) ############################################
THE STATES REORGANISATION ACT
937
of the States were demanding a share in the administration and
the Government of India had full sympathy with them. No won-
der, when the Indian States were merged into the Provinces, the
people of those States were put on the same footing as the people
of the provinces concerned. When the Government of India creat-
ed Centrally administered areas, the people of those States were also
associated with the administration. When the Unions of the States
were created, full-fledged responsible government was established
in them. It is true that the people living within the Centrally-
administered areas were not given full control over their administra-
tion, but the people of other Indian States were given responsible
government. Legislatures were set up in the States and the Minis-
tries were made responsible to them. The Rajpramukhs were made
constitutional heads.
THE STATES REORGANISATION COMMISSION
For a long time, there was a demand for the reorganisation of
the provinces of India on linguistic lines. It was contended that
the existing provinces were not created by the British Government
on any scientific principle. Those were set up from time to time
on grounds of expediency. In 1948, the Linguistic Provinces Com-
mittee known as the Dar Committee was set up to go into the mat-
ter. The Committee reported against the proposition. Its view
was that nationalism and sub-nationalism were two emotional
experiences which grew at the expense of each other. A Commit-
tee consisting of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel
and Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya was set up to examine the findings
of the Dar Committee. As a result of the death of Sriramulu,
the situation in Andhra became very tense and the Government of
India appointed Mr. Justice Wanchoo (as he then was) to report
on the matter. It was under these circumstances that the first lin-
guistic State was set up in Andhra. This gave an impetus to the
supporters of the idea of linguistic States and ultimately Prime
Minister Nehru made a statement in Parliament on 22 December,
1953, to the effect that a Commission would be appointed to exa-
mine “objectively and dispassionately” the question of the reorgan-
isation of the States of the Indian Union "so that the welfare of the
people of each constituent unit as well as the nation as a whole is
promoted. ” The Commission was appointed under a resolution of
the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs. Mr.
Fazl Ali was appointed the Chairman of the Commission and its
two other members were Pandit Hridayanath Kunzru and Sardar
K. M. Panikkar.
## p. 938 (#982) ############################################
938
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
Para 7 of the resolution mentioned above runs thus: “The Com-
mission will investigate the conditions of the problem, the historical
background, the existing situation and the bearing of all important
and relevant factors thereon. They will be free to consider any
proposal relating to such reorganisation. The Government expects
that the Commission would, in the first instance, not go into the
details, but make recommendations in regard to the broad princi-
ples which should govern the solution of this problem. The langu-
age and culture of an area have an undoubted importance as they
represent a pattern of living which is common in that area. In
considering a reorganisation of States, however, there are other im-
portant factors which have also to be borne in mind. The first
essential consideration is the preservation and strengthening of the
unity and security of India. Financial, economic and administra-
tive considerations are almost equally important, not only from
the point of view of each State, but for the whole nation. India is
embarked upon a great ordered plan for the economic, cultural
and moral progress. Changes which interfere with the successful
prosecution of such a national plan would be harmful to the
national interest. "
The Commission submitted its report to the Government of India
on 30 September, 1955 and it was released to the public on 10
October, 1955. According to the recommendations of the Com-
mission, the Indian Union was to consist of 16 States as against the
existing 27 and
27 and three Centrally-administered territories. The
States that were to disappear were those of Travancore-Cochin,
Mysore, Coorg, Saurashtra, Kutch, Madhya Bharat, Bhopal,
Vindhya Pradesh, PEPSU, Himachal Pradesh, Ajmer and Tripura.
In certain cases, the whole of the State and in certain others only a
part was to be merged in a neighbouring State or States. PEPSU
and Himachal Pradesh were to form part of the Punjab. All the
Part 'C' States were to be abolished. The distinction between Part
‘A’ and Part 'B' States was to be done away with.
The Commission recommended the abolition of the institution
of Rajpramukhs. Special safeguards were recommended for lin-
guistic minorities. The minorities were given the right to have
instruction in their mother-tongue at the primary school stage. In
the interests of national unity and good administration, the Com-
mission recommended the reconstitution of certain All-India Servi-
ces, viz. , the Indian Medical and Health Services. With the same
object in view, the Commission recommended that as a general
rule, 50% of the new entrants in the All-India Services should be
from outside the State concerned and regular transfers to and from
the Centre and the States should be arranged. At least one-third
## p. 939 (#983) ############################################
THE STATES REORGANISATION ACT
939
of the number of judges in a High Court should consist of persons
recruited from outside that State so that the administration might
inspire confidence and help in arresting parochial trends. The
Commission put emphasis on the need for encouraging the study of
Indian languages other than Hindi. It also recommended that for
some time to come, English should continue to occupy an important
place in universities and institutions of higher learning, even after
the adoption of Hindi and the regional languages for official and
educational purposes.
According to the Commission, the linguistic complexion and the
communicational needs of the Punjab did not justify the creation
of a Punjabi-speaking State. The creation of such a State was
likely to disrupt the economic life of the area. There was no case
for a Punjabi-speaking State because it lacked the general support
of the people inhabiting the area, and because it was not to elimi-
nate any of the causes of friction from which the demand for a
separate Punjabi-speaking State had arisen. The Punjabi Suba
was to solve neither the language nor the communal problem. On
the other hand, it might further exacerbate the existing feelings.
PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh were too small to continue by
themselves. Having regard to the economic and administrative
links between PEPSU and the Himachal Pradesh on the one hand
and the present Punjab State on the other, the merger of these two
States in the Punjab was justified.
During its inquiry, the Commission received 152,250 memo-
randa, petitions and communications, travelled 38,000 miles and
interviewed over 9,000 persons in an effort to get a complete cross-
section of public opinion. The report of the Commission com-
prises 267 printed pages, including two minutes of dissent by Sir
Fazl Ali and Sardar K. M. Panikkar. The first opposed the mer-
ger of Himachal Pradesh in the new Punjab and the second object-
ed to the retention of U. P. in undivided form.
There was a lot of agitation against the recommendations of the
Commission. The interested parties tried to create a sort of chaos
in the country. The Maharashtrians raised a lot of hue and cry
over the city of Bombay. The Congress High Command declared
that it was willing to make alterations in the recommendations of
the Commission if all the interested parties agreed upon any alter-
native. Prolonged negotiations were held and many changes were
made in the recommendations of the Commission but the problem
of Bombay City gave headache to all.
