The camp was probably
somewhere
near
Katwyk.
Katwyk.
Tacitus
Julius Priscus, who had commanded the Guards under Vitellius,
committed suicide, more from shame than of necessity. Alfenus Varus
survived the disgrace of his cowardice. [261] Asiaticus,[262] who was a
freedman, paid for his malign influence by dying the death of a
slave. [263]
FOOTNOTES:
[228] Because they were taken for members of Vitellius' German
auxiliary cohorts.
[229] Cp. iii. 86 sub fin.
[230] Cp. iii. 6.
[231] See iii. 76.
[232] These three towns are all on the Appian Way, Bovillae
ten miles from Rome, Aricia sixteen, Tarracina fifty-nine, on
the coast.
[233] Cp. iii. 12.
[234] Gallica.
[235] Capua had adhered to Vitellius. Tarracina had been held
for Vespasian (cp. iii. 57).
[236] See iii. 77.
[237] The insignia of equestrian rank (cp. i. 13).
[238] The chief of these were the powers of tribune,
pro-consul, and censor, and the title of Augustus (cp. i. 47,
ii. 55).
[239] Vindex had risen in Gaul; Galba in Spain; Vitellius in
Germany; Antonius Primus in the Danube provinces (Illyricum);
Vespasian and Mucianus in Judaea, Syria, and Egypt.
[240] This was necessary in the absence of Vespasian and Titus.
[241] See vol. i, note 339.
[242] A triumph could, of course, be held only for victories
over a foreign enemy. Here the pretext was the repulse of the
Dacians (iii. 46).
[243] Vitellius' son-in-law (cp. i. 59).
[244] In the text some words seem to be missing here, but the
general sense is clear.
[245] Cp. ii. 91.
[246] If Tacitus ever told the story of his banishment and
death, his version has been lost with the rest of his history
of Vespasian's reign.
[247] In Samnium.
[248] i. e. shirking the duties of public life.
[249] i. e. the Stoic.
[250] See ii. 91.
[251] Cp. ii. 53.
[252] Soranus, like Thrasea, was a Stoic who opposed the
government mainly on moral grounds. The story of their end is
told in the _Annals_, Book XVI. Sentius was presumably another
member of their party.
[253] He refers to Augustus' regularization of the principate.
[254] Fifty-nine.
[255] The administration of this office was changed several
times in the first century of the empire. Here we have a
reversion to Augustus' second plan. Trajan restored Augustus'
original plan--also adopted by Nero--of appointing special
Treasury officials from the ex-praetors.
[256] His offence lay in assigning to the emperor a merely
secondary position.
[257] His ill-timed advocacy of Stoicism is mentioned iii. 81.
[258] Described in the _Annals_, xvi. 32.
[259] The description of this is postponed to chap. 40. Celer
was convicted.
[260] C. Piso had conspired against Nero, A. D. 65.
[261] They had both abandoned their camp at Narnia (cp. iii. 61).
[262] Cp. ii. 57.
[263] i. e. he was crucified.
THE REVOLT OF CIVILIS AND THE BATAVI
The growing rumour of a reverse in Germany[264] had not as yet 12
caused any alarm in Rome. People alluded to the loss of armies, the
capture of the legions' winter quarters, the defection of the Gallic
provinces as matters of indifference. I must now go back and explain
the origin of this war, and of the widespread rebellion of foreign and
allied tribes which now broke into flame.
The Batavi were once a tribe of the Chatti,[265] living on the further
bank of the Rhine. But an outbreak of civil war had driven them across
the river, where they settled in a still unoccupied district on the
frontier of Gaul and also in the neighbouring island, enclosed on one
side by the ocean and on the other three sides by the Rhine. [266]
There they fared better than most tribes who ally themselves to a
stronger power. Their resources are still intact, and they have only
to contribute men and arms for the imperial army. [267] After a long
training in the German wars, they still further increased their
reputation in Britain, where their troops had been sent, commanded
according to an ancient custom by some of the noblest chiefs. There
still remained behind in their own country a picked troop of horsemen
with a peculiar knack of swimming, which enabled them to make a
practice[268] of crossing the Rhine with unbroken ranks without losing
control of their horses or their weapons.
Of their chieftains two outshone the rest. These were Julius 13
Paulus and Julius Civilis, both of royal stock. Paulus had been
executed by Fonteius Capito on a false charge of rebellion. [269] On
the same occasion Civilis was sent in chains to Nero. Galba, however,
set him free, and under Vitellius he again ran great risk of his life,
when the army clamoured for his execution. [270] This gave him a motive
for hating Rome, and our misfortunes fed his hopes. He was, indeed,
far cleverer than most barbarians, and professed to be a second
Sertorius or Hannibal, because they all three had the same physical
defect. [271] He was afraid that if he openly rebelled against the
Roman people they would treat him as an enemy, and march on him at
once, so he pretended to be a keen supporter of Vespasian's party.
This much was true, that Antonius Primus had written instructing him
to divert the auxiliaries whom Vitellius had summoned, and to delay
the legions on the pretence of a rising in Germany. Moreover,
Hordeonius Flaccus[272] had given him the same advice in person, for
Flaccus was inclined to support Vespasian and anxious for the safety
of Rome, which was threatened with utter disaster, if the war were to
break out afresh and all these thousands of troops come pouring into
Italy.
Having thus made up his mind to rebel, Civilis concealed in the 14
meantime his ulterior design, and while intending to guide his
ultimate policy by future events, proceeded to initiate the rising as
follows. The young Batavians were by Vitellius' orders being pressed
for service, and this burden was being rendered even more irksome than
it need have been by the greed and depravity of the recruiting
officers. They took to enrolling elderly men and invalids so as to get
bribes for excusing them: or, as most of the Batavi are tall and
good-looking in their youth, they would seize the handsomest boys for
immoral purposes. This caused bad feeling; an agitation was organized,
and they were persuaded to refuse service. Accordingly, on the pretext
of giving a banquet, Civilis summoned the chief nobles and the most
determined of the tribesmen to a sacred grove. Then, when he saw them
excited by their revelry and the late hour of the night, he began to
speak of the glorious past of the Batavi and to enumerate the wrongs
they had suffered, the injustice and extortion and all the evils of
their slavery. 'We are no longer treated,' he said, 'as we used to be,
like allies, but like menials and slaves. Why, we are never even
visited by an imperial Governor[273]--irksome though the insolence of
his staff would be. We are given over to prefects and centurions; and
when these subordinates have had their fill of extortion and of
bloodshed, they promptly find some one to replace them, and then there
are new pockets to fill and new pretexts for plunder. Now conscription
is upon us: children are to be torn from parents, brother from
brother, never, probably, to meet again. And yet the fortunes of Rome
were never more depressed. Their cantonments contain nothing but loot
and a lot of old men. Lift up your eyes and look at them. There is
nothing to fear from legions that only exist on paper. [274] And we are
strong. We have infantry and cavalry: the Germans are our kinsmen: the
Gauls share our ambition. Even the Romans will be grateful if we go to
war. [275] If we fail, we can claim credit for supporting Vespasian: if
we succeed, there will be no one to call us to account. '
His speech was received with great approval, and he at once bound 15
them all to union, using the barbarous ceremonies and strange oaths of
his country. They then sent to the Canninefates to join their
enterprise. This tribe inhabits part of the Island,[276] and though
inferior in numbers to the Batavi, they are of the same race and
language and the same courageous spirit. Civilis next sent secret
messages to win over the Batavian troops, which after serving as Roman
auxiliaries in Britain had been sent, as we have already seen,[277] to
Germany and were now stationed at Mainz. [278]
One of the Canninefates, Brinno by name, was a man of distinguished
family and stubborn courage. His father had often ventured acts of
hostility, and had with complete impunity shown his contempt for
Caligula's farcical expedition. [279] To belong to such a family of
rebels was in itself a recommendation. He was accordingly placed on a
shield, swung up on the shoulders of his friends, and thus elected
leader after the fashion of the tribe. Summoning to his aid the
Frisii[280]--a tribe from beyond the Rhine--he fell upon two cohorts
of auxiliaries whose camp lay close to the neighbouring shore. [281]
The attack was unexpected, and the troops, even if they had foreseen
it, were not strong enough to offer resistance: so the camp was taken
and looted. They then fell on the Roman camp-followers and traders,
who had gone off in all directions as if peace were assured. Finding
the forts now threatened with destruction, the Roman officers set fire
to them, as they had no means of defence. All the troops with their
standards and colours retired in a body to the upper end of the
island, led by Aquilius, a senior centurion. But they were an army in
name only, not in strength, for Vitellius had withdrawn all the
efficient soldiers and had replaced them by a useless mob, who had
been drawn from the neighbouring Nervian and German villages and were
only embarrassed by their armour. [282]
Civilis thought it best to proceed by guile, and actually ventured 16
to blame the Roman officers for abandoning the forts. He could, he
told them, with the cohort under his command, suppress the outbreak of
the Canninefates without their assistance: they could all go back to
their winter-quarters. However, it was plain that some treachery
underlay his advice--it would be easier to crush the cohorts if they
were separated--and also that Civilis, not Brinno, was at the head of
this war. Evidence of this gradually leaked out, as the Germans loved
war too well to keep the secret for long. Finding his artifice
unsuccessful, Civilis tried force instead, forming the Canninefates,
Frisii and Batavi into three separate columns. [283] The Roman line
faced them in position near the Rhine bank. [284] They had brought
their ships there after the burning of the forts, and these were now
turned with their prows towards the enemy. Soon after the engagement
began a Tungrian cohort deserted to Civilis, and the Romans were so
startled by this unexpected treachery that they were cut to pieces by
their allies and their enemies combined. Similar treachery occurred in
the fleet. Some of the rowers, who were Batavians, feigning clumsiness
tried to impede the sailors and marines in the performance of their
functions, and after a while openly resisted them and turned the
ships' sterns towards the enemy's bank. Finally, they killed the
pilots and centurions who refused to join them, and thus all the
twenty-four ships of the flotilla either deserted to the enemy or were
captured by them.
This victory made Civilis immediately famous and proved 17
subsequently very useful. Having now got the ships and the weapons
which they needed, he and his followers were enthusiastically
proclaimed as champions of liberty throughout Germany and Gaul. The
German provinces immediately sent envoys with offers of help, while
Civilis endeavoured by diplomacy and by bribery to secure an alliance
with the Gauls. He sent back the auxiliary officers whom he had taken
prisoner, each to his own tribe, and offered the cohorts the choice of
either going home or remaining with him. Those who remained were given
an honourable position in his army: and those who went home received
presents out of the Roman spoil. At the same time Civilis talked to
them confidentially and reminded them of the miseries they had endured
for all these years, in which they had disguised their wretched
slavery under the name of peace. 'The Batavi,' he would say, 'were
excused from taxation, and yet they have taken arms against the common
tyrant. In the first engagement the Romans were routed and beaten.
What if Gaul throws off the yoke? What forces are there left in Italy?
It is with the blood of provincials that their provinces are won.
Don't think of the defeat of Vindex. Why, it was the Batavian cavalry
which trampled on the Aedui and Arverni,[285] and there were Belgic
auxiliaries in Verginius' force. The truth is that Gaul succumbed to
her own armies. But now we are all united in one party, fortified,
moreover, by the military discipline which prevails in Roman camps:
and we have on our side the veterans before whom Otho's legions lately
bit the dust. Let Syria and Asia play the slave: the East is used to
tyrants: but there are many still living in Gaul who were born before
the days of tribute. [286] Indeed, it is only the other day[287] that
Quintilius Varus was killed, when slavery was driven out of Germany,
and they brought into the field not the Emperor Vitellius but Caesar
Augustus himself. Why, liberty is the natural prerogative even of dumb
animals: courage is the peculiar attribute of man. Heaven helps the
brave. Come, then, fall upon them while your hands are free and theirs
are tied, while you are fresh and they are weary. Some of them are for
Vespasian, others for Vitellius; now is your chance to crush both
parties at once. '
Civilis thus had his eye on Gaul and Germany and aspired, had his 18
project prospered, to become king of two countries, one pre-eminent in
wealth and the other in military strength.
FOOTNOTES:
[264] Cp. iii. 46.
[265] One of the greatest and most warlike of the German
tribes living in the modern Hessen-Nassau and Waldeck. Tacitus
describes them at length in his _Germania_.
[266] i. e. a stretch of land about sixty miles in length, from
Nymwegen to the Hook of Holland, enclosed by the diverging
mouths of the Rhine, the northern of which is now called the
Lek, the southern the Waal (in Tacitus' time Vahalis). The
name Betuwe is still applied to the eastern part of this
island.
[267] In the _Germania_ Tacitus says that, like weapons, they
are kept exclusively for use in war, and are spared the
indignity of taxation.
[268] Some such word as _peritus_ or _exercitus_ must be
supplied at the end of this chapter.
[269] Probably during the revolt of Vindex. Capito governed
Lower Germany.
[270] Cp. i. 59.
[271] The loss of an eye.
[272] Governor of Upper Germany.
[273] As a subordinate division of Lower Germany the Batavian
district would be administered by 'prefects' subordinate to
the imperial legate.
[274] Vitellius had reduced the strength of the legions (cp. ii. 94).
[275] Because it would weaken the position of Vitellius.
[276] They lived north of the Batavi, between the Zuider Zee
and the North Sea.
[277] ii. 29.
[278] Mogontiacum.
[279] Caligula's only trophy had been helmetfuls of stones and
shells from the sea-shore of Germany.
[280] Living in Friesland, north-east of the Zuider Zee.
[281] Reading _applicata_ (Andresen) instead of _occupata_,
which gives no sense.
The camp was probably somewhere near
Katwyk.
[282] The Nervii were a Gallic tribe living on the Sambre,
with settlements at Cambray, Tournay, Bavay. Ritter's
alteration of _Germanorum_ to _Cugernorum_ is very probably
right. They lived about a dozen miles west of Vetera, and are
thus a likely recruiting-ground. They were of German origin,
so if _Germanorum_ is right, the reference will still be to
them and the Tungri and other German Settlements on the east
of the Rhine.
[283] See ii. 42, note 301. Here, however, it is not
improbable that the word _cuneus_ means a V-shaped formation.
Tacitus' phrase in _Germ. _ 6 is generally taken to mean that
the Germans fought in wedge-formation. The separation of the
three tribes in three columns was also typical of German
tactics. The presence of kinsmen stimulated courage.
[284] Presumably at the eastern end of the island, near either
Nymwegen or Arnheim.
[285] The Aedui lived in Bourgogne and Nivernois, between the
Loire and the Saône; the Arverni in Auvergne, north-west of
the Cevennes. Both had joined Vindex.
[286] 'Many' must be an exaggeration, since Augustus' census
of Gaul took place 27 B. C. , ninety-five years ago.
[287] Sixty years ago, to be exact.
THE MUTINY OF THE BATAVIAN COHORTS
Hordeonius Flaccus at first furthered Civilis' schemes by shutting his
eyes to them. But when messengers kept arriving in panic with news
that a camp had been stormed, cohorts wiped out, and not a Roman left
in the Batavian Island, he instructed Munius Lupercus, who commanded
the two legions[288] in winter-quarters,[289] to march against the
enemy. Lupercus lost no time in crossing the river,[290] taking the
legions whom he had with him, some Ubii[291] who were close at hand,
and the Treviran cavalry who were stationed not far away. To this
force he added a regiment of Batavian cavalry, who, though their
loyalty had long ago succumbed, still concealed the fact, because they
hoped their desertion would fetch a higher price, if they actually
betrayed the Romans on the field. Civilis set the standards of the
defeated cohorts[292] round him in a ring to keep their fresh honours
before the eyes of his men, and to terrify the enemy by reminding them
of their disaster. He also gave orders that his own mother and sisters
and all the wives and small children of his soldiers should be
stationed in the rear to spur them to victory or shame them if they
were beaten. [293] When his line raised their battle-cry, the men
singing and the women shrieking, the legions and their auxiliaries
replied with a comparatively feeble cheer, for their left wing had
been exposed by the desertion of the Batavian cavalry, who promptly
turned against us. However, despite the confusion, the legionaries
gripped their swords and kept their places. Then the Ubian and
Treviran auxiliaries broke in shameful flight and went wandering all
over the country. The Germans pressed hard on their heels and
meanwhile the legions could make good their escape into the camp,
which was called 'Castra Vetera'. [294] Claudius Labeo, who commanded
the Batavian cavalry, had opposed Civilis as a rival in some petty
municipal dispute. Civilis was afraid that, if he killed him, he might
offend his countrymen, while if he spared him his presence would give
rise to dissension; so he sent him off by sea to the Frisii.
It was at this time that the cohorts of Batavians and 19
Canninefates, on their way to Rome under orders from Vitellius,
received the message which Civilis had sent to them. [295] They
promptly fell into a ferment of unruly insolence and demanded a
special grant as payment for their journey, double pay, and an
increase in the number of their cavalry. [296] Although all these
things had been promised by Vitellius they had no hope of obtaining
them, but wanted an excuse for rebellion. Flaccus made many
concessions, but the only result was that they redoubled their vigour
and demanded what they felt sure he would refuse. Paying no further
heed to him they made for Lower Germany, to join Civilis. Flaccus
summoned the tribunes and centurions and debated with them whether he
should use force to punish this defiance of authority. After a while
he gave way to his natural cowardice and the fears of his
subordinates, who were distressed by the thought that the loyalty of
the auxiliaries was doubtful and that the legions had been recruited
by a hurried levy. It was decided, therefore, to keep the soldiers in
camp. [297] However, he soon changed his mind when he found himself
criticized by the very men whose advice he had taken. He now seemed
bent on pursuit, and wrote to Herennius Gallus in command of the First
legion, who was holding Bonn, telling him to bar the path of the
Batavians, and promising that he and his army would follow hard upon
their heels. The rebels might certainly have been crushed had Flaccus
and Gallus each advanced their forces from opposite directions and
thus surrounded them. But Flaccus soon gave up the idea, and wrote
another letter to Gallus, warning him to let the rebels pass
undisturbed. This gave rise to a suspicion that the generals were
purposely promoting the war; and all the disasters which had already
occurred or were feared in the future, were attributed not to the
soldiers' inefficiency or the strength of the enemy, but to the
treachery of the generals.
On nearing the camp at Bonn, the Batavians sent forward a 20
messenger to explain their intentions to Herennius Gallus. Against the
Romans, for whom they had fought so often, they had no wish to make
war: but they were worn out after a long and unprofitable term of
service and wanted to go home and rest. If no one opposed them they
would march peaceably by; but if hostility was offered they would find
a passage at the point of the sword. Gallus hesitated, but his men
induced him to risk an engagement. Three thousand legionaries, some
hastily recruited Belgic auxiliaries, and a mob of peasants and
camp-followers, who were as cowardly in action as they were boastful
before it, came pouring out simultaneously from all the gates, hoping
with their superior numbers to surround the Batavians. But these were
experienced veterans. They formed up into columns[298] in deep
formation that defied assault on front, flank, or rear. They thus
pierced our thinner line. The Belgae giving way, the legion was driven
back and ran in terror to reach the trench and the gates of the camp.
It was there that we suffered the heaviest losses. The trenches were
filled with dead, who were not all killed by the blows of the enemy,
for many were stifled in the press or perished on each other's swords.
The victorious cohorts avoided Cologne and marched on without
attempting any further hostilities. For the battle at Bonn they
continued to excuse themselves. They had asked for peace, they said,
and when peace was persistently refused, had merely acted in
self-defence.
FOOTNOTES:
[288] V Alaudae and XV Primigenia, both depleted.
[289] At Vetera.
[290] Waal.
[291] They lived round their chief town, known since A. D. 50
as Colonia Agrippinensis, now Cologne (cp. i. 56, note 106).
[292] See chap. 16.
[293] This was a German custom. We read in the _Germania_ that
in battle 'they keep their dearest close at hand, where the
women's cries and the wailing of their babies can be heard'.
[294] This means, of course, simply The Old Camp, but, as
Tacitus treats Vetera as a proper name, it has been kept in
the translation. It was probably on the Rhine near Xanten and
Fürstenberg, some sixty-six miles north of Cologne.
[295] Cp. i. 59; ii. 97; iv. 15.
[296] Who got better pay for lighter service.
[297] i. e. at Mainz, Bonn, Novaesium and Vetera.
[298] See note 283.
THE SIEGE OF VETERA
After the arrival of these veteran cohorts Civilis was now at the 21
head of a respectable army. But being still uncertain of his plans,
and engaged in reckoning up the Roman forces, he made all who were
with him swear allegiance to Vespasian, and sent envoys to the two
legions, who after their defeat in the former engagement[299] had
retired into Vetera, asking them to take the same oath. The answer
came back that they never followed the advice either of a traitor or
of an enemy: Vitellius was their emperor, and they would keep their
allegiance and their arms for him so long as they had breath in their
bodies. A Batavian deserter need not try to decide the destiny of
Rome; he should rather expect the punishment he richly deserved. When
this was reported to Civilis he flew into a passion, and called the
whole Batavian people to take arms. They were joined by the Bructeri
and Tencteri,[300] and Germany was summoned to come and share the
plunder and the glory.
Threatened with this gathering storm, Munius Lupercus and Numisius 22
Rufus, who were in command of the two legions, proceeded to strengthen
the ramparts and walls. They pulled down the buildings near the
military camp, which had grown into a small town during the long years
of peace, fearing that the enemy might make use of them. But they
omitted to provide a sufficient store of provisions for the camp, and
authorized the soldiers to make up the deficiency by looting, with the
result that what might have supplied their needs for a long time was
consumed in a few days. Meanwhile Civilis advanced, himself holding
the centre with the flower of the Batavi: on both banks of the Rhine
he massed large bands of Germans to strike terror into the enemy: the
cavalry galloped through the fields, while the ships were
simultaneously moved up the stream. Here could be seen the colours of
veteran Roman cohorts, there the figures of beasts which the Germans
had brought from their woods and groves, as their tribes do when they
go to battle. It seemed both a civil and a savage war at once; and
this strange confusion astounded the besieged. The hopes of the
assailants rose when they saw the circumference of the ramparts, for
there were barely five thousand Roman soldiers to defend a camp which
had been laid out to hold two legions. [301] However, a large number of
camp-followers had collected there on the break-up of peace, and
remained to give what assistance they could to the military
operations.
The camp was built partly on the gentle slope of a hill and partly 23
on the level ground. Augustus had believed that it would serve as a
base of operations and a check upon the German tribes: as for their
actually coming to assault our legions, such a disaster never
occurred to him. Consequently no trouble had been taken in choosing
the site or erecting defences: the strength of the troops had always
seemed sufficient.
The Batavians and the Germans from across the Rhine[302] now formed up
tribe by tribe--the separation was designed to show their individual
prowess--and opened fire from a distance. Finding that most of their
missiles fell harmlessly on to the turrets and pinnacles of the walls,
and that they were being wounded by stones hurled from above, they
charged with a wild shout and surged up to the rampart, some using
scaling-ladders, others climbing over their comrades who had formed a
'tortoise'. But no sooner had some of them begun to scale the wall,
than they were hurled down by the besieged, who thrust at them with
sword and shield, and buried under a shower of stakes and javelins.
The Germans are always impetuous at the beginning of an action and
over-confident when they are winning; and on this occasion their greed
for plunder even steeled them to face difficulties. They actually
attempted to use siege-engines, with which they were quite unfamiliar.
But though they had no skill themselves, some of the deserters and
prisoners showed them how to build a sort of bridge or platform of
timber, on to which they fitted wheels and rolled it forward. Thus
some of them stood on this platform and fought as though from a mound,
while others, concealed inside, tried to undermine the walls. However,
stones hurled from catapults soon destroyed this rude engine. Then
they began to get ready hurdles and mantlets, but the besieged shot
blazing spears on to them from engines, and even attacked the
assailants themselves with fire-darts. At last they gave up all hope
of an assault and resolved to try a waiting policy, being well aware
that the camp contained only a few days' provisions and a large number
of non-combatants. They hoped that famine would breed treason, and
counted, besides, on the wavering loyalty of the slaves and the usual
hazards of war to aid them.
Meanwhile, Flaccus,[303] who had received news of the siege of 24
Vetera, dispatched a party to recruit auxiliaries in Gaul, and gave
Dillius Vocula, in command of the Twenty-second, a force of picked
soldiers from his two legions. [304] Vocula was to hurry by forced
marches along the bank of the Rhine, while Flaccus himself was to
approach by water, since he was in bad health and unpopular with his
men. Indeed, they grumbled openly that he had let the Batavian cohorts
get away from Mainz, had connived at Civilis' schemes, and invited the
Germans to join the alliance. Vespasian, they said, owed his rise more
to Flaccus than to all the assistance of Antonius Primus or of
Mucianus, for overt hatred and hostility can be openly crushed, but
treachery and deceit cannot be detected, much less parried. While
Civilis took the field himself and arranged his own fighting line,
Hordeonius lay on a couch in his bedroom and gave whatever orders
best suited the enemy's convenience. Why should all these companies
of brave soldiers be commanded by one miserable old invalid? Let them
rather kill the traitor and free their brave hearts and good hopes
from the incubus of such an evil omen. Having worked on each other's
feelings by these complaints, they were still further incensed by the
arrival of a letter from Vespasian. As this could not be concealed,
Flaccus read it before a meeting of the soldiers, and the messengers
who brought it were sent to Vitellius in chains.
With feelings thus appeased the army marched on to Bonn, the 25
head-quarters of the First legion. There the men were still more
indignant with Flaccus, on whom they laid the blame of their recent
defeat. [305] It was by his orders, they argued, that they had taken
the field against the Batavians on the understanding that the legions
from Mainz were in pursuit. But no reinforcements had arrived and his
treachery was responsible for their losses. The facts, moreover, were
unknown to the other armies, nor was any report sent to their emperor,
although this treacherous outbreak could have been nipped in the bud
by the combined aid of all the provinces. In answer Flaccus read out
to the army copies of all the letters which he had sent from time to
time all over Gaul and Britain and Spain to ask for assistance, and
introduced the disastrous practice of having all letters delivered to
the standard-bearers of the legions, who read them to the soldiers
before the general had seen them. He then gave orders that one of the
mutineers should be put in irons, more by way of vindicating his
authority than because one man was especially to blame. Leaving Bonn,
the army moved on to Cologne, where they were joined by large numbers
of Gallic auxiliaries, who at first zealously supported the Roman
cause: later, when the Germans prospered, most of the tribes took arms
against us, actuated by hopes of liberty and an ambition to establish
an empire of their own when once they had shaken off the yoke.
Meanwhile the army's indignation steadily increased. The imprisonment
of a single soldier was not enough to terrify them, and, indeed, the
prisoner actually accused the general of complicity in crime, alleging
that he himself had carried messages between Flaccus and Civilis. 'It
is because I can testify to the truth,' he said, 'that Flaccus wants
to get rid of me on a false charge. ' Thereupon Vocula, with admirable
self-possession, mounted the tribunal and, in spite of the man's
protestations, ordered him to be seized and led away to prison. This
alarmed the disaffected, while the better sort obeyed him promptly.
The army then unanimously demanded that Vocula should lead them, and
Flaccus accordingly resigned the chief command to him. However, 26
there was much to exasperate their disaffection. They were short both
of pay and of provisions: the Gauls refused either to enlist or to pay
tribute: drought, usually unknown in that climate, made the Rhine
almost too low for navigation, and thus hampered their commissariat:
patrols had to be posted at intervals all along the bank to prevent
the Germans fording the river: and in consequence of all this they had
less food and more mouths to eat it. To the ignorant the lowness of
the river seemed in itself an evil omen, as though the ancient
bulwarks of the empire were now failing them. In peace they would have
called it bad luck or the course of nature: now it was 'fate' and 'the
anger of heaven'.
On entering Novaesium[306] they were joined by the Sixteenth legion.
Herennius Gallus[307] now shared with Vocula the responsibility of
command. As they could not venture out against the enemy, they
encamped . . . at a place called Gelduba,[308] where the soldiers were
trained in deploying, in fortification and entrenchment, and in
various other military manoeuvres. To inspire their courage with the
further incentive of plunder, Vocula led out part of the force against
the neighbouring tribe of the Cugerni,[309] who had accepted Civilis'
offers of alliance. The rest of the troops were left behind with 27
Herennius Gallus,[310] and it happened that a corn-ship with a full
cargo, which had run aground close to the camp, was towed over by the
Germans to their own bank. This was more than Gallus could tolerate,
so he sent a cohort to the rescue. The number of the Germans soon
increased: both sides gradually gathered reinforcements and a regular
battle was fought, with the result that the Germans towed off the
ship, inflicting heavy losses. The defeated troops followed what had
now become their regular custom, and threw the blame not on their own
inefficiency but on their commanding-officer's bad faith. They dragged
him from his quarters, tore his uniform and flogged him, bidding him
tell them how much he had got for betraying the army, and who were his
accomplices. Then their indignation recoiled on Hordeonius Flaccus: he
was the real criminal: Gallus was only his tool. At last their threats
so terrified Gallus that he, too, charged Flaccus with treason. He was
put in irons until the arrival of Vocula, who at once set him free,
and on the next day had the ringleaders of the riot executed. The army
showed, indeed, a strange contrast in its equal readiness to mutiny
and to submit to punishment. The common soldiers' loyalty to Vitellius
was beyond question,[311] while the higher ranks inclined towards
Vespasian. Thus we find a succession of outbreaks and penalties; an
alternation of insubordination with obedience to discipline; for the
troops could be punished though not controlled.
Meanwhile the whole of Germany was ready to worship Civilis, 28
sending him vast reinforcements and ratifying the alliance with
hostages from their noblest families. He gave orders that the country
of the Ubii and Treviri was to be laid waste by their nearest
neighbours, and sent another party across the Maas to harass the
Menapii and Morini[312] and other frontier tribes of Gaul. In both
quarters they plundered freely, and were especially savage towards the
Ubii, because they were a tribe of German origin who had renounced
their fatherland and adopted the name of Agrippinenses. [313] A Ubian
cohort was cut to pieces at the village of Marcodurum,[314] where they
were off their guard, trusting to their distance from the Rhine. The
Ubii did not take this quietly, nor hesitate to seek reprisals from
the Germans, which they did at first with impunity. In the end,
however, the Germans proved too much for them, and throughout the war
the Ubii were always more conspicuous for good faith than good
fortune. Their collapse strengthened Civilis' position, and emboldened
by success, he now vigorously pressed on the blockade of the legions
at Vetera, and redoubled his vigilance to prevent any message creeping
through from the relieving army. The Batavians were told off to look
after the engines and siege-works: the Germans, who clamoured for
battle, were sent to demolish the rampart and renew the fight directly
they were beaten off. There were so many of them that their losses
mattered little.
Nightfall did not see the end of their task. They built huge fires 29
of wood all round the ramparts and sat drinking by them; then, as the
wine warmed their hearts, one by one they dashed into the fight with
blind courage. In the darkness their missiles were ineffective, but
the barbarian troops were clearly visible to the Romans, and any one
whose daring or bright ornaments made him conspicuous at once became a
mark for their aim. At last Civilis saw their mistake, and gave orders
to extinguish the fires and plunge the whole scene into a confusion of
darkness and the din of arms. Discordant shouts now arose: everything
was vague and uncertain: no one could see to strike or to parry.
Wherever a shout was heard, they would wheel round and lunge in that
direction. Valour was useless: chance and chaos ruled supreme: and the
bravest soldier often fell under a coward's bolt. The Germans fought
with blind fury. The Roman troops were more familiar with danger; they
hurled down iron-clamped stakes and heavy stones with sure effect.
Wherever the sound of some one climbing or the clang of a
scaling-ladder betrayed the presence of the enemy, they thrust them
back with their shields and followed them with a shower of javelins.
Many appeared on top of the walls, and these they stabbed with their
short swords. And so the night wore on. Day dawned upon new 30
methods of attack. The Batavians had built a wooden tower of two
stories and moved it up to the Head-quarters Gate,[315] which was the
most accessible spot. However, our soldiers, by using strong poles and
hurling wooden beams, soon battered it to pieces, with great loss of
life to those who were standing on it. While they were still dismayed
at this, we made a sudden and successful sally. Meanwhile the
legionaries, with remarkable skill and ingenuity, invented still
further contrivances. The one which caused most terror was a crane
with a movable arm suspended over their assailants' heads: this arm
was suddenly lowered, snatched up one or more of the enemy into the
air before his fellows' eyes, and, as the heavy end was swung round,
tossed him into the middle of the camp. Civilis now gave up hope of
storming the camp and renewed a leisurely blockade, trying all the
time by messages and offers of reward to undermine the loyalty of the
legions.
FOOTNOTES:
[299] Chap. 18.
[300] The Bructeri lived between the Lippe and the Upper Ems,
the Tencteri along the eastern bank of the Rhine, between its
tributaries the Ruhr and the Sieg, i. e. opposite Cologne.
[301] i. e. about 12,000 men. The bulk of the Fifth and a
detachment of the Fifteenth had gone to Italy.
[302] i. e. Frisii, Bructeri, Tencteri, &c.
[303] At Mainz.
[304] His other legion was IV Macedonica.
[305] Cp. chap. 20.
[306] Neuss.
committed suicide, more from shame than of necessity. Alfenus Varus
survived the disgrace of his cowardice. [261] Asiaticus,[262] who was a
freedman, paid for his malign influence by dying the death of a
slave. [263]
FOOTNOTES:
[228] Because they were taken for members of Vitellius' German
auxiliary cohorts.
[229] Cp. iii. 86 sub fin.
[230] Cp. iii. 6.
[231] See iii. 76.
[232] These three towns are all on the Appian Way, Bovillae
ten miles from Rome, Aricia sixteen, Tarracina fifty-nine, on
the coast.
[233] Cp. iii. 12.
[234] Gallica.
[235] Capua had adhered to Vitellius. Tarracina had been held
for Vespasian (cp. iii. 57).
[236] See iii. 77.
[237] The insignia of equestrian rank (cp. i. 13).
[238] The chief of these were the powers of tribune,
pro-consul, and censor, and the title of Augustus (cp. i. 47,
ii. 55).
[239] Vindex had risen in Gaul; Galba in Spain; Vitellius in
Germany; Antonius Primus in the Danube provinces (Illyricum);
Vespasian and Mucianus in Judaea, Syria, and Egypt.
[240] This was necessary in the absence of Vespasian and Titus.
[241] See vol. i, note 339.
[242] A triumph could, of course, be held only for victories
over a foreign enemy. Here the pretext was the repulse of the
Dacians (iii. 46).
[243] Vitellius' son-in-law (cp. i. 59).
[244] In the text some words seem to be missing here, but the
general sense is clear.
[245] Cp. ii. 91.
[246] If Tacitus ever told the story of his banishment and
death, his version has been lost with the rest of his history
of Vespasian's reign.
[247] In Samnium.
[248] i. e. shirking the duties of public life.
[249] i. e. the Stoic.
[250] See ii. 91.
[251] Cp. ii. 53.
[252] Soranus, like Thrasea, was a Stoic who opposed the
government mainly on moral grounds. The story of their end is
told in the _Annals_, Book XVI. Sentius was presumably another
member of their party.
[253] He refers to Augustus' regularization of the principate.
[254] Fifty-nine.
[255] The administration of this office was changed several
times in the first century of the empire. Here we have a
reversion to Augustus' second plan. Trajan restored Augustus'
original plan--also adopted by Nero--of appointing special
Treasury officials from the ex-praetors.
[256] His offence lay in assigning to the emperor a merely
secondary position.
[257] His ill-timed advocacy of Stoicism is mentioned iii. 81.
[258] Described in the _Annals_, xvi. 32.
[259] The description of this is postponed to chap. 40. Celer
was convicted.
[260] C. Piso had conspired against Nero, A. D. 65.
[261] They had both abandoned their camp at Narnia (cp. iii. 61).
[262] Cp. ii. 57.
[263] i. e. he was crucified.
THE REVOLT OF CIVILIS AND THE BATAVI
The growing rumour of a reverse in Germany[264] had not as yet 12
caused any alarm in Rome. People alluded to the loss of armies, the
capture of the legions' winter quarters, the defection of the Gallic
provinces as matters of indifference. I must now go back and explain
the origin of this war, and of the widespread rebellion of foreign and
allied tribes which now broke into flame.
The Batavi were once a tribe of the Chatti,[265] living on the further
bank of the Rhine. But an outbreak of civil war had driven them across
the river, where they settled in a still unoccupied district on the
frontier of Gaul and also in the neighbouring island, enclosed on one
side by the ocean and on the other three sides by the Rhine. [266]
There they fared better than most tribes who ally themselves to a
stronger power. Their resources are still intact, and they have only
to contribute men and arms for the imperial army. [267] After a long
training in the German wars, they still further increased their
reputation in Britain, where their troops had been sent, commanded
according to an ancient custom by some of the noblest chiefs. There
still remained behind in their own country a picked troop of horsemen
with a peculiar knack of swimming, which enabled them to make a
practice[268] of crossing the Rhine with unbroken ranks without losing
control of their horses or their weapons.
Of their chieftains two outshone the rest. These were Julius 13
Paulus and Julius Civilis, both of royal stock. Paulus had been
executed by Fonteius Capito on a false charge of rebellion. [269] On
the same occasion Civilis was sent in chains to Nero. Galba, however,
set him free, and under Vitellius he again ran great risk of his life,
when the army clamoured for his execution. [270] This gave him a motive
for hating Rome, and our misfortunes fed his hopes. He was, indeed,
far cleverer than most barbarians, and professed to be a second
Sertorius or Hannibal, because they all three had the same physical
defect. [271] He was afraid that if he openly rebelled against the
Roman people they would treat him as an enemy, and march on him at
once, so he pretended to be a keen supporter of Vespasian's party.
This much was true, that Antonius Primus had written instructing him
to divert the auxiliaries whom Vitellius had summoned, and to delay
the legions on the pretence of a rising in Germany. Moreover,
Hordeonius Flaccus[272] had given him the same advice in person, for
Flaccus was inclined to support Vespasian and anxious for the safety
of Rome, which was threatened with utter disaster, if the war were to
break out afresh and all these thousands of troops come pouring into
Italy.
Having thus made up his mind to rebel, Civilis concealed in the 14
meantime his ulterior design, and while intending to guide his
ultimate policy by future events, proceeded to initiate the rising as
follows. The young Batavians were by Vitellius' orders being pressed
for service, and this burden was being rendered even more irksome than
it need have been by the greed and depravity of the recruiting
officers. They took to enrolling elderly men and invalids so as to get
bribes for excusing them: or, as most of the Batavi are tall and
good-looking in their youth, they would seize the handsomest boys for
immoral purposes. This caused bad feeling; an agitation was organized,
and they were persuaded to refuse service. Accordingly, on the pretext
of giving a banquet, Civilis summoned the chief nobles and the most
determined of the tribesmen to a sacred grove. Then, when he saw them
excited by their revelry and the late hour of the night, he began to
speak of the glorious past of the Batavi and to enumerate the wrongs
they had suffered, the injustice and extortion and all the evils of
their slavery. 'We are no longer treated,' he said, 'as we used to be,
like allies, but like menials and slaves. Why, we are never even
visited by an imperial Governor[273]--irksome though the insolence of
his staff would be. We are given over to prefects and centurions; and
when these subordinates have had their fill of extortion and of
bloodshed, they promptly find some one to replace them, and then there
are new pockets to fill and new pretexts for plunder. Now conscription
is upon us: children are to be torn from parents, brother from
brother, never, probably, to meet again. And yet the fortunes of Rome
were never more depressed. Their cantonments contain nothing but loot
and a lot of old men. Lift up your eyes and look at them. There is
nothing to fear from legions that only exist on paper. [274] And we are
strong. We have infantry and cavalry: the Germans are our kinsmen: the
Gauls share our ambition. Even the Romans will be grateful if we go to
war. [275] If we fail, we can claim credit for supporting Vespasian: if
we succeed, there will be no one to call us to account. '
His speech was received with great approval, and he at once bound 15
them all to union, using the barbarous ceremonies and strange oaths of
his country. They then sent to the Canninefates to join their
enterprise. This tribe inhabits part of the Island,[276] and though
inferior in numbers to the Batavi, they are of the same race and
language and the same courageous spirit. Civilis next sent secret
messages to win over the Batavian troops, which after serving as Roman
auxiliaries in Britain had been sent, as we have already seen,[277] to
Germany and were now stationed at Mainz. [278]
One of the Canninefates, Brinno by name, was a man of distinguished
family and stubborn courage. His father had often ventured acts of
hostility, and had with complete impunity shown his contempt for
Caligula's farcical expedition. [279] To belong to such a family of
rebels was in itself a recommendation. He was accordingly placed on a
shield, swung up on the shoulders of his friends, and thus elected
leader after the fashion of the tribe. Summoning to his aid the
Frisii[280]--a tribe from beyond the Rhine--he fell upon two cohorts
of auxiliaries whose camp lay close to the neighbouring shore. [281]
The attack was unexpected, and the troops, even if they had foreseen
it, were not strong enough to offer resistance: so the camp was taken
and looted. They then fell on the Roman camp-followers and traders,
who had gone off in all directions as if peace were assured. Finding
the forts now threatened with destruction, the Roman officers set fire
to them, as they had no means of defence. All the troops with their
standards and colours retired in a body to the upper end of the
island, led by Aquilius, a senior centurion. But they were an army in
name only, not in strength, for Vitellius had withdrawn all the
efficient soldiers and had replaced them by a useless mob, who had
been drawn from the neighbouring Nervian and German villages and were
only embarrassed by their armour. [282]
Civilis thought it best to proceed by guile, and actually ventured 16
to blame the Roman officers for abandoning the forts. He could, he
told them, with the cohort under his command, suppress the outbreak of
the Canninefates without their assistance: they could all go back to
their winter-quarters. However, it was plain that some treachery
underlay his advice--it would be easier to crush the cohorts if they
were separated--and also that Civilis, not Brinno, was at the head of
this war. Evidence of this gradually leaked out, as the Germans loved
war too well to keep the secret for long. Finding his artifice
unsuccessful, Civilis tried force instead, forming the Canninefates,
Frisii and Batavi into three separate columns. [283] The Roman line
faced them in position near the Rhine bank. [284] They had brought
their ships there after the burning of the forts, and these were now
turned with their prows towards the enemy. Soon after the engagement
began a Tungrian cohort deserted to Civilis, and the Romans were so
startled by this unexpected treachery that they were cut to pieces by
their allies and their enemies combined. Similar treachery occurred in
the fleet. Some of the rowers, who were Batavians, feigning clumsiness
tried to impede the sailors and marines in the performance of their
functions, and after a while openly resisted them and turned the
ships' sterns towards the enemy's bank. Finally, they killed the
pilots and centurions who refused to join them, and thus all the
twenty-four ships of the flotilla either deserted to the enemy or were
captured by them.
This victory made Civilis immediately famous and proved 17
subsequently very useful. Having now got the ships and the weapons
which they needed, he and his followers were enthusiastically
proclaimed as champions of liberty throughout Germany and Gaul. The
German provinces immediately sent envoys with offers of help, while
Civilis endeavoured by diplomacy and by bribery to secure an alliance
with the Gauls. He sent back the auxiliary officers whom he had taken
prisoner, each to his own tribe, and offered the cohorts the choice of
either going home or remaining with him. Those who remained were given
an honourable position in his army: and those who went home received
presents out of the Roman spoil. At the same time Civilis talked to
them confidentially and reminded them of the miseries they had endured
for all these years, in which they had disguised their wretched
slavery under the name of peace. 'The Batavi,' he would say, 'were
excused from taxation, and yet they have taken arms against the common
tyrant. In the first engagement the Romans were routed and beaten.
What if Gaul throws off the yoke? What forces are there left in Italy?
It is with the blood of provincials that their provinces are won.
Don't think of the defeat of Vindex. Why, it was the Batavian cavalry
which trampled on the Aedui and Arverni,[285] and there were Belgic
auxiliaries in Verginius' force. The truth is that Gaul succumbed to
her own armies. But now we are all united in one party, fortified,
moreover, by the military discipline which prevails in Roman camps:
and we have on our side the veterans before whom Otho's legions lately
bit the dust. Let Syria and Asia play the slave: the East is used to
tyrants: but there are many still living in Gaul who were born before
the days of tribute. [286] Indeed, it is only the other day[287] that
Quintilius Varus was killed, when slavery was driven out of Germany,
and they brought into the field not the Emperor Vitellius but Caesar
Augustus himself. Why, liberty is the natural prerogative even of dumb
animals: courage is the peculiar attribute of man. Heaven helps the
brave. Come, then, fall upon them while your hands are free and theirs
are tied, while you are fresh and they are weary. Some of them are for
Vespasian, others for Vitellius; now is your chance to crush both
parties at once. '
Civilis thus had his eye on Gaul and Germany and aspired, had his 18
project prospered, to become king of two countries, one pre-eminent in
wealth and the other in military strength.
FOOTNOTES:
[264] Cp. iii. 46.
[265] One of the greatest and most warlike of the German
tribes living in the modern Hessen-Nassau and Waldeck. Tacitus
describes them at length in his _Germania_.
[266] i. e. a stretch of land about sixty miles in length, from
Nymwegen to the Hook of Holland, enclosed by the diverging
mouths of the Rhine, the northern of which is now called the
Lek, the southern the Waal (in Tacitus' time Vahalis). The
name Betuwe is still applied to the eastern part of this
island.
[267] In the _Germania_ Tacitus says that, like weapons, they
are kept exclusively for use in war, and are spared the
indignity of taxation.
[268] Some such word as _peritus_ or _exercitus_ must be
supplied at the end of this chapter.
[269] Probably during the revolt of Vindex. Capito governed
Lower Germany.
[270] Cp. i. 59.
[271] The loss of an eye.
[272] Governor of Upper Germany.
[273] As a subordinate division of Lower Germany the Batavian
district would be administered by 'prefects' subordinate to
the imperial legate.
[274] Vitellius had reduced the strength of the legions (cp. ii. 94).
[275] Because it would weaken the position of Vitellius.
[276] They lived north of the Batavi, between the Zuider Zee
and the North Sea.
[277] ii. 29.
[278] Mogontiacum.
[279] Caligula's only trophy had been helmetfuls of stones and
shells from the sea-shore of Germany.
[280] Living in Friesland, north-east of the Zuider Zee.
[281] Reading _applicata_ (Andresen) instead of _occupata_,
which gives no sense.
The camp was probably somewhere near
Katwyk.
[282] The Nervii were a Gallic tribe living on the Sambre,
with settlements at Cambray, Tournay, Bavay. Ritter's
alteration of _Germanorum_ to _Cugernorum_ is very probably
right. They lived about a dozen miles west of Vetera, and are
thus a likely recruiting-ground. They were of German origin,
so if _Germanorum_ is right, the reference will still be to
them and the Tungri and other German Settlements on the east
of the Rhine.
[283] See ii. 42, note 301. Here, however, it is not
improbable that the word _cuneus_ means a V-shaped formation.
Tacitus' phrase in _Germ. _ 6 is generally taken to mean that
the Germans fought in wedge-formation. The separation of the
three tribes in three columns was also typical of German
tactics. The presence of kinsmen stimulated courage.
[284] Presumably at the eastern end of the island, near either
Nymwegen or Arnheim.
[285] The Aedui lived in Bourgogne and Nivernois, between the
Loire and the Saône; the Arverni in Auvergne, north-west of
the Cevennes. Both had joined Vindex.
[286] 'Many' must be an exaggeration, since Augustus' census
of Gaul took place 27 B. C. , ninety-five years ago.
[287] Sixty years ago, to be exact.
THE MUTINY OF THE BATAVIAN COHORTS
Hordeonius Flaccus at first furthered Civilis' schemes by shutting his
eyes to them. But when messengers kept arriving in panic with news
that a camp had been stormed, cohorts wiped out, and not a Roman left
in the Batavian Island, he instructed Munius Lupercus, who commanded
the two legions[288] in winter-quarters,[289] to march against the
enemy. Lupercus lost no time in crossing the river,[290] taking the
legions whom he had with him, some Ubii[291] who were close at hand,
and the Treviran cavalry who were stationed not far away. To this
force he added a regiment of Batavian cavalry, who, though their
loyalty had long ago succumbed, still concealed the fact, because they
hoped their desertion would fetch a higher price, if they actually
betrayed the Romans on the field. Civilis set the standards of the
defeated cohorts[292] round him in a ring to keep their fresh honours
before the eyes of his men, and to terrify the enemy by reminding them
of their disaster. He also gave orders that his own mother and sisters
and all the wives and small children of his soldiers should be
stationed in the rear to spur them to victory or shame them if they
were beaten. [293] When his line raised their battle-cry, the men
singing and the women shrieking, the legions and their auxiliaries
replied with a comparatively feeble cheer, for their left wing had
been exposed by the desertion of the Batavian cavalry, who promptly
turned against us. However, despite the confusion, the legionaries
gripped their swords and kept their places. Then the Ubian and
Treviran auxiliaries broke in shameful flight and went wandering all
over the country. The Germans pressed hard on their heels and
meanwhile the legions could make good their escape into the camp,
which was called 'Castra Vetera'. [294] Claudius Labeo, who commanded
the Batavian cavalry, had opposed Civilis as a rival in some petty
municipal dispute. Civilis was afraid that, if he killed him, he might
offend his countrymen, while if he spared him his presence would give
rise to dissension; so he sent him off by sea to the Frisii.
It was at this time that the cohorts of Batavians and 19
Canninefates, on their way to Rome under orders from Vitellius,
received the message which Civilis had sent to them. [295] They
promptly fell into a ferment of unruly insolence and demanded a
special grant as payment for their journey, double pay, and an
increase in the number of their cavalry. [296] Although all these
things had been promised by Vitellius they had no hope of obtaining
them, but wanted an excuse for rebellion. Flaccus made many
concessions, but the only result was that they redoubled their vigour
and demanded what they felt sure he would refuse. Paying no further
heed to him they made for Lower Germany, to join Civilis. Flaccus
summoned the tribunes and centurions and debated with them whether he
should use force to punish this defiance of authority. After a while
he gave way to his natural cowardice and the fears of his
subordinates, who were distressed by the thought that the loyalty of
the auxiliaries was doubtful and that the legions had been recruited
by a hurried levy. It was decided, therefore, to keep the soldiers in
camp. [297] However, he soon changed his mind when he found himself
criticized by the very men whose advice he had taken. He now seemed
bent on pursuit, and wrote to Herennius Gallus in command of the First
legion, who was holding Bonn, telling him to bar the path of the
Batavians, and promising that he and his army would follow hard upon
their heels. The rebels might certainly have been crushed had Flaccus
and Gallus each advanced their forces from opposite directions and
thus surrounded them. But Flaccus soon gave up the idea, and wrote
another letter to Gallus, warning him to let the rebels pass
undisturbed. This gave rise to a suspicion that the generals were
purposely promoting the war; and all the disasters which had already
occurred or were feared in the future, were attributed not to the
soldiers' inefficiency or the strength of the enemy, but to the
treachery of the generals.
On nearing the camp at Bonn, the Batavians sent forward a 20
messenger to explain their intentions to Herennius Gallus. Against the
Romans, for whom they had fought so often, they had no wish to make
war: but they were worn out after a long and unprofitable term of
service and wanted to go home and rest. If no one opposed them they
would march peaceably by; but if hostility was offered they would find
a passage at the point of the sword. Gallus hesitated, but his men
induced him to risk an engagement. Three thousand legionaries, some
hastily recruited Belgic auxiliaries, and a mob of peasants and
camp-followers, who were as cowardly in action as they were boastful
before it, came pouring out simultaneously from all the gates, hoping
with their superior numbers to surround the Batavians. But these were
experienced veterans. They formed up into columns[298] in deep
formation that defied assault on front, flank, or rear. They thus
pierced our thinner line. The Belgae giving way, the legion was driven
back and ran in terror to reach the trench and the gates of the camp.
It was there that we suffered the heaviest losses. The trenches were
filled with dead, who were not all killed by the blows of the enemy,
for many were stifled in the press or perished on each other's swords.
The victorious cohorts avoided Cologne and marched on without
attempting any further hostilities. For the battle at Bonn they
continued to excuse themselves. They had asked for peace, they said,
and when peace was persistently refused, had merely acted in
self-defence.
FOOTNOTES:
[288] V Alaudae and XV Primigenia, both depleted.
[289] At Vetera.
[290] Waal.
[291] They lived round their chief town, known since A. D. 50
as Colonia Agrippinensis, now Cologne (cp. i. 56, note 106).
[292] See chap. 16.
[293] This was a German custom. We read in the _Germania_ that
in battle 'they keep their dearest close at hand, where the
women's cries and the wailing of their babies can be heard'.
[294] This means, of course, simply The Old Camp, but, as
Tacitus treats Vetera as a proper name, it has been kept in
the translation. It was probably on the Rhine near Xanten and
Fürstenberg, some sixty-six miles north of Cologne.
[295] Cp. i. 59; ii. 97; iv. 15.
[296] Who got better pay for lighter service.
[297] i. e. at Mainz, Bonn, Novaesium and Vetera.
[298] See note 283.
THE SIEGE OF VETERA
After the arrival of these veteran cohorts Civilis was now at the 21
head of a respectable army. But being still uncertain of his plans,
and engaged in reckoning up the Roman forces, he made all who were
with him swear allegiance to Vespasian, and sent envoys to the two
legions, who after their defeat in the former engagement[299] had
retired into Vetera, asking them to take the same oath. The answer
came back that they never followed the advice either of a traitor or
of an enemy: Vitellius was their emperor, and they would keep their
allegiance and their arms for him so long as they had breath in their
bodies. A Batavian deserter need not try to decide the destiny of
Rome; he should rather expect the punishment he richly deserved. When
this was reported to Civilis he flew into a passion, and called the
whole Batavian people to take arms. They were joined by the Bructeri
and Tencteri,[300] and Germany was summoned to come and share the
plunder and the glory.
Threatened with this gathering storm, Munius Lupercus and Numisius 22
Rufus, who were in command of the two legions, proceeded to strengthen
the ramparts and walls. They pulled down the buildings near the
military camp, which had grown into a small town during the long years
of peace, fearing that the enemy might make use of them. But they
omitted to provide a sufficient store of provisions for the camp, and
authorized the soldiers to make up the deficiency by looting, with the
result that what might have supplied their needs for a long time was
consumed in a few days. Meanwhile Civilis advanced, himself holding
the centre with the flower of the Batavi: on both banks of the Rhine
he massed large bands of Germans to strike terror into the enemy: the
cavalry galloped through the fields, while the ships were
simultaneously moved up the stream. Here could be seen the colours of
veteran Roman cohorts, there the figures of beasts which the Germans
had brought from their woods and groves, as their tribes do when they
go to battle. It seemed both a civil and a savage war at once; and
this strange confusion astounded the besieged. The hopes of the
assailants rose when they saw the circumference of the ramparts, for
there were barely five thousand Roman soldiers to defend a camp which
had been laid out to hold two legions. [301] However, a large number of
camp-followers had collected there on the break-up of peace, and
remained to give what assistance they could to the military
operations.
The camp was built partly on the gentle slope of a hill and partly 23
on the level ground. Augustus had believed that it would serve as a
base of operations and a check upon the German tribes: as for their
actually coming to assault our legions, such a disaster never
occurred to him. Consequently no trouble had been taken in choosing
the site or erecting defences: the strength of the troops had always
seemed sufficient.
The Batavians and the Germans from across the Rhine[302] now formed up
tribe by tribe--the separation was designed to show their individual
prowess--and opened fire from a distance. Finding that most of their
missiles fell harmlessly on to the turrets and pinnacles of the walls,
and that they were being wounded by stones hurled from above, they
charged with a wild shout and surged up to the rampart, some using
scaling-ladders, others climbing over their comrades who had formed a
'tortoise'. But no sooner had some of them begun to scale the wall,
than they were hurled down by the besieged, who thrust at them with
sword and shield, and buried under a shower of stakes and javelins.
The Germans are always impetuous at the beginning of an action and
over-confident when they are winning; and on this occasion their greed
for plunder even steeled them to face difficulties. They actually
attempted to use siege-engines, with which they were quite unfamiliar.
But though they had no skill themselves, some of the deserters and
prisoners showed them how to build a sort of bridge or platform of
timber, on to which they fitted wheels and rolled it forward. Thus
some of them stood on this platform and fought as though from a mound,
while others, concealed inside, tried to undermine the walls. However,
stones hurled from catapults soon destroyed this rude engine. Then
they began to get ready hurdles and mantlets, but the besieged shot
blazing spears on to them from engines, and even attacked the
assailants themselves with fire-darts. At last they gave up all hope
of an assault and resolved to try a waiting policy, being well aware
that the camp contained only a few days' provisions and a large number
of non-combatants. They hoped that famine would breed treason, and
counted, besides, on the wavering loyalty of the slaves and the usual
hazards of war to aid them.
Meanwhile, Flaccus,[303] who had received news of the siege of 24
Vetera, dispatched a party to recruit auxiliaries in Gaul, and gave
Dillius Vocula, in command of the Twenty-second, a force of picked
soldiers from his two legions. [304] Vocula was to hurry by forced
marches along the bank of the Rhine, while Flaccus himself was to
approach by water, since he was in bad health and unpopular with his
men. Indeed, they grumbled openly that he had let the Batavian cohorts
get away from Mainz, had connived at Civilis' schemes, and invited the
Germans to join the alliance. Vespasian, they said, owed his rise more
to Flaccus than to all the assistance of Antonius Primus or of
Mucianus, for overt hatred and hostility can be openly crushed, but
treachery and deceit cannot be detected, much less parried. While
Civilis took the field himself and arranged his own fighting line,
Hordeonius lay on a couch in his bedroom and gave whatever orders
best suited the enemy's convenience. Why should all these companies
of brave soldiers be commanded by one miserable old invalid? Let them
rather kill the traitor and free their brave hearts and good hopes
from the incubus of such an evil omen. Having worked on each other's
feelings by these complaints, they were still further incensed by the
arrival of a letter from Vespasian. As this could not be concealed,
Flaccus read it before a meeting of the soldiers, and the messengers
who brought it were sent to Vitellius in chains.
With feelings thus appeased the army marched on to Bonn, the 25
head-quarters of the First legion. There the men were still more
indignant with Flaccus, on whom they laid the blame of their recent
defeat. [305] It was by his orders, they argued, that they had taken
the field against the Batavians on the understanding that the legions
from Mainz were in pursuit. But no reinforcements had arrived and his
treachery was responsible for their losses. The facts, moreover, were
unknown to the other armies, nor was any report sent to their emperor,
although this treacherous outbreak could have been nipped in the bud
by the combined aid of all the provinces. In answer Flaccus read out
to the army copies of all the letters which he had sent from time to
time all over Gaul and Britain and Spain to ask for assistance, and
introduced the disastrous practice of having all letters delivered to
the standard-bearers of the legions, who read them to the soldiers
before the general had seen them. He then gave orders that one of the
mutineers should be put in irons, more by way of vindicating his
authority than because one man was especially to blame. Leaving Bonn,
the army moved on to Cologne, where they were joined by large numbers
of Gallic auxiliaries, who at first zealously supported the Roman
cause: later, when the Germans prospered, most of the tribes took arms
against us, actuated by hopes of liberty and an ambition to establish
an empire of their own when once they had shaken off the yoke.
Meanwhile the army's indignation steadily increased. The imprisonment
of a single soldier was not enough to terrify them, and, indeed, the
prisoner actually accused the general of complicity in crime, alleging
that he himself had carried messages between Flaccus and Civilis. 'It
is because I can testify to the truth,' he said, 'that Flaccus wants
to get rid of me on a false charge. ' Thereupon Vocula, with admirable
self-possession, mounted the tribunal and, in spite of the man's
protestations, ordered him to be seized and led away to prison. This
alarmed the disaffected, while the better sort obeyed him promptly.
The army then unanimously demanded that Vocula should lead them, and
Flaccus accordingly resigned the chief command to him. However, 26
there was much to exasperate their disaffection. They were short both
of pay and of provisions: the Gauls refused either to enlist or to pay
tribute: drought, usually unknown in that climate, made the Rhine
almost too low for navigation, and thus hampered their commissariat:
patrols had to be posted at intervals all along the bank to prevent
the Germans fording the river: and in consequence of all this they had
less food and more mouths to eat it. To the ignorant the lowness of
the river seemed in itself an evil omen, as though the ancient
bulwarks of the empire were now failing them. In peace they would have
called it bad luck or the course of nature: now it was 'fate' and 'the
anger of heaven'.
On entering Novaesium[306] they were joined by the Sixteenth legion.
Herennius Gallus[307] now shared with Vocula the responsibility of
command. As they could not venture out against the enemy, they
encamped . . . at a place called Gelduba,[308] where the soldiers were
trained in deploying, in fortification and entrenchment, and in
various other military manoeuvres. To inspire their courage with the
further incentive of plunder, Vocula led out part of the force against
the neighbouring tribe of the Cugerni,[309] who had accepted Civilis'
offers of alliance. The rest of the troops were left behind with 27
Herennius Gallus,[310] and it happened that a corn-ship with a full
cargo, which had run aground close to the camp, was towed over by the
Germans to their own bank. This was more than Gallus could tolerate,
so he sent a cohort to the rescue. The number of the Germans soon
increased: both sides gradually gathered reinforcements and a regular
battle was fought, with the result that the Germans towed off the
ship, inflicting heavy losses. The defeated troops followed what had
now become their regular custom, and threw the blame not on their own
inefficiency but on their commanding-officer's bad faith. They dragged
him from his quarters, tore his uniform and flogged him, bidding him
tell them how much he had got for betraying the army, and who were his
accomplices. Then their indignation recoiled on Hordeonius Flaccus: he
was the real criminal: Gallus was only his tool. At last their threats
so terrified Gallus that he, too, charged Flaccus with treason. He was
put in irons until the arrival of Vocula, who at once set him free,
and on the next day had the ringleaders of the riot executed. The army
showed, indeed, a strange contrast in its equal readiness to mutiny
and to submit to punishment. The common soldiers' loyalty to Vitellius
was beyond question,[311] while the higher ranks inclined towards
Vespasian. Thus we find a succession of outbreaks and penalties; an
alternation of insubordination with obedience to discipline; for the
troops could be punished though not controlled.
Meanwhile the whole of Germany was ready to worship Civilis, 28
sending him vast reinforcements and ratifying the alliance with
hostages from their noblest families. He gave orders that the country
of the Ubii and Treviri was to be laid waste by their nearest
neighbours, and sent another party across the Maas to harass the
Menapii and Morini[312] and other frontier tribes of Gaul. In both
quarters they plundered freely, and were especially savage towards the
Ubii, because they were a tribe of German origin who had renounced
their fatherland and adopted the name of Agrippinenses. [313] A Ubian
cohort was cut to pieces at the village of Marcodurum,[314] where they
were off their guard, trusting to their distance from the Rhine. The
Ubii did not take this quietly, nor hesitate to seek reprisals from
the Germans, which they did at first with impunity. In the end,
however, the Germans proved too much for them, and throughout the war
the Ubii were always more conspicuous for good faith than good
fortune. Their collapse strengthened Civilis' position, and emboldened
by success, he now vigorously pressed on the blockade of the legions
at Vetera, and redoubled his vigilance to prevent any message creeping
through from the relieving army. The Batavians were told off to look
after the engines and siege-works: the Germans, who clamoured for
battle, were sent to demolish the rampart and renew the fight directly
they were beaten off. There were so many of them that their losses
mattered little.
Nightfall did not see the end of their task. They built huge fires 29
of wood all round the ramparts and sat drinking by them; then, as the
wine warmed their hearts, one by one they dashed into the fight with
blind courage. In the darkness their missiles were ineffective, but
the barbarian troops were clearly visible to the Romans, and any one
whose daring or bright ornaments made him conspicuous at once became a
mark for their aim. At last Civilis saw their mistake, and gave orders
to extinguish the fires and plunge the whole scene into a confusion of
darkness and the din of arms. Discordant shouts now arose: everything
was vague and uncertain: no one could see to strike or to parry.
Wherever a shout was heard, they would wheel round and lunge in that
direction. Valour was useless: chance and chaos ruled supreme: and the
bravest soldier often fell under a coward's bolt. The Germans fought
with blind fury. The Roman troops were more familiar with danger; they
hurled down iron-clamped stakes and heavy stones with sure effect.
Wherever the sound of some one climbing or the clang of a
scaling-ladder betrayed the presence of the enemy, they thrust them
back with their shields and followed them with a shower of javelins.
Many appeared on top of the walls, and these they stabbed with their
short swords. And so the night wore on. Day dawned upon new 30
methods of attack. The Batavians had built a wooden tower of two
stories and moved it up to the Head-quarters Gate,[315] which was the
most accessible spot. However, our soldiers, by using strong poles and
hurling wooden beams, soon battered it to pieces, with great loss of
life to those who were standing on it. While they were still dismayed
at this, we made a sudden and successful sally. Meanwhile the
legionaries, with remarkable skill and ingenuity, invented still
further contrivances. The one which caused most terror was a crane
with a movable arm suspended over their assailants' heads: this arm
was suddenly lowered, snatched up one or more of the enemy into the
air before his fellows' eyes, and, as the heavy end was swung round,
tossed him into the middle of the camp. Civilis now gave up hope of
storming the camp and renewed a leisurely blockade, trying all the
time by messages and offers of reward to undermine the loyalty of the
legions.
FOOTNOTES:
[299] Chap. 18.
[300] The Bructeri lived between the Lippe and the Upper Ems,
the Tencteri along the eastern bank of the Rhine, between its
tributaries the Ruhr and the Sieg, i. e. opposite Cologne.
[301] i. e. about 12,000 men. The bulk of the Fifth and a
detachment of the Fifteenth had gone to Italy.
[302] i. e. Frisii, Bructeri, Tencteri, &c.
[303] At Mainz.
[304] His other legion was IV Macedonica.
[305] Cp. chap. 20.
[306] Neuss.
