No More Learning

VII. A capacity that would be absolutely undetermined is a non- thing. But every determination presupposes something that is al- ready determined and the consequence and fulfillment of a law. De- sire a priori of both the first and second kind thus also presupposes laws a priori.
VIII. The original drive of the rational being consists, like the drive of each and every other being, in the incessant striving to preserve and to extend the capacity-to-exist of the particular natural thing of which it is the drive.
IX. The existence of rational natural beings is called a personal exis- tence in opposition to all other natural beings. This consists in the consciousness of its identity that the particular being has and is the consequence of a higher degree of consciousness in general.
X. The natural drive of the rational natural being, or rational de- sire, aims thus necessarily at increasing the degree of personhood [Personalita? t], that is, of living existence itself.
XI. We call rational desire in general, or the drive of the rational being as such, the will.
XII. The existence of each finite being is a successive existence; its personhood is based on recollection and reflection, its limited but clear cognition on concepts, consequently, on abstraction and ver- bal, written or other signs.
XIII. The law of the will is to act according to concepts of agreement and coherence, that is according to basic principles [Grundsa? tzen]. The will is the faculty [Vermo? gen] of practical principles [Prinzipien].
XIV. Whenever the rational being does not act in accordance with its basic principles it does not act according to its will, not according to a rational but rather to an irrational desire.
XV. The identity of the rational existence is disrupted by the satis- faction of each and every irrational desire; consequently the person- hood, which alone is grounded in the rational existence, is injured and, therefore, the quantity of the living existence is diminished by the same amount.
XVI. That degree of the living existence that brings forth the per- son is only one manner of the living existence in general, and not a personal particular existence or being. Thus, the person does not only impute those actions to himself that happen according to basic principles but also those that are the effects of irrational desires and blind inclinations.
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XVII. If man, blindfolded by an irrational desire, violates his basic principles, then he tends to say afterward, when he senses the bad consequences of his action: It serves me right. Since he is aware of the identity of his being he must regard himself as the originator of the awkward state in which he is situated and experience the most humil- iating discord within himself.
XVIII. The entire system of practical reason grounds itself on this experience, to the extent it is constructed on only one basic drive.
XIX. If man had only one desire he would have no concept of right and wrong at all. But he has many desires that he cannot all satisfy to the same degree, but rather the possibility of satisfaction of one de- sire abolishes the possibility of satisfaction of the others in a thou- sand cases. Since all of these different desires are only modifications of one single primary desire, the latter provides the principle accord- ing to which the different desires can be weighed against each other and through which the proportion becomes determinable according to which the desire could be satisfied, without the person falling into contradiction and antagonism with himself.
XX. Such an inner right develops imperfectly in every man in a me- chanical manner due to the identity of his consciousness. The exter- nal right that men freely agree on and adopt voluntarily when they join a civil union, is always only the reproduction of the inner right that arose among the single members. I refer to the history of all peo- ples of which we have somewhat detailed information.
XXI. The greater perfection, which the inner right achieves accord- ing to circumstances, follows only as a continuation and develop- ment of the very mechanism which brought about the lesser perfec- tion. All basic principles are based on desire and experience and presuppose, to the extent they are in fact observed, an activity al- ready determined from somewhere else; they can never be the begin- ning or the first cause of an action. The capability and readiness to de- velop or practically accept effective basic principles is the same as the capacity to receive ideas, as the capacity to turn these represen- tations into concepts, as the vivacity and energy of thought, and as the degree of rational existence.
XXII. The principle (or the a priori) of the basic principles is the original desire of the rational being in general to preserve its own par- ticular existence, that is, to preserve its person and to subdue that which wants to injure its identity.
XXIII. From precisely this drive flows a natural love and commit- ment to justice for others. The rational being cannot differentiate it- self as rational being (in abstraction) from another rational being. I and man are one, he and man are one; thus he and I are one. The love of the person thus restricts the love of the individuum, and it requires the individual not hold itself in reverence. But so that the latter would not extend in theory to the possible elimination of the individual and a mere nothing would be left in the person, more exact determina- tions--which were suggested in the foregoing, and further discussion of which does not belong to our purpose here--are necessary. It is enough for us to have come in this way to the clear realization, how these moral laws, which could be called apodictic laws of practical reason, come about, and that we are now able to decide that the sim- ple basic drive that is connected to reason shows pure mechanism and no freedom, although an appearance of freedom is achieved by the often antipodal interests of individuum and person, and by the al- ternating fortune of a sovereignty to which the person connected with clear consciousness alone has a claim.
Second Part
Man Has Freedom
XXIV. It is undeniable that the existence of all finite things is based on coexistence [Mitdasein] and that we are not able to form an idea of a being that exists utterly for itself. But it is just as undeniable that we are even less able to form an idea of an utterly dependent being. Such a being would have to be entirely passive, and yet could not be pas- sive, because what is not already something cannot merely be deter- mined to be something; for that which has no attributes none can be generated in it through relations, indeed not even a relation in regard to it is possible.
XXV. If now a completely mediated existence or being is not think- able, but rather is a non-thing, then a merely mediated--that is, an en- tirely mechanical--ACTION must likewise be a non-thing. Consequently, mechanism in itself is only something contingent, and a PURE self- activity must necessarily form the basis for mechanism everywhere.
XXVI. In so far as we recognize that every finite thing in its exis- tence, consequently also in its activity [Tun] and passivity [Leiden], is necessarily based on, and relates to, other finite things, we recog- nize at the same time the subordination of all and every individual
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being to mechanistic laws. For, to the extent their Being [Sein] and ef- fectiveness is mediated, to that extent it must be based entirely on laws of mechanics.
XXVII. The cognition of that which the existence of things mediates is called a distinct cognition and that which does not allow mediation cannot be cognized distinctly by us.
XXVIII. Absolute self-activity permits no mediation, and it is impos- sible that we somehow cognize its inner realm distinctly.
XXIX. The possibility of absolute self-activity thus cannot be cog- nized, but surely its actuality, which presents itself immediately in consciousness and proves itself through the act, can be cognized.
XXX. Self-activity is called freedom, to the extent that it can set it- self against and prevail over the mechanism which accounts for the sensory [sinnlich] existence of every individual being.
XXXI. Among living beings we know only man to be endowed with that degree of consciousness of his self-activity, which carries within itself the calling and impetus toward free acts.
XXXII. Freedom thus exists not in an inconsistent capacity to de- cide without grounds, just as little as it does in the choice of what is better among what is useful or the choice of rational desire. For such a choice, even if it happens according to the most abstract concepts, still occurs only mechanically; but rather this freedom exists, accord- ing to its essence, in the independence of the WILL from DESIRE.
XXXIII. Will is pure self-activity, raised to the degree of conscious- ness that we call reason.
XXXIV. The independence and inner omnipotence of the will, or the possible rule of the intellectual being over the sensible being, is ad- mitted de facto by all men.
XXXV. From the wise men of antiquity, mainly from the Stoics, it is known that they allowed no comparison between things of desire and things of HONOR. The objects of desire, they said, could be compared among each other according to the sensation of that which is pleas- ant and the concepts of that which is beneficial, and one desire could be sacrificed for the other. The principle of desire, however, lies out- side of all relation with the principle of honor, which has only one ob- ject: the perfection of human nature in itself, self-activity, freedom. Thus, all wrongdoings were alike for them, and it was always only the question from which of the two incommensurable principles-- that could not possibly come to a real collision with each other--the
action had occurred. They wanted quite rightly to have one called a free man who lived only the life of his soul, determined himself ac- cording to the laws of his own nature, therefore obeyed only himself and always acted on his own. They saw in contrast utter slaves in those who, determined by the things of desire, lived by following the laws of those things and subjugated themselves to them so that they might be continuously changed and put into action by them in a man- ner in accord with their desires.
XXXVI. In as much as our enlightened age now may be above the ef- fusions [Schwa? rmereien] or the mysticism of an Epictetus and Antoni- nus, we have not yet advanced in distinctness and thoroughness so that we would be unbound from all feeling of honor. But as long as a spark of this feeling still lives in man, there is in him an irrefutable tes- timonial of freedom and an invincible belief in the inner omnipotence of the will. He can deny this belief with his lips, but it remains in the conscience and sometimes erupts suddenly as in the poet's Ma- homet 9 where Mohammed, turned inward and stricken, utters the terrible words:
Il est donc des remords!
[Alas, there is remorse! ]
XXXVII. Yet, this belief cannot be denied entirely, even with the lips. For who wants to be known as one who at any time could not re- sist all temptations to a shameful action; who, then, needs to deliber- ate here, to take advantages and disadvantages into consideration, to think about degree and greatness? And, in the same way, we also make judgments in regard to other men. If we see someone preferring what is pleasant over what is useful, choosing perverse means for his ends, contradicting himself in his wishes and strivings, then we find only that he acts irrationally, foolishly. If he is careless in the fulfill- ment of his duties, even staining himself with vice, if he is unjust and carries out acts of violence, then we can hate, loathe him. But we can- not yet entirely disdain him. If he denies, however, in some sort of de- cisive manner the feeling of honor, if he shows that he cannot carry inner disgrace or cannot feel self-contempt, then we disdain him with- out mercy, he is excrement under our feet.
XXXVIII. Whence these unconditional judgments? Whence such immoderate [ungemessen] presumptions and demands that are not
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even restricted merely to actions but rather lay claim to feeling and demand its existence apodictically?
XXXIX. Should the right to these presumptions and demands be based in all likelihood on a formula, for instance, on the insight into the correct connections, on the certain truth of the results of the fol- lowing propositions: if A equals B and C is like A then B is like C? Spi- noza demonstrated in this way that man, to the extent he is a rational being, would rather sacrifice his life, even if he does not believe in the immortality of the soul, than save himself from death through a lie. * And Spinoza is right in abstracto. It is just as impossible that men of pure reason lie or deceive as that the three angles in a triangle do not equal two right ones. But will a being actually endowed with reason really allow itself to be driven into a corner in such a way by the ab- stracto of its reason, to be so entirely captured by a thing of thought through a play on words? Never! If there is reliance in honor, and man can keep his word, then another spirit than the spirit of mere syllo- gism must reside in him. ?
XL. I consider this other spirit to be the breath [Odem] of God in the work of clay [in dem Gebilde von Erde].
XLI. This spirit proves its existence first in the understanding which, without it, would truly be that miraculous mechanism that would not only make the guidance of a seeing person by a blind one possible, but rather would also prove the necessity of such an ar- rangement through conclusions of reason. Who constrains the syllo- gism here in so far as it sets out its premises? Only this spirit, through its presence in acts of freedom and in an ineradicable consciousness. ?
XLII. As this consciousness is the conviction itself: intelligence is for itself alone effective; it is the highest, indeed the sole force truly known to us. Thus it also directly teaches the belief in one primary su- preme intelligence and in an intelligent originator and lawgiver for na- ture, in one God WHO IS ONE SPIRIT.
XLIII. But this belief receives its full force and becomes religion only when the capacity of pure love develops in the heart of man.
* Eth. , P. IV, Prop. LXXII.
? The reason of man, separated from man himself and from any drive, is only
a thing of thought that neither can act [agieren] nor react, neither think nor
be practically active [handeln]. Cf. p. 423 of this text.
? Cf. S. 28 and 29 of this text [see XXXIV-XXXIX above--our note].
XLIV. Pure love? Does such a love exist? How does it prove itself, and where does one find its object?
XLV. If I answer that the principle of love is the same principle of whose existence as the principle of honor we have already assured ourselves, then one will believe oneself to have an even greater right to be insistent in regard to the object that I am supposed to present.
XLVI. Thus I answer: the object of pure love is that which a Socrates had in mind. It is the Theion [divine] in man, and the reverence for what is divine forms the basis of all virtue, all sense of honor.
XLVII. I can construct neither this drive nor its object. In order to be able to, I would have to know how substances are created and how a necessary being is possible. But the following will perhaps explain my conviction about its existence a little further.
XLVIII. If the universe is not a god but rather a creation; if it is the ef- fect of a free intelligence, then the original direction of each being must be [the] expression of a divine will. This expression in created beings is their original law in which the force to fulfill it [Kraft es zu erfu? llen] must necessarily be given as well. This principle, which is the condition of the existence of the being itself, its original drive, its OWN WILL, cannot be compared with the laws of nature, which are only results of relations and are in fact based on mediation. But now every individual being belongs to nature. It is thus subject to the laws of nature and has a double direction.
XLIX. The direction toward the finite is the sensory [sinnlich] drive or the principle of desire, and the direction toward the eternal is the intellectual drive, the principle of pure love.
L. Were one to take me to task about this double direction itself, and ask about the possibility of such a relation and of the theory of its establishment, then I would rightly dismiss such a question, be- cause it deals with the possibility and theory of creation, having as object conditions of the unconditional. It is enough if the existence of this double direction and its relation are proved through the act and recognized by reason. As all men ascribe freedom to themselves and set THEIR HONOR alone in the possession of freedom, they all ascribe to themselves a capacity for pure love and a feeling of the overwhelm- ing energy of this love on which the possibility of freedom is based. All want to be lovers of virtue itself, not of the advantages connected with it; all want to know about a beauty which is not merely pleasing, about a joy that is not mere excitation.
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LI. We name actions that actually follow from this capacity divine actions, and their source, the dispositions themselves, divine disposi- tions. They are also accompanied by a joy which cannot be compared with any other joy; it is the joy that God himself has in his existence.
LII. Joy is every enjoyment of existence, just as everything that challenges existence brings about pain and sadness. Its source is the source of life and all activity. But if its affect relates only to a transi- tory existence, then it is itself transitory: the soul of the animal. If its object is that which is permanent and eternal, then it is the force of the deity itself and its reward [Beute] immortality.
JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER
God.
Some Conversations
Excerpt from the Fifth Conversation:"Principle of persistency through separation of that which is opposed,through poles"1
Theophron. [. . . ] Thus, to begin with: Every being is what it is and nei- ther has a concept of nothingness nor a yearning for it. All perfection in one thing is its reality [Wirklichkeit]; the feeling of this reality is the indwelling reward of its existence, its inner joy. In the so-called moral world that is also a natural world, Spinoza sought to ascribe all pas- sions and strivings of man to this inner love toward existence and to- ward persistency in existence [zur Beharrung]; in the physical world, many, somewhat unworthy, names have been bestowed on the ap- pearances that resulted from this law of nature. Now it is called the force of inertia, because every thing remains what it is and does not change without cause: now it is called, although from a different point of view, the force of gravity [Kraft der Schwere], according to which every thing has its center of gravity [Schwerpunkt] on which it rests. Inertia and gravity, just as their opposite, motion, are only appear- ances since space and body themselves are only appearances; that which is true, that which is of essence in them is persistency, [a] con- tinuation of existence which can and may not be interrupted. Even its shape [Gestalt] shows that every thing strives only toward a state of persistency, and you, dear Theano, as a painter of nature, will be able to explain much for yourself from the form [Form] of things if you pay heed to it. We want to take the easiest example from the system of things that can tie the most sprightly mobility with the greatest ho- mogeneity and, therefore, at the same time choose a shape for them- selves. We name these fluid things. Now then, Philolaus, all fluid things
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whose parts act homogenously toward each other without obstruc- tion, what kind of shape do they take?
Philolaus. The shape of a drop.
Theophron. And why the shape of a drop? Should we assume, for instance, a drop-forming principium in nature that arbitrarily loves this shape?
Philolaus. By no means! The drop is a sphere; and within a sphere, all parts come homogenously about at one midpoint in harmony and order. The sphere rests on itself: its gravity is in the middle, its shape is therefore the most beautiful state of persistency of homogenous be- ings that assemble around this midpoint and, with equal forces, lend the [proper] counterweight to each other. In accordance with neces- sary laws of harmony and order, a world will emerge in the drop.
Theophron. Consequently, dear Philolaus, you obtain in the law according to which the drop takes shape, at the same time, the rule according to which our earth, the sun, and all heavenly systems are formed.
For our earth also emerged once from fluid status and gath- ered itself together in the drop. Thus the sun and this entire system in which the sun rules by gravitational force is a larger drop. Every- thing descends in radii and is being upheld in orbit by other forces; thus the orbit of all planets must approach more or less a circle. The sun in its system forms with millions of other suns in turn a cir- cle or an ellipse, since they move around a common middle or focal point, as the Milky Way proves, and as those systems of suns, [and] the nebular stars show. Altogether they are bright drops from the deity's sea that, by means of indwelling eternal laws of harmony and order, sought and found their state of persistency in their shape and in their course of movement [Lauf]. They were able to find their state of persistency in no other way than in the shape of a sphere and in a circular course, the product of opposite forces, and not through arbitrariness but rather through inner principles of homo- geneously acting forces in fluidity, in the sphere-shape, in the ellip- tic movement of a circle. The small tear, Theano, that every morn- ing you find in the calyx of a rose, shows the principle according to which earth, suns, and all solar, indeed, all world systems, were formed. For, if we allow ourselves the enormous flight of fancy of thinking the entire universe, then no giant emerges but rather a sphere that rests on itself.
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Theano. I thank you, Theophron, for this vast viewpoint concern- ing such a simple law of nature that exists in itself; but do come back to our earth or at least back to our solar system: since I do not like to fly so high. You spoke of a second law of nature according to which everything that is similar unites and everything that is opposed separ- ates; don't you want to provide examples for this?
Theophron. I shall remain with my liquid drop. Surely, Theano, you are acquainted, with the stone of hate and love in the world of nature?
Theano. You mean the magnet?
Theophron. That very thing, and though its theory lies very much in obscurity, our experiences with it are that much more clear. So you know its two poles and their friendly or hostile activity?
Theano. I know of them and also know that a point of the greatest love and a point of complete indifference exists in its axis.
Theophron. Therefore, you know all that I need for my example. Consider the magnet as a round drop in which the magnetic force has distributed itself so homogeneously and regularly that its opposite ends comprise north pole and south pole. You are aware that one cannot come into being without the other.
Theano. I know this and that, if one alters one of them, one alters both.
Theophron. You therefore have in the magnet the most beautiful il- lustration of what hate and love in creation may be, and I am sure that one will discover the same thing in several and, possibly, in all fluids.
Philolaus. And this same thing is?
Theophron. That where a system of homogeneous forces achieves an axis the forces arrange themselves around this axis and around its middle point, in a manner such that every homogeneous thing flows to the homogeneous pole und organizes itself, in accordance with geometric laws, from this pole through all degrees of increase to the culmination and then through the point of indifference to the oppo- site pole. Every sphere would in this manner become the arrange- ment of two hemispheres with opposite forces, just as every ellipse with its two focal points; and the laws of this construction would lie-- according to fixed rules--in the active forces of the system that con- sequently forms itself. As much as in a sphere there cannot be a north pole without a south pole, in a system of forces that forms itself in a regular manner there cannot be a shape in which to the same degree
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[eben sowohl] that which is friendly would separate itself from that which is hostile. Consequently, it would form a whole exactly by means of the counterweight that both lend to each other according to decreasing and increasing degrees of connection. There probably could not be a system of electric forces in the world if it were not for two types of electricity opposing each other that one had actually discovered through experience. It is the same also with warmth and coldness as it is the same with probably every system of forces that can obtain unity only through multiplicity and coherence through that which is opposed to it. The remarkable teaching about nature, which is still so young, will eventually go a long way in these mat- ters, so that it will at last dispel every blind arbitrariness from the world, according to which everything would fall apart and all laws of nature would come to an end. For you must concede, my friends, if the magnet, electric force, light, warmth and coldness, attraction, gravity, and so on, act arbitrarily, then the triangle is no triangle, and compasses are no compasses; then we might declare all observa- tions of physics and mathematics as nonsense and wait for arbitrary revelation. But if it is certain that we have discovered accurate math- ematical laws of nature for so many forces, who wants to set the boundary for us where these laws are no longer to be found, but rather where God's blind will begins? In creation, everything is con- nection, everything is order; therefore, if one law of nature occurs somewhere, then laws of nature must preside everywhere, or crea- tion collapses like chaos.
Theano. You depart however, my friend, from the law of hate and love where according to your system one cannot be without the other. Theophron. Because everything in the world exists that can, then also that which is opposed must exist, and a law of the highest wis- dom must form a system everywhere precisely from this opposition [aus diesem Entgegengesetzten], from the north and south pole. In every circle of nature is the table of the thirty two currents of air, in every ray of sunshine is the full spectrum of colors, and it depends only on which current now and then flows, which color appears here and there. As soon as something solid emerges from a fluid, every- thing crystallizes and forms itself according to inner laws that lie in this system of active forces. All things gravitate toward, or repel, or re- main indifferent against, one other, and the axis of these active forces passes continuously [zusammenha? ngend] through all gradations.
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Chemists arrange nothing but weddings and separations, nature does this in a much richer and more profound manner. All things seek and find themselves that love each other, and the teaching about nature it- self could not help but assume the concept of an elective-attraction [Wahl-Anziehung] for the naming of its bodies. What is opposite de- parts the one from the other and comes together only through the point of indifference. Often, the forces vary rapidly; whole systems be- have differently as do the system's single forces among each other: hate can become love, love can become hate, and everything because of one and the same reason, namely, because every system seeks per- sistency in itself and arranges its forces accordingly. You see how cau- tious one thus has to be with respect to those analogies of external oc- currences in so far as one is not immediately justified, for example, to perceive magnetism and electricity as one, because one discovers in both some similar laws. The systems of forces can be very different from each other und still behave in accordance with all the same laws, since in nature, everything ultimately has to be connected, and there can only be one main law according to which even the most different forces arrange themselves.
Theano. Your principle of persistency, of hate and love comes--as it seems to me--very close to this main law: since it appears every- where, regardless of all the countless differences and opposed ap- pearances in nature. For a few moments I would like to be a higher spirit in order to observe this great workshop in its inner workings [in ihrem Innern].
Theophron. Do not wish for this, Theano. The spectator from out- side is better off, perhaps, at least more comfortable than the ob- server from inside who, however, also could never gain a synoptic view [u? bersehen] of the whole. The spectator in front of the stage stands more comfortably than he who eavesdrops behind the scenes. The exploration of the truth has greater appeal; possessing it per- haps makes [one] sated and dull. To investigate nature, to have a first premonition of her high laws, then to comment, to verify, to assure oneself about these laws, to find them now confirmed a thousand times and newly applied; to perceive finally the same wisest rule, the same holy necessity everywhere, to fall in love, to educate oneself, precisely this accounts for what a man's life is worth. For, dear Theano, are we only spectators, are we not actors ourselves, partici- pants in nature and her emulators? Is it not true that hate and love
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rules in the empire of men? And are not both equally necessary for the formation of the whole? He who cannot hate cannot love; he just has to learn to hate properly and to love properly. There is a point of indif- ference among men; but this is, thank God, within the entire magnetic axis only one point.
[. . . ]
Notes
Introduction
1. Martin Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Athens: University of Ohio Press, 1985). See Wal- ter Schulz, Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spa? tphilo- sophie Schellings (Pfullingen: Neske, 1975); Manfred Frank, Der unend- liche Mangel an Sein (Mu? nchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1992); Slavoj ? Zi? zek, The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters (London: Verso, 1996). We should note that, of these authors, only Hei- degger and ? Zi? zek focus on the Philosophical Investigations, while Frank makes no attempt to hide his distaste.
2. This is not to say, however, that the Philosophical Investigations has not received attention as an attempt at theodicy: see, for example, Friedrich Hermanni, Die letzte Entlastung: Vollendung und Scheitern des abendla? ndi- schen Theodizeeprojekts in Schellings Philosophie (Vienna: Passagen Ver- lag, 1994).
3. Richard Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical Investigation (Oxford: Polity Press, 2002), 3-4. But see Odo Marquard, "Unburdenings: Theo- dicy Motives in Modern Philosophy," in In Defense of the Accidental, trans. Robert M. Wallace (New York: Oxford UP, 1991), 8-28. For another opposing view, see Joseph Laurence's excellent essay, "Schelling's Meta- physics of Evil," in The New Schelling, ed. Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman (London: Continuum, 2004), 167-189.
4. Heidegger's influence here, as elsewhere, is probably determinative, since he did not take the theodical aspect of the Philosophical Investiga- tions seriously, considering it the "package in which 'the problem of evil' is passed around" and that it would be better to refer to the Philosophi- cal Investigations as an attempt at "systemadicy" [Systemadicee] (Hei- degger, Schelling's Treatise, 15).
5. Z? iz? ek, The Indivisible Remainder, 42.
6. But this may be a less justifiable statement now given the steep increase
in interest in Schelling exhibited by a series of new translations and essay collections including The New Schelling and Schelling Now. See The New Schelling above as well as Schelling Now: Contemporary Read- ings, ed. Jason M. Wirth (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2005). Also see the recent collection of essays in German devoted to Schelling's remarkable and influential concept of personality: Alle Perso? nlichkeit ruht auf einem dunkeln Grunde: Schellings Philosophie der
132 | NOTES TO PAGES IX-XXIX
Perso? nlichkeit, eds. Thomas Buchheim and Friedrich Hermanni (Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 2004).
7. Leibniz writes:
Mathematics or the art of measuring can elucidate such things very nicely, for everything in nature is, as it were, set out in num- ber, measure and weight or force. If, for example, one sphere meets another sphere in free space and if one knows their sizes and their paths and directions before collision, one can then fore- tell and calculate how they will rebound and what course they will take after the impact. Such splendid laws also apply, no matter how many spheres are taken or whether objects are taken other than spheres. From this one sees then that everything proceeds mathematically--that is, infallibly--in the whole wide world, so that if someone could have sufficient insight into the inner parts of things, and in addition had remembrance and intelligence enough to consider all the circumstances and to take them into account, he would be a prophet and would see the future in the present as in a mirror.
This is quoted in Ernst Cassirer's book Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics. Cassirer comments that the "same infallibility that dis- closes itself in mathematical thought and inference must obtain in nature, for if nature did not possess this infallibility it would be inaccessible to mathematical thought. In this mode of argument there is expressed the characteristic subjective fervor that inspired the first founders and champions of classical rationalism. " It is worthwhile to add that the es- sence of the modern striving to mathematize nature is an overcoming of the reticence of Greek and Christian culture in regard to the possibility of obtaining true knowledge, the prerogative of the gods or God. See, E. Cas- sirer, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics: Historical and Systematic Studies of the Problem of Causality (New Haven: Yale UP, 1956), 11-12. See also Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984), 37-50, 57-69.
8. Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1983), 55-56.
9. Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloom- ington: Indiana UP, 1991), 3-9.
10. Hermanni argues persuasively for the distinctive innovation of Leibniz's approach in regard to the traditional privation theory of evil. See Frie- drich Hermanni, "Die Positivita? t des Malum: Die Privationstheorie und ihre Kritik in der neuzeitlichen Philosophie," in Die Wirklichkeit des Bo? sen, ed. Peter Koslowski and Friedrich Hermanni (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1998), 49-55.
11. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975), 42-43. See, in this connection, Marquard, "Unburdenings," 14-17 and Wilhelm G. Jacobs,
"Die Theodizeeproblematik in der Sicht Schellings," in Studia Leibnitiana,
Supp 26, 1986, 217.
12. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Ox-
ford UP, 1977), 19.
13. Here is a close connection between Hegel and Goethe, one that helps to
explain the effusive letter that is the centerpiece of Karl Lo? with's ac- count of their relationship in his From Nietzsche to Hegel. See Karl Lo? with, From Nietzsche to Hegel: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought, trans. David E. Green (New York: Columbia UP, 1964), 3-6.
14. See Bernstein, Radical Evil, 46. Also see William Desmond, "Dialectic and Evil," in Beyond Hegel and Dialectic: Speculation, Cult and Comedy (Al- bany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 189-250.
15. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Volume III, The Con- summate Religion, trans. R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart, with the assistance of H. S. Harris (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 301. The key passage on p. 301 reads:
Being evil is located in the act of cognition, in consciousness. And cer- tainly, as we already said earlier, being evil resides in cognitive knowl- edge; cognition is the source of evil. For cognition or consciousness means in general a judging or dividing, a self-distinguishing within oneself. Animals have no consciousness, they are unable to make distinctions within themselves, they have no free being-for-self in the face of objectivity generally. The cleavage, however, is what is evil; it is the contradiction. It contains the two sides: good and evil. Only in this cleavage is evil contained and hence it is itself evil. Therefore it is entirely correct to say that good and evil are first to be found in consciousness.
16. This seems to be one of the strands in the critique of Enlightenment that stems from Horkheimer and Adorno. See Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stan- ford: Stanford UP, 2002).
17. The paradigmatic modern example of this kind of questioning starts and ends with Auschwitz, which seems to mock any notion of theodicy in the traditional sense or even in the peculiar Nietzschean sense of the eternal return.
18. See Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002), 62. Also see Bernstein, Radical Evil, 11-45 and, for a more wide- ranging discussion, Gordon E. Michalson, Jr.