(3) Whether it is a part of
justice?
Summa Theologica
" Therefore
all vengeance is unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear
with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant
2:2, "As the lily among the thorns," says: "He is not a good man that
cannot bear with a wicked one. " Therefore we should not take vengeance
on the wicked.
Objection 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment,
which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of
fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii).
Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.
Objection 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes
revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful
even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom
[*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth. , falsely ascribed to St.
Chrysostom] says: "Let us learn after Christ's example to bear our own
wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's wrongs, not even by
listening to them. " Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.
Objection 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the
sin of only one: for it is written (Ecclus. 26:5-7): "Of three things
my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the
gathering together of the people, and a false calumny. " But vengeance
should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Mat.
13:29,30, "Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both
to grow," says that "a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor
should the sovereign. " Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful.
On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save what is good
and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His enemies: for
it is written (Lk. 18:7): "Will not God revenge His elect who cry to
Him day and night? " as if to say: "He will indeed. " Therefore vengeance
is not essentially evil and unlawful.
I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on
one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must
consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed
chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests
there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take
pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the
charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that
he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as
neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may
not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned
against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden
by the Apostle, who says (Rom. 12:21): "Be not overcome by evil, but
overcome evil by good. "
If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good,
to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned
(for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be
restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and
God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due
circumstances be observed.
Reply to Objection 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping
with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes
use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of
the earthly prince that "he is God's minister, an avenger to execute
wrath upon him that doeth evil. " If, however, a man takes vengeance
outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and
therefore sins.
Reply to Objection 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring
patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from
them: but they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they
inflict on God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus
Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth. , falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom]
says: "It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to
overlook God's wrongs is most wicked. "
Reply to Objection 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and
therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong
to the Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but
only those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they
belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on
God and the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge
the wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come
to seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked
him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him
into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the wrong
inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if
this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood
as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i).
Reply to Objection 5: When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be
taken on them, either in respect of the whole multitude---thus the
Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the
children of Israel (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely
destroyed (Gn. 19)---or as regards part of the multitude, as may be
seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf.
Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the
severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the
principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord
(Num 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin
of the multitude.
On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the
multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the
innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that
this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude should
be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the sovereign,
whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if it
cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude: unless indeed his
sin were such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either
spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to
arise from his punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vengeance is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct
virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so are
the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the good
does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative
justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a
special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for
an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues.
Now man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to
avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special
virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance.
Therefore it is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
justice.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude to
virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us
through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that
virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural
inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every
definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now
there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which
reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the
concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs,
lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already
been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of
removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and
in general whatever is obscure" [*'Obscurum' Cicero wrote 'obfuturum'
but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the parenthesis]
"(i. e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it. "
Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to
commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from the
bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so
too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public
justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as it is
concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is
resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.
Reply to Objection 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an
obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting
the fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far
as a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because
charity makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue
proceeds from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom.
xxvii in Ev. ), "there are no green leaves on the bough of good works,
unless charity be the root. "
Reply to Objection 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of
excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the
measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency
and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written
(Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son. " But the virtue
of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with
regard to all the circumstances.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among
men?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means of
punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to uproot
him. But our Lord forbade (Mat. 13:29) the uprooting of the cockle,
whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore sinners
should not be put to death.
Objection 2: Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the
same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with
death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death:
and this is evidently false.
Objection 3: Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to
publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the
multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion for
sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not be
inflicted for a sin.
On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the divine law as
appears from what we have said above ([3198]FS, Q[105], A[2]).
I answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to
the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive of
virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing those
things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning, else
fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin
should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the
things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom,
and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name.
Wherefore, according to Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi), "Tully
writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment": namely,
"death," whereby man is deprived of life; "stripes," "retaliation," or
the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety;
"slavery," and "imprisonment," whereby he is deprived of freedom;
"exile" whereby he is banished from his country; "fines," whereby he is
mulcted in his riches; "ignominy," whereby he loses his good name.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle,
when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But
sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without danger,
but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the
punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners.
Reply to Objection 2: All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal
death, as regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the
truth of the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more
of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is
inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of
others.
Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that the punishment, whether of
death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same
time as the sin, makes man's will avers to sin: because the fear of
punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who have
sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow from the
will of another. Yet one man is punished for another, according to Ex.
20:5, "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the
fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation. " Thus
for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was curse (Gn. 9:25) and for the
sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck with leprosy (4 Kings 5).
Again the blood of Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the
ban of punishment, for they said (Mat. 27:25): "His blood be upon us
and upon our children. " Moreover we read (Josue 7) that the people of
Israel were delivered into the hands of their enemies for the sin of
Achan, and that the same people were overthrown by the Philistines on
account of the sin of the sons of Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person
is to be punished without having deserved it voluntarily.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's
power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power;
thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on account
of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an episcopal
see on account of the depravity or evil of the people. Therefore
vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.
Objection 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance
is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of
Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their
parents (Gn. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their
children were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover, dumb
animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain on
account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore vengeance
is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily.
Objection 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But
a man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by
fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those
who have deserved it involuntarily.
Objection 5: Further Ambrose says on Lk. 5 that "the ship in which
Judas was, was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm in the
security of his own merits, was in distress about those of others. " But
Peter did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes
punished without having voluntarily deserved it.
On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is voluntary
according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i). Therefore
vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved it
voluntarily.
I answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ways. First, under
the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due save
for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is
restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his
own will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Wherefore,
since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as stated
above ([3199]FS, Q[81], A[1]), it follows that no one is punished in
this way, except for something done voluntarily. Secondly, punishment
may be considered as a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but
also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good, and in this
way a person is sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet
not without cause.
It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater
good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body never
blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it is
harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of greater
consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence,
while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a person is
punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own. Such are
many of the punishments inflicted by God in this present life for our
humiliation or probation. But no one is punished in spiritual goods
without any fault on his part, neither in this nor in the future life,
because in the latter punishment is not medicinal, but a result of
spiritual condemnation.
Reply to Objection 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual
punishment for another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects
the soul, in respect of which each man is master of himself. But
sometimes a man is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the
sin of another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may
be the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in
punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a
belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their master.
Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another, either by
"imitation," as children copy the sins of their parents, and slaves the
sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater daring; or by way of
"merit," as the sinful subjects merit a sinful superior, according to
Job 34:30, "Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins
of the people? " Hence the people of Israel were punished for David's
sin in numbering the people (2 Kings 24). This may also happen through
some kind of "consent" or "connivance": thus sometimes even the good
are punished in temporal matters together with the wicked, for not
having condemned their sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9).
Thirdly, in order to mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one
man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to
inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all,
as though all were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin
of Achan (QQ. sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, "Visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth
generation," seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He
does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in
order that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the
wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to
take vengeance on them.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human
judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is manifest,
and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment
cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby He punishes
certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since
man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments so as to know
what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore according to human
judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an
inflictive punishment, such as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man
may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to a punishment of
forfeiture, even without any fault on his part, but not without cause:
and this in three ways.
First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his,
disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being
infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the
Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man
is hindered from receiving sacred orders.
Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own
but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a
certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to
the good of the clerics.
Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of
another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his inheritance
through the sin of his parent.
Reply to Objection 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in
temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a
possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also in
their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they be
spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve
to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on dumb
animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way their
owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.
Reply to Objection 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not
involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated
above ([3200]FS, Q[6], AA[5],6).
Reply to Objection 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin
of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of
one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply OBJ[1],2).
__________________________________________________________________
OF TRUTH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning
truth there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is a part of justice?
(4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether truth is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of
virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object precedes
the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue, but
something prior to virtue.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it
belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to
be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always
praiseworthy---neither in good things, since according to Prov. 27:2,
"Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth"---nor even in evil
things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Is.
3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have
not hid it. " Therefore truth is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or
intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because
its object is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent.
Rhet. ii) that by "truth we faithfully represent things as they are
were, or will be. " Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues,
but their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean
between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the
better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second and in the Fourth
Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues.
I answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by
reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a
virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this way,
truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but a
certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing
understood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as
stated in the [3201]FP, Q[16], A[1]; [3202]FP, Q[21], A[2]. Secondly,
truth may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which
sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs
be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and virtue is
"that which makes its possessor good, and renders his action good. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes truth in the first sense.
Reply to Objection 2: To state that which concerns oneself, in so far
as it is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this
does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite
for that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due
circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful.
Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for
that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one's sin, by
praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it
uselessly.
Reply to Objection 3: A person who says what is true, utters certain
signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either
words, or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of
things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the
latter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far as
this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore truth
is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue. And
it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways. First, on the
part of the object, secondly, on the part of the act. On the part of
the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of equality,
and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the very reason
that a man says what is true about himself, he observes the mean
between one that says more than the truth about himself, and one that
says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe the mean
is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. Excess consists
in making known one's own affairs out of season, and deficiency in
hiding them when one ought to make them known.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether truth is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the true
and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special virtue, in
fact every virtue is goodness, because "it makes its possessor good. "
Therefore truth is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an act
of truth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue,
since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore
truth is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives
aright, and of which it is written (Is. 38:3): "I beseech Thee . . .
remember how I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect
heart. " Now one lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the
definition of virtue given above ([3203]FS, Q[55], A[4]). Therefore
truth is not a special virtue.
Objection 4: Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since
hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue,
since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every virtue.
Therefore neither is truth a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is numbered together with other virtues (Ethic. ii,
7).
I answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in making a man's
deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of goodness
in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto by a
special virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii)
good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good will
be found where there is a special order. Now there is a special order
whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered in
relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto man is
perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that truth is
a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The true and the good are convertible as to
subject, since every true thing is good, and every good thing is true.
But considered logically, they exceed one another, even as the
intellect and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands
the will and many things besides, and the will desires things
pertaining to the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the "true"
considered in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a
particular good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner
the "good" considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite
is something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since
virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to be
a special virtue, just as the "true" is a special good; yet it is not
possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather, considered
logically, it is the genus of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: The habits of virtue and vice take their species
from what is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental
and beside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns
himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly
intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and
beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act
bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a
consequence beside his principal intention.
Reply to Objection 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is
true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else
is said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure,
namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity
to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to
duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while
having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this
virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since this
belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man
pretends one thing and intends another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether truth is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it seems
proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling the
truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the case in
all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of
justice.
Objection 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice
is in the will, as stated above ([3204]Q[58], A[4]). Therefore truth is
not a part of justice.
Objection 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely,
"truth of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of doctrine. " But none
of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all virtues,
as stated above (A[2], ad 3): truth of justice is the same as justice,
so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs
rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of
justice.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among the
parts of justice.
I answer that, As stated above ([3205]Q[80]), a virtue is annexed to
justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something
in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue
thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with justice.
In the first place it is directed to another, since the manifestation,
which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to another,
inasmuch as one person manifests to another the things that concern
himself. In the second place, justice sets up a certain equality
between things, and this the virtue of truth does also, for it equals
signs to the things which concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls
short of the proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for
this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers, but
rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, one man owes
another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore truth is a part of
justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary virtue to its principal.
Reply to Objection 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally
owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human
society. Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless
they believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence
the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.
Reply to Objection 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But
man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters
external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the
manifestation of the truth is an act of the will.
Reply to Objection 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs
from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding A[2], ad 3.
We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to
the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according
to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice
differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life a man
lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes
the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to another man:
and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with the truth
of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of life. In another way
the truth of justice may be understood as referring to the fact that,
out of justice, a man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man
confesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice. This
truth is a particular act of justice, and does not pertain directly to
this truth of which we are now speaking, because, to wit, in this
manifestation of the truth a man's chief intention is to give another
man his due. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing
this virtue: "We are not speaking of one who is truthful in his
agreements, nor does this apply to matters in which justice or
injustice is questioned. "
The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths
relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain
to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in
speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern
him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are.
Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something
concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of
doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of truth
whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less?
Objection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to that
which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so does one
by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five, than that
four are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil, and to be
avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore the
virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather than to
that which is greater.
Objection 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather
than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is
nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer
to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to one
extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of
equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more
incline to that which is less.
Objection 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems
to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract
therefrom; and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to
amount to an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant
to truth than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible
with the denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition.
Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that which is greater
rather than to that which is less.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by this
virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is
less. "
I answer that, There are two ways of declining from the truth to that
which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show the
whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so forth.
This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained
in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less.
For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), "this seems to be more
prudent because exaggerations give annoyance. " For those who represent
themselves as being greater than they are, are a source of annoyance to
others, since they seem to wish to surpass others: whereas those who
make less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since they
seem to defer to others by their moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2
Cor. 12:6): "Though I should have a mind to glory, I shall not be
foolish: for I will say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should
think of me above that which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from
me. "
Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say that
what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this virtue to
incline to what is less, because this would imply falsehood. And yet
this would be less repugnant to the truth, not indeed as regards the
proper aspect of truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which
should be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught with
greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is more repugnant to
prudence to think or boast that one has what one has not, than to think
or say that one has not what one has.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2)
dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice.
Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth?
(2) Of the species of lying;
(3) Whether lying is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether lying is always opposed to truth?
Objection 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For
opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible
with truth, since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies,
according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not
opposed to truth.
Objection 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but
also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by
this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's life.
But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii)
that "a lie is a false signification by words. " Accordingly, it seems
that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the
"liar's sin is the desire to deceive. " But this is not opposed to
truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not
opposed to truth.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt
that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a
false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie. " But
this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.
I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its
object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is
the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its
own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and
stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to
formal, as stated above ([3206]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7).
Now it has been said above ([3207]Q[109], A[1], ad 3) that the virtue
of truth---and consequently the opposite vices---regards a
manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or
statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified;
because every representation consists in comparison, which is the
proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest
something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do
something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But
when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be
voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper
object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And
the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is
that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a
false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.
Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is
said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to
deceive, then there is falsehood---materially, since what is said is
false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and
effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.
However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood,
from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false;
wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from its being in
opposition to the "mind. " Consequently if one says what is false,
thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally,
because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it
is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is
accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on
the other hand, one utters' falsehood formally, through having the will
to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a
voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth
accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.
That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by
deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to
perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its
species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking;
for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come
down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is
evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of
truth.
Reply to Objection 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it
formally and essentially rather than according to what is in it
materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth,
considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of
telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of
telling the truth.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words
hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a
lie is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every
kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false
by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.
Reply to Objection 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection
of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to
the species of its cause.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and
mischievous lies?
Objection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into
"officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should be
made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its
nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part.
Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from
a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that
act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one act.
Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect: for
a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, an "officious" lie for
some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in order to injure
someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds
of lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie
that profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party
so as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying
and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the
sixth "injures no one, and profits /someone in saving his money"; the
seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death";
the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from
defilement of the body. " Therefore it seems that the first division of
lies is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into
"boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which falls
short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not
contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above.
all vengeance is unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear
with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant
2:2, "As the lily among the thorns," says: "He is not a good man that
cannot bear with a wicked one. " Therefore we should not take vengeance
on the wicked.
Objection 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment,
which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of
fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii).
Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.
Objection 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes
revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful
even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom
[*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth. , falsely ascribed to St.
Chrysostom] says: "Let us learn after Christ's example to bear our own
wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's wrongs, not even by
listening to them. " Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.
Objection 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the
sin of only one: for it is written (Ecclus. 26:5-7): "Of three things
my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the
gathering together of the people, and a false calumny. " But vengeance
should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Mat.
13:29,30, "Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both
to grow," says that "a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor
should the sovereign. " Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful.
On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save what is good
and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His enemies: for
it is written (Lk. 18:7): "Will not God revenge His elect who cry to
Him day and night? " as if to say: "He will indeed. " Therefore vengeance
is not essentially evil and unlawful.
I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on
one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must
consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed
chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests
there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take
pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the
charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that
he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as
neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may
not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned
against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden
by the Apostle, who says (Rom. 12:21): "Be not overcome by evil, but
overcome evil by good. "
If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good,
to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned
(for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be
restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and
God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due
circumstances be observed.
Reply to Objection 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping
with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes
use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of
the earthly prince that "he is God's minister, an avenger to execute
wrath upon him that doeth evil. " If, however, a man takes vengeance
outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and
therefore sins.
Reply to Objection 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring
patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from
them: but they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they
inflict on God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus
Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth. , falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom]
says: "It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to
overlook God's wrongs is most wicked. "
Reply to Objection 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and
therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong
to the Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but
only those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they
belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on
God and the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge
the wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come
to seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked
him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him
into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the wrong
inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if
this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood
as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i).
Reply to Objection 5: When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be
taken on them, either in respect of the whole multitude---thus the
Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the
children of Israel (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely
destroyed (Gn. 19)---or as regards part of the multitude, as may be
seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf.
Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the
severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the
principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord
(Num 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin
of the multitude.
On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the
multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the
innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that
this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude should
be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the sovereign,
whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if it
cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude: unless indeed his
sin were such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either
spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to
arise from his punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vengeance is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct
virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so are
the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the good
does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative
justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a
special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for
an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues.
Now man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to
avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special
virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance.
Therefore it is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
justice.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude to
virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us
through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that
virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural
inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every
definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now
there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which
reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the
concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs,
lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already
been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of
removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and
in general whatever is obscure" [*'Obscurum' Cicero wrote 'obfuturum'
but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the parenthesis]
"(i. e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it. "
Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to
commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from the
bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so
too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public
justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as it is
concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is
resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.
Reply to Objection 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an
obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting
the fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far
as a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because
charity makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue
proceeds from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom.
xxvii in Ev. ), "there are no green leaves on the bough of good works,
unless charity be the root. "
Reply to Objection 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of
excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the
measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency
and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written
(Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son. " But the virtue
of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with
regard to all the circumstances.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among
men?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means of
punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to uproot
him. But our Lord forbade (Mat. 13:29) the uprooting of the cockle,
whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore sinners
should not be put to death.
Objection 2: Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the
same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with
death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death:
and this is evidently false.
Objection 3: Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to
publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the
multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion for
sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not be
inflicted for a sin.
On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the divine law as
appears from what we have said above ([3198]FS, Q[105], A[2]).
I answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to
the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive of
virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing those
things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning, else
fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin
should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the
things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom,
and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name.
Wherefore, according to Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi), "Tully
writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment": namely,
"death," whereby man is deprived of life; "stripes," "retaliation," or
the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety;
"slavery," and "imprisonment," whereby he is deprived of freedom;
"exile" whereby he is banished from his country; "fines," whereby he is
mulcted in his riches; "ignominy," whereby he loses his good name.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle,
when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But
sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without danger,
but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the
punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners.
Reply to Objection 2: All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal
death, as regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the
truth of the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more
of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is
inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of
others.
Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that the punishment, whether of
death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same
time as the sin, makes man's will avers to sin: because the fear of
punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who have
sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow from the
will of another. Yet one man is punished for another, according to Ex.
20:5, "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the
fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation. " Thus
for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was curse (Gn. 9:25) and for the
sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck with leprosy (4 Kings 5).
Again the blood of Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the
ban of punishment, for they said (Mat. 27:25): "His blood be upon us
and upon our children. " Moreover we read (Josue 7) that the people of
Israel were delivered into the hands of their enemies for the sin of
Achan, and that the same people were overthrown by the Philistines on
account of the sin of the sons of Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person
is to be punished without having deserved it voluntarily.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's
power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power;
thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on account
of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an episcopal
see on account of the depravity or evil of the people. Therefore
vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.
Objection 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance
is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of
Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their
parents (Gn. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their
children were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover, dumb
animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain on
account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore vengeance
is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily.
Objection 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But
a man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by
fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those
who have deserved it involuntarily.
Objection 5: Further Ambrose says on Lk. 5 that "the ship in which
Judas was, was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm in the
security of his own merits, was in distress about those of others. " But
Peter did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes
punished without having voluntarily deserved it.
On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is voluntary
according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i). Therefore
vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved it
voluntarily.
I answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ways. First, under
the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due save
for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is
restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his
own will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Wherefore,
since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as stated
above ([3199]FS, Q[81], A[1]), it follows that no one is punished in
this way, except for something done voluntarily. Secondly, punishment
may be considered as a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but
also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good, and in this
way a person is sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet
not without cause.
It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater
good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body never
blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it is
harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of greater
consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence,
while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a person is
punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own. Such are
many of the punishments inflicted by God in this present life for our
humiliation or probation. But no one is punished in spiritual goods
without any fault on his part, neither in this nor in the future life,
because in the latter punishment is not medicinal, but a result of
spiritual condemnation.
Reply to Objection 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual
punishment for another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects
the soul, in respect of which each man is master of himself. But
sometimes a man is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the
sin of another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may
be the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in
punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a
belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their master.
Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another, either by
"imitation," as children copy the sins of their parents, and slaves the
sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater daring; or by way of
"merit," as the sinful subjects merit a sinful superior, according to
Job 34:30, "Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins
of the people? " Hence the people of Israel were punished for David's
sin in numbering the people (2 Kings 24). This may also happen through
some kind of "consent" or "connivance": thus sometimes even the good
are punished in temporal matters together with the wicked, for not
having condemned their sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9).
Thirdly, in order to mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one
man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to
inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all,
as though all were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin
of Achan (QQ. sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, "Visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth
generation," seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He
does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in
order that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the
wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to
take vengeance on them.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human
judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is manifest,
and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment
cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby He punishes
certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since
man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments so as to know
what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore according to human
judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an
inflictive punishment, such as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man
may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to a punishment of
forfeiture, even without any fault on his part, but not without cause:
and this in three ways.
First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his,
disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being
infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the
Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man
is hindered from receiving sacred orders.
Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own
but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a
certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to
the good of the clerics.
Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of
another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his inheritance
through the sin of his parent.
Reply to Objection 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in
temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a
possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also in
their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they be
spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve
to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on dumb
animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way their
owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.
Reply to Objection 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not
involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated
above ([3200]FS, Q[6], AA[5],6).
Reply to Objection 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin
of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of
one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply OBJ[1],2).
__________________________________________________________________
OF TRUTH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning
truth there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is a part of justice?
(4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether truth is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of
virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object precedes
the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue, but
something prior to virtue.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it
belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to
be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always
praiseworthy---neither in good things, since according to Prov. 27:2,
"Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth"---nor even in evil
things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Is.
3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have
not hid it. " Therefore truth is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or
intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because
its object is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent.
Rhet. ii) that by "truth we faithfully represent things as they are
were, or will be. " Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues,
but their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean
between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the
better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second and in the Fourth
Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues.
I answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by
reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a
virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this way,
truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but a
certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing
understood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as
stated in the [3201]FP, Q[16], A[1]; [3202]FP, Q[21], A[2]. Secondly,
truth may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which
sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs
be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and virtue is
"that which makes its possessor good, and renders his action good. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes truth in the first sense.
Reply to Objection 2: To state that which concerns oneself, in so far
as it is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this
does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite
for that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due
circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful.
Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for
that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one's sin, by
praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it
uselessly.
Reply to Objection 3: A person who says what is true, utters certain
signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either
words, or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of
things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the
latter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far as
this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore truth
is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue. And
it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways. First, on the
part of the object, secondly, on the part of the act. On the part of
the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of equality,
and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the very reason
that a man says what is true about himself, he observes the mean
between one that says more than the truth about himself, and one that
says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe the mean
is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. Excess consists
in making known one's own affairs out of season, and deficiency in
hiding them when one ought to make them known.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether truth is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the true
and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special virtue, in
fact every virtue is goodness, because "it makes its possessor good. "
Therefore truth is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an act
of truth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue,
since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore
truth is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives
aright, and of which it is written (Is. 38:3): "I beseech Thee . . .
remember how I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect
heart. " Now one lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the
definition of virtue given above ([3203]FS, Q[55], A[4]). Therefore
truth is not a special virtue.
Objection 4: Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since
hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue,
since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every virtue.
Therefore neither is truth a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is numbered together with other virtues (Ethic. ii,
7).
I answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in making a man's
deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of goodness
in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto by a
special virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii)
good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good will
be found where there is a special order. Now there is a special order
whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered in
relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto man is
perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that truth is
a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The true and the good are convertible as to
subject, since every true thing is good, and every good thing is true.
But considered logically, they exceed one another, even as the
intellect and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands
the will and many things besides, and the will desires things
pertaining to the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the "true"
considered in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a
particular good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner
the "good" considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite
is something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since
virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to be
a special virtue, just as the "true" is a special good; yet it is not
possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather, considered
logically, it is the genus of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: The habits of virtue and vice take their species
from what is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental
and beside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns
himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly
intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and
beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act
bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a
consequence beside his principal intention.
Reply to Objection 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is
true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else
is said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure,
namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity
to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to
duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while
having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this
virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since this
belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man
pretends one thing and intends another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether truth is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it seems
proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling the
truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the case in
all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of
justice.
Objection 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice
is in the will, as stated above ([3204]Q[58], A[4]). Therefore truth is
not a part of justice.
Objection 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely,
"truth of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of doctrine. " But none
of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all virtues,
as stated above (A[2], ad 3): truth of justice is the same as justice,
so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs
rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of
justice.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among the
parts of justice.
I answer that, As stated above ([3205]Q[80]), a virtue is annexed to
justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something
in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue
thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with justice.
In the first place it is directed to another, since the manifestation,
which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to another,
inasmuch as one person manifests to another the things that concern
himself. In the second place, justice sets up a certain equality
between things, and this the virtue of truth does also, for it equals
signs to the things which concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls
short of the proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for
this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers, but
rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, one man owes
another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore truth is a part of
justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary virtue to its principal.
Reply to Objection 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally
owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human
society. Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless
they believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence
the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.
Reply to Objection 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But
man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters
external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the
manifestation of the truth is an act of the will.
Reply to Objection 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs
from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding A[2], ad 3.
We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to
the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according
to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice
differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life a man
lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes
the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to another man:
and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with the truth
of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of life. In another way
the truth of justice may be understood as referring to the fact that,
out of justice, a man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man
confesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice. This
truth is a particular act of justice, and does not pertain directly to
this truth of which we are now speaking, because, to wit, in this
manifestation of the truth a man's chief intention is to give another
man his due. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing
this virtue: "We are not speaking of one who is truthful in his
agreements, nor does this apply to matters in which justice or
injustice is questioned. "
The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths
relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain
to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in
speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern
him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are.
Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something
concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of
doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of truth
whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less?
Objection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to that
which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so does one
by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five, than that
four are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil, and to be
avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore the
virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather than to
that which is greater.
Objection 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather
than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is
nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer
to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to one
extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of
equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more
incline to that which is less.
Objection 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems
to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract
therefrom; and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to
amount to an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant
to truth than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible
with the denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition.
Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that which is greater
rather than to that which is less.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by this
virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is
less. "
I answer that, There are two ways of declining from the truth to that
which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show the
whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so forth.
This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained
in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less.
For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), "this seems to be more
prudent because exaggerations give annoyance. " For those who represent
themselves as being greater than they are, are a source of annoyance to
others, since they seem to wish to surpass others: whereas those who
make less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since they
seem to defer to others by their moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2
Cor. 12:6): "Though I should have a mind to glory, I shall not be
foolish: for I will say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should
think of me above that which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from
me. "
Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say that
what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this virtue to
incline to what is less, because this would imply falsehood. And yet
this would be less repugnant to the truth, not indeed as regards the
proper aspect of truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which
should be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught with
greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is more repugnant to
prudence to think or boast that one has what one has not, than to think
or say that one has not what one has.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2)
dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice.
Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth?
(2) Of the species of lying;
(3) Whether lying is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether lying is always opposed to truth?
Objection 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For
opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible
with truth, since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies,
according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not
opposed to truth.
Objection 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but
also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by
this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's life.
But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii)
that "a lie is a false signification by words. " Accordingly, it seems
that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the
"liar's sin is the desire to deceive. " But this is not opposed to
truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not
opposed to truth.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt
that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a
false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie. " But
this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.
I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its
object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is
the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its
own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and
stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to
formal, as stated above ([3206]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7).
Now it has been said above ([3207]Q[109], A[1], ad 3) that the virtue
of truth---and consequently the opposite vices---regards a
manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or
statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified;
because every representation consists in comparison, which is the
proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest
something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do
something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But
when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be
voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper
object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And
the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is
that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a
false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.
Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is
said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to
deceive, then there is falsehood---materially, since what is said is
false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and
effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.
However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood,
from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false;
wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from its being in
opposition to the "mind. " Consequently if one says what is false,
thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally,
because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it
is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is
accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on
the other hand, one utters' falsehood formally, through having the will
to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a
voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth
accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.
That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by
deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to
perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its
species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking;
for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come
down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is
evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of
truth.
Reply to Objection 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it
formally and essentially rather than according to what is in it
materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth,
considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of
telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of
telling the truth.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words
hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a
lie is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every
kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false
by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.
Reply to Objection 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection
of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to
the species of its cause.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and
mischievous lies?
Objection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into
"officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should be
made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its
nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part.
Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from
a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that
act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one act.
Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect: for
a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, an "officious" lie for
some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in order to injure
someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds
of lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie
that profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party
so as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying
and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the
sixth "injures no one, and profits /someone in saving his money"; the
seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death";
the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from
defilement of the body. " Therefore it seems that the first division of
lies is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into
"boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which falls
short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not
contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above.
