fluctuation
in reflection between the Apollonian and Dionysian dimensions of the mask.
Peter-Sloterdijk-Thinker-on-Stage
always with the sort of emphasis whereby what is stressed remains under Apollonian control.
Apollo is, even within Nietzsche himself, the ruler in the antithetical relationship with his Other.
W ith the establishment of this symmetrically frozen mask made up of the two halves of the faces of both deities, Nietzsche accomplished a stroke of genius vis-a-vis self-representation that has fascinated us to this day. For, far from reproaching him for not "really" giving full license to the Dionysian ? we would imagine the case to be after a century of liberalization and
tion ? must wonder at the mythological device that enabled him to open up the passage to the Dionysian a crack wider. Manfred Frank has demonstrated
? ? ? ? ? 26 ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE
most impressively in his book Der kommende Gott (The god to come) that this device was not without preconditions, but that the groundwork for it had been laid by the thought of early romanticism and Richard
Nietzsche's thought is established within this Dionysian fissure. However, he who begins thinking with the fissure of origin must be prepared to accept, as a logical consequence, the condition of having escaped as also being one of disso- lution and separation. Having made this acceptance possible within a cultural context is the greatest profoundly depth-psychological accomplishment of ro- mantic ? Nietzsche is able to risk putting on the double mask of Apollo and Dionysus because, since romanticism, the motif of a psychological fissure had become culturally acceptable. Even for those who were the most cissistically sensitive and chaste, this high-cultural symbolism had in the mean- time made a noncontemptible means of expression available for ambivalent psy- chological self-representation. Nietzsche made use of the romantic capability for looking back from the rationality of the day into the reason of the night in order to scout out, in his own way, the Dionysian energetics of the foundation of being. We cannot overlook the fact that this represents an extremely mediated and guarded form of playing with primordial
The recollection of Dionysus is precisely not a naturalistic Propddeutik of bar- barism; rather, it is the attempt to sink the foundation of culture deeper into an era of barbaric menace. In any case, Nietzsche's Dionysian fissure proves to be the most promising form for maintaining a relationship to that which precedes a con- scious awareness of ? arrangement to which one continually returns whenever the question arises as to how the Dionysian truths contained within the foundation of pain and pleasure ? can be "integrated" into the forms of modern life without our having to succumb to the barbaric risks of mad- ness and violence. My observations with respect to Nietzsche's acknowledgment of symmetry and his opting for the submission of the Dionysian to the com- pulsion toward the symbolic corroborate the thesis that few nineteenth-century books are quite as Apollonian as The Birth of Tragedy. The extent to which it can also be read as a Dionysian text will become apparent in Chapter 4 ? we imag- ine the esoteric concept of the "Dionysian" as representing philosophical
Nevertheless, what has been said must seem astonishing when dealing with an author who considered himself to be the rediscoverer of Dionysus. We cannot delude ourselves about one thing: whenever Nietzsche referred in his later work to The Birth of Tragedy, as he did in the famous "Attempt at a Self-Criticism" and in the preface to Ecce Homo, he did so in spite of all his reservations about the "immature" features of his first book, and was consistently aware that this
of its new understanding of the ? His own Dionysian reading of The Birth of Tragedy can ? all
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE ? 27
through the fact that, for the later Nietzsche, the word "Dionysian" was the equivalent of ? "heathen," "immoral,"
that correspond overwhelmingly to the tendencies of the book on its semantic
But this thematic prominence of the Dionysian cannot diminish the fact of the the Apollonian.
? ? ? ? ? I suggest that we take a
sian. This degree of exactness is justifiable, not least of all because, in the book on tragedy, there is one point at which the mystery of Nietzsche's Greek scholar concept of the Dionysian is laid bare ? bare, in fact, that there is nothing left that would require ? Nietzsche exposes his Dionysian alchemy, that is, his talent for changing a he-goat into a musician, at this one point more clearly than anywhere else. Let us slowly read through this most important first chapter once again.
What is happening here? Before our eyes, Nietzsche splits the Dionysian throng into two severely differentiated, almost oppositional choruses, which relate to each other like culture and nature or like civilization and barbarism. Ac- cording to the author, a "monstrous gap" separates the Dionysians of Greece from those of the a gap the highly cultured individual will never again bridge will never even be able to want to bridge. This gap ? take on immeasurable significance for the theory of tragedy. We can convince ourselves of this whenever we wait for the moment at which the fictive procession of the approaching god with its followers rolls toward us, only to be divided at the very second at which the winged (beschwingt) classical philologist is attempting to join it. The element that had fascinated the philologist in the distant and as yet undivided view of this chorus of Dionysian throngs is too evident to require an explanation. For, from a distance and presuming a grandiose disregard for de- tails, the vulgar chorus is condensed into a humanistic dream image with an ir- resistible power to entice:
Under the charm of the Dionysian not only is the union between man and man reaffirmed, but nature which has become alienated, hostile, or subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with her lost son, man. ? ? ? Now the slave is a free man; now all the rigid, hostile barriers that necessity, caprice, or "impudent convention" have fixed between man and man are broken. Now, with the gospel of universal harmony, each one feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused with his neighbor, but as one with him, as if the veil of had been torn aside and were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial unity. In song and dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher community. p. 37)
This is what Nietzsche has written though the reader might not believe his own eyes. If the text were to continue in the vein in which it has ? The Birth
construction of the Diony-
? ? ? ? ? ? 28 ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE
of Tragedy would be read today as The Socialist Manifesto, one that would not have to shrink from being compared with The Communist Manifesto. The work would be read as the program for an aesthetic socialism and as the Magna Carta of a cosmic ? one would glean from this book precisely those character- istics that only vestigially shared in the image of the corresponding political or- ganizations and ideologies. But the temptation Nietzsche feels to enter into tory as the spokesman for a socialism lasts only for a
long as it takes for the throngs of the to ? past at the appropriate hisj torical distance ? the reconciliation with man and nature is directly
of no
As soon as proximity provides for the dissolution of an idealistic inexactitude,
all previous premises are reversed. Admittedly, to the same extent that the fusion with the whole appeared as pure impossibility, nothing stood in the way of a sac- rifice to the ? But if the raving chorus of sounds, bodies, and appe- tites comes closer, the abyss of primordial origin is opened up into that to which the individualized subject cannot want to revert for anything in the world. Images of horror immediately rise ? of fatal constriction and death by suffo- cation in the cavern of eros. What appeared previously as a blessed disentangle- ment is now seen as a horrible dismemberment; that which longing purported to crave now causes it to recoil in horror with a definite sense of nausea in the face of its realization. The impulse toward unification suddenly changes over into a frenzy of ? and the eros of the return to the womb of earth and com- munity is transformed into a panic of dissolution and revulsion at the prospect of the socialist vulvocracy
This is the decisive moment. The bacchanalian festival procession is now split apart, and while the Dionysian barbarians continue to revel in their group rut, a noble minority branches off that has placed itself under the command of the Greek will to ? And thus, away with the barbaric ? of the Orient! Away with the orgiastic sexuality of the cult of ? Away with the compulsion toward physical contact among the people and other unappetizing ? Away with this leftist, Green Party, all-embracing crudeness! An Apollonian interven- tion is demanded here; a masculine, self-aware, individualistic principle should intervene, one that would confront with its purity and selectivity any sort of ob- scene confusion. Before the common Dionysians can become Greek and Nietz- schean Dionysians, they must be filtered through a sort of preliminary purifica- tion process. This I will call, following Nietzsche's description of it, the process of "Doric
Early Hellenism erected, so we are told, a masculine dam to protect itself against the Dionysian flood. It heroically resisted the "extravagant sexual licen- tiousness" that was characteristic of the Walpurgis Nights of the barbarian Dionysus. The Doric dam construction was responsible whenever the "horrible
of sensuality and cruelty" became ? The Diony-
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE 29
attempts at inundation recoil against the rejecting at- titude of Apollo" (BT, pp. 39-40).
What is worth noting here is the radical revaluation of the Dionysian. Sud- denly it no longer appears as a principle that is bent on reconciling the world, because of which all human existence would for the first time be able to achieve its true ? but rather as a primitive force of cultural destruction, an uncouth demonic danger of uncontrollable release and dissolution:
For me the Doric state and Doric art are explicable only as a permanent military encampment of the Apollonian, only [as] incessant resistance to the titanic-barbaric nature of the Dionysian. (BT, p. 47)
For ? then, the Doric process of precensorship existed in the initial stages of the ? it served to break the flood of the Dionysian against the dam of the ? The phenomenon of an art of ecstasy that has been tamed into submission to advanced culture develops for the first time out of the binary energetic complex of dam and flood, restraint and ? In the beginning was the compromise ? play of force and counterforce, which became inextri- cably interlaced with each other for the purpose of reciprocal ascent. Nietzsche represents this compromise graphically and does not neglect to mention that the authority who has succeeded in reaching the compromise is ? and not his irresponsible opponent! Thus, Apollo is the calculating subject who enters into a daring game with his own dissolution. After this same Apollo had finally reluc- tantly acknowledged the imperative of the demands of ? he
according to ? disarm his violent opponent by means of a "recon- ciliation. " Nietzsche goes so far as to note that this is "a seasonably effected reconciliation" (BT, p. 39).
The importance of this process can hardly be overestimated, for it signifies nothing less than the primal scene of civilization -- the historical compromise of Western culture. Because of the Apollonian compromise, the old orgiastic power of nature is forced upward and is welded once and for all to the register of the symbolic as artistic energy. In making this observation, Nietzsche was aware that he was speaking not of an arbitrary episode within the context of the history of Greek art but of an event that would prove fateful for all higher civilizing pro- cesses. "This he says, "is the most important moment in the history of the Greek ? and here we might add, the most important transition along the path from archaic to highly advanced forms of living. It is almost un- necessary to state that these more highly developed forms bring with them an increase in fragility, an ascent by the living being toward more ? more perilous forms that ? as if unavoidably, enveloped in a haze of perversion. Through the inhibiting and intensifying act of power that the Apollonian com- promise represents, the naive orgies of early human beings are transformed into the sentimental festival performances of more recent ? They are no longer
? ? ? ? ? 30 ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE
"reversions[s] of man to the tiger and the ? but progress toward "festivals of and days of
Only now does Nietzsche's Dionysian undertaking again come into play. After Doric precensorship and Apollonian resistance have done their job and erected adequate defenses, the ? for the Dionysian component
? ? ? ? ? to reenter, a
dance, completely mystical participation and beautiful ? short, every higher form of that the reverential traditional term
Just as soon as a distance from the vulgar procession of the satyrs has been symbolically reestablished, the transfiguration of the Dionysian begins anew. Bracketed within aesthetic parentheses and dramaturgical quotation marks, the singing he-goats are no longer libertines who regress to bestiality. Rather, they have been rejuvenated into the media for effecting a fusion with the foundation of being and the subjects of a musical socialism. The magic is re- peated within a secure framework that serves as protection against the risks in- volved in an actual enchantment. From this point on, everything appears in its revelers in place of Dionysian revelers, unifica- tion in place of unification, orgies in place of orgies. This process of "standing in place of something" is, however, conceived of as a process of beneficial sub- and not merely as a forfeiture of the Within the context of this gain, culture begins to affirm itself as and this quality of standing in place of something becomes the key to the mystery of the civilizing phenomenon. The ramifications of this for theories of truth will soon become ? the next two chapters I will discuss the dramaturgy of sub-
stitution and the metaphysics of illusion.
Henceforth, the old Dionysian forces are permitted to overflow with a new licentiousness ? place of licentiousness ? the riverbed of symbolization. No wonder, then, that the path to Greek tragedy is accompani6d by the "greatest exaltation of all symbolic faculties," indeed, by a "collective release of all sym- bolic ? Through this elevation into the symbolic, the world becomes more than it was. The substitution is superior to what it replaces; what has arisen from the original surpasses it. "The essence of nature is now to be expressed symbolically; we need a new world of symbols" (BT, p. 40). In short, the bar- baric he-goat has advanced to the status of civilized goat, and, if he were to think back on his wild youth (although this would have to be delayed a priori), could say to himself as a poststructuralist, "A symbol has inserted itself between me and my ? a language has preceded my ability to be present only as myself ? a discourse has taught my ecstasy to speak. But isn't it worth lamenting the fact that lamentation itself has become ? discourse? "
The Apollonian ? however, now notices for the first time, albeit too ? the dilemma in which it has implicated itself by agreeing to a compro- mise with the Dionysian. From here on out it can no longer conceive of itself aus
completely
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE
sich selbst. Apollo has lost the illusion of his own autonomy; in his attempts to reestablish it to the extent that he can, he must sink ever deeper into the discern- ment of his own lack of a foundation ? After he has glanced into the Dionysian abyss beneath the forms, Apollo is no longer able to believe in his substantial rationality and his masculine self-control. His initial hope of being able to negotiate a compromise with the Dionysian in which he will be able to preserve himself unaltered is revealed as an illusion. Without fail, Apollo is swept into the undertow of the Dionysian dissolution of identity. It undermines for him the idea that the beautiful illusion of his own self, with its glistening ab- straction and its abundance of rational light, might in truth represent only an ob-
of the amorphously suffering god,
What does this all mean for the actor on the stage with his mask of the two
deities? To what extent does this illuminate for him the structure of his own sub- jectivity? What does it profit his experience of himself to appear on stage in this way? The thinking mime is, I believe, now able to recognize that he himself is not a "One," a Unified Subject, but rather a dual subject who dreams of
able to possess himself as ? This dual existence no longer has the amorphous quality of an unformulated yearning and the pretentious pathos of he who feels that he is pregnant with his own self. This dual existence defines itself within the context of a thinking ?
fluctuation in reflection between the Apollonian and Dionysian dimensions of the mask. This uneasily repeated fluc- tuation establishes the pattern of thought for an all-penetrating critical ? A mechanism transformed Nietzsche into a philosopher: the Apollonian in him sus- pected that he was at bottom only a Dionysian ? while the Diony- sian saw through himself with the penetrating clairvoyancy of one who is re- minded of his Apollonian castration. He feels like a mere civilized satyr, like a he-goat in place of a he-goat, who can no longer believe in himself because he must understand that his present self is only a substitute for his true self.
In this way, Nietzsche has set in motion an unprecedented intellectual psycho- drama. Through his audacious game with the double mask of the deities, he has made of himself a genius of self-knowledge as ? He has become a psychologist spontaneously ? has become the first philosopher to be a psy- chologist as philosopher; his antiquating role playing has set him on this path. Nietzsche always finds himself in a position in which he faces himself as a trans- parent phenomenon: he does not believe in himself as Dionysus because he has had to sacrifice his wild lower half to the Apollonian compromise. Conversely, he has just as little belief in himself as Apollo because he suspects himself of being merely a veil before the Dionysian. The self of the thinker on stage that is in search of itself oscillates, within the confines of a sensational reflexivity, back and forth between the frozen halves of his mask. He relinquishes himself to a circular process of total self-distrust, which in time will mount into a distrust of all "truths" and all ? which at the same time rises up in a despair-
? ? ? ? ? 32 ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE
ing praise of the illusion of autonomy and the divine impenetrability of the phe- nomenal. Whatever position the ego may assume, whatever "representation" of itself it may choose to offer, it will perpetually sense that the other ? the dis- placed aspect, is lacking.
W ithin the framework of this ? confused fluctuation between the processes of masking and unmasking, Nietzsche's third face develops, with dramaturgical repercussions of the most impressive kind. It is the mask of Nietz- sche the ? the psychologist, the critic of knowledge, the thought dancer, the teacher of the affirmative pretense ? W ith this third face, Nietzsche begins to come dangerously close to his "Become who you dangerous because this mask, in its misleading optimism, could induce Narcissus to tumble into his own image. The danger that emanates from the image always strikes the person who passionately desires at his weakest ? fact that he would like to have ? reality" what he allows himself to have only in the
in the imaginary modus of ? Dionysus does not permit himself to possess, and whatever can be possessed is not Dionysus. Therefore, the greatest danger for Nietzsche lies in wanting to incarnate Dionysus so as to at least be able to take possession of him in his incarnate
On the basis of his theory of bipolar artistic forces, Nietzsche immediately emerges as a virtuoso in the art of an uneasy kind of ? that does not believe its own observations. It does not believe itself, not because it has re- nounced itself or because it would abet a "totalizing critique of reason," but rather because the self of this reflection is constituted in itself (an ? beschaf-
in such a way that that which could allow it to believe in itself must always elude it. Nietzsche's dramatic thought is in the process of discovering that it is absolutely impossible for ? and the sense of an experi- ence of unity that could lead to ? occur simultaneously. Whether as Apollo or as Dionysus, the named, identified, and masked subject is never permitted to believe that it has arrived at the foundation of its own identity. For as soon as it sees itself, this subject has already seen through itself as something wherein it cannot set its mind at ease because it is lacking the best part of itself, its Other.
Thus, Nietzsche's theatrical experience of self sets in motion a perfect system for Whatever might say " I " upon the stage will be a sym- bolicallyrepresented" I , "anApollonianartisticcreation,whichweholdout before us like a veil to protect ourselves from perishing of the complete
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Chapter 3
Cave or, Danger, Terrible Truth!
? Lonely one, you are going the way to yourself. And your way leads past yourself and your seven devils.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
"On the Way of the Creator"
He who seeks a path toward himself is dreaming of a condition in which he will be able to endure himself. For this reason, no search for the self can be a theo- retical one, for this search arises from the impulse within the living being to find a "truth" that will make his unendurable life endurable. Theorizing of any type grinds to a halt when it reaches the level of radical questions of this kind, and either leads to an art of living (Lebenskunst) or remains what it was ? symptom of wounded ? The idea that the true self might be something that can indeed be sought after arises directly from the suffering it causes. Only that which feels pain begins to ? with the longing for a better self, which would be the true one because it has ceased suffering on its own account ? sich).
only those who want to escape from themselves find themselves. It is the very desire to escape that directly points to the direction of the path that the search for self will follow. The search for oneself implies above all else the will to a path; the direction that path will take can initially be none other than the path away from oneself.
Embarking upon this path affords the wanderer the opportunity to encounter his own shadow. Through the act of leaving, the wanderer begins to discover what he has taken with him in spite of ? just when he thought he had left everything behind. The true self clings to the heels of the one who is embarking on the path. But only when the wanderer realizes that he himself constitutes his own heaviest baggage can the "dialectic of the path" begin. Through the efforts made to flee, and also through the stimuli that accompany any meaningful exodus, his powers increase to such an extent that he can recognize and endure
? 33
? 34 ? CAVE CANEM
what, in leaving, he had not wanted to recognize and endure: the unendurable Only along the way does it become apparent how little of what the traveler has driven out of himself really allows itself to be shaken off. The more passion- ate his searching flight, the more vehement his realization of that which cannot be gotten rid ? Only the search that despairs of its own passion can arrive at the decisive point at which the search itself becomes as unbearable as what set it in motion. At this point, the agony of the search reaches its crisis point when it gains insight into the unattainability of what is being sought. The searcher must burn out ? when he senses that nothing will save him from himself. He is extinguished in the dilemma of having to choose between the unbearable and
the ? Only in the fire of disillusionment can the last remaining illusions be burned away. W ith the departure of what is being sought, the search itself be- comes the ? and the path flows with a tragic bend into the pain from which it was initially able to turn away. Partir, ? ? ? ? is how ? paths begin. But arriver, c'est mourir
The self-knowledge (Selbsterkenntnis) entrusted to the path of experience therefore, the structure of a negative circle in that it returns to its beginnings -- that is, to its pain and its ? ? the gradual repulsion of disillusioned ideas and the burning away of the images of happiness it had sought. This is, incidentally, completely different from the positive circle of narcissistic reflec-
within which a seemingly material spirit loses itself and then rediscovers that identical self in order to perform, in the happy end, dances of jubilation around the golden idol of
I call this remarkably negative structure of self-knowledge the psychonautical Nietzsche's theatrical adventure into the theory of knowledge is intrinsi- cally implicated in it. His personal and philosophical fate depends to a great extent, I believe, on whether he can complete the task of burning away images and whether his search for self can be successfully completed within the context of a beneficial negativity and lack of ? The risk involved in any such uncontrolled search is extraordinary; it can easily happen that the searcher becomes caught up halfway in a vision of his own ego, because of which he will announce, having been duped and enraptured, that this vision is what he has been Homo. Only a crisis will then reveal whether the seeker will plunge himself into a reflection in order to perish of its ? or whether he will still have a chance to turn away from the mirror in order to assume respon- sibility for his life as a discovery that is void of ? But Nietzsche's drama is still far from arriving at this crisis point. He is still in the process of expanding the stage for his great play, exposing its antiquated foundation and properly de- termining what masks the actors will wear. Let us look at what else Nietzsche had
in mind for his Hellenistic, psychodramatic stage!
Contrary to what might be expected, what appears there the inter- mezzo of his contemporary critique, the Untimely not a classi-
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? CAVE 35
? masked hero, not a Wagnerian tenor who has been transplanted into antiq- and not a hero who has been transposed into modernity from the family of Oedipus, Siegfried, Heracles, and Prometheus. What we observe here is a figure who cannot be foreseen, who hardly seems to exist in a believable relationship to the tragic stage. What is produced there on the stage is a sort of theorizing Le- porello, a freethinker and on-stage enlightener, who reminds us of the philoso- pher figures on the stages of the eighteenth ? the Figaro in the works
of perhaps, and even more of Don Alfonso in Mozart's ? fan who, in his modish cynicism, has already mistaken the truth for a woman and woman for a synthesis of the bottomless cask and the thing " i n itself" (an
sich).
In the third trope of his ? Nietzsche reveals himself prima facie to be on paths that are ? As I have already indicated, a critical activity that seems far removed from the mythological performances of the first scene results from his experience of himself within the ? du- ality. Nietzsche now appears behind the mask of the philosophical specialist in abysses ? known as womanizers as the illusionless grand seigneur to whom nothing inhuman or human is ? He speaks maliciously and with bravura of the lies told by the great men and of the abysses of the lesser ones; he presents himself as a virtuoso of cultural-critical distrust. He poses as a libertine underminer of idealistic values and as a positivist psychologist who, out of boredom with his own depth, makes fun of lending out to the British a dose of platitudes and to the French a prize for their infamous worldliness. Has Nietzsche thus completely turned his back on his classical and Wagnerian inspirations? The truth of the matter is that he acknowledged the Apollonian energy of resistance more openly in the psychocritical writing of his middle period. It is as if the ra- tionalist in him were resisting subversion by the forces of
In order to appreciate the dramatic context of Nietzsche's ? however, one must first see lurking behind this third mask, which is negativistic and im- posed by Apollo, a fourth ? mask of Dionysian prophecy. This is Za- rathustra, drawn up to his full height, who will resound across the stage as the heroic tenor of immoralism, a subject his psychologizing precursor had only hinted at aphoristically, jeeringly, and in a miniaturizing way as an intellectual chamber play It must therefore be understood that the masks of the third and fourth orders the Gay Scientist, there the prophet of immo-
essentially only the unfoldings of the Apollonian and Diony- sian double ? from behind which Nietzsche's literary appearance had
The antagonism between the two artistic impulses within the soul thus remains every bit as valid as their relationship as ? the distinction that Nietzsche is now setting in motion what he initially presented within the context of a static symmetry and frozen dialectic. W ithin his process of thought, the po- larity between the extremes begins to swing out of balance ? ? all
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 1
? ? 36 CAVE
Apollonian attempts at establishing control notwithstanding ? because of this oscillation, the Dionysian, which had been at first exhibited only as a dominated and silenced power, gains in latitude.
This is all just another way of expressing how closely this Nietzsche of the middle ? one of the Gay Science and the great dismantling of values -- is connected to the later Nietzsche, the one of the prophetic dithyrambs. The free- thinking, "cynical" underminer of all existing values ? Apollo who has turned ? ? remains the closest accomplice of Zarathustra, the Dionysus who has turned immoral. The all-penetrating psychologist of the stage performs, in his exercises in the critique of knowledge, the recitative to which Zarathustra's proclamation of self provides the aria.
In the thematic arrangement of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche had already es- tablished the prerequisites for his next step forward. In the reciprocal distrust of both deities lay the philosophical dynamite of the future: the age of ideas was drawing to a close, while the age of energies' was announced. Radical doubt no longer leads ? is the case in Descartes ? to an unshakable foundation in the certainty of thought, but instead to a fireworks display of incredible reflection and a free play of doubting power. Doubt can no longer be assuaged in the cer- tainty of ideas.
Nietzsche forges ahead unchecked on the trail ? Spur) of insights and hunches. He discovers while under way through the psychonautical circle that a labor of negation ? be necessary that is as painful as it is invigorating. His gods experience a twilight from which they will never ? adoration vacillates, the brightly colored paper wrappings fall away from the ideals, leav- ing them naked and deserving only of laughter. Wagner becomes questionable to a degree from which he will not recover; Schopenhauer has retreated far into the background. Classical philology becomes completely nauseating, and the values of the new German present evoke only antipathy and ? period of willful self-deception through the idea of a greatness of this sort has come irre- vocably to an end. The exemplary seeker takes it upon himself to destroy, piece by piece, the value system, the world of images, the pantheon of the noblest goals under whose authority his exodus was set in ? Nietzsche commented on this in retrospect:
It is a war, but a war without powder and smoke, without bellicose attitudes, without pathos and dislocated ? would all itself still be "idealism. " One error after the other is put on ice, the ideal is not
freezes to death ? ? ? Here, for instance, the idea of "genius" freezes; around the corner, the "saint" freezes. The "hero" is freezing beneath a thick icicle, and finally "belief" freezes, so-called conviction, even compassion cools down significantly
everywhere, the thing in itself [das Ding an ? is freezing to
? ? ? ? ? ? CAVE 37
words could better express what it means to enter the phase of an active dis- illusionment. And yet Nietzsche's reflection remains too alert to settle down into a comfortable attitude of triumphal ? The problem that will prove essen- tial has already emerged on the horizon: if ideals collapse, what becomes of the force that has motivated these ideals? After one is no longer able to deceive
self, the question remains: what becomes of the impulse that has allowed one to deceive and lie to oneself? Nietzsche's thought advances to a level that corre- sponds to that of a thermodynamics of illusion; it orients itself, as it were, to a "principle [Satz] of the maintenance of illusion-creating ? The idols col- lapse, and yet the idolatrizing force remains constant; ideals perish in the cold, and yet the fire of idealism continues to wander about, objectless and passion- ately desiring. The period of self-deception has ended, without the reservoirs from which the lies were supplied having been exhausted.
With this turning point, Nietzsche has begun to grow into a thinker whose thought will have incalculable long-range effects. Now we can understand why, when compared to Nietzsche's critique, all other forms of a critique of ideology seem short-winded and reveal themselves to be almost scandalously in want of a self-critical alertness. His realism thinks, as it were, a whole epoch ahead of itself. In his play with the masks of the deities of antiquity, he has already begun to gaze into the abyss of a self-doubt that cannot be assuaged, from which arose the phenomenon of the fundamental untenability of reflexive ? What he gained from this is as disturbing as it is ? insight into the exis- tential inevitability of the lie. One can imagine what would become of philoso- phy if this conjectured insight were to prove true!
W ith the establishment of this symmetrically frozen mask made up of the two halves of the faces of both deities, Nietzsche accomplished a stroke of genius vis-a-vis self-representation that has fascinated us to this day. For, far from reproaching him for not "really" giving full license to the Dionysian ? we would imagine the case to be after a century of liberalization and
tion ? must wonder at the mythological device that enabled him to open up the passage to the Dionysian a crack wider. Manfred Frank has demonstrated
? ? ? ? ? 26 ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE
most impressively in his book Der kommende Gott (The god to come) that this device was not without preconditions, but that the groundwork for it had been laid by the thought of early romanticism and Richard
Nietzsche's thought is established within this Dionysian fissure. However, he who begins thinking with the fissure of origin must be prepared to accept, as a logical consequence, the condition of having escaped as also being one of disso- lution and separation. Having made this acceptance possible within a cultural context is the greatest profoundly depth-psychological accomplishment of ro- mantic ? Nietzsche is able to risk putting on the double mask of Apollo and Dionysus because, since romanticism, the motif of a psychological fissure had become culturally acceptable. Even for those who were the most cissistically sensitive and chaste, this high-cultural symbolism had in the mean- time made a noncontemptible means of expression available for ambivalent psy- chological self-representation. Nietzsche made use of the romantic capability for looking back from the rationality of the day into the reason of the night in order to scout out, in his own way, the Dionysian energetics of the foundation of being. We cannot overlook the fact that this represents an extremely mediated and guarded form of playing with primordial
The recollection of Dionysus is precisely not a naturalistic Propddeutik of bar- barism; rather, it is the attempt to sink the foundation of culture deeper into an era of barbaric menace. In any case, Nietzsche's Dionysian fissure proves to be the most promising form for maintaining a relationship to that which precedes a con- scious awareness of ? arrangement to which one continually returns whenever the question arises as to how the Dionysian truths contained within the foundation of pain and pleasure ? can be "integrated" into the forms of modern life without our having to succumb to the barbaric risks of mad- ness and violence. My observations with respect to Nietzsche's acknowledgment of symmetry and his opting for the submission of the Dionysian to the com- pulsion toward the symbolic corroborate the thesis that few nineteenth-century books are quite as Apollonian as The Birth of Tragedy. The extent to which it can also be read as a Dionysian text will become apparent in Chapter 4 ? we imag- ine the esoteric concept of the "Dionysian" as representing philosophical
Nevertheless, what has been said must seem astonishing when dealing with an author who considered himself to be the rediscoverer of Dionysus. We cannot delude ourselves about one thing: whenever Nietzsche referred in his later work to The Birth of Tragedy, as he did in the famous "Attempt at a Self-Criticism" and in the preface to Ecce Homo, he did so in spite of all his reservations about the "immature" features of his first book, and was consistently aware that this
of its new understanding of the ? His own Dionysian reading of The Birth of Tragedy can ? all
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE ? 27
through the fact that, for the later Nietzsche, the word "Dionysian" was the equivalent of ? "heathen," "immoral,"
that correspond overwhelmingly to the tendencies of the book on its semantic
But this thematic prominence of the Dionysian cannot diminish the fact of the the Apollonian.
? ? ? ? ? I suggest that we take a
sian. This degree of exactness is justifiable, not least of all because, in the book on tragedy, there is one point at which the mystery of Nietzsche's Greek scholar concept of the Dionysian is laid bare ? bare, in fact, that there is nothing left that would require ? Nietzsche exposes his Dionysian alchemy, that is, his talent for changing a he-goat into a musician, at this one point more clearly than anywhere else. Let us slowly read through this most important first chapter once again.
What is happening here? Before our eyes, Nietzsche splits the Dionysian throng into two severely differentiated, almost oppositional choruses, which relate to each other like culture and nature or like civilization and barbarism. Ac- cording to the author, a "monstrous gap" separates the Dionysians of Greece from those of the a gap the highly cultured individual will never again bridge will never even be able to want to bridge. This gap ? take on immeasurable significance for the theory of tragedy. We can convince ourselves of this whenever we wait for the moment at which the fictive procession of the approaching god with its followers rolls toward us, only to be divided at the very second at which the winged (beschwingt) classical philologist is attempting to join it. The element that had fascinated the philologist in the distant and as yet undivided view of this chorus of Dionysian throngs is too evident to require an explanation. For, from a distance and presuming a grandiose disregard for de- tails, the vulgar chorus is condensed into a humanistic dream image with an ir- resistible power to entice:
Under the charm of the Dionysian not only is the union between man and man reaffirmed, but nature which has become alienated, hostile, or subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with her lost son, man. ? ? ? Now the slave is a free man; now all the rigid, hostile barriers that necessity, caprice, or "impudent convention" have fixed between man and man are broken. Now, with the gospel of universal harmony, each one feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused with his neighbor, but as one with him, as if the veil of had been torn aside and were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial unity. In song and dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher community. p. 37)
This is what Nietzsche has written though the reader might not believe his own eyes. If the text were to continue in the vein in which it has ? The Birth
construction of the Diony-
? ? ? ? ? ? 28 ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE
of Tragedy would be read today as The Socialist Manifesto, one that would not have to shrink from being compared with The Communist Manifesto. The work would be read as the program for an aesthetic socialism and as the Magna Carta of a cosmic ? one would glean from this book precisely those character- istics that only vestigially shared in the image of the corresponding political or- ganizations and ideologies. But the temptation Nietzsche feels to enter into tory as the spokesman for a socialism lasts only for a
long as it takes for the throngs of the to ? past at the appropriate hisj torical distance ? the reconciliation with man and nature is directly
of no
As soon as proximity provides for the dissolution of an idealistic inexactitude,
all previous premises are reversed. Admittedly, to the same extent that the fusion with the whole appeared as pure impossibility, nothing stood in the way of a sac- rifice to the ? But if the raving chorus of sounds, bodies, and appe- tites comes closer, the abyss of primordial origin is opened up into that to which the individualized subject cannot want to revert for anything in the world. Images of horror immediately rise ? of fatal constriction and death by suffo- cation in the cavern of eros. What appeared previously as a blessed disentangle- ment is now seen as a horrible dismemberment; that which longing purported to crave now causes it to recoil in horror with a definite sense of nausea in the face of its realization. The impulse toward unification suddenly changes over into a frenzy of ? and the eros of the return to the womb of earth and com- munity is transformed into a panic of dissolution and revulsion at the prospect of the socialist vulvocracy
This is the decisive moment. The bacchanalian festival procession is now split apart, and while the Dionysian barbarians continue to revel in their group rut, a noble minority branches off that has placed itself under the command of the Greek will to ? And thus, away with the barbaric ? of the Orient! Away with the orgiastic sexuality of the cult of ? Away with the compulsion toward physical contact among the people and other unappetizing ? Away with this leftist, Green Party, all-embracing crudeness! An Apollonian interven- tion is demanded here; a masculine, self-aware, individualistic principle should intervene, one that would confront with its purity and selectivity any sort of ob- scene confusion. Before the common Dionysians can become Greek and Nietz- schean Dionysians, they must be filtered through a sort of preliminary purifica- tion process. This I will call, following Nietzsche's description of it, the process of "Doric
Early Hellenism erected, so we are told, a masculine dam to protect itself against the Dionysian flood. It heroically resisted the "extravagant sexual licen- tiousness" that was characteristic of the Walpurgis Nights of the barbarian Dionysus. The Doric dam construction was responsible whenever the "horrible
of sensuality and cruelty" became ? The Diony-
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE 29
attempts at inundation recoil against the rejecting at- titude of Apollo" (BT, pp. 39-40).
What is worth noting here is the radical revaluation of the Dionysian. Sud- denly it no longer appears as a principle that is bent on reconciling the world, because of which all human existence would for the first time be able to achieve its true ? but rather as a primitive force of cultural destruction, an uncouth demonic danger of uncontrollable release and dissolution:
For me the Doric state and Doric art are explicable only as a permanent military encampment of the Apollonian, only [as] incessant resistance to the titanic-barbaric nature of the Dionysian. (BT, p. 47)
For ? then, the Doric process of precensorship existed in the initial stages of the ? it served to break the flood of the Dionysian against the dam of the ? The phenomenon of an art of ecstasy that has been tamed into submission to advanced culture develops for the first time out of the binary energetic complex of dam and flood, restraint and ? In the beginning was the compromise ? play of force and counterforce, which became inextri- cably interlaced with each other for the purpose of reciprocal ascent. Nietzsche represents this compromise graphically and does not neglect to mention that the authority who has succeeded in reaching the compromise is ? and not his irresponsible opponent! Thus, Apollo is the calculating subject who enters into a daring game with his own dissolution. After this same Apollo had finally reluc- tantly acknowledged the imperative of the demands of ? he
according to ? disarm his violent opponent by means of a "recon- ciliation. " Nietzsche goes so far as to note that this is "a seasonably effected reconciliation" (BT, p. 39).
The importance of this process can hardly be overestimated, for it signifies nothing less than the primal scene of civilization -- the historical compromise of Western culture. Because of the Apollonian compromise, the old orgiastic power of nature is forced upward and is welded once and for all to the register of the symbolic as artistic energy. In making this observation, Nietzsche was aware that he was speaking not of an arbitrary episode within the context of the history of Greek art but of an event that would prove fateful for all higher civilizing pro- cesses. "This he says, "is the most important moment in the history of the Greek ? and here we might add, the most important transition along the path from archaic to highly advanced forms of living. It is almost un- necessary to state that these more highly developed forms bring with them an increase in fragility, an ascent by the living being toward more ? more perilous forms that ? as if unavoidably, enveloped in a haze of perversion. Through the inhibiting and intensifying act of power that the Apollonian com- promise represents, the naive orgies of early human beings are transformed into the sentimental festival performances of more recent ? They are no longer
? ? ? ? ? 30 ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE
"reversions[s] of man to the tiger and the ? but progress toward "festivals of and days of
Only now does Nietzsche's Dionysian undertaking again come into play. After Doric precensorship and Apollonian resistance have done their job and erected adequate defenses, the ? for the Dionysian component
? ? ? ? ? to reenter, a
dance, completely mystical participation and beautiful ? short, every higher form of that the reverential traditional term
Just as soon as a distance from the vulgar procession of the satyrs has been symbolically reestablished, the transfiguration of the Dionysian begins anew. Bracketed within aesthetic parentheses and dramaturgical quotation marks, the singing he-goats are no longer libertines who regress to bestiality. Rather, they have been rejuvenated into the media for effecting a fusion with the foundation of being and the subjects of a musical socialism. The magic is re- peated within a secure framework that serves as protection against the risks in- volved in an actual enchantment. From this point on, everything appears in its revelers in place of Dionysian revelers, unifica- tion in place of unification, orgies in place of orgies. This process of "standing in place of something" is, however, conceived of as a process of beneficial sub- and not merely as a forfeiture of the Within the context of this gain, culture begins to affirm itself as and this quality of standing in place of something becomes the key to the mystery of the civilizing phenomenon. The ramifications of this for theories of truth will soon become ? the next two chapters I will discuss the dramaturgy of sub-
stitution and the metaphysics of illusion.
Henceforth, the old Dionysian forces are permitted to overflow with a new licentiousness ? place of licentiousness ? the riverbed of symbolization. No wonder, then, that the path to Greek tragedy is accompani6d by the "greatest exaltation of all symbolic faculties," indeed, by a "collective release of all sym- bolic ? Through this elevation into the symbolic, the world becomes more than it was. The substitution is superior to what it replaces; what has arisen from the original surpasses it. "The essence of nature is now to be expressed symbolically; we need a new world of symbols" (BT, p. 40). In short, the bar- baric he-goat has advanced to the status of civilized goat, and, if he were to think back on his wild youth (although this would have to be delayed a priori), could say to himself as a poststructuralist, "A symbol has inserted itself between me and my ? a language has preceded my ability to be present only as myself ? a discourse has taught my ecstasy to speak. But isn't it worth lamenting the fact that lamentation itself has become ? discourse? "
The Apollonian ? however, now notices for the first time, albeit too ? the dilemma in which it has implicated itself by agreeing to a compro- mise with the Dionysian. From here on out it can no longer conceive of itself aus
completely
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE
sich selbst. Apollo has lost the illusion of his own autonomy; in his attempts to reestablish it to the extent that he can, he must sink ever deeper into the discern- ment of his own lack of a foundation ? After he has glanced into the Dionysian abyss beneath the forms, Apollo is no longer able to believe in his substantial rationality and his masculine self-control. His initial hope of being able to negotiate a compromise with the Dionysian in which he will be able to preserve himself unaltered is revealed as an illusion. Without fail, Apollo is swept into the undertow of the Dionysian dissolution of identity. It undermines for him the idea that the beautiful illusion of his own self, with its glistening ab- straction and its abundance of rational light, might in truth represent only an ob-
of the amorphously suffering god,
What does this all mean for the actor on the stage with his mask of the two
deities? To what extent does this illuminate for him the structure of his own sub- jectivity? What does it profit his experience of himself to appear on stage in this way? The thinking mime is, I believe, now able to recognize that he himself is not a "One," a Unified Subject, but rather a dual subject who dreams of
able to possess himself as ? This dual existence no longer has the amorphous quality of an unformulated yearning and the pretentious pathos of he who feels that he is pregnant with his own self. This dual existence defines itself within the context of a thinking ?
fluctuation in reflection between the Apollonian and Dionysian dimensions of the mask. This uneasily repeated fluc- tuation establishes the pattern of thought for an all-penetrating critical ? A mechanism transformed Nietzsche into a philosopher: the Apollonian in him sus- pected that he was at bottom only a Dionysian ? while the Diony- sian saw through himself with the penetrating clairvoyancy of one who is re- minded of his Apollonian castration. He feels like a mere civilized satyr, like a he-goat in place of a he-goat, who can no longer believe in himself because he must understand that his present self is only a substitute for his true self.
In this way, Nietzsche has set in motion an unprecedented intellectual psycho- drama. Through his audacious game with the double mask of the deities, he has made of himself a genius of self-knowledge as ? He has become a psychologist spontaneously ? has become the first philosopher to be a psy- chologist as philosopher; his antiquating role playing has set him on this path. Nietzsche always finds himself in a position in which he faces himself as a trans- parent phenomenon: he does not believe in himself as Dionysus because he has had to sacrifice his wild lower half to the Apollonian compromise. Conversely, he has just as little belief in himself as Apollo because he suspects himself of being merely a veil before the Dionysian. The self of the thinker on stage that is in search of itself oscillates, within the confines of a sensational reflexivity, back and forth between the frozen halves of his mask. He relinquishes himself to a circular process of total self-distrust, which in time will mount into a distrust of all "truths" and all ? which at the same time rises up in a despair-
? ? ? ? ? 32 ? THE PHILOLOGY OF EXISTENCE, THE DRAMATURGY OF FORCE
ing praise of the illusion of autonomy and the divine impenetrability of the phe- nomenal. Whatever position the ego may assume, whatever "representation" of itself it may choose to offer, it will perpetually sense that the other ? the dis- placed aspect, is lacking.
W ithin the framework of this ? confused fluctuation between the processes of masking and unmasking, Nietzsche's third face develops, with dramaturgical repercussions of the most impressive kind. It is the mask of Nietz- sche the ? the psychologist, the critic of knowledge, the thought dancer, the teacher of the affirmative pretense ? W ith this third face, Nietzsche begins to come dangerously close to his "Become who you dangerous because this mask, in its misleading optimism, could induce Narcissus to tumble into his own image. The danger that emanates from the image always strikes the person who passionately desires at his weakest ? fact that he would like to have ? reality" what he allows himself to have only in the
in the imaginary modus of ? Dionysus does not permit himself to possess, and whatever can be possessed is not Dionysus. Therefore, the greatest danger for Nietzsche lies in wanting to incarnate Dionysus so as to at least be able to take possession of him in his incarnate
On the basis of his theory of bipolar artistic forces, Nietzsche immediately emerges as a virtuoso in the art of an uneasy kind of ? that does not believe its own observations. It does not believe itself, not because it has re- nounced itself or because it would abet a "totalizing critique of reason," but rather because the self of this reflection is constituted in itself (an ? beschaf-
in such a way that that which could allow it to believe in itself must always elude it. Nietzsche's dramatic thought is in the process of discovering that it is absolutely impossible for ? and the sense of an experi- ence of unity that could lead to ? occur simultaneously. Whether as Apollo or as Dionysus, the named, identified, and masked subject is never permitted to believe that it has arrived at the foundation of its own identity. For as soon as it sees itself, this subject has already seen through itself as something wherein it cannot set its mind at ease because it is lacking the best part of itself, its Other.
Thus, Nietzsche's theatrical experience of self sets in motion a perfect system for Whatever might say " I " upon the stage will be a sym- bolicallyrepresented" I , "anApollonianartisticcreation,whichweholdout before us like a veil to protect ourselves from perishing of the complete
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Chapter 3
Cave or, Danger, Terrible Truth!
? Lonely one, you are going the way to yourself. And your way leads past yourself and your seven devils.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
"On the Way of the Creator"
He who seeks a path toward himself is dreaming of a condition in which he will be able to endure himself. For this reason, no search for the self can be a theo- retical one, for this search arises from the impulse within the living being to find a "truth" that will make his unendurable life endurable. Theorizing of any type grinds to a halt when it reaches the level of radical questions of this kind, and either leads to an art of living (Lebenskunst) or remains what it was ? symptom of wounded ? The idea that the true self might be something that can indeed be sought after arises directly from the suffering it causes. Only that which feels pain begins to ? with the longing for a better self, which would be the true one because it has ceased suffering on its own account ? sich).
only those who want to escape from themselves find themselves. It is the very desire to escape that directly points to the direction of the path that the search for self will follow. The search for oneself implies above all else the will to a path; the direction that path will take can initially be none other than the path away from oneself.
Embarking upon this path affords the wanderer the opportunity to encounter his own shadow. Through the act of leaving, the wanderer begins to discover what he has taken with him in spite of ? just when he thought he had left everything behind. The true self clings to the heels of the one who is embarking on the path. But only when the wanderer realizes that he himself constitutes his own heaviest baggage can the "dialectic of the path" begin. Through the efforts made to flee, and also through the stimuli that accompany any meaningful exodus, his powers increase to such an extent that he can recognize and endure
? 33
? 34 ? CAVE CANEM
what, in leaving, he had not wanted to recognize and endure: the unendurable Only along the way does it become apparent how little of what the traveler has driven out of himself really allows itself to be shaken off. The more passion- ate his searching flight, the more vehement his realization of that which cannot be gotten rid ? Only the search that despairs of its own passion can arrive at the decisive point at which the search itself becomes as unbearable as what set it in motion. At this point, the agony of the search reaches its crisis point when it gains insight into the unattainability of what is being sought. The searcher must burn out ? when he senses that nothing will save him from himself. He is extinguished in the dilemma of having to choose between the unbearable and
the ? Only in the fire of disillusionment can the last remaining illusions be burned away. W ith the departure of what is being sought, the search itself be- comes the ? and the path flows with a tragic bend into the pain from which it was initially able to turn away. Partir, ? ? ? ? is how ? paths begin. But arriver, c'est mourir
The self-knowledge (Selbsterkenntnis) entrusted to the path of experience therefore, the structure of a negative circle in that it returns to its beginnings -- that is, to its pain and its ? ? the gradual repulsion of disillusioned ideas and the burning away of the images of happiness it had sought. This is, incidentally, completely different from the positive circle of narcissistic reflec-
within which a seemingly material spirit loses itself and then rediscovers that identical self in order to perform, in the happy end, dances of jubilation around the golden idol of
I call this remarkably negative structure of self-knowledge the psychonautical Nietzsche's theatrical adventure into the theory of knowledge is intrinsi- cally implicated in it. His personal and philosophical fate depends to a great extent, I believe, on whether he can complete the task of burning away images and whether his search for self can be successfully completed within the context of a beneficial negativity and lack of ? The risk involved in any such uncontrolled search is extraordinary; it can easily happen that the searcher becomes caught up halfway in a vision of his own ego, because of which he will announce, having been duped and enraptured, that this vision is what he has been Homo. Only a crisis will then reveal whether the seeker will plunge himself into a reflection in order to perish of its ? or whether he will still have a chance to turn away from the mirror in order to assume respon- sibility for his life as a discovery that is void of ? But Nietzsche's drama is still far from arriving at this crisis point. He is still in the process of expanding the stage for his great play, exposing its antiquated foundation and properly de- termining what masks the actors will wear. Let us look at what else Nietzsche had
in mind for his Hellenistic, psychodramatic stage!
Contrary to what might be expected, what appears there the inter- mezzo of his contemporary critique, the Untimely not a classi-
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? CAVE 35
? masked hero, not a Wagnerian tenor who has been transplanted into antiq- and not a hero who has been transposed into modernity from the family of Oedipus, Siegfried, Heracles, and Prometheus. What we observe here is a figure who cannot be foreseen, who hardly seems to exist in a believable relationship to the tragic stage. What is produced there on the stage is a sort of theorizing Le- porello, a freethinker and on-stage enlightener, who reminds us of the philoso- pher figures on the stages of the eighteenth ? the Figaro in the works
of perhaps, and even more of Don Alfonso in Mozart's ? fan who, in his modish cynicism, has already mistaken the truth for a woman and woman for a synthesis of the bottomless cask and the thing " i n itself" (an
sich).
In the third trope of his ? Nietzsche reveals himself prima facie to be on paths that are ? As I have already indicated, a critical activity that seems far removed from the mythological performances of the first scene results from his experience of himself within the ? du- ality. Nietzsche now appears behind the mask of the philosophical specialist in abysses ? known as womanizers as the illusionless grand seigneur to whom nothing inhuman or human is ? He speaks maliciously and with bravura of the lies told by the great men and of the abysses of the lesser ones; he presents himself as a virtuoso of cultural-critical distrust. He poses as a libertine underminer of idealistic values and as a positivist psychologist who, out of boredom with his own depth, makes fun of lending out to the British a dose of platitudes and to the French a prize for their infamous worldliness. Has Nietzsche thus completely turned his back on his classical and Wagnerian inspirations? The truth of the matter is that he acknowledged the Apollonian energy of resistance more openly in the psychocritical writing of his middle period. It is as if the ra- tionalist in him were resisting subversion by the forces of
In order to appreciate the dramatic context of Nietzsche's ? however, one must first see lurking behind this third mask, which is negativistic and im- posed by Apollo, a fourth ? mask of Dionysian prophecy. This is Za- rathustra, drawn up to his full height, who will resound across the stage as the heroic tenor of immoralism, a subject his psychologizing precursor had only hinted at aphoristically, jeeringly, and in a miniaturizing way as an intellectual chamber play It must therefore be understood that the masks of the third and fourth orders the Gay Scientist, there the prophet of immo-
essentially only the unfoldings of the Apollonian and Diony- sian double ? from behind which Nietzsche's literary appearance had
The antagonism between the two artistic impulses within the soul thus remains every bit as valid as their relationship as ? the distinction that Nietzsche is now setting in motion what he initially presented within the context of a static symmetry and frozen dialectic. W ithin his process of thought, the po- larity between the extremes begins to swing out of balance ? ? all
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 1
? ? 36 CAVE
Apollonian attempts at establishing control notwithstanding ? because of this oscillation, the Dionysian, which had been at first exhibited only as a dominated and silenced power, gains in latitude.
This is all just another way of expressing how closely this Nietzsche of the middle ? one of the Gay Science and the great dismantling of values -- is connected to the later Nietzsche, the one of the prophetic dithyrambs. The free- thinking, "cynical" underminer of all existing values ? Apollo who has turned ? ? remains the closest accomplice of Zarathustra, the Dionysus who has turned immoral. The all-penetrating psychologist of the stage performs, in his exercises in the critique of knowledge, the recitative to which Zarathustra's proclamation of self provides the aria.
In the thematic arrangement of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche had already es- tablished the prerequisites for his next step forward. In the reciprocal distrust of both deities lay the philosophical dynamite of the future: the age of ideas was drawing to a close, while the age of energies' was announced. Radical doubt no longer leads ? is the case in Descartes ? to an unshakable foundation in the certainty of thought, but instead to a fireworks display of incredible reflection and a free play of doubting power. Doubt can no longer be assuaged in the cer- tainty of ideas.
Nietzsche forges ahead unchecked on the trail ? Spur) of insights and hunches. He discovers while under way through the psychonautical circle that a labor of negation ? be necessary that is as painful as it is invigorating. His gods experience a twilight from which they will never ? adoration vacillates, the brightly colored paper wrappings fall away from the ideals, leav- ing them naked and deserving only of laughter. Wagner becomes questionable to a degree from which he will not recover; Schopenhauer has retreated far into the background. Classical philology becomes completely nauseating, and the values of the new German present evoke only antipathy and ? period of willful self-deception through the idea of a greatness of this sort has come irre- vocably to an end. The exemplary seeker takes it upon himself to destroy, piece by piece, the value system, the world of images, the pantheon of the noblest goals under whose authority his exodus was set in ? Nietzsche commented on this in retrospect:
It is a war, but a war without powder and smoke, without bellicose attitudes, without pathos and dislocated ? would all itself still be "idealism. " One error after the other is put on ice, the ideal is not
freezes to death ? ? ? Here, for instance, the idea of "genius" freezes; around the corner, the "saint" freezes. The "hero" is freezing beneath a thick icicle, and finally "belief" freezes, so-called conviction, even compassion cools down significantly
everywhere, the thing in itself [das Ding an ? is freezing to
? ? ? ? ? ? CAVE 37
words could better express what it means to enter the phase of an active dis- illusionment. And yet Nietzsche's reflection remains too alert to settle down into a comfortable attitude of triumphal ? The problem that will prove essen- tial has already emerged on the horizon: if ideals collapse, what becomes of the force that has motivated these ideals? After one is no longer able to deceive
self, the question remains: what becomes of the impulse that has allowed one to deceive and lie to oneself? Nietzsche's thought advances to a level that corre- sponds to that of a thermodynamics of illusion; it orients itself, as it were, to a "principle [Satz] of the maintenance of illusion-creating ? The idols col- lapse, and yet the idolatrizing force remains constant; ideals perish in the cold, and yet the fire of idealism continues to wander about, objectless and passion- ately desiring. The period of self-deception has ended, without the reservoirs from which the lies were supplied having been exhausted.
With this turning point, Nietzsche has begun to grow into a thinker whose thought will have incalculable long-range effects. Now we can understand why, when compared to Nietzsche's critique, all other forms of a critique of ideology seem short-winded and reveal themselves to be almost scandalously in want of a self-critical alertness. His realism thinks, as it were, a whole epoch ahead of itself. In his play with the masks of the deities of antiquity, he has already begun to gaze into the abyss of a self-doubt that cannot be assuaged, from which arose the phenomenon of the fundamental untenability of reflexive ? What he gained from this is as disturbing as it is ? insight into the exis- tential inevitability of the lie. One can imagine what would become of philoso- phy if this conjectured insight were to prove true!
