No More Learning

Nothing opposed the advance into Mace- donia and Thrace; Philippi was occupied, Abdera was voluntarily evacuated by the Pontic garrison, the European
‘
cHAr. vni THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
45
continent in general was cleared of the enemy. At the
end of the third year of the war (669) Sulla was able to 85.
take up winter-quarters in Thessaly, with a view to begin the Asiatic campaign in the spring of 670,1 for which 84 purpose he gave orders to build ships in the Thessalian ports.
Meanwhile the circumstances of Asia Minor also had Reaction undergone a material change. If king Mithradates had as: once come forward as the liberator of the Hellenes, if he against had introduced his rule with the recognition of civic inde pendence and with remission of taxes, they had after this
brief ecstasy been but too rapidly and too bitterly undeceived. He had very soon emerged in his true character, and had begun to exercise a despotism far surpassing the tyranny of the Roman governors-—a despotism which drove even the patient inhabitants of Asia Minor to open revolt. The sultan again resorted to the most violent expedients. His decrees granted inde pendence to the townships which turned to him, citizenship to the metoea', full remission of debts to the debtors, lands to those that had none, freedom to the slaves; nearly
1 5,000 such manumitted slaves fought in the army of Archelaus. The most fearful scenes were the result of this high-handed subversion of all existing order. The most considerable mercantile cities, Smyrna, Colophon, Ephesus, Tralles, Sardes, closed their gates against the king’s
1 The chronology of these events is, like all their details, enveloped in
an obscurity which investigation is able to dispel, at most, only partially.
That the battle of Chaeronea took place. if not on the same day as the storming of Athens (Pausan. i. no). at any rate soon afterwards, perhaps
in March 668, is tolerably certain. That the succeeding Thessalian and 86
the second Boeotian campaign took up not merely the remainder of 668 55 but also the whole of 669, is in itself probable and is rendered still more 85
so by the fact that Sulla's enterprises in Asia are not suflicient to fill more
than a single campaign. Licinianus also appears to indicate that Sulla returned to Athens for the winter of 668-669 and there took in hand the 86-8‘,
work of investigation and punishment; after which he relates the battle
of Orchomenus. The crossing of Sulla to Asia has accordingly been
placed not in 669, but in 670. 85. 84.
Lucullus and the fleet on the Asiatic coast.
governors or put them to death, and declared for Rome. 1 On the other hand the king’s lieutenant Diodorus, a philosopher of note like Aristion, of another school, but equally available for the worst subservience, under the instructions of his master caused the whole town-council of Adramyttium to be put to death. The Chians, who were suspected of an inclination to Rome, were fined in the first instance in 2000 talents (£480,000) and, when the pay ment was found not correct, they were at marr: put on board ship and deported in chains under the charge of their own slaves to the coast of Colchis, while their island was occupied with Pontic colonists. The king gave orders that the chiefs of the Celts in Asia Minor should all be put to death along with their wives and children in one day, and that Galatia should be converted into a Pontic satrapy. Most of these bloody edicts were carried into effect either
at Mithradates’ own headquarters or in Galatia, but the few who escaped placed themselves at the head of their powerful tribes and expelled Eumachus, the governor of the king, out of their bounds. It may readily be conceived that such a king would be pursued by the daggers of assassins ; sixteen hundred men were condemned to death
by the royal courts of inquisition as having been implicated in such conspiracies.
While the king was thus by his suicidal fury provoking his temporary subjects to rise in arms against him, he was at the same time hard pressed by the Romans in Asia, both by sea and by land. Lucullus, after the failure of his attempt to lead forth the Egyptian fleet against Mithra dates, had with better success repeated his efforts to procure
1 The resolution of the citizens of Ephesus to this effect has recentlv been found (Waddington, Additions to Lebas, Inrcr. iii. 136 a). They had, according to their own declaration, fallen into the power of Mithra dates " the king of Cappadocia," being frightened by the magnitude of his forces and the suddenness of his attack; but. when opportunity offered, they declared war against him “for the rule (-ij'yepoyla. ) of the Romans and the common weal. "
46
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK IV
cans. vru THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
47
vessels of war in the Syrian maritime towns, and reinforced his nascent fleet in the ports of Cyprus, Pamphylia, and Rhodes till he found himself strong enough to proceed to the attack. He dexterously avoided measuring himself against superior forces and yet obtained no inconsiderable advantages. The Cnidian island and peninsula were occupied by him, Samos was assailed, Colophon and Chios were wrested fr. m the enemy.
Meanwhile Flaccus had proceeded with his army through Flaccus
l
Macedonia and Thrace to Byzantium, and thence, passing
the straits, had reached Chalcedon (end of 668). There 85,
a military insurrection broke out against the general, ostensibly because he embezzled the spoil from the soldiers. The soul of it was one of the chief oflicers of
the army, a man whose name had become a proverb in
Rome for a true mob-orator, Gaius Flavius Fimbria, who, Fimbria. after having differed with his commander-in-chief, trans
ferred the demagogic practices which he had begun in the
Forum to the camp. Flaccus was deposed by the army
and soon afterwards put to death at Nicomedia, not far from Chalcedon; Fimbria was installed by decree of the soldiers in his stead. As a matter of course he allowed
his troops every indulgence; in the friendly Cyzicus, for instance, the citizens were ordered to surrender all their property to the soldiers on pain of death, and by way of warning example two of the most respectable citizens were
at once executed. Nevertheless in a military point of view
the change of commander-in-chief was a gain; Fimbria
was not, like Flaccus, an incapable general, but energetic
and talented. At Miletopolis (on the Rhyndacus to the
west of Brussa) he defeated the younger Mithradates, who
as governor of the satrapy of Pontus had marched against Poll! him, completely in a nocturnal assault, and by this victory opened his way to Pergamus, the capital formerly of the Roman province and now of the Pontic king, whence he
Fimbria‘! 30521“
Perilous position
dislodged the king and compelled him to take flight to the port of Pitane not far off, with the view of there embarking. Just at that moment Lucullus appeared in those waters with his fleet ; Fimbria adjured him to render assistance so that he might be enabled to capture the king. But the Optimate was stronger in Lucullus than the patriot; he sailed onward and the king escaped to Mitylene. The situation of Mithradates was even thus sufliciently embar rassed. At the end of 669 Europe was lost, Asia Minor was partly in rebellion against him, partly occupied by a Roman army; and he was himself threatened by the latter in his immediate vicinity. The Roman fleet under Lucullus had maintained its position on the Trojan coast by two successful naval engagements at the promontory of Iectum and at the island of Tenedos ; it was joined there by the ships which had in the meanwhile been built by Sulla’s orders in Thessaly, and by its position commanding the Hellespont it secured to the general of the Roman sena torial army a safe and easy passage next spring to Asia.
Mithradates attempted to negotiate. Under other circumstances no doubt the author of the edict for the Ephesian massacre could never have cherished the hope of being admitted at all to terms of peace with Rome; but amidst the internal convulsions of the Roman republic, when the ruling government had declared the general sent against Mithradates an outlaw and subjected his partisans at home to the most fearful persecutions, when one Roman general opposed the other and yet both stood opposed to the same foe, he hoped that he should be able to obtain not merely a peace, but a favourable peace. He had the choice of applying to Sulla or to Fimbria; he caused negotiations to be instituted with both, yet it seems from the first to have been his design to come to terms with Sulla, who, at least from the king’s point of view, seemed decidedly superior to his rival. His general Archelaus, a
of [85. Mithra
dates.
48
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK Iv
Negotia tions for
can. vm THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES 49
instructed by his master, asked Sulla to cede Asia to the king and to expect in return the king’s aid against the democratic party in Rome. But Sulla, cool and clear as ever, while urgently desiring a speedy settlement of Asiatic affairs on account of the position of things in Italy, estimated the advantages of the Cappadocian alliance for the war impending over him in Italy as
and was altogether too much of a Roman to consent to so disgraceful and so injurious a con cession.
very slight,
In the peace conferences, which took place in the winter Prelimi
of 669-70, at Delium on the coast of Boeotia opposite to nariel d '
Euboea, Sulla distinctly refused to cede even a foot’s
sis-a4. breadth of land, but, with good reason faithful to the old Roman custom of not increasing after victory the demands
made before battle, did not go beyond the conditions previously laid down. He required the restoration of all the conquests made by the king and not wrested from him again—Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, Bithynia, Asia Minor and the islands—the surrender of prisoners and deserters, the delivering up of the eighty war-vessels of Archelaus to reinforce the still insignificant Roman fleet; lastly, pay and provisions for the army and the very moderate sum of 3000 talents (£720,000) as indemnity for the expenses of the war. The Chians carried off to the Black Sea were to be sent home, the families of the Mace donians who were friendly to Rome and had become refugees were to be restored, and a number of war-vessels were to be delivered to the cities in alliance with Rome. Respecting Tigranes, who in strictness should likewise have been included in the peace, there was silence on both sides, since neither of the contracting parties cared for the endless further steps which would be occasioned by making him a party. The king thus retained the state of possession which he had before the war, nor was he subjected to any
voL. Iv
104
diflicultiel.
humiliation affecting his honour. 1 Archelaus, clearly per ceiving that much comparatively beyond expectation was obtained and that more was not obtainable, concluded the preliminaries and an armistice on these conditions, and withdrew the troops from the places which the Asiatics still possessed in Europe.
But Mithradates rejected the peace and demanded at least that the Romans should not insist on the surrender of the war-vessels and should concede to him Paphlagonia ; while he at the same time asserted that Fimbria was ready to grant him far more favourable conditions. Sulla, offended by this placing of his offers on an equal footing with those of an unofficial adventurer, and having already gone to the utmost measure of concession, broke off the negotiations. He had employed the interval to reorganize Macedonia and to chastise the Dardani, Sinti, and Maedi, in doing which he at once procured booty for his army and drew nearer Asia; for he was resolved at any rate to go thither, in order
50
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK IV
Sulla
proceeds to to come to a reckoning with Fimbria. He now at once
Asia.
put his legions stationed in Thrace as well as his fleet in motion towards the Hellespont. Then at length Archelaus succeeded in wringing from his obstinate master a reluctant consent to the treaty; for which he was
subsequently regarded with an evil eye at court as the author of the injurious peace, and even accused of treason, so that some time afterwards he found himself compelled to leave the country and to take refuge with the Romans, who readily received him and loaded him with honours. The Roman soldiers also murmured; their disappointment doubtless at
not receiving the expected spoil of Asia probably contributed
1 The statement that Mithradates in the peace stipulated for impunity to the towns which had embraced his side (Memnon, 35) seems, looking to the character of the victor and of the vanquished, far from credible, and it is not given by Appian or by Licinianus. They neglected to draw up the treaty of peace in writing, and this neglect afterwards left room fer various mist epresentations.
can vur THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
51
to that murmuring more than their indignation—in itself very justifiable—that the barbarian prince, who had murdered eighty thousand of their countrymen and had brought unspeakable misery on Italy and Asia, should be allowed to return home unpunished with the greatest part of the treasures which he had collected by the pillage of Asia. Sulla himself may have been painfully sensible that the political complications thwarted in a most vexatious way a task which was in a military point of view so simple, and compelled him after such victories to content himself with such a peace. But the self-denial and the sagacity with which he had conducted this whole war were only dis played afresh in the conclusion of this peace ; for war with a prince, to whom almost the whole coast of the Black Sea belonged, and whose obstinacy was clearly displayed by the very last negotiations, would still under the most
favourable circumstances require years, and the situation of Italy was such that it seemed almost too late even for Sulla to oppose the party in power there with the few legions which he possessed. 1 Before this could be done, however,
1 Armenian tradition also is acquainted with the first Mithradatic war. Ardasches king of Armenia-Moses of Chorene tells ns—was not content with the second rank which rightfully belonged to him in the Persian (Parthian) empire, but compelled the Parthian king Arschagan to cede to him the supreme power, whereupon he had a palace built for himself in Persia and had coins struck there with his own image. He appointed Arschagan Viceroy of Persia and his son Dicran (Tigranes) Viceroy of Armenia, and gave his daughter Ardaschama in marriage to the great prince of the Iberians Mihrdates (Mithradates) who was descended from Mihrdates satrap of Darius and governor appointed by Alexander over the conquered lberians, and ruled in the northern mountains as well as over the Black Sea. Ardasches then took Croesus the king of the Lydians prisoner, subdued the mainland between the two great seas (Asia Minor), and crossed the sea with innumerable vessels to subjugate the west. As there was anarchy at that time in Rome, be nowhere encountered serious resistance, but his soldiers killed each other and Ardasches fell by the hands of his own troops. After Ardasches' death his successor Dicran marched against the army of the Greeks (ie. the Romans) who now in turn invaded the Armenian land ; he set a limit to their advance, handed over to his brother-in-law Mihrdats the administration of Madschag (Muaca in Cappadocia) and of the interior along with a considerable force, and returned to Armenia. Many years afterwards there were still
Dardanus.
Sulla against Fimbria.
it was ‘absolutely necessary to overthrow the bold officer who was at the head of the democratic army in Asia, in order that he might not at some future time come from Asia to the help of the Italian revolution, just as Sulla now hoped to return from Asia and crush it. At Cypsela on the Hebrus Sulla obtained accounts of the ratification of the peace by Mithradates ; but the march to Asia went on. The king, it was said, desired personally to confer with the Roman general and to cement the peace with him ; it may be presumed that this was simply a convenient pretext for transferring the army to Asia and there putting an end to Fimbria.
So Sulla, attended by his legions and by Archelaus, crossed the Hellespont ; after he had met with Mithradates on its Asiatic shore at Dardanus and had orally concluded the treaty, he made his army continue its march till he came upon the camp of Fimbria at Thyatira not far from Pergamus, and pitched his own close beside The Sullan soldiers, far superior to the Fimbrians in number, discipline, leadership, and ability, looked with contempt on the dispirited and demoralized troops and their uncalled commander-in-chief. Desertions from the ranks of the Fimbrians became daily more numerous. When Fimbria ordered an attack, the soldiers refused to fight against their
pointed out in the Armenian towns statues of Greek god: by well-known masters, trophies of this campaign.
We have no difliculty in recognizing here various facts of the first Mithradatic war, but the whole narrative evidently confused, furnished with heterogeneous additions, and in particular transferred by patriotic falsification to Armenia. In just the same way the victory over Crassus afterwards attributed to the Armenians. These Oriental accounts are to be received with all the greater caution, that they are by no means mere popular legends on the contrary the accounts of Josephus, Eusebius, and other authorities current among the Christians of the fifth century have been amalgamated with the Armenian traditions, and the historical romances of the Greeks and beyond doubt the patri ntic fancies also of Moses himself have been laid to a considerable extent under contribution. Bad as cur Occidental tradition in itself, to call in the aid of Oriental tradition this and similar cases-4. ! has been attempted for instance by the un critical Saint-Martin--can only lead to still further confusion.
52
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOCK w
in
is
is
;
is
it.
CRAP. VIII THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
53
fellow-citizens, or even to take the oath which he required
that they would stand faithfully by each other in battle.
An attempt to assassinate Sulla miscarried; at the confer
ence which Fimbria requested Sulla did not make his appearance, but contented himself with suggesting to him
through one of his officers a means of personal escape.
Fimbria was of an insolent temperament, but he was no Fimbria’! poltroon ; instead of accepting the vessel which Sulla death. offered to him and fleeing to the barbarians, he went to
and fell on his own sword in the temple of Asklepios. Those who were most compromised in his army resorted to Mithradates or to the pirates, with whom they found ready reception; the main body placed itself under the orders of Sulla.
Sulla determined to leave these two legions, whom he did not trust for the impending war, behind in Asia, where the fearful crisis left for long its lingering traces in the several cities and districts. The command of this corps and the governorship of Roman Asia he committed to his best oflicer, Lucius Licinius Murena. The revolutionary measures of Mithradates, such as the liberation of the slaves and the annulling of debts, were of course cancelled; a restoration, which in many places could not be carried into effect without force of arms. The towns of the territory on the eastern frontier underwent a comprehensive reorganization, and reckoned from the year 670 as the date of their being constituted. justice moreover was exercised, as the victors understood the term. The most noted adherents of Mithradates and the authors of the massacre of the Italians were punished with death. The persons liable to taxes were obliged immediately to pay down in cash according to valuation the whole arrears of tenths and customs for the last five years; besides which they had to pay a war-indemnity of 20,000 talents (£4,800,000), for the collection of ‘which Lucius Lucullus was left behind.
Pergarnus
Regulation of Asiatic affairs.
84.
54
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATFS BOOK 1v
These were measures fearful in their rigour and dreadful in their effects ; but when we recall the Ephesian decree and its execution, we feel inclined to regard them as a com
mild retaliation. That the exactions in other respects were not unusually oppressive, is shown by the value of the spoil afterwards carried in triumph, which amounted in precious metal to only about £1,000,000. The few communities on the other hand that had remained faithful -—particularly the island of Rhodes, the region of Lycia, Magnesia on the Maeander—were richly rewarded : Rhodes received back at least a portion of the possessions withdrawn from it after the war against Perseus 515). In like manner compensation was made as far as possible by free
charters and special favours to the Chians for the hardships which they had borne, and to the Ilienses for the insanely cruel maltreatmentinflicted on them by Fimbria on account of the negotiations into which they had entered with Sulla. Sulla had already brought the kings of Bithynia and Cappa docia to meet the Pontic king at Dardanus, and had made them all promise to live in peace and good neighbourhood; on which occasion, however, the haughty Mithradates had refused to admit Ariobarzanes who was not descended of royal blood—the slave, as he called him—to his presence. Gaius Scribonius Curio was commissioned to superintend the restoration of the legal order of things in the two
kingdoms evacuated by Mithradates.
The goal was thus attained. After four years of war the
Pontic king was again client of the Romans, and single and settled government was re-established in Greece, Mace donia, and Asia Minor; the requirements of interest and honour were satisfied, not adequately, yet so far as circum stances would allow; Sulla had not only brilliantly distin guished himself as soldier and general, but had the skill,
in his path crossed by thousand obstacles, to preserve the diflicult mean between bold perseverance and prudent
paratively
a
a if a
a
(ii.
CHAP- vnl THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
55
concession. Almost like Hannibal he had fought and
in order that with the forces, which the first victory gave him, he might prepare forthwith for a second and severer struggle. After he had in some degree com pensated his soldiers for the fatigues which they had undergone by luxurious winter-quarters in the rich west of Asia Minor, he in the spring of 671 transferred them in
1600 vessels from Ephesus to the Piraeeus and thence by the land route to Patrae, where the vessels again lay ready to convey the troops to Brundisium. His arrival was pre ceded by a report addressed to the senate respecting his campaigns in Greece and Asia, the writer of which appeared to know nothing of his deposition; it was the mute herald of the impending restoration.
conquered,
Sulla [88.
linear In my.
7_
'I‘rm state of suspense and uncertainty existing in Italy when Sulla took his departure for Greece in the beginning of 667 has been already described : the half-suppressed insurrection, the principal army under the more than half-usurped com mand of a general whose politics were very doubtful, the confusion and the manifold activity of intrigue in the capital. The victory of the oligarchy by force of arms had, in spite or because of its moderation, engendered manifold discontent. The capitalists, painfully affected by the blows of the most severe financial crisis which Rome had yet wit nessed, were indignant at the government on account of the
law which it had issued as to interest, and on account of the Italian and Asiatic wars which it had not prevented. The insurgents, so far as they had laid down their arms, bewailed not only the disappointment of their proud hopes of obtain ing equal rights with the ruling burgesses, but also the forfeiture of their venerable treaties, and their new position as subjects utterly destitute of rights. The communities between the Alps and the Po were likewise discontented with the partial concessions made to them, and the new burgesses and freedmen were exasperated by the cancelling of the Sulpician laws. The populace of the city suffered amid the general distress, and found it intolerable that the
government of the sabre was no longer disposed to acquiesce
56
CINNA AND SULLA loox rv
CHAPTER II
CINNA ANDSULIA
cnar. ix CINNA AND SULLA
57
in the constitutional rule of the bludgeon. The adherents, resident in the capital, of those outlawed after the Sulpician revolution—adherents who remained very numerous in consequence of the remarkable moderation of Sulla laboured zealously to procure permission for the outlaws to return home ; and in particular some ladies of wealth and distinction spared for this purpose neither trouble nor money. None of these grounds of ill-humour were such as to furnish any immediate prospect of a fresh violent collision between the parties ; they were in great part of an aimless and tem porary nature; but they all fed the general discontent, and had already been more or less con'cerned in producing the murder of Rufus, the repeated attempts to assassinate Sulla,
the issue of the consular and tribunician elections for 667 87 partly in favour of the opposition.
The name of the man whom the discontented had sum- Chain. moned to the head of the state, Lucius Cornelius Cinna,
had been hitherto scarcely heard of, except so far as he had
borne himself well as an officer in the Social war. We
have less information regarding the personality and the original designs of Cinna than regarding those of any other party leader in the Roman revolution. The reason to all appearance, simply that this man, altogether vulgar and guided by the lowest selfishness, had from the first no ulterior political plans whatever. It was asserted at his very first appearance that he had sold himself for round sum of money to the new burgesses and the coterie of Marius, and the charge looks very credible; but even were false, remains nevertheless significant that suspicion of the sort, such as was never expressed against Saturninus and Sulpicius, attached to Cinna. In fact the movement, at the head of which he put himself, has altogether the appearance of worthlessness both as to motives and as to aims. pro
ceeded not so much from party as from number of mal contents without proper political aims or notable support,
a
a
it It
is,
a
it
a
Carbo. Sertorius.
58
CINNA AND SULLA BOOK rv
who had mainly undertaken to effect the recall of the exiles by legal or illegal means. Cinna seems to have been admitted into the conspiracy only by an afterthought and merely because the intrigue, which in consequence of the restriction of the tribunician powers needed a consul to bring forward its proposals, saw in him among the consular
87. candidates for 667 its fittest instrument and so pushed him forward as consul. Among the leaders appearing in the second rank of the movement were some abler heads ; such was the tribune of the people Gnaeus Papirius Carbo, who had made himself a name by his impetuous popular elo quence, and above all Quintus Sertorius, one of the most talented of Roman oflicers and a man in every respect excellent, who since his candidature for the tribunate of the people had been a personal enemy to Sulla and had been led by this quarrel into the ranks of the disaffected to which he did not at all by nature belong. The proconsul Strabo, although at variance with the government, was yet far from going along with this faction.
Outbreak of the Cinnan revolution.
So long as Sulla was in Italy, the Confederates for good reasons remained quiet. But when the dreaded proconsul, yielding not to the exhortations of the consul Cinna but to the urgent state of matters in the east, had embarked, Cinna, supported by the majority of the college of tribunes, immediately submitted the projects of law which had been concerted as a partial reaction against the Sullan restoration of666. They embraced the political equalization of the new burgesses and the freedmen, as Sulpicius had proposed
and the restitution of those who had been banished in consequence of the Sulpician revolution to their former status. The new burgesses flocked en marr: to the capital, that along with the freedmen they might terrify, and in case of need force, their opponents into compliance. But the government party was determined not to yield consul stood against consul, Gnaeus Octavius against Lucius Cinna,
,
it,
l
can. rx CINNA AND SULLA
59
and tribune against tribune; both sides appeared in great
part armed on the day and at the place of voting. The
tribunes of the senatorial party interposed their veto ; when
swords were drawn against them even on the rostra, Octavius
employed force against force. His compact bands of armed Victory 0! men not only cleared the Via Sacra and the Forum, but gzxfifm'" also, disregarding the commands of their more gentle-minded
leader, exercised horrible atrocities against the assembled multitude. The Forum swam with blood on this “ Octavius’ day,” as it never did before or afterwards—the number of corpses was estimated at ten thousand. Cinna called on the slaves to purchase freedom for themselves by sharing in the struggle ; but his appeal was as unsuccessful as the like appeal of Marius in the previous year, and no course was left to the leaders of the movement but to take flight. The constitution supplied no means of proceeding farther against the chiefs of the conspiracy, so long as their year of oflice lasted. But a prophet presumably more loyal than pious had announced that the banishment of the consul Cinna and of the six tribunes of the people adhering to him would restore peace and tranquillity to the country; and, in con formity not with the constitution but with this counsel of the gods fortunately laid hold of by the custodiers of oracles, the consul Cinna was by decree of the senate deprived of his oflice, Lucius Cornelius Merula was chosen in his stead, and outlawry was pronounced against the chiefs who had fled. It seemed as if the whole crisis were about to end in a few additions to the number of the men who were exiles in Numidia.
Beyond doubt nothing further would have come of the movement, had not the senate on the one hand with its usual remissness omitted to compel the fugitives at least rapidly to quit Italy, and had the latter on the other hand been, as champions of the emancipation of the new bur gesses, in a position to renew to some extent in their own
The
1,, MIL
Lending of Marius.
6o CINNA AND SULLA BOOK 1'
favour the revolt of the Italians. Without obstruction they appeared in Tibur, in Praeneste, in all the important com munities of new burgesses in Latium and Campania, and asked and obtained everywhere money and men for the furtherance of the common cause. Thus supported, they made their appearance at the army besieging Nola. The armies of this period were democratic and revolutionary in their views, wherever the general did not attach them to himself by the weight of his personal influence; the speeches of the fugitive magistrates, some of whom, especially Cinna and Sertorius, were favourably remem bered by the soldiers in connection with the last campaigns, made a deep impression; the unconstitutional deposition of the popular consul and the interference of the senate with the rights of the sovereign people told on the common soldier, and the gold of the consul or rather of the new burgesses made the breach of the constitution clear to the oflicers. The Campanian army recognized Cinna as consul and swore the oath of fidelity to him man by man ; it be came a nucleus for the bands that flocked in from the new burgesses and even from the allied communities; a con
siderable army, though consisting mostly of recruits, soon moved from Campania towards the capital. Other bands approached it from the north. On the invitation of Cinna those who had been banished in the previous year had landed at Telamon on the Etruscan coast. There were not more than some 500 armed men, for the most part slaves of the refugees and enlisted Numidian horsemen; but, as Gaius Marius had in the previous year been willing to fraternize with the rabble of the capital, so he now ordered the ergartula in which the landholders of this region shut up their field-labourers during the night to be broken open, and the arms which he offered to these for the purpose of achieving their freedom were not despised. Reinforced by these men and the contingents of the new
can. I: CINNA AND SULLA 61
burgesses, as well as by the exiles who flocked to him with their partisans from all sides, he soon numbered 6000 men under his eagles and was able to man forty ships, which took their station before the mouth of the Tiber and gave chase to the com-ships sailing towards Rome. With these he placed himself at the disposal of the “consul” Cinna. The leaders of the Campanian army hesitated; the more sagacious, Sertorius in particular, seriously pointed out the danger of too closely connecting themselves with a man whose name would necessarily place him at the head of the movement, and who yet was notoriously incapable of any
statesmanlike action and haunted by an insane thirst for revenge; but Cinna disregarded these scruples, and con firmed Marius in the supreme command in Etruria and at sea with proconsular powers.
Thus the storm gathered around the capital, and the government could no longer delay bringing forward their troops to protect it. 1 But the forces of Metellus were detained by the Italians in Samnium and before Nola; Strabo alone was in a position to hasten to the help of the capital. He appeared and pitched his camp at the Colline gate: with his numerous and experienced army he might doubtless have rapidly and totally annihilated the still weak bands of insurgents; but this seemed to be no part of his design. On the contrary he allowed Rome to be actually invested by the insurgents. Cinna with his corps and that
Dubious attitude of Strabo.
of Carbo took post on the
to the Janiculum, Sertorius on the left bank confronting Pompeius over against the Servian wall. Marius with his band which had gradually increased to three legions, and in possession of a number of war-vessels, occupied one
l The whole of the representation that follows is based in substance on the recently discovered account of Licinianus, which communicates a number of facts previously unknown, and in particular enables us to per eeive the sequence and connection of thee events more clearly than was possible before.
The Cinnanl around
right
bank of the Tiber
opposite Rome.
Negotia tions of parties with the Italian.
63 CINNA AND SULLA 800K IV
place on the coast after another till at length even Ostia fell into his hands through treachery, and, by way of pre lude as it were to the approaching reign of terror, was abandoned by the general to the savage band for massacre and pillage. The capital was placed, even by the mere obstruction of traflic, in great danger; by command of the senate the walls and gates were put in a state of defence and the burgess-levy was ordered to the Janiculum. The inaction of Strabo excited among all classes alike surprise and indignation. The suspicion that he was negotiating secretly with Cinna was natural, but was probably without foundation. A serious conflict in which he engaged the band of Sertorius, and the support which he gave to the consul Octavius when Marius had by an understanding with one of the officers of the garrison penetrated into the Ianiculum, and by which in fact the insurgents were successfully beaten off again with much loss, showed that he was far from intending to unite with, or rather to place himself under, the leaders of the insurgents. It seems rather to have been his design to sell his assistance in sub— duing the insurrection to the alarmed government and citizens of the capital at the price of the consulship for the next year, and thereby to get the reins of government into his own hands.
The senate was not, however, inclined to throw itself into the arms of one usurper in order to escape from another, and sought help elsewhere. The franchise was by decree of the senate supplementarily conferred on all the Italian communities involved in the Social war, which had laid down their arms and had in consequence thereof forfeited their old alliance. 1 It seemed as it were their
1 iii. 527. That there was no confirmation by the comitia, is clear from Cic. Phil. xii. 11, 27. The senate seems to have made use of the form of simply prolonging the term of the Plautio-Papirian law (iii. 517), a course which by use and wont 409) was open to and practically amounted to conferring the franchise on all Italians.
(i.
it
can. or CINNA AND SULLA
63
intention oflicially to demonstrate that Rome in the war against the Italians had staked her existence for the sake not of a great object but of her own vanity: in the first momentary embarrassment, for the purpose of bringing into the field an additional thousand or two of soldiers, she sacrificed everything which had been gained at so terribly dear a cost in the Social war. In fact, troops arrived
from the communities who were benefited by this con cession ; but instead of the many legions promised, their contingent on the whole amounted to not more than, at most, ten thousand men. It would have been of more moment that an agreement should be come to with the Samnites and Nolans, so that the troops of the thoroughly trustworthy Metellus might be employed for the protection of the capital. But the Samnites made demands which recalled the yoke of Caudium—restitution of the spoil taken from the Samnites and of their prisoners and de serters, renunciation of the booty wrested by the Samnites from the Romans, the bestowal of the franchise on the Samnites themselves as well as on the Romans who had passed over to them. The senate rejected even in this emergency terms of peace so disgraceful, but instructed Metellus to leave behind a small division and to lead in person all the troops that could at all be dispensed with in southern Italy as quickly as possible to Rome. He obeyed. But the consequence was, that the Samnites attacked and defeated Plautius the legate left behind by Metellus and his weak band; that the garrison of Nola marched out and set on fire the neighbouring town of Abella in alliance with Rome; that Cinna and Marius, moreover, granted to the Samnites everything they asked —what mattered Roman honour to them ! —and a Samnite contingent reinforced the ranks of the insurgents. It was a severe loss also, when after a combat unfavourable to the troops of the government Ariminum was occupied by the
Death of Strabo.
Vacillation of the govern ment.
insurgents and thus the important communication between Rome and the valley of the Po, whence men and supplies were expected, was interrupted. Scarcity and famine set in. The large populous city numerously garrisoned with troops was but inadequately supplied with provisions; and Marius in particular took care to cut off its supplies more and more. He had already blocked up the Tiber by a bridge of ships ; now by the capture of Antium, Lanuvium, Aricia, and other townships he gained control over the means of land communication still open, and at the same time appeased temporarily his revenge by causing all the citizens, wherever resistance was offered, to be put to the sword with the exception of those who had possibly be trayed to him the town. Contagious diseases followed on the distress and committed dreadful ravages among the masses of soldiers densely crowded round the capital; of Strabo’s veteran army 1 1,000, and of the troops of Octavius 6000 are said to have fallen victims to them. Yet the government did not despair; and the sudden death of Strabo was a fortunate event for He died of the pestilence the masses, exasperated on many grounds against him, tore his corpse from the bier and dragged through the streets. The remnant of his troops was in corporated the consul Octavius with his army.
After the arrival of Metellus and the decease of Strabo the army of the government was again at least match for its antagonists, and was able to array itself for battle against the insurgents at the Alban Mount. But the minds of the soldiers of the government were deeply agitated when Cinna appeared in front of them, they received him with acclama tion as he were still their general and consul; Metellus
"Aqflatur . n'dere," as Livy (according to Obsequensv 56) expresses means "seized by the pestilence" (Patron. Sat. 2; Plin. H. N. ii. 41, 108; Liv. viii. 9, m), not "struck by lightning," as later writers
have misunderstood it.
64
CINNA AN D SULLA BOOK IV
it,
1
if
;
a
;1 by
it
it.
CHAP- 1x CINNA AND SULLA
65
deemed it advisable not to allow the battle to come on, but to lead back the troops to their camp. The Optimates themselves wavered, and fell at variance with each other. While one party, with the honourable but stubborn and shortsighted consul Octavius at their head, perseveringly opposed all concession, Metellus more experienced in war and more judicious attempted to bring about a compromise ; but his conference with Cinna excited the wrath of the extreme men on both sides : Cinna was called by Marius a weakling, Metellus was called by Octavius a traitor. The soldiers, unsettled otherwise and not without cause distrust ing the leadership of the untried Octavius, suggested to Metellus that he should assume the chief command, and, when he refused, began in crowds to throw away their arms or even to desert to the enemy. The temper of the bur gesses became daily more depressed and troublesome. On the proclamation of the heralds of Cinna guaranteeing
freedom to the slaves who should desert, these flocked in
troops from the capital to the enemy’s camp. But the proposal that the senate should guarantee freedom to the slaves willing to enter the army was decidedly resisted by Octavius. The government could not conceal from itself that it was defeated, and that nothing remained but to come to terms if possible with the leaders of the band, as the overpowered traveller comes to terms with the captain of banditti. Envoys went to Cinna ; but, while they foolishly made difliculties as to recognizing him as consul, and Cinna in the interval thus prolonged transferred his camp close to the city-gates, the desertion spread to so great an extent that it was no longer possible to settle any terms. The senate submitted itself unconditionally to the outlawed consul, adding only a request that he would refrain from bloodshed, Cinna promised this, but refused to ratify his promise by an oath; Marius, who kept by his side during the negotiations, maintained a sullen silence.
Reine caplmhm
voL. IV
I05
reign of tu'ror.
66 CINNA AND SULLA Book IV
The gates of the capital were opened. The consul marched in with his legions ; but Marius, scoflingly recalling the law of outlawry, refused to set foot in the city until the law allowed him to do so, and the burgesses hastily assembled in the Forum to pass the annulling decree. He then entered, and with him the reign of terror. It was deter mined not to select individual victims, but to have all the notable men of the Optimate party put to death and to confiscate their property. The gates were closed; for five days and five nights the slaughter continued without inter ruption ; even afterwards the execution of individuals who had escaped or been overlooked was of daily occurrence, and for months the bloody persecution went on throughout Italy. The consul Gnaeus Octavius was the first victim. True to his often-expressed principle, that he would rather suffer death than make the smallest concession to men acting illegally, he refused even now to take flight, and in his consular robes awaited at the Janiculum the assassin, who was not slow to appear. Among the slain were Lucius
90. Caesar (consul in 664) the celebrated victor of Acerrae (iii. 51 1); his brother Gaius, whose unseasonable ambition had provoked the Sulpician tumult (iii. 5 32), well known as an orator and poet and as an amiable companion; Marcus Antonius (consul in 655), after the death of Lucius Crassus beyond dispute the first pleader of his time ; Publius Crassus
97. (consul in 657) who had commanded with distinction in the Spanish and in the Social wars and also during the siege of Rome; and a multitude of the most considerable men of the government party, among whom the wealthy were traced out with especial zeal by the greedy executioners. Peculiarly sad seemed the death of Lucius Merula, who very much against his own wish had become Cinna’s successor, and who now, when criminally impeached on that account and cited before the comitia, in order to anticipate the inevitable condemnation opened his veins, and at the altar
can. 1! CINNA AND SULLA
67
of the Supreme Jupiter whose priest he was, after laying aside the priestly headband as the religious duty of the dying Flamen required, breathed his last; and still more
the death of Quintus Catulus (consul in 652), once in better 102. days the associate of the most glorious victory and triumph
of that same Marius who now had no other answer for the suppliant relatives of his aged colleague than the mono syllabic order, “he must die. ”
The originator of all these outrages was Gaius Marius. The last
He designated the victims and the executioners—only in exceptional cases, as in those of Merula and Catulus, was any form of law observed; not unfrequently a glance or the silence with which he received those who saluted him formed the sentence of death, which was always executed at once. His revenge was not satisfied even with the death of his victim; he forbade the burial of the dead bodies: he gave
orders—anticipated, it is true, in this respect by Sulla—that the heads of the senators slain should be fixed to the rostra in the Forum ; he ordered particular corpses to be dragged through the Forum, and that of Gaius Caesar to be stabbed afresh at the tomb of Quintus Varius, whom Caesar presum
ably had once impeached (iii. 516); he publicly embraced the man who delivered to him as he sat at table the head of Antonius, whom he had been with difliculty restrained from seeking out in his hiding-place, and slaying with‘ his own hand. His legions of slaves, and in particular a division of Ardyaeans (iii. 427), chiefly served as his executioners, and
did not neglect, amidst these Saturnalia of their new freedom, to plunder the houses of their former masters and to dis honour and murder all whom they met with there. His own associates were in despair at this insane fury ; Sertorius adjured the consul to put a stop to it at any price, and even Cinna was alarmed. But in times such as these were, mad ness itself becomes a power; man hurls himself into the abyss, to save himself from giddiness. It was not easy to
days of
58 CINNA AND SULLA BOOK rv
restrain the furious old man and his band, and least of all had Cinna the courage to do so ; on the contrary, he chose Marius as his colleague in the consulship for the next year. The reign of terror alarmed the more moderate of the victors not much less than the defeated party ; the capitalists alone were not displeased to see that another hand lent itself to the work of thoroughly humbling for once the
haughty oligarchs, and that at the same time, in consequence of the extensive confiscations and auctions, the best part of the spoil came to themselves—in these times of terror they
acquired from the people the surname of the “h0arders. " Fate had thus granted to the author of this reign of terror, the old Gaius Marius, his two chief wishes. He had
taken vengeance on the whole genteel pack that had em bittered his victories and envenomed his defeats; he had been enabled to retaliate for every sarcasm by a stroke of the dagger. Moreover he entered on the new year once more as consul; the vision of a seventh consulate, which the oracle had promised him, and which he had sought for thirteen years to grasp, had now been realized. The gods had granted to him what he wished ; but now too, as in the old legendary period, they practised the fatal irony of destroying man by the fulfilment of his wishes. In his early
consulates the pride, in his sixth the laughing-stock, of his fellow-citizens, he was now in his seventh loaded with the execration of all parties, with the hatred of the whole nation ; he, the originally upright, capable, gallant man, was branded as the crackbrained chief of a reckless band of robbers. He himself seemed to feel His days were passed as in delirium, and by night his couch denied him rest, so that be grasped the wine-cup in order merely to drown thought. A burning fever seized him after being stretched for seven days on a sick bed, in the wild fancies of which he was fighting on the fields of Asia Minor the battles of which the laurels were destined for Sulla, he expired on the 13th Jan.
;
it.
CHAP. Ix CINNA AND SULLA
69
668. He died, more than seventy years old, in full Death [86. possession of what he called power and honour, and in his °r Mums‘ bed ; but Nemesis assumes various shapes, and does not
always expiate blood with blood. Was there no sort of retaliation in the fact, that Rome and Italy now breathed
more freely on the news of the death of the famous saviour of the people than at the tidings of the battle on the
Raudine plain?
Even after his death individual incidents no doubt
occurred, which recalled that time of terror; Gaius Fimbria, for instance, who more than any other during the Marian butcheries had dipped his hand in blood, made an attempt at the very funeral of Marius to kill the universally revered
pontzfex maxr'mur Quintus Scaevola (consul in 659) who had been spared even by Marius, and then, when Scaevola recovered from the wound he had received, indicted him criminally on account of the offence, as Fimbria jestingly expressed of having not been willing to let himself be murdered. But the orgies of murder at any rate were over. Sertorius called together the Marian bandits, under pretext of giving them their pay, surrounded them with his trusty Celtic troops, and caused them to be cut down an mass-e to
the number, according to the lowest estimate, of 4000. Along with the reign of terror came the tyranm's. Cinna not only stood at the head of the state for four years in
succession (667-670) as consul, but he regularly nominated himself and his colleagues without consulting the people; seemed as these democrats set aside the sovereign popular assembly with intentional contempt. No other chief of the popular party, before or afterwards, possessed so perfectly absolute power in Italy and in the greater
part of the provinces for so long time almost undisturbed, as Cinna; but no one can be named, whose government was so utterly worthless and aimless. The law proposed by Sulpicius and thereafter Cinna himself, which
95.
Govern
32;? ‘
87-84.
by
a
if a
it
it,
7o
CINNA AND SULLA BOOK rv
promised to the new burgesses and the freedmen equality of suffrage with the old burgesses, was naturally revived; and it was formally confirmed by a decree of the senate as valid in law (6 7o). Censors were nominated (668) for the purpose of distributing all the Italians, in accordance with into the thirty-five burgess-districts—by conjuncture, in consequence of want of qualified candidates for the censorship the same Philippus, who when consul in
91. 66 had chiefly occasioned the miscarriage of the plan of Drusus for bestowing the franchise on the Italians (iii. 487), was now selected as censor to inscribe them in the burgess rolls. The reactionary institutions established Sulla in
88. 666 were of course overthrown. Some steps were taken to please the proletariate—for instance, the restrictions on the distribution of grain introduced some years ago (iii. 504), were probably now once more removed the design of Gaius Gracchus to found colony at Capua was in reality carried out in the spring of 671 on the proposal of the tribune of the people, Marcus Junius Brutus; Lucius Valerius Flaccus the younger introduced law as to debt, which reduced every private claim to the fourth part of its nominal amount and cancelled three-fourths in favour of the debtors. But these measures, the only positive ones during the whole Cinnan government, were without exception the dictates of the moment; they were based—and this
plan possibly erroneous, but on no political plan at all. The populace were caressed, and at the same time offended
in very unnecessary way by
' the constitutional arrangements for election. The capitalist
party might have furnished support, but was injured in
the most sensitive point by the law as to debt.
mainstay of the government was—whol1y without any co operation on its part—the new burgesses their assistance was acquiesced in, but nothing was done to regulate the
meaningless disregard of
singular
perhaps the most shocking feature in this whole catastrophe—not on
The true
;
it
a
a
a
a
3
it,
a
is
a a
;
by a
can. IX CINNA AND SULLA 7r
of the Samnites, who were now nominally Roman citizens, but evidently regarded their country’s
independence as practically the real object and prize of the struggle and remained in arms to defend it against all and sundry. Illustrious senators were struck down like mad dogs; but not the smallest step was taken to reorganize the senate in the interest of the government, or even per manently to terrify it; so that the government was by no means sure of its aid. Gaius Gracchus had not understood the fall of the oligarchy as implying that the new master might conduct himself on his self-created throne, as legiti mate cipher-kings think proper to do. But this . Cinna had been elevated to power not by his will, but by pure acci
dent; was there any wonder that he remained where the storm-wave of revolution had washed him up, till a second wave came to sweep him away again i‘
The same union of the mightiest plenitude of power with the most utter impotence and incapacity in those who held
was apparent in the warfare waged by the revolutionary government against the oligarchy—a warfare on which withal its existence primarily depended. In Italy ruled with absolute sway. Of the old burgesses very large portion were on principle favourable to democratic views, and the still greater mass of quiet people, while disapproving the Marian horrors, saw in an oligarchic restoration simply the commencement of second reign of terror by the opposite party. The impression of the outrages of 667 on the nation at large had been comparatively slight, as they had chiefly affected the mere aristocracy of the capital; and was moreover somewhat efi‘aeed by the three years of tolerably peaceful government that ensued. Lastly the whole mass of the new burgesses—three-fifths perhaps of the Italians—were decidedly, not favourable to the present government, yet opposed to the oligarchy.
Like Italy, most of the provinces adhered to the oligarchy
strange position
Cinna and Sulla.
Italy and the pro vinces in favour of the govern menl.
87.
if
it
a
a
it
it,
Measurel Sullm
O6.
11
CINNA AND SULLA BOOK 1v
—Sicily, Sardinia, the two Gauls, the two Spains. In Africa Quintus Metellus, who had fortunately escaped the mur derers, made an attempt to hold that province for the Optimates ; Marcus Crassus, the youngest son of the Publius Crassus who had perished in the Marian massacre, resorted to him from Spain, and reinforced him by a band which he had collected there. But on their quarrelling with each other they were obliged to yield to Gaius Fabius Hadrianus, the governor appointed by the revolutionary government. Asia was in the hands of Mithradates ; consequently the province of Macedonia, so far as it was in the power of Sulla, remained the only asylum of the exiled oligarchy. Sulla’s wife and children who had with difliculty escaped death, and not a few senators who had made their escape, sought refuge there, so that a sort of senate was soon formed at his head-quarters.
The government did not fail to issue decrees against the oligarchic proconsul. Sulla was deprived by the comitia of his command and of his other honours and dignities and outlawed, as was also the case with Metellus, Appius Claudius, and other refugees of note; his house in Rome was razed, his country estates were laid waste. But such proceedings did not settle the matter. Had Gaius Marius lived longer, he would doubtless have marched in person against Sulla to those fields whither the fevered visions of his death-bed drew him; the measures which the government took after his death have been stated already. Lucius Valerius Flaccus the younger,1 who after Marius’
1 Lucius Valerius Flaccus, whom the Fasti name as consul in 668, was 100. not the consul of 6 54, but a younger man of the same name, perhaps son of the preceding. For, first, the law which prohibited re-election to the 151. 81. consulship remained legally in full force from c. 603 (iii. 299) to 673, and
it is not probable that what was done in the case of Scipio Aemilianus and Marius was done also for Flaccus. Secondly, there is no mention any where, when either Flaccus is named, of a double consulship, not even where it was necessary as in Cic. pro Flace. 32, 77. Thirdly, the Lucius
85. Valerius Flaccus who was active in Rome in 669 as prime)r muztur and consequently of consular rank (Liv. 83), cannot have been the consul of
can. ix CINNA AND SULLA
73
death was invested with the consulship and the command
in the east (668), was neither soldier nor oflicer; Gaius 35, Fimbria who accompanied him was not without ability, but insubordinate; the army assigned to them was even in numbers three times weaker than the army of Sulla. Tidings successively arrived, that Flaccus, in order not to
be crushed by Sulla, had marched past him onward to Asia (668); that Fimbria had set him aside and installed himself 85, in his room (beg. of 669) ; that Sulla had concluded peace 85, with Mithradates (669-670). Hitherto Sulla had been 85-84. silent so far as the authorities ruling in the capital were concerned. Now a letter from him reached the senate, in which he reported the termination of the war and announced
his return to Italy; he stated that he would respect the
rights conferred on the new burgesses, and that, while
penal measures were inevitable, they would light not on the masses, but on the authors of the mischief. This announcement frightened Cinna out of his inaction: while he had hitherto taken no step against Sulla except the placing some men under arms and collecting a numberof vessels in the Adriatic, he now resolved to cross in all haste to Greece.
On the other hand Sulla’s letter, which in the circum- Attempt: stances might be called extremely moderate, awakened in 21:13:" the middle-party hopes of a peaceful adjustment. The
majority of the senate resolved, on the proposal of the
elder Flaccus, to set on foot an attempt at reconciliation, and with that view to summon Sulla to come under the guarantee of a safe-conduct to Italy, and to suggest to the
668, for the latter had already at that time departed for Asia and was 86.
probably already dead. The consul of 654, censor in 657, is the person whom Cicero (ad Att. viii. 3, 6) mentions among the consulars present in Rome in 667 ; he was in 669 beyond doubt the oldest of the old censors living and thus fitted to be prime)r . renalur; he was also the interrex and the magirter eyuitum of 672. On the other hand, the consul of 668, who perished at Nicomeclia (p. 47). was the father of the Lucius Flaccus defended by Cicero (pro Fla“. :5, 6r, comp. 23, 55. 32, 77).
100. 97. 87. 85. 82. 86.
74 CINNA AND SULLA BOOK XV
consuls Cinna and Carbo that they should suspend their preparations till the arrival of Sulla’s answer. Sulla did not absolutely reject the proposals. Of course he did not come in person, but he sent a message that he asked nothing but the restoration of the banished to their former status and the judicial punishment of the crimes that had been perpetrated, and moreover that he did not
security to be provided for himself, but proposed to bring it to those who were at home. His envoys found the state of things in Italy essentially altered. Cinna had, without concerning himself further about that decree of the senate, immediately after the termination of its sitting proceeded to the army and urged its embarkation. The summons to trust themselves to the sea at that unfavourable season of the year provoked among the already dissatisfied troops in the head-quarters at Ancona a mutiny, to which Cinna fell a victim (beg. of 670); whereupon his colleague Carbo found himself compelled to bring back the divisions that had already crossed and, abandoning the idea of taking up the war in Greece, to enter into winter-quarters in
Ariminum. But Sulla’s ofl‘ers met no better reception on that account; the senate rejected his proposals without even allowing the envoys to enter Rome, and enjoined him summarily to lay down arms. It was not the coterie of the Marians which primarily brought about this resolute attitude. That faction was obliged to abandon its hitherto usurped occupation of the supreme magistracy at the very time when it was of moment, and again to institute consular elections for the decisive year 67 r. The suffrages on this occasion were united not in favour of the former consul Carbo or of any of the able oflicers of the hitherto ruling clique, such as Quintus Sertorius or Gaius Marius the younger, but in favour of Lucius Scipio and Gaius Norbanus, two incapables, neither of whom knew how to fight and Scipio not even how to speak; the former of these recommended himself
desire
Death of Cinna. [84. Carbo and the new burgesses am against Sulla.
88.
can. u: CINNA AND SULLA
75
to the multitude only as the great-grandson of the conqueror of Antiochus, and the latter as a political opponent of the oligarchy (iii. 478). The Marians were not so much ab horred for their misdeeds as despised for their incapacity; but if the nation would have nothing to do with these, the great majority of it would have still less to do with Sulla and an oligarchic restoration. Earnest measures of self defence were contemplated. While Sulla crossed to Asia and induced such defection in the army of Fimbria that its leader fell by his own hand, the government in Italy
the further interval of a year granted to it by these steps of Sulla in energetic preparations; it is said that at Sulla’s landing 100,000 men, and afterwards even double that number of troops, were arrayed in arms against him.
Against this Italian force Sulla had nothing to place in the scale except his five legions, which, even including some contingents levied in Macedonia and the Pelo
employed
amounted to scarce 40,000 men. It is true that this army had been, during its seven years’ conflicts in Italy, Greece, and Asia, weaned from politics,
and adhered to its general—who pardoned everything in his soldiers, debauchery, brutality, even mutiny against their oflicers, required nothing but valour and fidelity towards their general, and set before them the prospect of the most extravagant rewards in the event of victory—with all that soldierly enthusiasm, which is the more powerful that the noblest and the meanest passions often combine to produce it in the same breast. The soldiers of Sulla voluntarily according to the Roman custom swore mutual oaths that they would stand firmly by each other, and each voluntarily brought to the general his savings as a contribu tion to the costs of the war. But considerable as was the weight of this solid and select body of troops in comparison with the masses of the enemy, Sulla saw very well that Italy
ponnesus, probably
Dificult position of Sulla.
His mode ration.
could not be subdued with five legions if it remained united in resolute resistance. To settle accounts with the popular party and their incapable autocrats would not have been difficult; but he saw opposed to him and united with that party the whole mass of those who desired no oligarchic restoration with its terrors, and above all the whole body of new burgesses—both those who had been withheld by the Julian law from taking part in the insur rection, and those whose revolt a few years before had brought Rome to the brink of ruin.