No More Learning

Accordingly
his policy, which he had at first represented as one of self-defence, now
became avowedly aggressive. Medina was no longer the refuge of a
persecuted sect—it was the seat of a religious despotism which in a few
years subjugated the whole of Arabia. To ordinary Europeans this
development of Islam naturally appears as a mere misuse of religion
for purposes of political aggrandisement; it is, however, necessary to
remember, in judging of Mahomet's conduct, that the communities
which he attacked were not organised States but societies which recog-
nised no permanent bond save that of blood. With the exception of
the Kuraish, who inhabited a sacred territory, almost every Arabian
tribe was engaged in perpetual feuds with its neighbours. In founding
a community united solely by religion Mahomet necessarily placed
himself in a position of antagonism to the tribal system, which required
every man to take the part of his fellow-tribesmen against the members
of all other tribes. But Mahomet was very far from being a cosmo-
polite of the modern type. Though his doctrines logically involved the
equality of all races, it probably never occurred to him that it was his
duty to ignore national and tribal distinctions. The authority of the
tribal chiefs was not to be overthrown but it was to be subordinated to
a higher authority, which could be none other than that of the Prophet
himself. Moreover Mahomet's belief in the peculiar sanctity of Mecca
rather increased than diminished during his long exile. Until the House
of God had been purged of idols the main object of the Prophet's
mission was still unattained. To win over Mecca to the true faith
seemed therefore a matter of supreme importance.
The first expedition made for this purpose took place in the year 628.
Shortly before the time of the annual Pilgrimage Mahomet marched
towards Mecca accompanied by several hundreds of his disciples and
taking with him a large number of camels which were marked with
badges, according to ancient Arabian custom, to denote that they were
victims intended for sacrifice. If his aim was to force his way into the
city, he carefully concealed the design, giving out that he and his
followers were coming simply as pilgrims, to do honour to the Meccan
sanctuary. He hoped to convince the Kuraish that Islam would not in
any way interfere with the privileges which they had hitherto enjoyed,
C MED. B. VOL. II. CH. X. 21


## p. 322 (#354) ############################################

322 Treaty of Hudaibiya [628
and he persuaded himself that they might thereby be induced to
recognise his claims. But the memory of the blood shed at his command
and especially of the occasion on which he had violated the truce of the
sacred months was vividly present to the minds of the Meccans, and
they determined on no account to admit him. When he reached
Hudaibiya, a place within a few hours' march of Mecca, he found his
way blocked by an armed force consisting partly of Meccans and partly
of their Bedouin allies. A series of negotiations ensued, in the course
of which Othman (properly iUthman) ibn 'Aflan went as Mahomet's
agent to Mecca; the selection of this man was doubtless due to his being a
relative of Abu Sufyan and other influential citizens. During Othman's
absence a rumour that he had been murdered spread through the camp
of the Muslims, whereupon Mahomet, fearing, or pretending to fear,
an attack on the part of the $uraish, assembled his followers under a
tree and required from each of them a promise that he would on no
account flee, if a conflict took place. To this scene the Koran alludes1
as one specially pleasing to God; hence in Muslim tradition it is
called "the Homage of good pleasure. '1 Almost immediately afterwards
Othman returned to Hudaibiya, bringing, it would seem, proofs that
his mission to Mecca had not been fruitless. The negotiations were
accordingly resumed in the Prophet's camp, whither the Kuraish sent a
certain Suhail ibn 'Amr as their representative. After prolonged dis-
cussion a compromise was agreed upon, whereby Mahomet consented
to withdraw for that year, while the Kuraish, on their part, promised
that the year following he and his disciples should be allowed to
enter Mecca, without weapons, and remain there for three days.
Furthermore both parties were to refrain from hostilities for ten years;
during that time no member of the Kurftisb who was still a minor
might join the Muslim community without the permission of his
parents or guardians, whereas the sons of Muslims might freely go
over to the Kuraish.
The terms of this treaty appeared at first so unfavourable to Islam
that the more zealous followers of the Prophet, in particular Omar,
vehemently protested. Mahomet, however, perceived that the con-
ditions, humiliating as they might seem, would in the end turn to his
advantage, and he accordingly adhered to them in spite of the opposition
of his too eager disciples. Never was his influence put to so severe a
test and never did he achieve a more signal triumph. From the moment
when the treaty of Hudaibiya was concluded the number of conversions
to Islam became larger than ever.
According to the ordinary Muslim tradition, the Prophet about
this time took a step which shewed that he contemplated the con-
version not only of Arabia but of the world—he despatched messengers
to the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius, to the Persian king and to
1 Chap, xlviii. 18.


## p. 323 (#355) ############################################

«29] Battle of Mtita 323
various other foreign potentates, summoning them to recognise his
divine mission. But the evidence for this story is by no means satis-
factory, and the details present so many suspicious features that it may
be doubted whether the narrative rests on any real basis.
Soon after his return to Medina, Mahomet set out on an expedition
against Khaibar, where^the banished Banu-n-Nadlr had taken refuge.
The Jews, as usual, shrank from a conflict in the open plain and shut
themselves up in their fortresses, which fell one by one into the hands of
the Muslims. The vanquished were compelled to surrender all their
wealth, which was very considerable, but they were permitted to remain
at Khaibar as cultivators of the soil, on condition that half of the
produce should be annually made over to the Muslim authorities. This
is the first instance of an arrangement which was afterwards adopted in
most parts of the Muslim Empire where the population consisted of
non-Muslims.
Early in the year 629 Mahomet, with about 2000 followers, carried out
his project of visiting Mecca as a pilgrim, in accordance with the treaty
of Hudaibiya. For the stipulated three days he was allowed to occupy
the sacred city and to perform the traditional ceremonies in the sanctuary.
The scene must have been a curious one, never to be repeated—the great
preacher of monotheism publicly doing homage at a shrine filled with
idols. The sight of Mahomet's power deeply impressed the Meccan
aristocracy, and two of the^ most eminent among them, Khalid ibn
al-Walid and 'Amr ibn al-'As, took the opportunity of going over to
Islam. Both of these men afterwards played a prominent part in the
building up of the Muslim Empire.
A few months later Islam for the first time came into conflict with
the great Christian power against which it was destined to struggle,
with scarcely any intermission, for a period of eight centuries. In the
autumn of the year 629 Mahomet despatched a force of 3000 men,
commanded by his adopted son Zaid ibn Qaritha, to the north-western
frontier of Arabia. The reason which most of the historians assign for
this expedition is that a messenger sent by the Prophet had been
assassinated, a year earlier, by an Arab chieftain named Shurahbll, who
owned allegiance to the Byzantine Emperor. But since Ibn Ishak, the
oldest writer who records the expedition, does not allege any pretext for
it, the correctness of the aforesaid explanation is at least doubtful. In
any case it is difficult to believe that Mahomet contemplated an attack
on the Byzantine Empire, for ignorant as he was of foreign countries he
must have been aware that an army of 3000 men would be wholly
inadequate for such a purpose. When the Muslim force reached the
neighbourhood of the Dead Sea, they found themselves, to their great
surprise, confronted by a much larger army composed partly of Byzan-
tines and partly of Arabs subject to the Emperor. After some hesitation
Zaid ibn Haritha determined to fight. The battle took place at Mu'ta,
ch. x. 21—2


## p. 324 (#356) ############################################

324 Capture of Mecca [630
a village to the east of the Dead Sea. The Muslims fought bravely but
were totally defeated; among the slain was their leader Zaid and Ja'far,
a first cousin of the Prophet. The recently converted Khalid ibn
al-Walid, who had accompanied the expedition, finally assumed the
command and succeeded in bringing back the greater part of the army
safely to Medina.
This reverse was quickly followed by a great success in another
quarter. The truce of ten years, established by the treaty of
Hudaibiya, might perhaps have been observed faithfully if the matter
had depended solely on the two contracting parties, Mahomet and the
Kuraish. But each party was in alliance with certain Bedouin tribes,
and, as anyone might have foreseen, a feud among the allies was likely
to produce a general rupture. In fact the truce had lasted only a year
and a half when Mahomet's allies the Khuza'a were attacked by a small
tribe, the Bakr ibn 'Abd-Manat, who likewise dwelt in the neighbour-
hood of Mecca and happened to be in alliance with the Kuraish. Some
members of the Kuraish were accused, rightly or wrongly, of assisting
the Bakr ibn 'Abd-Manat, whereupon the Khuza'a naturally complained
to Mahomet that the terms of the treaty had been violated. The
Kuraish, on their part, sent Abu Sufyan to Medina, in the hope that
hostilities might be averted. What passed between Abu Sufyan and
Mahomet on this occasion it is, of course, impossible to know with
certainty, but it appears highly probable that, as several modern
historians have suggested, the ambassador of the Kuraish, realising the
superiority of the Muslim forces, agreed to facilitate the surrender of
Mecca, while the Prophet promised to avoid all unnecessary bloodshed.
No sooner had Abu Sufyan returned to his native city than Mahomet
collected an army of about 10,000 men, chiefly Bedouins, and marched
southwards. But he abstained from declaring war against the Kuraish
and endeavoured to conceal the real object of his expedition. On the
way he was met by his uncle 'Abbas, who at length professed himself
a convert to Islam and joined the Prophet's army. About the end of
January 630 the Muslims were encamped within sight of Mecca. No
one could now doubt what was Mahomet's aim, but very few of the
Meccans shewed any inclination to risk their lives in defence of the city.
With the exception of a small band who perished in a fruitless skirmish,
the citizens, following the advice of Abu Sufyan, threw away their arms,
retired into their houses and suffered the conqueror to enter unopposed.
Mahomet, on taking possession of the city, at once proclaimed a
general amnesty, from which only ten persons were by name excluded1;
even of these the majority soon obtained pardon. He then proceeded
to destroy the idols with which the city abounded; it was even thought
1 It is somewhat remarkable that among the few persons singled out for special
vengeance were three female musicians, whose crime consisted in the fact that they
had been accustomed to sing songs reflecting on the Prophet's character.


## p. 325 (#357) ############################################

630] Battle of Hunain 325
necessary to efface some of the paintings which adorned, the interior ot
the Ka'ba. A curious legend relates that while this process of purifica-
tion was being carried out one of the Meccan goddesses, called Na'ila,
suddenly appeared in the form of a black woman and fled away shrieking1
—an example of the belief, familiar to us from early Christian literature,
that the pagan deities are devils. But while many of the ancient gods
vanished for ever, one at least remained and in fact has continued to the
present day. A certain black stone, which formed part of the wall of
the Ka'ba, was regarded by the heathen Arabs with extraordinary
veneration; the practice of kissing this object and of stroking it with
the hand was not only tolerated but expressly sanctioned by the Prophet.
That such fetish-worship disgusted some of his own followers appears
evident from a saying ascribed to the Caliph Omar8. How far Mahomet's
policy in these matters was due to genuine superstition and how far
to the desire of conciliating the heathen cannot be determined; but it
is certain that a large part of the ancient cult was adopted into Islam
with little change. For this it was necessary to devise some historical
justification; accordingly the Prophet gave out, perhaps in good faith,
that the Meccan sanctuary had been originally founded by Abraham
and that the ceremonial practised in it was a divine institution though
it had been partially corrupted through the perversity of men. The
Meccans, it is needless to say, gladly accepted the theory which tended,
on the whole, to enhance the prestige of their city. Henceforth the
Kuraish, who had so long opposed the new religion, were among its
firmest adherents, if not from conviction at least from self-interest.
The news of the capture of Mecca spread a panic among some of the
neighbouring tribes of Bedouins. It is not probable that they were
much influenced by religious feeling, but they dreaded the loss of their
independence. An army was quickly brought together, consisting of
several tribes who bore the collective appellation of Hawazin; the most
prominent members of the coalition were the Thaklf, a tribe to which
the inhabitants of the town of Ta'if belonged*. Mahomet at once
marched from Mecca with a much larger force and encountered the
Hawazin in the valley of Hunain. The Muslims, in spite of their
numerical superiority, were at first thrown into confusion by the on-
slaught of the enemy, and the Prophet himself was in great peril; the
troops from Medina, however, succeeded in turning the tide of battle.
At length the Hawazin were not only routed but were forced to abandon
their women and children, together with a vast quantity of flocks and
herds which, after the fashion of the Bedouins, they had brought into
1 Wellhausen, Mohammed in Medina, p. 341.
2 "I know that thou art a atone, without power to harm or to help, and had
I not seen the Messenger of God kiss thee I would not kiss thee" (Bukkarl,
ed. Krehl, i. p. 406. 1 ff. ).
5 See above, p. 311.


## p. 326 (#358) ############################################

326 Expedition to Tabuk [630-632
the battle-field. Immediately after the victory Mahomet proceeded
to besiege Ta'if, but the inhabitants of the town defended it with
unusual vigour and the Muslims were soon obliged to retreat. This
discomfiture, however, does not seem to have injured the Prophet's
cause, for a few days later the majority of the Hawfizin announced their
intention of adopting Islam. The new converts received back their
wives and children, but the rest of the booty taken at Hunain was
distributed among the victors. Nor did the people of Ta'if long
remain faithful to their old religion; after an interval of about half a
year they entered into negotiations with the Prophet and finally sub-
mitted to his authority.
In the autumn of this year (630) a report reached Medina that
a great Byzantine army was advancing into Arabia from the north-
west. The report was certainly false; whether Mahomet believed it or
merely utilised it as a pretext for a raid it is impossible to say. In any
case he collected all his forces and marched with them as far as Tabuk,
which is about 300 miles to the north-west of Medina. As no Byzan-
tines appeared to oppose him, the only result of his expedition was the
subjugation of some small Jewish and Christian settlements in the north
of Arabia. Both Jews and Christians were allowed to retain their
property and the right to profess their religion, on condition that they
paid a yearly tribute, the amount of which was fixed in each case by a
special treaty.
On the occasion of the next annual Pilgrimage, in the spring of 631,
Mahomet issued a solemn proclamation, now contained in chap. ix. of
the Koran, whereby heathens were thenceforth excluded from participa-
tion in the Pilgrimage and the cult of the Ka'ba. The following year
the Prophet himself performed the Pilgrimage and finally settled the
details of the ceremonies to be observed in connexion with it. During
all subsequent ages this institution, notwithstanding its purely heathen
origin, continued to be the great bond whereby Muslims of all parties
were held together. Such a result could not have been attained
by the Koran alone or by any abstract creed however carefully formu-
lated.
Another matter which he undertook to regulate at about the same
time was the sacred Calendar. Till then the Arabs, so far as can be
ascertained, had reckoned by solar years but by lunar months, that is to
say, they followed the practice, which appears to have been common
among the Semitic nations, of inserting an intercalary month from
time to time so as to adjust the year to the seasons. But as their
notions of astronomy were of the crudest sort, much confusion naturally
arose. This the Prophet, who was equally ignorant, endeavoured to
remedy by announcing, in the name of God, that thenceforth the
year was always to consist of twelve lunar months. Accordingly the
Muslim year was altogether dissociated from the natural seasons, for


## p. 327 (#359) ############################################

632] Death of Mahomet 327
which reason the more civilised Muslim nations are obliged to have
a civil Calendar, consisting of Persian, Syrian or Coptic months, as the
case may be, in addition to the sacred Calendar.
Soon after his return to Medina, Mahomet made preparations for
another campaign against the Byzantines, but before the expedition had
started he was seized with fever and expired, in the arms of 'A'isha, on
Monday, 7 June 632. Of his last utterances there are various accounts,
many of which are obvious fabrications designed to support the claims
of rival candidates for the Caliphate. That he ever appointed a successor
is highly improbable.
It would be vain to attempt an enumeration of the conflicting
judgments which have been passed on his character and his work, not
only by fanatical devotees and opponents but even by scientific historians.
The immense majority of the attacks published in Europe may be safely
ignored, since they were made at a time when the most trustworthy
sources of information had not yet come to light. During the last two
or three generations more favourable estimates have been formed, but it
would be a grave mistake to suppose that even at the present day there
is anything like a consensus of opinion on this subject among those who
are most qualified to judge. One of the greatest Orientalists that ever
lived has recently stated that having, in his younger days, planned a
work on the history of the early Muslim Empire he was finally deterred
from carrying out the scheme by his inability to offer any satisfactory
account of the Prophet's character1. This example should suffice to
inspire diffidence.
In discussing the subject there are two opposite dangers which we
must constantly strive to avoid. On the one hand, we should beware of
assuming that Mahomet's doctrine and policy were determined solely
by his own personal qualities. Much that strikes us as peculiar in his
preaching may in reality be due to his Jewish or Christian informants.
It is likewise clear that the spread of his religion was largely governed
by factors over which he had no control. All the evidence tends to
shew that during the first few years of his propaganda he never dreamt
of acquiring political power. He strove, it is true, to convert Mecca as
a whole*, and not merely a few individuals, to the true faith; but this
was not in view of an earthly kingdom—it was in view of the impending
Day of Judgment. Even when at length circumstances placed him in
the position of a ruler his authority rested much more on the voluntary
co-operation of his followers than on any material resources that were at
his command. It has often been suggested in recent times that the
religious movement of which Mahomet was the head coincided with a
great national movement on the part of the Arabs who, it is said, had
1 Noldeke, in the Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgeniandes, xxi.
p. 298, footnote 3.
2 On this point see Wellhausen, Das arabitche Reich und tein Store, pp. 2 ff.


## p. 328 (#360) ############################################

328 Result
already developed, independently of Islam, a sense of their superiority
to other races and were eager to overrun the neighbouring countries.
On this question it is difficult to pronounce a definite opinion, since
nearly all our information about the Arabs of that period comes through
Muslim channels. But in any case there can be no doubt that in the
diffusion of Islam the national feelings of the Arabs played a very
important part.
On the other hand, we must not fall into the error of ignoring the
extraordinary influence exerted by the Prophet over his disciples, an
influence which was apparently due quite as much to his moral as to his
intellectual qualities. The confidence which he inspired may seem to us
undeserved, but it is only just to acknowledge that he used his immense
power much oftener for the purpose of restraining than for the purpose
of stimulating fanaticism.


## p. 329 (#361) ############################################

329
CHAPTER XL
THE EXPANSION OF THE SARACENS.
GENERAL REMARKS, ASIA, EGYPT.
The migration of the Teutonic tribes and the expansion of the
Saracens form the basis of the history of the Middle Ages. As the
migrations laid the foundation for the development of the Western
States, the diffusion of the Saracens gave the form which it has kept
till our own day to the ancient contrast of East and West. These two
movements gave birth to the severance between Christian Europe and
the Muslim East, momentous not only throughout the Middle Ages
but even to the present day. True, Spain was long included in the
Muslim territory, while Eastern Europe and Asia Minor formed part of
the Christian sphere, but these later changes simply alter the geogra-
phical aspect; the origin of the contrast, affecting universal history,
dates back to the seventh century.
The Middle Ages regarded the severance from such a one-sided
ecclesiastical and clerical point of view as was bound to obscure the
comprehension of historical facts. The popular version of the matter,
even among the cultured classes of to-day, is still under the spell of this
tradition:—" Inspired by their prophet, the Arab hordes fall upon the
Christian nations, to convert them to Islam at the point of the sword.
The thread of ancient development is torn completely asunder; a new
civilisation, that of Islam, created by the Arabs, takes the place of the
older civilisation of Christianity; the eastern and western countries are
opposed to each other on terms of complete estrangement, reacting on
each other only during the period of the crusades. " If we look into
Arabian sources with this idea before us, we shall find it fully confirmed,
for Arabian tradition also took its bearings from the ecclesiastical
standpoint, like the tradition of the West; with one as with the
other everything commenced with Mahomet and the expansion of the
Arabs; Mahomet and the first Caliphs made all things anew and
substantially created the civilisation of Islam. It is only in recent
times that historical research has led away from this line of thought.
We recognise now the historical continuity. Islam emerges from its


## p. 330 (#362) ############################################

330 Historical Aspect of Islam
isolation and becomes heir to the Oriental-Hellenistic civilisation. It
appears as the last link in a long development of universal history. From
the days of Alexander the Great until the time of the Roman emperors
the East had been compelled to endure Western conditions and European
rule. But as in the days of the earlier emperors the Hellenic spirit was
stifled by the embrace of the East, and as the classical world greedily
, absorbed the cults and religions of the East, an ethnical reaction of the
7 . East sets in from the third century onwards and the Semitic element
[begins to stir beneath the Hellenistic surface. Within the Christian
sphere this current shews itself more especially in the territories of the
Greek and Aramaic languages, and the difference between the Greek and
the Latin Churches is mainly that between Asia and Europe. With
the expansion of the Arabs then the East reacquires in the political
sphere the independence which had been slowly preparing in the domain
of civilisation. Nothing absolutely new therefore arrives from the
expansion of the Arabs, not even conditions uncongenial to the West of
the Middle Ages; in fact on closer examination we perceive an intimate
inner relationship in the world of thought between the Christianity of
the Middle Ages and Islam. This fact is moreover not remarkable, for
both spheres of culture repose on the same foundation, the Hellenistic-
Oriental civilisation of early Christian times. In the territory of
the Mediterranean circle conquered by the Arabs this civilisation lived
on, but as the empire of the Caliphs thrust its main centre further
and further eastward, and annexed more and more the traditions of
ancient Persia, the culture of Islam, at first strongly tinged with
Hellenism, was bound to assume an ever stronger Oriental character.
On the other hand on Western ground the Germanic genius freed itself
from this civilisation, which as a foreign import could not thrive there,
to develop out of its remnants the typically Western forms of the
Middle Ages.
Just as the ecclesiastical conception on the one hand broke the
historical continuity, it perceived on the other hand in the expansion of
the Arabs nothing but a further extension of the religion of Islam
and therefore totally misunderstood the real nature of the movement.
It was not the religion of Islam which was by that time disseminated by
the sword, but merely the political sovereignty of the Arabs. The
acceptance of Islam by others than Arabians was not only not striven
for, but was in fact regarded with disfavour. The subdued peoples
might peacefully retain their old religions, provided only they paid
ample tribute. As on conversion to Islam these payments ceased, at
least in the early times such changes of religion were disliked. The
circumstance that a few pious men subsequently practised such pro-
selytism, or that the material advantages of apostasy gradually led the
population of the conquered countries to Islam, must not blind our eyes
to the fact that the movement originated from quite. other motives.


## p. 331 (#363) ############################################

The Arab Migration 331
The sudden surging forward of the Arabs was only apparently sudden.
For centuries previously the Arab migration had been in preparation. It
was the last great Semitic migration connected with the economical
decline of Arabia. Such a decline is indisputable, even though we may
not be disposed to accept all the conclusions which have in recent times
been connected with this oft-discussed thesis. Ever since the commence-
ment of our chronology the Arabs had been in fluctuation. South-Arabian
tribes were lords of Medina, others also from South Arabia were settled
in Syria and Mesopotamia. Legendary information, confirmed however
by inscriptions of Southern Arabia, shews that for a long period the
conditions of life in the southern part of the Arabian peninsula had been
growing worse. With the decline of political power the care of the
public waterworks, on which the prosperity of the land more or less
depended, also suffered. In short, long before Mahomet Arabia was
in a state of unrest, and a slow, uncontrollable infiltration of Arabian
tribes and tribal branches had permeated the adjoining civilised lands
in Persian as also in Roman territory, where they had met with the
descendants of earlier Semitic immigrants to those parts, the Aramaeans,
who were already long acclimatised there.
Persia and Byzantium suffered severely from this constant unrest in
their border provinces, and both empires had endeavoured to organise the
movement and to use it as a fighting medium, the one against the other.
The Romans had organised the Syrian Arabs for this purpose under the
leadership of princes of the house of Ghassan, the most celebrated of whom
even received the title of patrician, while the Sassanids founded a similar
bulwark in Hlra, where the Lakhmites, under Persian sovereignty, lived
a princely life, greatly celebrated by Arabian poets. A short-sighted
policy, and probably also internal weakness, permitted the ruin of
both of these States, which would have offered an almost insuperable
barrier to the Islamitic expansion. The hitherto united dominions
of the Ghassanids were subdivided and various governors took the
place of the popular Lakhmite princes. Thus the great empires had
succeeded in destroying the smaller Arabian States which had grown too
powerful, but the tradition remained, according to which the Arabians
on the borders might with impunity levy contributions on the neighbour-
ing cultivated countries during the constant wars between Persia and
Byzantium. These traditions were assimilated by those Arabs then
gradually becoming dependent on Medina, and their procedure was
sanctioned and encouraged by the young and rising Caliphate; at first
in a wavering, but later in a more and more energetic manner. The
expansion of the Saracens is thus the final stage in a process of develop-
ment extending over centuries.
Islam was simply a change in the
watchword for which they fought; and thus arose at the same time
an organisation which, based on religious and ethnical principles and
crowned with unexpected success, was bound to attain an historical


## p. 332 (#364) ############################################

332 Character of the Movement [632
importance quite different from that of buffer States like Hira and
Ghassan.
Under these circumstances it would be a mistake to regard the Arab
migration merely as a religious movement incited by Mahomet. The
question may in fact be put whether the whole movement is not conceivable
without the intervention of Islam. There can in any case be no question
of any zealous impulse towards proselytism. That strong religious tie
which at the present time binds together all Muslims, that exclusive
religious spirit of the later world of Islam, is at all events not the
primary cause of the Arab migration, but merely a consequence of the
political and cultural conditions caused by it. The importance of Islam
in this direction lies in its masked political character, which the modern
world has even in our own time to take into consideration. In the
1 outset Islam meant the supremacy of Medina, but it soon identified
itself with Arabianism, i. e. , it preached the superiority of the Arabian
people generally. This great idea gives an intellectual purport to the
restless striving for expansion, and makes a political focus of the great
Arabian State of Medina, founded on religion. Hunger and avarice,
not religion, are the impelling forces, but religion supplies the essential
unity and central power. The expansion of the Saracens1 religion, both
in point of time and in itself, can only be regarded as of minor import and
rather as a political necessity. The movement itself had been on foot
long before Islam gave it a party cry and an organisation. Then it was
that the minor streams of Arabian nationality, gradually encroaching on
the cultivated territory, united with the related elements already resident
there and formed that irresistible migratory current which flooded the
older kingdoms, and seemed to flood them suddenly.
If the expansion of the Saracens is thus allowed to take its proper
place in the entire development of the Middle Ages, a glance at the state
of affairs at the time of the prophet's death leads directly to the history
of the Arab migration itself.
The death of the prophet is represented by tradition as an event
which surprised the whole world and to the faithful seemed impossible,
notwithstanding the fact that Mahomet had always confessed himself
to be a mortal man. He had, it is true, never taken his eventual decease
into consideration, nor had he left a definite code of laws or any
instructions regarding his succession. But can we suppose a similar self-
deception also among his nearest companions, who must certainly have
seen how he was ageing, and must have had him before them in all his
human weakness? Can we suppose any delusion in so circumspect a
nature as Abu Bakr, or in such a genius for government as Omar?
The energetic and wise conduct of both these men and their companion
Abu 'Ubaida, immediately after the catastrophe, seems to prove the
contrary and their action seems based on well-prepared arrange-
ments. Energetic action was moreover very necessary, for it was


## p. 333 (#365) ############################################

632] Abu Bakrs Election 833
a giant task which Mahomet bequeathed to those entrusted with the
regulation of his inheritance. At the very outset loomed up the
difficulties in the capital itself. The sacred personality of the prophet
had succeeded in holding in check the old antipathies within the ranks of
the Medina allies (Ansar) and the continual petty jealousies between
these and the Muhajirun, the companions of his flight from Mecca. But
on his death, which for the great majority was sudden and unexpected,
these two groups confronted each other, each claiming the right to take
up the lead. As soon as the news of the death first reached them the
Khazraj, the most numerous tribe of the Ansar, assembled in the hall
(Saklfa) of the Banu Sa'ida. Informed of this by the Aus, who feared a
revival of the old dissensions, Abu Bakr, Omar and Abu 'Ubaida at once
repaired thither and arrived just in time to prevent a split in the
community. The hot-blooded Omar wanted to put a stop to it promptly
and by energetic means, and would of a certainty have spoiled the whole
situation, but at this stage the venerable and awe-inspiring Abu Bakr,
the oldest companion of the prophet, intervened and whilst fully recog-
nising the merits of the Ansar insisted on the election of one of the
Kuraishite companions of the prophet as leader of the community.
He proposed Omar or Abu 'Ubaida. The proposal did not meet with
success and the discussion became more and more excited; suddenly
Omar seized the hand of Abu Bakr and rendered homage to him, and
others followed his example. In the meantime the hall and adjoining
rooms had become filled with people belonging, not to either of the
main groups, but to the fluctuating population of Muslim Arabs of
the neighbourhood, who had in the preceding years become especially
numerous in Medina, and whose main interest was that matters should
remain in statu quo. These people really turned the scales, and thus
Abu Bakr was chosen by a minority and recognised on the following day
by the community, though unwillingly, as even tradition is unable to veil,
on the part of many. They rendered homage to him as the repre-
sentative (Khalifa) of the prophet. The term Caliph was at that time
not regarded as a title, but simply as a designation of office; Omar, the
successor of Abu Bakr, is said to have been the first to assume the
distinctive title "Commander of the Faithful," Amir al-Mu'minin,
rendered by the Greek papyri as dfiipaXfiovfiviv.
The election of Abu Bakr was doubtless a fortunate one, but it was
regarded in circles closely interested as an inexcusable coup de main.
Quite apart from the fact that the Ansar had failed to carry their
point and were accordingly in bad humour, the nearer relations of the
prophet and their more intimate companions appear to have carried
out a policy of obstruction which yielded only to force. Ali, the
husband of the prophet's daughter Fatima and father of the prophet's
grandsons Hasan and Husain, who had previously held the first claim
to the supreme position, was suddenly ousted from the front rank. His


## p. 334 (#366) ############################################

334 Mahomets Burial \m
uncle 'Abbas and probably also Talha and Zubair (two of the earliest
converts to Islam) allied themselves with him. Ali was a good
swordsman but not a man of cautious action or quick resolve. He
and those nearest to him appear to have had no other object in vie*
than to gather around the corpse of the prophet while the fight for
the succession was raging without. The news of Abu Baler's election
however roused them at last from their lethargy, and thereupon
ensued an act of revenge, shrouded certainly in mystery by Muslim
f tradition, but which cannot be obliterated; the body of the prophet was
I secretly buried during the same night below the floor of his death-
chamber. It was the custom, after pronouncing the benediction over
the coffin, to carry the dead in solemn procession through the town to
the cemetery. As however this procession would have simultaneously
formed the triumphal entry of the new ruler, the body was disposed of
as quickly as possible without the knowledge of Abu Bakr or the
other leading companions. Tradition, which represents the old com-
panions as working together in pure friendship and unanimity, has
endeavoured with much care to picture these remarkable occurrences as
legal. For instance Mahomet is said to have stated previously that
prophets should always be buried at the spot where they died. To the
modern historian however this episode unveils the strong passions and
deep antipathies which divided, not only the Meccans and the Medina
faction, but also the nearest companions of the prophet. Abu Baler's rule
was but feebly established, and a dissolution of the young realm would
have been inevitable had not the pure instinct of self-preservation forced
the opposing parties into unity.
The news of the death appeared to let loose all the centrifugal forces
of the new State. According to Muslim accounts all Arabia was already
subjected and converted to Islam; and as soon as the news of Mahomet's
death was known, many of the tribes seceded from Islam and had to be
again subjected in bloody wars and reconverted. This apostasy is
termed Ridda, a change of belief, a well-known term of the later la*
of Islam. In reality Mahomet, at the time of his death, had by no
means united Arabia, much less had he converted all the country to
Islam. Not quite all of what to-day forms the Turkish province of
Hijaz, that is the central portion of the west coast of Arabia with its
corresponding back-country, was in reality politically joined with
Medina and Mecca as a united power, and even this was held together
more by interest than by religious brotherhood. The tribes of Central
Arabia, e. g. , the Ghatafan, Bahila, Tayyi', Asad, etc. , were in a state
of somewhat lax dependence on Mahomet and had probably also
partially accepted the doctrine of Islam, whilst in the Christian district
to the north and in Yamama, which had its own prophet, and in the
south and east of the peninsula Mahomet either had no connexions
whatever or had made treaties with single or isolated tribes, i. e. , with a


## p. 335 (#367) ############################################

632] The Ridda War 385
weak minority. It was inexplicable to the subsequent historians of the
Arabian State that after the death of Mahomet so many wars were
necessary on Arabian soil; they accounted for this fact by a Ridda, an
apostasy, from Islam. The death of the prophet was doubtless a reason
for secession to all those who had unwillingly followed Mahomet's lead,
or who regarded their contracts as void on his death. The majority of
those regarded as secessionists (Ahl ar-Ridda) had however previously
never been adherents of the religion, and many had not even belonged
to the political State of Islam. It has but recently been recognised that
an intelligible history of the expansion of the Arabs is only possible by
making these wars against the Ridda the starting-point from which the
great invasions developed themselves, more from internal necessity than
through any wise direction from Medina—undertakings moreover from
the enormous extent of which even the optimism of Mahomet would
have flinched.
The movement in Arabia had received through the formation of
the State of Medina a new and powerful stimulation. Mahomet's
campaigns, with their rich booty, had allured many from afar. He
had moreover, as a great diplomatist, strengthened the opposition
where he could find no direct acknowledgment. His example alone
had also its effect. Should not the prophet of the Banu Hanifa, of
the Asad, or of the Tamim be able to do what the Meccan Naln had
done? In this way prophetism gained ground in Arabia, i. e. , the
tension already existing grew until it neared an outburst. The sudden
death of Mahomet gave new support to the centrifugal tendencies.
The character of the whole movement, as it forces itself on the notice
of the historian, was of course hidden from contemporaries. Arabia
would have sunk into particularism if the necessity caused by the
secession of the Ahl ar-Ridda had not developed in the State of Medina
an energy which carried all before it. The fight against the Ridda was
not a fight against apostates; the objection was not to Islam per se but
to the tribute which had to be paid to Medina; the fight was for the
political supremacy over Arabia; and its natural result was the
extension of the dominions of the prophet, not their restoration. With
such a distribution of the Arabian element as has been described it was
only in the nature of things that the fight must make itself felt moreover
beyond the boundaries of Arabia proper.
Only a few of the tribes more nearly connected with Medina
recognised the supremacy of Abu Bakr, the others all seceding. Before
the news of these secessions reached Medina an expedition, which had
been prepared by Mahomet before his death, had already departed for
the Syrian border to avenge the defeat at Mu'ta, Medina was therefore
quite denuded of troops. A few former allies wished to utilise this pre-
carious position and make a sudden attack on Medina; this however was
prevented by Abu Bakr with great energy. Fortunately the expedition


## p. 336 (#368) ############################################

336 Khalid's Arabian Campaign [635
returned in time to enable him to capture the camp of the insurgents
after a severe battle at Dhu-1-Kassa (Aug. —Sept. 632). Khalid ibn al-
Walid, who had already distinguished himself under Mahomet, was
thereupon entrusted with the task of breaking the opposition of the
tribes of Central Arabia. Khalid was without doubt a military genius
of the first rank. He was somewhat lax in matters of religion and could be
\ ' as cruel as his master had been before him; but was a brilliant strategist,
carefully weighing his chances; yet once his mind was made up, he was
endued with an energy and daring before which all had to yield. He is
the actual conqueror of the Ridda, and his good generalship secured
victory after victory for Islam.
With a force of about 4000 men he again reduced the TayyT to
obedience, and then in rapid succession routed at Buzakha the Asad and
Ghatafan, who had gathered round a prophet called Talha, scoffinglv
styled by the Muslims fulmlra? meaning the little Talha. Khalids
success caused fresh troops to flock to his standard. He then at once
proceeded further into the territory of the Tamlm, but against the
wishes of the Ansar accompanying him and without the authority of the
Caliph. This arbitrary procedure, together with a cruel act of personal
revenge which he performed at the last-named place caused his recall; he
was however not only exculpated, but a proposal of his was adopted, to
strike a heavy blow at the Banu Hanifa in Yamama. At this place the
prophet Maslama was then ruling, and as in the case of Tulaiha the
Muslims sarcastically formed a diminutive of his name and styled him
Musailima. According to tradition this Musailima had maintained
friendly relations with Mahomet. Be that as it may, certain it is
that he was not in any way subject to Medina in either a political
or religious sense, but more probably an imitator of his successful
colleague Mahomet. In any case his rule was somewhat firmly
established, and it cost Khalid a bloody battle to destroy his power.
This memorable battle was fought at 'Akraba and was without doubt
the bloodiest and most important during the whole of the Ridda war.
We are as yet but poorly informed in regard to the chronology of these
events, but it may probably be assumed that the battle of 'Akraba was
fought about one year after the death of the prophet.
By the side of these great successes of Khalid the campaigns of other
generals in Bahrain, 'Uman, Mahra, Hadramaut and Yaman are less
important. Moreover the earliest subjection of all these lands under the
rule of Islam was not carried out by troops specially sent out from
Medina; it may even be doubtful if the commanders, with whose names
these conquests are associated, were despatched from Medina. It may
be that they were only subsequently legalised and that Muhajir ibn
Abl Umayya was the first actual delegate of the Caliph. In any case
these districts were unsettled for a long time after the Muslim troop had
invaded Syria and the 'Irak. Further, the same districts were in less than


## p. 337 (#369) ############################################

632] Consequences of the Ridda War 337
half a century later almost independent, and later still a focus of
heterodox tendencies.
The further march of events is connected, not with these wars
but with Khalid's unparalleled succession of victories, and with the
complication on the Syrian border. The subjection of Central Arabia
to Medina inspired the Arabs of the border districts with a profound
respect, but it simultaneously excited the warlike propensities of the
most important tribes of Arabia. It would have been an enormous task
for the government in Medina to compel all these restless elements,
accustomed to marauding excursions, to live side by side in neighbourly
peace under the sanctuary of Islam in unfertile Arabia. Within the
boundaries of the empire however such fratricidal feuds were henceforth
abolished. It was only to be expected that after the withdrawal of
Khalid's army a reaction against Medina should seize upon the newly
subjected tribes. The necessity of keeping their own victorious troops
employed, as also of reconciling the subjected ones to the new conditions,
irresistibly compelled an extension of the Islamitic rule beyond the
borders of Arabia. Chronologically the raid on 'Irak (the ancient
Babylonia) stands at the commencement of these enterprises. This
however was quite a minor affair, and the main attention of the govern-
ment was directed to Syria.
Before going further, we have to shew that our exposition differs
radically from all the usual descriptions of the expansion of the Arabs,
not only in our estimates of the sources and events, but also in our
chronological arrangement of them. The conquests of the Saracens
have in later years been a focus of scientific debate. Through the labours
of De Goeje, Wellhausen and Miednikoff a complete revolution in our
views has been effected. We have learnt to differentiate the various
schools of tradition, of which that of 'Irak, represented by Saif ibn
Omar, has produced an historical novel which can hardly be classed as
actual history. The reports of the Medina and the Syrian schools are
more trustworthy, and a certain amount of reliance may be placed on
the Egyptian school, but they all suffer from later harmonising efforts,
and also from their revision during the period of the Abbasids, in which
it was sought in every way to depreciate the Umayyads. All these
traditions are now being collected and critically sifted in the stupendous
annals of Leone Caetani. His epoch-making results are utilised in the
following paragraphs.
Between Yamama and the Hira district, which we must regard as a
long, narrow strip of country, the North Arabian (Ishmaelite) tribe of Bakr
ibn Wall led a nomadic existence on the borders of the cultivated country,
covered by the protecting marshes of the lower Euphrates, and this tribe
was again subdivided into various independent minor groups. They
formed part of the restless border tribes against which Hira had been
erected as a bulwark. The sub-tribe of the Banu Shaiban especially
c. mkii. ii. vol. ii. en. xi. 22


## p. 338 (#370) ############################################

338 Khalid on the Euphrates [604-632
had brilliant traditions, for it was these people who had won the first
and much celebrated victory of the Arabs over Persian regular troops at
Dhu Kar before the rise of Islam (between 604 and 611). This tribe of the
Banu Shaiban and their leader Muthanna ibn Huritha, whose example
was followed by the others, induced Khalid and his Muslims to cross the
Persian boundary for the first time. That was not a matter of chance,
but shews the deep inner connexion of the Saracen expansion with the
migration already in being before the rise of Islam. The Shaiban, like all
the other components of the Bakr ibn VVa'il, were wholly independent of
Medina, and had no intention of becoming Muslims. But when Medina
suddenly extended its dominion beyond Yamama, and all Arabia echoed
with the fame of Khalid in warfare, the Bakr found themselves in a
dilemma between the rising Arabian great power and their old here-
ditary enemy, Persia. What could be more obvious than that, simply
because they needed a screen for their rear, they should draw the related
Muslims into their alliance and with their assistance continue their raids
into the cultivated country? Khalid, reckless plunger that he was, seized
with avidity this opportunity for fresh deeds of valour. Tradition reports
that the chiefs of the Bakr tribes, and of them Muthanna first and
foremost, paid a visit to the Caliph Abu Bakr at Medina, professed
Islam, and received from Abu Bakr the command to conquer 'Irak
in conjunction with Khalid. In reality it is doubtful whether the Caliph
even so much as knew of any connexion between Khalid and the Bakr
tribes. At the same time it is not improbable that he gave his consent for
Khalid to participate in one of the customary raids of the Bakr ibn Wa'il,
but the conversion of the head of the tribes was no part of his plan, much
less the conversion of the tribes themselves. They certainly from this
time onward were in touch with Medina, and regarded themselves as in
political alliance with the Muslims; and in the rapid developments of
the next few years they were merged in the Caliph's dominions. Abu
Bakr did not at first contemplate any systematic occupation of 'Irak, for
he was at that time considering an expedition against Syria, which from
the point of view of Medina was of infinitely greater importance. Even
at that time they desired to have Khalid in Syria; but he had in any
case already taken part in the raid of the Banu Shaiban, either with or
without the knowledge of the Caliph. How little any conquest of Persia
was contemplated is shewn by the fact that the main body of Khalid's
troops was ordered home to recruit, and he undertook his first invasion
of Persian territory with only about 500 men, certainly well selected
troops, and then continued his march further with the same contingent
into Syria.
Khalid attracted volunteers of all kinds from Central Arabia, and
marched with them westward of the Euphrates to avoid the marshes; at
Khaftan he effected a junction with the Bakr under Muthanna; their com-
bined forces amounted in all to only two to three thousand men, but they


## p. 339 (#371) ############################################

632-636] KhalicFs Raid into Syria 339
had fortune on their side. They crossed the fertile land to the north of
Hlra unmolested and plundering as they went; Ullais was also put under
contribution, and suddenly they appeared before Hlra. The town was
well fortified, but the garrison was palpably insufficient for an open
battle. And what was the use of resistance within the walls if their rich
lands around were to be desolated? Thinking thus they quickly resolved
to pay a ransom, especially as the Arabs only demanded the ridiculously
small sum of 60,000 dirhams. To the Arabs this seemed an enormous
booty. Elated with victory they withdrew, and Hlra was thus saved for
the time being. It is scarcely conceivable that the payment of this
sum was regarded as an annual tribute. After this expedition Khalid
marched on with his braves, by command of the Caliph, right through
the enemy's territory, appearing in all directions with lightning speed
and disappearing again with equal rapidity, from Hlra through Palmyra
to Syria where he appeared, suddenly and unexpectedly, under the walls
of Damascus. This expedition, so woven round with legendary lore, and
apart from that a military masterpiece, shews better than anything else
that the conquest of Persia was not premeditated, and that the Muslims
were making their main effort in Syria. The raid against Hlra was made
at a time of the greatest confusion in Persia, but few months after the
accession of Yezdegerd, when the central authority was to some extent
restored by his general Rustam. Thereupon a counter-raid was prepared
against the plunderers. Muthanna sought help from Medina. This
was in the early days of Omar's government, and he granted the request
only with a certain amount of reluctance, refusing to spare his best
troops from Syria. The combined troops of the Bakr and of Medina
were few and badly handled, and in a second expedition they were
almost annihilated; in the so-called Bridge battle Muthanna saved with
difficulty the remnants, of the Muslim army (26 Nov. 634). It was in
consequence of this disaster that Omar, a year later (635), was led to a
more energetic interference in the conditions of the 'Irak, but even then
his actions were somewhat dilatory. Of this it will be necessary to
speak later, if only briefly. For a history of the Middle Ages the
expansion of the Arabs in Mediterranean territories is of much greater
importance.
The Arabian records of these events are not only distorted by lies,
but are terribly confused: especially in their chronology. Fortunately
we are better informed through some of the Byzantine writers, especially
Theophanes. It was not the sagacity of the Caliphs, wanting to conquer
tReTworTd, that flung the Muslim host on Syria, but the Christian Arabs
of the border districts who applied to the powerful organisation of
Medina for assistance. We are told very little about the relations
between Mahomet and the great tribes of North Arabia, such as the
Judham, Kalb, Kuda'a, Lakhm, Ghassfin; but the defeat of Mu'ta
shews that they were enemies of Medina. It was only the expedition
ch. xi. 22—2


## p. 340 (#372) ############################################

840 First Victory in Syria [633-634
against Tabuk, which had to be subjected two years before the death of
the prophet, that created friendly relations with at least a few of the
tribes on the southern boundary of Palestine. In the war of conquest
the great tribes of the former boundary State of the Ghassanids still
fought on the side of the Byzantines. The tribes to the south of the
Dead Sea however, such as the Judham and Kuda'a, who commanded
the route from Medina to Gaza, had every reason for connecting them-
selves more closely with Medina. Previously they had been in the pay
of the Byzantines, and being moreover Christians, they had no intentiou
of allying themselves with the Muslims. Soon after the battle of Mu'ta
however, we are informed, the Emperor Heraclius, who at that time was
in great financial difficulties owing to the debt contracted with the
Church for the great Persian war, suspended the yearly subsidies to the
Bedouins on the southern boundary, probably thinking that with
the new political situation he might venture on this economy. At that
time even a far-seeing politician could not have regarded as serious the
organisation of the ever-divided Arabs living in the interior of Arabia.
Judging by the behaviour of the northern tribes, they continued for a
time to be paid. Theophanes even treats the suspension of subsidies as
being in some way the cause of the summoning of the Muslims. Apart
from this may be added that, after the victories of Khalid in Central
Arabia, these border tribes, like the Bakr ibn Wa'il in the East, were led
into a dilemma; as Byzantium withdrew the subsidies from them it was
only natural that they made an alliance with the Muslims to recoup
themselves by plundering raids.
Their suggestion met with the approval of the Caliph, who probably
recognised that the commotion which had been raised must be diverted
in some direction or other. The Medina people themselves, according to
Arabian reports, do not appear to have at first displayed any enthusiasm
for such a risky action; probably they had-not forgotten the disaster of
Mu'ta Nevertheless in the autumn of 633 various small detachments
were sent off' into Syria, the first under Yazld ibn Abl Sufyan, a brother
of the subsequent Caliph Mu'awiya, the second under Shurahbll ibn
Hasana, the third under 'Amr ibn al-'As. The first two bodies of
troops, probably co-operating most of the time, took the direct track via
Tabuk-Ma'an; 'Amr marched along the coast via Aila ('Akaba); other
smaller companies followed later and pushed forward from the South into
the country east of the Jordan. The first to get engaged in battle was
Yazld. Approaching from westward he ascended the hills surmounting
the WadI 'Araba, the great valley south of the Dead Sea, and surprised
several thousands of Byzantine troops under the Patricius of Caesarea,
named Sergius. These were routed and compelled to retire on Gaza;
before reaching this town however they were overtaken (4 Feb. 634) by
the Arabs and annihilated, Sergius also losing his life. After this
success Yazld again retired beyond the protecting Dead Sea. Shortly


## p. 341 (#373) ############################################

634] Battle of Ajnadain 341
afterwards 'Amr put in an appearance, coming from Aila with fresh
troops, which had been further strengthened on the way by recruits. They
raided the whole of southern Palestine as far as Gaza, and 'Amr in fact
on one occasion pushed forward into the district of Kaisarlya (Caesarea).
Upon hearing of these surprising events the Emperor Heraclius who
at that time was still dwelling at Emesa, in northern Syria, concen-
trated a great army to the south of Damascus, and placed it under the
command of his brother Theodorus. It was unusually difficult for the
Greeks to recognise any plan of attack on the part of the Arabs; these
simply advanced without any definite aim; the leader of each detach-
ment went whithersoever he listed, and whither he conceived the greatest
amount of booty was available. Possibly the troops of Theodorus may
have destroyed a small detachment of the Arabs in the country east of
the Jordan, but in any case they advanced very slowly in a southerly
direction, where the greatest danger threatened, for Jerusalem was
temporarily cut off from the sea, and even Caesarea and Gaza were
threatened. Immediately after this advance Khalid, approaching in
their rear from the Euphrates, suddenly appeared before Damascus
(24 April 634). He remained unmolested, because all available troops
were then on the way to the South. Clever strategist that he was, and
without the selfish greed for plunder of the other leaders, Khalid at once
recognised the precarious position of the Arabs in the southern part
of Palestine. Advancing down the country east of Jordan he succeeded,
probably with the utmost difficulty, in effecting a junction with the
detachments in the South, engaged in their own selfish interests. Finally,
in the WadI 'Araba, he united with 'Amr and Yazid, who were retiring
before the approaching Byzantines. This effected, the combined forces
of the Muslims once more advanced against Theodorus, who had occupied
a strong position at Ajnadain, or better Jannabatain, between Jeru-
salem and Gaza.