No More Learning

No certainly.
Soerat. Is there a third fort, w h o are neither sick
nor in health >
Alcib. *No. Thatcan'tbe.
Soerat. For a M a n must necessarily be in health
or sick, there is no Medium.
Alcib. So I think.
Soerat. But is it the fame thing with respect to
Wisdom and Folly in your opinion ? y
Alcib. Howdoyoulay?
Soerat. I ask you if a M a n must necessarily be either foolishorwife;oristhereacertainMedi umwhichmakesonebecomeneitherawileMannor
a Fool ?
vv,ii
? ? ? ,. :. . ;. <
* If one were dispos'd to Criticize, one might fay, there isa third state which i>thatof Convalescence, in which Men have not yetrecover'dHealth,neitherareproperlytick. Butatbottom, thisisnottrue, forone whoisrecovering isnolongerunder the Power of Sickness, but is in the way of Hc>>kh. . .
Q_ J- Alcib.
? ? %^i
The Second Alcibiades ,? or,
thtpfjp-
Alcib. f-No. There'snoMedium.
Socrat. Then'One must necessarily be one or t'other. Alcib. So I think.
Socrat. Did you not just now grant that Madness
isoppositetoWisdom?
Alcib. Yes.
Socrat. And that there is no Medium, to put a
Man intosuch? Conditionastobeneitherwifenor foolish ?
Alcib. I did grant it.
Socrat. But isitpossible for the fame thingto, have two Contraries oppos'd to it ?
Alcib. By no means.
Socrat. Then Folly and Madness will appear to. be one and the fame thing.
' Alcib. So methihks.
Socrat. Thenifwe layallFoolsaremad,we
shall lay right.
; Alcib. Certainly.
Socrat. Without going any farther ; Among all theMenofyourAge, ifthereareany"Fools,,as without doubt there are, and some of a longer stand ing,'(for, I pray, don't you find wise M e n are very rare in this City and Fools very numerous) would youcalltheseFoolsmad?
*,jAlcib. Without any Scruple.
Socrat. But do you think we should be very fase
ihityyebichamongibmanymadMen;andthatweshouldnot Socrates beforenowhavebornthepunishmentoffiichCon-
*&at Aid- verfati? n h in suffering from 'em whatever might be biaseshasexpectedfrommadMen? Haveacarewharyoufay,
justgrot'
W. ? '
* Tothis'cisobjected,thatthereisacertainMediumbetween
Verrue and Vice,"whichistheStateofsuchasare,neithervi cicus, nor vertaous,' as Tacitus fays of Galba, migis extra Vitia
qumcmVirtutibus. But'ciseasytofee,thacthisExpressionof Tacitmisnettrue,butonlyinthecommonLanguageoftheWorld, which makes only a superficial Judgment, without penetrating deeply intothings, arid so'callsnjne vicious but those'who prac tisegrossVices;andisfalse,whenwespeak withaPhilolophick Accuracy. 'WheneverVertueisnot, thereVicemustnecessarily
be. The fame may be said of Wildom and Folly. Every Man
wh9hnotvyise,canbenootherthanaFool. - /
f. -. ;:>>. ? -' ? ? : . '? :; ; ;. . . . . . :. . '. . : there-
? ? Of9^ArE% 133
therefore,my dearAkibiades;lestthismatterbe otherwise than you pretend.
Alcib. Well then how isit? for I perceive it may be otherwise than I say.
Socrat. I think so too ^ and- w e must examine the MatterafterthisManner. AleAfterwhatManner? Socrat. I'm going to tell you ; Some Persons are
lick,aretheynot? Alcib. Whodoubtsit? . Socrat. Is? itabsolutely necessary, that every one
that is sick, should have the Gout or Fever, or sore
Eyes ? and don't you think he may be free from all . ? . . these. Distempersand yetbesickofanotherDisease? 0rthisM? -. For there are divers kinds of Diseases, besides these. cultj.
Alcib. So I think.
Socrat. You believe every Distemper of the Eyes is a Disease, but you don't think every Disease is a Distemper of the Eyes. v
i/i-. Nocertainly,butyetIdon'tseewhat thatproves. Socrat. But ifyou'llfollowme, Iam persvvaded, weshallfindthatpresently, louknotsthatfaying
ofthePoet*Two Men thatgotogether.
Alcib. Ifollowyou. withallmy might,Socrates. Socrat. Are we not agreed that every Distemper
of the Eyes is a Disease, and that every Disease is. not a Distemper of the Eyes I
* PlatooftenintermixesSentencesofthePoetsinhisDiscour seswithoutgivinganynoricewhenhedoesit. To understandthis Passive well, and to know all its Elegancy ; 'tis necessary to re member the Words Homer puts into Diomedes his Mouth, when NestorproposestofendSpiesinto<theTrojanCams. Forliespeaks thus,My CouragepromptsmetogointotheEnemiesArmr,butifany onewould, accompany me, 1 should go with greater Boldness and Confi dence ; for two Men that go together, take a better ziew ofthings, one
feeiwhattheotherdoesnotobfirve:OneMan alone,thohewantnot Prudence,yethasalwayslessVigouraridAitivifyinhjsMind. Iliad. K. \er. 224. So that here isa manifest Allusion to this Paffige. Homer fays eoVre Ji'e^fupu, Two /ken that go tngether. And Plato fays evvTi J\Jo aturrlmiva, Two Men that examixt together. EutbecauseHomirisnotnowsowellkr. ownashewasin Plato'stime, IhaveelucidatedthePassageintheTranslation,by adding,youknowthatSayingofthePoit. WithoutwhichtheAl
lusionwouldnothavebeenperceiveable. TheLatinTranslators
have flip'd over it without perceiving it.
:"? '? ? ? ? "? ? -? : - Alcib.
? ? %34
TheSecondAlcibiades? or,
Alcib. In that we are agreed.
Soc. AndthatwithgoodReason-, forallthathave aFeveraresick^ butallthataresick, havenota Fever,ortheGout,orsoreEyes. AlltheseAfflicti onsareDiseases, butPhysiciansassureusthatthey are so many different Diseases by their Effects ; for they are not allalike^ and they don't deal with them all after,the fame manner ; but according to the Na tureandViolenceof'em. Aretherenotagreatma ny sorts of Artificers ? There are Shoemakers, Brick layers, Architects, Carvers, Painters, and a multitude ofothers,whomIneednotname;workisdivided among 'em. They are all Artificers, but they are notallCarversorArchitects. . Alcib. 'Tistrue.
Socrat. In like manner Folly is divided among Men, thosethathavethegreatestshareofitwecall
'mad, or distracted. Thole that have a degree less . wecallFools,andStupid? ,but whileMen leekto
Follyisdi- hide these Vices under honourable and specious
AtofasLit'Names ;theycallthe formerMen of Magnanimi- bour'andin-ty? and Courage ; and they call the others Men of
dusty>> Simplicity;orelsetheyfaytheyhaveloharmin (htr"da- 'em. buthavelittleExperience,andmuchYouth. mmg em. Yovl'U. find a great many other Names besides these
withwhichtheypalliatetheirweakfide. Butthese are so many sorts ofFolly, which differonly asone Art does from another, and one Disease from another. Don't you think so as well as I >
Alcib. Iamofthefamemindwithyou.
Socrat. To return then to our Subjects Our first design was exactly to know and distingish the Foolishfrom theWise-,forwe agreedthatsome Men are Wise and others Foolish, did we not ?
Alcib-. Yes, in that we agreed.
Socrat. Don'tyoucall,himwisewhoknowsWhat heoughttofayordo,andhimfoolishwhoknows neitheronenort'other? Ale. Yescertainly.
Socrat. Arethey,whoknownotwhattheyought lionoft t0 say or do' ignorant that they fay and do what WifeMan theyoughtnot?
a<<A a. Fool. Alcib. ,
? ? Alcib. Ithink so.
Socrat. I told you Oedipus was of that number :
But you'll yet find in our time a.
multirude of Peo
ple, who without being transported with anEmoti
on of Anger like him will request ofGod realEvils
whiletheythinkrheyareaskingrealGoods. For
asforOediprts ; ifhe did not ask tor what waSxGood
neither did he think he ask'd it j whereas others every day do the quite contrary ? ,and without go
ingany farther,Alcibiades,iftheGod towhom you are going to pray, should appear suddenly to you, and before you have open'd your Lips should ask you, ifyou would be content to be theTyrant ofAthens-, Or (ifthatseemtoolittleforyou) ofallGreece^ or ifyou were not yet satisfied, should promise you all Europe together-, and fully to gratifie your A m bition, should add, that that very day all the World should know that Alcibiades the Son of Clinias is K i n g -, I a m p e r f w a d e d y o u w o u l d g o o u t o f t h e Temple with abundance of Joy, as one that has just received the greatest of all Goods.
Alcib. And, Socrates, Iverilybelieve, there'sno Man but he would be transported with Joy, ifthe same thing should happen to him.
Socrat. But you would not give your Life for the
Empire of the Greeks, nor for that of the Barba
rians.
Alcib. No certainly? ,towhat purpose >forthen
Icould not enjoy that Empire.
Socrat. But suppose you could enjoy it, would
y o u d o it, i f t h i s E n j o y m e n t w e r e t o b e f a t a l t o y o u ? Alcib. No, neither would I do it, on that'Con-
dition.
Socrat. Then by this you fee very well, that it
is not safe to accept, or desire what one does not
k n o w , if it be true, that it m a y bring great M i s ibtn'ut.
chiefsuponus, orevenmakeusloseourLives:gnatdeal ForIcouldnametoyouagreatmanyofthoseAm->>/danger
bitiousMen, who having passionately desir'd the'"Jlf^. Tyranny, and fpar'd nothing to obtain it, as theinga,hatm
greatest {now not.
? ? 1 36
7be Second Alcibiades ; orj
greatest of all Goods ; yet have deriy'd no other Advantage from this great Elevation, than to be ex- pos'd to the Stratagems of their Enemies, w h o have assassinatedthemontheThrone. Tisimpossible but you mult have heard of that Tragical Story that haslatelyhappen'd. *Archelaoe,theKingofMa cedoniahadaFavorite whom he lov'dwithanun
boundedPassion\thisFavorite, whowasyetmore
in love with the Throne of Arcbelaus, than this
Prince was with him, kilPd him tofillup hisplace,
flattering himself that he should be the happiest
ManintheWorld:Buthehadscarceenioy'dthe
T y r a n n y t, o r 4 d a y s , w h e n h e w a s c u t o f f b y o t h e r s
thatwerepossess'dwiththefameAmbition. And
among our Athenians (fortheseare Examples which comenottousbyhear-say? ,but such aswe have
seen with our Eyes) how many have therebeen,who, after they had ardently aspir'd to be Generals of the Army, andhadobtain'dwhattheydefir'd,havebeen puttodeath, orbanished ? How many otherswho have seem'd more happy, have pass'd through innu merable Dangers, and been expos'd to continual Fears, not only during the time of their being Ge nerals, but also after their return into their Comv try, where they have all their Life-time had a more cruel Siege to maintain against envious Detractors, than all those they sustain'd in War against the E- nemies of the State ? So that the greatest part of 'em wifh'd they had never been any more than pri
vateMen, ratherthan tohavehad the Command ofArmiesatsodeararate. IfalltheseDangers andFatigueswould produceaMananyadvantage intheend-,therewouldbelome reasonforhim to
to expose himself to 'em, but 'tis the quite contra ry. WhatIlayofHonours, IfayalsoofChildren. How many People have we ieen, who after they
*ArchtUtuwasthenaturalSonofFetMccas. Hekill'dhisFa ther,hisUncleAlcitasandhisSon. Heafterwardskill'dtheLe gitimateSonofPerdicsar, andafterhehadpossess'ddieThrone 7. years, was assassinated by his Favorite Crgtew.
have
? ? Os <P\AXE% 137
have importunately desir'd of God, that he Would givethemChildren, and haveaccordinglyobtain'd 'em, have by this means precipitated themselves in to terrible Miseries and Troubles : For some of 'em have spent their whole Life in Sorrow and Bitter ness ; because their Children have prov'd wicked *,
and others who have had such as have prov'd good have been no more happy than the former, becauie they have lost them for the most part in the Flower of their Age : So that they had much rather never have had 'era* N o w tho all these Miseries, and many Others, arevery obvious, and common ;yet there'sscarceaMan tobefound,whowouldrefuse thesefalseGoods, ifGod shouldgive! 'emhim;or who would cease to importune him for 'erri, if he were assur'd he should obtain 'em by his Prayers. The generality of Men would not refuse,eitherthe Tyranny, or the Command of Armies, or any other
great Honours, which yet are certainly much more
pernicious than useful j but would request 'em of
God, ifthey did not spontaneously offer themselves
to'erri. Butwaitamoment,andyou'llhear'em
sing a Palinodia, and offer Petitions quite contrary A Rienu- totheformer. Formy part,Iconfess,Ican'tchoosetm'
butthink,thatMen arereallytoblame, incom-rbUUa. plainingostheGods,and accusing"emosbeingthePffii'ts Cause os the Miseries theysuffer ; for 'tis them-}*TM**'**
selves, w h o by their Faults, or rather by their Follies, o/Ucuyfl* In spite offate draw Mischiefs on themselves. atthebt- '
Andtherefore,Akibiades, thatAncientPoetseemstiming. tome to havehadagreat dealofSense andRea son,who having (asIthink) veryimprudentFriends, whom hesaweverydaygoingoninaCourseofask
ing of God such things as seem'd good to them, and
yet were very bad for 'em, compos'd for 'em this
Prayer,andgaveit'em. GreatGod,giveusthe
Good Things that are necessary for us, whether we askyemornot;andkeepevilthingsfromw,evenAntdmhx-
wbenweask"emofthee. Thisseemstobeamost"jfPr^'r
ExcellentandverysafePrayer. Ifyouhaveany%tmAn thingtber.
? ? 138
7he Second Aksfoiadesj or^
igmmiu sometimes
thing to object: ngainst it, do not hide it from me. Alcib. 'Tishardtocontradictwhatiswellspoken. The only reflectionI make on it, Socrates, Is how many Evils are brought upon Mankind by Ignorance. For w e don't so m u c h as perceive that'tis this thatnot
onlymakesuseverydaydo suchthingsasarefatalto us ; but (which is most deplorable) engages us to askourown unhappinessofGod; andthisiswhat noMancantellhowtoimagine. There's1*0Per son but thinks him'elf capable of asking such things ofGod, asareveryusefulforhim, andveryuncapa- ble of desiring such as are pernicious to him ^ for this would not Le a Prayer, but a real Imprecation.
Socrat. Hold a little, my dear Alcibiaies, 'tis possibletheremay befoundsomePersonwiserthan youandI,whomightwithgoodReasonreprehend us, andtellusweareverymuchinthewrongthus to blame Ignorance, without adding what fork of Ignorance itisthat we condemn, and in what itcon- "":s- For if Ignorance is bad in some things, 'tis goodinothers.
Alcib. H o w do you fay,Socratesjs there any thing
end.
. ;. ? : v:. ofwhatkindsoeverofwhich'tismoreusefultobe
ignorant, thantoknow it?
S o c r a t . S o I t h i n k , a n d y o u t h i n k o t h e r w i s e . '-
i/v-'' Alclb. That I do I protest.
Socrat. Yet I shall never believe you capable of
,- *beingirritatedagainstyourMotherwiththe,furyei- . '. ';,'. . ther of an Orestes, or an Alcmoeon^ qr any the like Parricides-, ifthere have been any others who have
committed the fame Crimes. ; ,j, . . . Alcib. Ah! Socrates, I intreat you in $s' JSfame
pfGod alteryour discourse. ,;:, ,. , t. . ;, Socrat. Alcibiades, youaretoblametodesirethat ofme,ofme,Isay,who tellyou*,1don'tthink;you capableofcommittingthoseCrimes. Youcould donomoreifIaccus'dyouof'em. Butsincethese Actions appear so abominable to you , that one
mustnotname 'emunlesstherebeanabsolutene cessityofit5withallmy heart, soletitbe, Ion
? ? Of T^AYE^.
139
ly ask you, do you think, if Orestes had been in his Senses, and had known what was good, and useful forhim,hewouldhavedar'dtodowhathedid?
Alcib. No certainly.
Socrat. Neither he nor any body else would have done it.
Alcib. That's most certain.
Socrat. Then inmy OpinionthisIgnoranceofwhat is good and useful is a great Evil.
Alcib. IamofthelameMind.
Socrat. And that either in Orefles, or any other Person.
Alcib. Iam fullypersuadedofthat
Socrat. Letusexaminethismatteryetalittlefar ther. Suppose then * it had formerly come into yourHeadonasudden,thatitwasaverygoodand laudable Action for you to go and kill Pericles your Tutor and Friend ; and that you had taken a Dagger, andgonedirectlytohisDoor, toaskifhewereat Home, ashavingadesignagainsthimalone, andnot any other ; and that you had been told he was with in. Idon'tmeanbythisthatyoucouldeverhave been capable of committing so horrible an Action -,
* TheLarinInterpretershavetranslatedthisPassage,asifPla to had said, if it should, come intoyour head oj a sadden, to go and 'kfU Pericles your Tutor and Friend, not considering that they make
PlatofallintoaveryridiculousFault. Fortospeakthus,Peri clesmusthavebeenstillliving. AndPlatohadbeensaying,thac Archtlaui, King of Macedonia, had been assassinated,andwe know Ptriclesdied20yearsbefore. How thenshallthisContradiction bereconcild? How(hallwesecurePlatofromthisFaultofwhich he is not guilty : seeing he speaks the contrary in Gorgias and Tkea- gts i There's no great difficulty in the Matter, 'tis only to tran slate as the Greek Terms will bear ; if it had formerly come into your beadonasudden, thatis,ifwhilePericlestvasliving, &c. By this meanswenotonlypreventagreatmistake, inregardofthetime, butalsoescapeagreatFaultagainsttheRulesofDecency. For that Pericles should be yet alive when Socrates speaks thus to Aid- Hades, isahardandodiousSupposition-,butsupposingPericlesto bedead,ithasnotthesameharshnessinit. Atheneitswouldnot have forgot to improve this Passige to strengthen his Chicanerie against Plato\ Gorgias, if he had not very well understood that it would bear another Interpretation besides that given it by his Translators.
' . !
but
? ? 140 The Second Alcibiades ? or,
* butImakethisSuppositiontoshewyouthatthere's nothinghinders,butaManwhoknowsnotwhatis comely and honourable may be in a disposition of taking that for very Good, which is in it self very Evil ? ,Don't you think so as well as I >
Alcib. I am perfectly ofthe fame Mind.
S o c r a t . T o g o o n t h e n ? , s u p p o s i n g y o u h a d b e e n
told Pericles was at Home, and you had gone in,
andseenhim,butnotknownhim,andimaginedthat you saw some body else ? , would you have had the
Boldnesstokillhim? No certainly,foryourdesign would have been only against him ; and every time you had been at his House on the same Design, and had mistaken him for another, you would nor have donehim theleastInjury*
Alcib. That's very certain.
Socrat. What then? Do youthinkOresteswould havelaidhisParricidialHandsonhisMother, ifhe had mistaken her for another ?
Alcib. No doubtless. m
Socrat. For he did not design to kill the first W o manhemet,northeMotherofthisofthatPersonj buthadamindtokillhisownMother.
Alcib. You fay right.
Socrat. Then this fort of Ignorance is'very good for those that are in such a disposition of mind as his, and have such kind of Fancies in their Heads.
Alcib. So I think;
Scorat. By thisthenyouplainlysee, thaton some Occasions, and in some Persons whose Minds are dis pos'd after a certain manner, Ignorance is a Good
andnotanEvil,asyoujustnowsuppos'd;
Alcib: I perceive it very well.
Socrat. Ifyouwilltakethepainstoexamine'what
*Atthe*amnowgoingt0^ how"rangesoeveritmay &imetsanatfir^scemt0y? u>irmay**you'llbeofthesame
tfitfsmta- mind with me:
m the Alcib. Well, Socrates, What isit>
f S f Socrati 'Tistrue,. thatpossiblyallthe*Sciences whichis withoutthekhowledgofthatwhichisverygdod,; vtrygood. are
? ? OsV%AtE% '141
areseldomofusetothosethatpossess'em, naymost commonlyarepernicioustd'em. Followmealit tleinyourThoughts,Ientreatyou. ' Whenweare about tofayor doanything^Isitnotaltogether
necessary,eitherthatwe reallyknowwhatwearego ingtodoorfay,oratleastthatwe thinkweknow it?
Alcib. Without doubt.
Socrat. According to this Principle the Orators who everyDay advisethe People, givethem advice aboutwhattheyknow, oratleastthinktheyknow; Some give'emcounselaboutPeaceandWar, others about the Walls that ought to be built:, about the Fortifications, Gates, andArsenals. Inaword, all, that the City does for it self, or against another City, is not done but by the advice of Orators.
Alcib Tis true;
? Socrat\ Observe well what follows \ and fee if I
canfinishmyproof: Don't youdividethePeople intowiseMen and Fools? Alcib. Yes.
Socrat. Don't you call the greatest number Fools, and the leastwifeMen ? Alcib, Yes
Socrat. Is it not with reference to something that youcall'emso?
Alcib. Most certaintyj
Socrat. DoyouthencallhimawiseManwhocan give this Counsel without knowing what is best, or inwhattimeitisbest> -
Alcib. No certainly.
Socrat. Nordoyoucallhimwise,whocanmake War, but knows not when nor hoyv, nor how long 'tis best so to do.
Alcib. No, not I.
Socrat. NeitherdoyoucallthoseMagistrateswife, whoknowhowtoputtodeath,tofine,andtoba nish ; and yet know not when or on what Occasi ons these punishments are best and most just.
Alcib. No indeed.
Socrdt. Wellthe'n,whenanyoneknowswellhow to do all these things, and these Sciences are acconv panied with the knowledge of that which is very
R good*
? ? i^i
The Second Alcibiades $ or,
good (andthisisthelamewiththeknowledge of that which isvery useful, as you have granted) we call this M a n wile, and fay he is very capable to ad viseand conduct himself, and govern the Common wealth. Andwelaydirectlythecontraryofhim whodoesnotadd theknowledgeofthatwhichis
good to theseSciences.
Htiiieins Alcib. Thismultbegranted.
*hf"Vh Soir'WhenaManknowshowtomountaHorse,
skUUUthtt0^rawaB? w>t0Wrestle,inawordtoperforma- A r t a. m m n y o f t h e l i k e E x e r c i s e s -, o r i s w e l l i n s t r u c t e d ' i n a -
frojifsu ny other Art, how do you call him, when he *otfuficmt jjnows perfectly well what is most conformable to
ZmTof 7 wistmm.
the Art he Presses? Don tyou callhim a Qiieny that employs himself in managing of Horses, him Wrestler that makes ithis businesstoWrestle, and him a Musician who understands Mustek, and sooftherest? Don'tyougive'emallsuchNames as are deriv'd from their Art, and are suitable to it> or do you give them other Appellations ?
Alcib. We give'emonlyliichNamesasaretaken from their Art.
Socrat. Do youthink'tisofabsolutenecessitythat he who well understands the Art of which he makes Profession, should also be a wise M a n ^ or shall w e lay he may befarfrom thatCharacter ?
Alcib. He may be very farfrom itSocrates.
Socrat. * What will you say of a Republick com-
5os'd of Wrestlers, Pipers, Archers, and other liich
dnd ofPeoplemingledwithsuchPersons aswe have
)eenspeakingof^someofwhomknowhowromake War, others to condemn to Death ? ,and with those
States-Men, who are bloated with pride on the Account of their pretended Capacity in Politicks > Supposing all these People to have knowledge of whatisverygood, andthatthereisbutonesingle
* ThisisasubtileSatyr againsttheRepublickoftheAthenians, in v hich allArts and Sciences w ere seen to flourish, but the know- ledg of what isvery good w as not to be found there ; and there
forenothingbutConfusionand Disorderwastobeseenamong'en. Man
? ? ,> Of Q%ArE% .