" Neither he nor anyone else has offered a particle of evi- dence that Sandinista control over the electoral machinery made the elections a sham, or to contest the conclusion of the LASA delegation that "the FSLN did little more to take advantage of its incumbency than incumbent parties
everywhere
(including the United States) rou- tinely do.
Manufacturing Consent - Chomsky
More generally, the substantial merits of the Nicaraguan elec- tions were never contrasted with the procedures in the U.
S.
client states, a comparison that would have been most revealing and that would have thoroughly undermined the Reagan agenda to which the media were committed in their reporting of the election.
Time, as noted, mentions the compromised Salvadoran procedures as if they were meri- torious.
The Times mentioned the transparent voting boxes in EI Salva- dor only once (Richard Meislin, on March 25, 1984), repeating without question the official line that the purpose of the translucent boxes was to prevent fraud.
Any other possibility is unmentioned.
Newsweek and CBS News ignored these matters.
3. 6. 3. Rebel disruption into the black hole; turnout no longer an index of triumph of democracy
In the Salvadoran election, rebel disruption was a central feature of the government's propaganda frame. Because the rebels opposed the elec- tion, voting by the people proved their rejection of the rebels and approval of the army. Turnout was the index of democratic triumph and rebel defeat. As we saw, the mass media followed this frame with- out question. In the case of Nicaragua, the propaganda format was reversed-the rebels were the good guys, and the election held by the bad guys was condemned in advance. Rebel opposition to the
election-and efforts at disruption-did not make voting and a large
122 MAlI;UFACTURING CONSENT
turnout a repudiation of the rebels and approval of the Sandinistas. The U. S. mass media once again followed the government agenda, even though it meant an exact reversal of the standards they had applied in the Salvadoran election. The contras and their supporters urged the public not to vote, and interfered with the election process with at least as much vigor as (and with more killings than) the rebels in El Salvador. Furthermore, voting was more assuredly secret and the citizens were not required to vote, or to have ID cards stamped indicating that they had. And the Sandinistas did not kill ordinary citizens on a daily basis, as was true in the "death-squad democracies. " Thus turnout was far more meaningful in the Nicaraguan election than in the ones held in El Salvador and Guatemala-the public was free to abstain as well as
to vote for opposition parties.
The U. S. mass media disposed of this problem mainly by massive
suppression. They simply ignored the contra-U. S. campaign for absten- tion, waged with threats and attacks on polling places and election workers; and they buried the fact of an effectively secret vote and the right not to vote,93 just as, in parallel, they had inflated rebel disruption efforts in EI Salvador in 1982 and 1984 and buried the voting requirement and other pressures to vote.
Although the New York Times had gone out of its way to focus on the "challenge" of rebel opposition and alleged disruption as giving turnout special meaning in the Salvadoran election of 1982,94 Stephen Kinzer never once mentioned that the cantras attacked a number of polling stations and had issued radio appeals for abstention. 95 For Kinzer, neither these facts nor the U. S. campaign to discredit were seen as posing a "challenge" that made turnout meaningful in Nicaragua.
The Irish delegation pointed out that "The Parties of the Demo- cratic Coordinating Committee [based in the business communityl op- posed the voter registration, and called for a boycott of this process" (p. 5), and it noted that eleven polling stations were closed down by counterrevolutionary activities (p. 7). The public voted in large num- bers "despite the possible dangers involved," which suggested to' the Irish delegation that turnout was significant and "showed how impor- tant the election was to the people" (p. 6). LASA pointed out the various ways in which the "main opposition" called for voter absten- tion, and cited the radio warnings broadcast into the country from Costa Rica threatening that voters would be killed by the contras (pp. 16, 28). LASA also pointed out that "voter turnout was heavy," with "more enthusiasm among voters in low-income areas than in more affluent neighborhoods. " 9 6 Like Time, LASA notes that the turnout did not quite realize the expectations of FSL~ officials, but unlike Time,
LEGIT1MIZISG VERSUS MEANllIiGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 123
LASA points out that the rate of participation achieved "compares very favorably with the rates achieved in II other recent Latin American elections, as well as the 1984 U. S. presidential election . . . " (p. 16). 97
In sum, the two observer reports discuss rebel disruption in Nicara- gua, turnout, and the meaning of that turnout. The U. S. mass media, which had featured these matters heavily in reference to the Salvadoran election-where they fitted the government's propaganda agenda- found them entirely unnewsworthy as regards Nicaragua.
3. 6. 4. The revived sensitivity to coercion
As we described earlier, the "coercion package" was off the agenda for the U. S. government and mass media in addressing the Salvadoran and Guatemalan elections. So was the element of fear engendered by mass murder and the absence of any rule of law in these U. S. client states. Coercion and fear were back on the agenda, however, for Nicaragua. This revival was illustrated with amazing dishonesty and hypocrisy in Time~ which had never mentioned fear and pressures from the govern- ment as factors possibly explaining turnout in the U. S. -sponsored elec- tions, even after the murder of 50,000 civilians. In Nicaragua, however, the "pugnacious" Sandinistas had "an awesome monopoly of force," and getting them to "relax their grip," which was "essential for free electoral competition," was extremely dubious. Time's Central Ameri- can correspondent George Russell even located a "Latin American diplomat" who says, "You can't have democracy where there is no personal liberty at all" (Oct. 8 and May 14, 1984). Russell and Time had never found the Salvadoran government "pugnacious," with any "awe- some monopoly of force," or as having a "grip" that needed relaxing for electoral competition, and personal liberty was never mentioned as lacking or even pertinent to Salvadoran ejections. For the Nicaraguan
election, however, Time found that "The pressure to participate was high: many citizens feared they would lose precious rationing cards. " Further, "the government had made it clear that it considered failure to vote a counterrevolutionary stance. " Later, quoting Daniel Ortega, "All Nicaraguans who are Nicaraguans are going to vote. The only ones who are not going to vote are sellouts" (Nov. 19, 1984).
As we pointed out earlier, both the Guatemalan and Salvadoran army warned the public that voting was required by law and that nonvoting was treasonous. These statements were more precisely warn-
I24 MA/I;UFACTURING CONSENT
ingsj whereas Ortega's was an insult but not a clear threat. Ortega's was the only such statement of its kind reported, and Time's statement that the government "made it clear" that nonvoting was "counterrevolu- tionary" is doubly dishonest-the statement was not clearly a warning, and "counterrevolutionary" is an invidious word concocted by Time. The official government position as expressed in the law was that Nica- raguans did not have to vote. Time suppresses this fact. It suppresses the secrecy of the ballot and absence of a checkable ID card, so that there would have been no way to implement a threat even if one had been made. It suppresses the fact that the Nicaraguan army did not regularly murder even "counterrevolutionaries," whereas the Salvado- ran and Guatemalan armies murdered numerous people who weren't "revolutionaries" but were somehow in the way. In short, propaganda
could hardly be more brazen.
Time's alleged "fact," that "many" people feared the removal of the
rationing card, is contested by LASA, which states that "in our inter- views in many neighborhoods in several cities, we found no evidence that ration cards were being held back or withdrawn . . . for any reason. " They note that there were five reports filed with the supreme electoral council alleging intimidation by threat of withdrawal of ration cards, "but none of these allegations were sustained upon investiga- tion" (p. 27). Time does not indicate the source of its evidence and fails to provide a single illustration of the "many" cases.
We noted earlier that Stephen Kinzer cited more claims of coercion in the Nicaraguan than the Guatemalan elections, a remarkable jour- nalistic achievement, given the unchallenged facts about the actual scale and character of repression in the two states. His playing down of state terror in Guatemala as a basic factor affecting the quality of the election in all its dimensions-the ability of candidates to run, freedom of speech and press, the existence of intermediate groups, endemic fear, and the meaning of turnout-amounts to massive deceit. His Nicarag- uan coverage also involved large-scale misrepresentation. He did not point out the absence of mass killings, and he failed to mention the absence of a coercion package-no transparent boxes, no requirement that an ID card be stamped, and no legal obligation to vote. Kinzer's one notice of the voting requirement in his fourteen articles on the election amounts to serious deception-he quotes a voter as follows: " 'I've always voted because it is always required,' he said. 'Of course, the law says one thing, but after a while one realizes that voting is part of patriotism, and patriotism leads to long life. ' "98 Kinzer's source implies but doesn't say directly that voting is not legally required in Nicaragua, and this murky statement-the closest Kinzer ever comes
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEA:-JINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTlOr-:S 125
to acknowledging the absence of a voting requirement-is counter- balanced by his respondent's suggestion that voting may be based on some kind of threat.
Both the Irish and LASA delegations stressed the superior protection of secrecy in the balloting, which, in LASA's words, was "meticulously designed to minimize the potential for abuses" (p. 15). They also em- phasized the fact that voting was not required by law, and that, contrary to the U. S. government propaganda expounded by Time and other media entities, the coercive elements in getting out the vote were small. Human-rights abuses by the government that contribute to an environ- ment of fear, LASA pointed out, were "on a very small scale" when "compared to other nations in the region . . . " (p. 28). In fact, they note that fear in Nicaragua is directed more to the United States and the contras than to the government in Managua.
3. 6. 5. The "main opposition" to the fore
As we saw, in El Salvador and Guatemala, the fact that the insurgents were off the ballot did not faze the U. S. media one bit. Neither did Duarte's acknowledgment in 1981 that "the masses were with the guer- rillas" when he joined the junta a year earlier (which would clearly make them a "main opposition"). 99 Nor were the media affected by the army's murder of the opposition leadership in both El Salvador and Guatemala. In ? 1 Salvador, the exclusion of the rebels was part of the U. S. government's electoral plan; they were, therefore, not a "main opposition," and the debarment and even murder of their leaders did not compromise election quality. In the Nicaraguan case, in sharp contrast, the U. S. government worked with a different frame-the exclusion of its sponsored rebels and any other candidates was a serious matter that threatened the quality of the election. The media followed like good little doggies (lap- rather than watch-).
The central dramatic propaganda line for the Nicaraguan election pressed by U. S. officials was the alleged struggle of Arturo Cruz to induce the Sandinistas to create an open system in which he would be able to compete fairly, the failure of the "Marxists-Leninists" to make adequate concessions, Cruz's refusal to compete, and the subsequent "exclusion" of the "main opposition. " Cruz, however, was a "main opposition" only in the propaganda construct of the U. S. government and mass media. A longtime expatriate (who now concedes that he was
126 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
on the CIA payroll), with no mass base in Nicaragua, Cruz would
almost certainly have done poorly in a free election. lOo There is good
reason to believe that Cruz never intended to run, but that he and his
sponsors had held out this possibility precisely to allow the propaganda 1 frame to be used effectively. IOI
The mass media focused on the Cruz drama heavily and uncritically. ' Cruz was given enormous play: he was continually referred to as the . . . "main opposition" or "leading opponent" of the ruling party (without
any supporting evidence), and his candidacy was made "an acid test of
the Sandinistas' democratic intentions" (Time, Oct. 29, 1984). For the Times, the election would be a "sham" without Cruz (editorial, Oct. 7, 1984), and its news columns placed "main opposition" Cruz on center stage, from which vantage point he could regularly denounce the pro- ceedings as a "farce" or sham. l02 The Times did have one good back- page article that provided evidence that Cruz had not intended to run or would not have been allowed to run by his closest Nicaraguan allies and U. S. officials, and that his function was, as we stated, to discredit
the election by pretending to be interested, thus capturing press atten- tion. 103 But this low-keyed article stood alone and did not alter the unremitting focus on the alleged exclusion of this alleged main opposi- tion as the centerpiece of the Nicaraguan election drama.
In focusing on an alleged "main opposition" in Nicaragua, which voluntarily chose not to run, while ignoring a real main opposition in El Salvador, excluded by force and plan, the mass media simply adopted without question the government's propaganda framework. Sources that would speak to the condition of the "main opposition" in El Salvador and the significance ofits exclusion-both Salvadorans and foreign observers-were simply ignored. I04 In the case of the Nicara- guan election, in contrast, Cruz and U. S. government officials were given the floor to present their themes, which were transmitted on a daily basis with no accompanying notice of their possible falsity and manipulative intent, in perfect accord with the expectations of a propa-
ganda model.
The Reagan administration not only dangled Cruz before the media,
it tried hard to induce or bribe other candidates in the Nicaraguan election to withdraw in order to fulfil the prophecy of a meaningless election. The brazenness of this intervention by a great power was remarkable, but the U. S. media gave it minimal attention. They never denounced it as antidemocratic, they failed to link it to Cruz's campaign (with its suggestion of a larger effort to discredit by boycott), and they never suggested that voter "turnout" was more meaningful given the active U. S. campaign to discredit the election. On October 31, 1984,
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEA:>IIl<iGLESS THIRD WORLD ELI! CTIOl<iS 127
Stephen Kinzer noted that senior U. S. officials confirmed accouncs of "regular contacts" with the Nicaraguan parties. Kinzer's article is head- lined "Nicaraguan Parties Cite Sandinista and U. S. Pressure," the headline and article itself equating the government's aid to, and agree- ments with, its own political parties with U. S. intervention to get the Nicaraguan parties to boycott the election! CBS, Newsweek, and Time ignored the U. S. bribe program entirely. Time gave great emphasis to the number of candidates and the withdrawal of several, but it never once mentioned that this was helped along by V. S. connivance, bribes, and pressure. It even quotes without comment the State Department fabrication that "it did not try to influence the outcome of the election" (Nov. 19, 1984). All substantive evidence is placed in the black hole. In the same article, Time asserts that "the V. 5. had pushed hard for elections in which all parties felt free to participate," a fabrication of considerable audacity.
As regards the scope of electoral options in Nicaragua, the Irish delegation noted that "The [political parties] law guarantees participa- tion to political parties of all ideologies," an interesting point validated by a range of political opinion in the contesting parties far wider than that found in ? 1 Salvador and Guatemala (or the United States).
LASA states that "No major political tendency in Nicaragua was denied access to the electoral process in 1984" (p. 18). This, of course, could not be said of ? 1 Salvador and Guatemala. These important features of the Nicaraguan law and practice were not mentioned in the U. S. media or compared with those of the client states.
The Irish delegation stressed two facts about Cruz as the "main opposition. " First,
The delegation found no evidence that these parties [the three small Cruz-related parties that boycotted the election] had wide support within the country. Speaking with many political figures, including representatives of the legitimate opposition parties. it became clear that the intention of Arturo Cruz to stand for elec- tion was dubious from the start. . . . While considerable coverage was given to these parties in the international press, members of the delegation found that their impact among the population was scant and few people supported their policies (p. 7).
Second, the Irish delegation stressed the fact that the populace was free not to vote or to spoil votes, and the low level of both. "despite the abstentionism promoted by" the Cruz parties, deflated their claims to any serious support (p. 7). The LASA report reached similar conclu-
u8 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
sions, based on an extensive review of the evidence, namely: (I) that "circumstantial evidence" indicates the strong probability that Cruz had no intention ofrunning, and (2) that he had no mass base and would have been badly beaten.
In retrospect, Kinzer concedes the fact, although with the customary propaganda twist. He writes that "Ortega's landslide victory was never in doubt," because "the opposition was splintered" (and, as he fails to observe, had no popular base, in contrast to the well-organized San- dinista party), and "because the Sandinistas controlled the electoral machinery.
" Neither he nor anyone else has offered a particle of evi- dence that Sandinista control over the electoral machinery made the elections a sham, or to contest the conclusion of the LASA delegation that "the FSLN did little more to take advantage of its incumbency than incumbent parties everywhere (including the United States) rou- tinely do. " A few days earlier, Kinzer had quoted Arturo Cruz as observing that the Sandinistas deserve credit for having overthrown Somoza and "having broken barriers in Nicaragua that had to be bro- ken, and that is irreversible," because "the Sandinistas were working in the catacombs while we in the traditional opposition were out of touch with the rising expectations of the masses. " As Kinzer knows, but will not write, the same was true at the time of the 1984 elections, which is why the Sandinisu victory was never in doubt. This deceitful dismis- sal of the 1984 elections is one of Kinzer's many contributions to the media campaign to contrast the "elected presidents" ofthe four Central American "democracies" with the Sandinista dictator Ortega, not an
elected president by U. S. government imprimatur. The specific context was the massive media campaign to attribute the failures of the Guatemala City peace agreement of August 1987 to the Sandinistas, in accordance with Reagan administration priorities, on the eve of the crucial congressional vote on renewed contra aid. lo~
LASA also stresses the fact that Cruz--effectively representing the contras, a segment of the local business community, and the United States---eould have run in the Nicaraguan electioD, with excellent funding, ample media access, and without fear of being murdered. Even without Cruz the contras had an electoral voice. LASA notes that
We know of no election in Latin America (or elsewhere) in which groups advocating the violent overthrow of an incumbent govern- ment have themselves been incorporated into the electoral pro- cess, particularly when these groups have been openly supported by a foreign power. The contras nevertheless had a voice in the 1984 election campaign. Two of the Coordinadora-affiliated par-
l. EGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGl. ESS tHIRD WORl. D ELECTIONS 129
ties, the PSD and the PLC, supported their inclusion in the elec- tions. And while denying that they represented the conn? as, Arturo Cruz and the Coordinadora seemed to endorse and promote their cause, both within Nicaragua and abroad (p. 18).
LASA also discusses in some detail the U. S. intervention in the elec- tion, noting the terrorizing overflights by U. S. planes during the elec- tion campaign, and considering at some length the U. S. efforts to induce the withdrawal ofcandidates. LASA reported the claims by both Liberal and Conservative party figures that the United States offered specific and large sums of money to get candidates to withdraw from the election.
3. 6. 6. The concern over freedom of the press and assembly
Not only the rights of any and all candidates to run for public office, but other basic conditions that had been off the agenda in EI Salvador and Guatemala were of deep concern to the U. S. government and mass media in reference to Nicaragua. The New York Times, Time, Newswee~ and CBS News all put great stress on the trials and tribulations of La Prensa,106 although during the Salvadoran election none of them had even mentioned the destruction by physical violence and murder ofLa Cr6nica and Ellndependieme, or the toll of murdered journalists. Mob violence allegedly organized by the government, and the threat of the neighborhood defense committees, were featured by Time in Nicara- gua, whereas ORDEN and the death squads in El Salvador and Guatemala it had never mentioned as pertinent to election quality. Basic conditions of a free election were not only back on the media agenda, but there were strong suggestions that Nicaragua was failing to meet these conditioZlS. These suggestions were based almost entirely on quotes from U. S. officials and Cruz and his allies in Nicaragua. The media never gave evidence of having actually looked into these matters for themselves or tapped independent sources of evidence.
Richard Wagner, on CBS News (Nov. 3, 1984), citing as usual Ar- turo Cruz as the "strongest opposition," also mobilizes a single Nica- raguan citizen (no doubt selected at random) who says: "How can this be free elections (sic J when we don't have freedom of speech, free- dom of the press? " Wagner says that "In addition to censorship" there were food shortages, a deteriorated transportation system, an
130 MA:-JUFACTURING CONSENT
unpopular draft, and church opposition, so that "it becomes apparent why a free and open election is not in the cards. " The cynicism in failing to raise the question of why there are food shortages and a deteriorated transportation system in Nicaragua is remarkable. Wag- ner also misses another distinction between Nicaragua and ? 1 Salva- dor; the former has an "unpopular draft," whereas in the terror state of El Salvador there is no draft-instead there is press-ganging of young men into the army from the slums, refugee camps, and rural areas, while the young sons of the wealthy live the high life in San Salvador and Miami (much the same is true in Guatemala and Hon- duras). Wagner's double standard is also remarkable. In ? 1 Salvador in 1982 and 1984 there was far more severe censorship (including out- right murder), food shortages, a deteriorating transport system, and
church opposition-and more pertinent, a complete exclusion of the "main opposition" and massive state terror-but these didn't make it apparent to CBS News that a free and open election was not in the cards in that U. S. -sponsored election. 107
The Irish delegation and LASA, especially the latter, addressed these
issues, gave evidence of having examined them seriously, and came up
with conclusions sharply at odds with the U. S. government-media portrayals. LASA provided an extensive discussion of the Sandinista
defense committees and the scope of the turbo. violence and interfer-
ence with freedom of assembly, concluding that the total number of disruptive incidents reported was "quite small," and that the most
serious occurred before the official campaign began. "In spite of Daniel Ortega's unfortunate statement on these disruptions, there is no evi-
dence that the FSLN had a coherent strategy of stimulating or orches-
trating them" (p. 24). As regards the defense committees, LASA ~ concluded that they did not seem to be functioning as a spying network
and that there was no serious evidence that they were a force making for intimidation (p. 27). LASA makes two additional points ignored by the free press. One is that the electoral commission "placed paid adver- tisements in the press urging citizens to respect the rights of all political parties to hold rallies without interference" (p. 24). The second is that the Cruz rallies that were disrupted were held in violation of the elec- toral law, which requires permits for campaign rallies and promises police protection. "In other words, given their decision not to register, Cruz and the Coordinadora were deliberately campaigning outside of the legal framework of protections which had been created by the electoral law" (p. 25). LASA also compares the violence in the Nicarag- uan election with that elsewhere in the area and in the Nicaraguan context, concluding that "compared to other nations in the region and
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 131
in the face of a war against the contras, such abuses are on a very small scale" (p. 28).
LASA also discussed freedom of the press, which it regards as one of the election's most troublesome features. It considers the imposition of press censorship to have been damaging to the election's quality and credibility, even though the argument ofthe Sandinistas, that a country at war "can't allow a newspaper which is the instrument of the enemy to publish its opinions freely" (Sergio Ramirez), is viewed as not wholly unreasonable. Nevertheless, while the censorship was also somewhat arbitrary and legalistic, LASA concluded that "The opposition could and did get its message out" (p. 26). And the finding overall was that the Nicaraguan election "by Latin American standards was a model of probity and fairness" (p. 32).
The U. S. mass media did not concur, but it is striking how they avoid comparisons and data. The way in which the media can denounce restrictions on freedom of the press in Nicaragua after having totally ignored the question in El Salvador, where restrictions were far more severe, is remarkable. This process ofdichotomization is so internalized that the writers use the double standard within the same article, appar- ently unaware of their own bias. In an article in the New York Times of March 12, 1984, "Clear Choices in Salvador, Murky Plans in Nicara- gua," Hedrick Smith regards the choices as "clear" in El Salvador, whereas in Nicaragua the problem is whether in an election the San- dinistas will "give up significant power and control. " Multiple parties from the fa. r right to the center-right in El Salvador demonstrate clear choices, but a variety of parties from right to far left in Nicaragua didn't cause Smith to perceive real choices there, although he didn't explain why. It apparently never occurs to Smith that there is an issue of whether the army and United States "will give up power and control" (and their determination to fight to victory) by the electoral route in El Salvador.
Are there essential freedoms and absence of coercion in El Salvador that are necessary for a truly free election? Hedrick Smith talks about substantive electoral conditions only in Nicaragua. He provides exten- sive detail on the trials of La Prensa, press censorship, the Sandinista monopoly of power, and limits allegedly imposed on opposition candi- dates in Nicaragua. Not a word, however, on death-squad and army murders of civilians in El Salvador or the Draconian laws of the state of siege. How many journalists have been killed in El Salvador? Papers closed? Radio stations blown up? Union leaders and political figures murdered? These questions are off the agenda in U. S. -staged elections, and Hedrick Smith ignores them. As a de facto spokesman for his
J32 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
government, the Times commentator uses doublethink with as much insouciance as Reagan and Shultz.
3. 7. QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMATIC MEDIA BIAS
To demonstrate more rigorously the structural bias in media coverage of Third World elections, tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 compare the topics mentioned in the New York Times in its articles on the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran elections of 1984. The tables are organized according to the U. S. government agenda described earlier. The elements in the upper part of the tables are the approved issues-rebel disruption, personali- ties, election mechanics, etc. -that the government wishes to stress in its sponsored elections. Below the line are the basic conditions and other negative elements that are off the agenda in sponsored elections. Our hypothesis is that the media will follow the agenda, stressing personalities and other elements above the line in sponsored elections and playing down basic conditions, whereas in elections like that in Nicaragua the agenda will be reversed-the stress will be placed on basic conditions.
TABLE 3-1
Topics Included and Excluded in the New York Times's Coverage
of the Salvadoran Election
of March 25, 1984*
TOPICS
Those compatible with the U. s. government's agenda for the Salvadoran election:
1. Democratic purpose and hopes
2. Rebel disruption
WITH TOPIC
6
WITH TOPIC
21. 4
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
53. 6
LeGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS
'll
TOPICS
WITH TOPIC 7
? I.
I.
5
3
2
0
I
WITH TOPIC
25. 0 32. 1 35. 7
35. 7 17. 9
10. 7 7. 1
?
3. 6
1;.
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
l. Turnout
,. Election mechanics
,. Personalities and political
infighting
6. Official reflections on the
election
7. The army as protector of
the election
Those incompatible with the U. S. government's agenda for the Salvadoran election:
8. The public-rdations purpose
9. U. S. investment in the election
10. Fraud in the 1982 dection II. The existence of free
tlpeech and assembly-
legal state of siege 12. Freedom of the press 13. Organizational freedom I'. Limits on the ability of
candidates to qualify
lmd campaign
I'. Prior state terror and
climate of fear
16. Power of armed forces,
links to candidates and parties, as possible negative factor
17. Legal obligation to vote 18. Legal penalties for
nOllvoring
19. Marking of voters' fingers
20. Stamping identification cards
21. Legal requirement that authorities check within
10 days, that voters
? ?
0
? ?
3 10. 7 1 3. .
? 14. 3 2 7. 1
I 3. . 2 7. 1
? ?
have voted
22. Possible nonlegal threat 0 ?
to nonvoters from death squads and security forces
134 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
TOPICS
23. Use of transparent voting
~
24. Legal right of the security forces to an armed
presence at voting stations
WITH TOPIC
1
o
WITH TOPIC 3. 6
o
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
* Based on a study ofthe 28 articles on the EI Salvador election that appeared in the New York TimeJ between Feb. I and Mar. 30, 1984.
TABLE 3-2
Topics Included and Excluded in the New York Times's Coverage of the Nicaraguan Election Planned for November 4, 1984*
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
TOPICS WITH TOPIC
Those compatible with the u. s. government's agenda for the Nicaraguan election: (Of the 7 items in table 3-1, all are blanks except one. )
I. Election mechanics 3
Those incompatible with the U. s. government's agenda for the Nica. raguau election:**
2. The public-relations purpose 3
3. Free speecl1 2 . . 4. Freedom of the press ?
5. Organizational freedom ? >li
WITH TOPIC
315
375 2S. O 75. 0 50. 0
?
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEA~INGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 135
TOPICS
6. Ability of candidates to qualify and run
7. Power of the armed forces, link to state, as negative factor
WITH TOPIC 5
3
WITH TOPIC 62. 5
37. 5
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
* Based on a study of the 8 articles on the forthl;oming Nicaraguan election that appeared in the New York Times between Feb. I and Mar. 30, 1984.
,. . ,. . Many of the topics listed in. Table 3-1 under this subheading are not relevant to the Nicaraguan election-all that are covered in the articles examined are listed here.
3. 6. 3. Rebel disruption into the black hole; turnout no longer an index of triumph of democracy
In the Salvadoran election, rebel disruption was a central feature of the government's propaganda frame. Because the rebels opposed the elec- tion, voting by the people proved their rejection of the rebels and approval of the army. Turnout was the index of democratic triumph and rebel defeat. As we saw, the mass media followed this frame with- out question. In the case of Nicaragua, the propaganda format was reversed-the rebels were the good guys, and the election held by the bad guys was condemned in advance. Rebel opposition to the
election-and efforts at disruption-did not make voting and a large
122 MAlI;UFACTURING CONSENT
turnout a repudiation of the rebels and approval of the Sandinistas. The U. S. mass media once again followed the government agenda, even though it meant an exact reversal of the standards they had applied in the Salvadoran election. The contras and their supporters urged the public not to vote, and interfered with the election process with at least as much vigor as (and with more killings than) the rebels in El Salvador. Furthermore, voting was more assuredly secret and the citizens were not required to vote, or to have ID cards stamped indicating that they had. And the Sandinistas did not kill ordinary citizens on a daily basis, as was true in the "death-squad democracies. " Thus turnout was far more meaningful in the Nicaraguan election than in the ones held in El Salvador and Guatemala-the public was free to abstain as well as
to vote for opposition parties.
The U. S. mass media disposed of this problem mainly by massive
suppression. They simply ignored the contra-U. S. campaign for absten- tion, waged with threats and attacks on polling places and election workers; and they buried the fact of an effectively secret vote and the right not to vote,93 just as, in parallel, they had inflated rebel disruption efforts in EI Salvador in 1982 and 1984 and buried the voting requirement and other pressures to vote.
Although the New York Times had gone out of its way to focus on the "challenge" of rebel opposition and alleged disruption as giving turnout special meaning in the Salvadoran election of 1982,94 Stephen Kinzer never once mentioned that the cantras attacked a number of polling stations and had issued radio appeals for abstention. 95 For Kinzer, neither these facts nor the U. S. campaign to discredit were seen as posing a "challenge" that made turnout meaningful in Nicaragua.
The Irish delegation pointed out that "The Parties of the Demo- cratic Coordinating Committee [based in the business communityl op- posed the voter registration, and called for a boycott of this process" (p. 5), and it noted that eleven polling stations were closed down by counterrevolutionary activities (p. 7). The public voted in large num- bers "despite the possible dangers involved," which suggested to' the Irish delegation that turnout was significant and "showed how impor- tant the election was to the people" (p. 6). LASA pointed out the various ways in which the "main opposition" called for voter absten- tion, and cited the radio warnings broadcast into the country from Costa Rica threatening that voters would be killed by the contras (pp. 16, 28). LASA also pointed out that "voter turnout was heavy," with "more enthusiasm among voters in low-income areas than in more affluent neighborhoods. " 9 6 Like Time, LASA notes that the turnout did not quite realize the expectations of FSL~ officials, but unlike Time,
LEGIT1MIZISG VERSUS MEANllIiGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 123
LASA points out that the rate of participation achieved "compares very favorably with the rates achieved in II other recent Latin American elections, as well as the 1984 U. S. presidential election . . . " (p. 16). 97
In sum, the two observer reports discuss rebel disruption in Nicara- gua, turnout, and the meaning of that turnout. The U. S. mass media, which had featured these matters heavily in reference to the Salvadoran election-where they fitted the government's propaganda agenda- found them entirely unnewsworthy as regards Nicaragua.
3. 6. 4. The revived sensitivity to coercion
As we described earlier, the "coercion package" was off the agenda for the U. S. government and mass media in addressing the Salvadoran and Guatemalan elections. So was the element of fear engendered by mass murder and the absence of any rule of law in these U. S. client states. Coercion and fear were back on the agenda, however, for Nicaragua. This revival was illustrated with amazing dishonesty and hypocrisy in Time~ which had never mentioned fear and pressures from the govern- ment as factors possibly explaining turnout in the U. S. -sponsored elec- tions, even after the murder of 50,000 civilians. In Nicaragua, however, the "pugnacious" Sandinistas had "an awesome monopoly of force," and getting them to "relax their grip," which was "essential for free electoral competition," was extremely dubious. Time's Central Ameri- can correspondent George Russell even located a "Latin American diplomat" who says, "You can't have democracy where there is no personal liberty at all" (Oct. 8 and May 14, 1984). Russell and Time had never found the Salvadoran government "pugnacious," with any "awe- some monopoly of force," or as having a "grip" that needed relaxing for electoral competition, and personal liberty was never mentioned as lacking or even pertinent to Salvadoran ejections. For the Nicaraguan
election, however, Time found that "The pressure to participate was high: many citizens feared they would lose precious rationing cards. " Further, "the government had made it clear that it considered failure to vote a counterrevolutionary stance. " Later, quoting Daniel Ortega, "All Nicaraguans who are Nicaraguans are going to vote. The only ones who are not going to vote are sellouts" (Nov. 19, 1984).
As we pointed out earlier, both the Guatemalan and Salvadoran army warned the public that voting was required by law and that nonvoting was treasonous. These statements were more precisely warn-
I24 MA/I;UFACTURING CONSENT
ingsj whereas Ortega's was an insult but not a clear threat. Ortega's was the only such statement of its kind reported, and Time's statement that the government "made it clear" that nonvoting was "counterrevolu- tionary" is doubly dishonest-the statement was not clearly a warning, and "counterrevolutionary" is an invidious word concocted by Time. The official government position as expressed in the law was that Nica- raguans did not have to vote. Time suppresses this fact. It suppresses the secrecy of the ballot and absence of a checkable ID card, so that there would have been no way to implement a threat even if one had been made. It suppresses the fact that the Nicaraguan army did not regularly murder even "counterrevolutionaries," whereas the Salvado- ran and Guatemalan armies murdered numerous people who weren't "revolutionaries" but were somehow in the way. In short, propaganda
could hardly be more brazen.
Time's alleged "fact," that "many" people feared the removal of the
rationing card, is contested by LASA, which states that "in our inter- views in many neighborhoods in several cities, we found no evidence that ration cards were being held back or withdrawn . . . for any reason. " They note that there were five reports filed with the supreme electoral council alleging intimidation by threat of withdrawal of ration cards, "but none of these allegations were sustained upon investiga- tion" (p. 27). Time does not indicate the source of its evidence and fails to provide a single illustration of the "many" cases.
We noted earlier that Stephen Kinzer cited more claims of coercion in the Nicaraguan than the Guatemalan elections, a remarkable jour- nalistic achievement, given the unchallenged facts about the actual scale and character of repression in the two states. His playing down of state terror in Guatemala as a basic factor affecting the quality of the election in all its dimensions-the ability of candidates to run, freedom of speech and press, the existence of intermediate groups, endemic fear, and the meaning of turnout-amounts to massive deceit. His Nicarag- uan coverage also involved large-scale misrepresentation. He did not point out the absence of mass killings, and he failed to mention the absence of a coercion package-no transparent boxes, no requirement that an ID card be stamped, and no legal obligation to vote. Kinzer's one notice of the voting requirement in his fourteen articles on the election amounts to serious deception-he quotes a voter as follows: " 'I've always voted because it is always required,' he said. 'Of course, the law says one thing, but after a while one realizes that voting is part of patriotism, and patriotism leads to long life. ' "98 Kinzer's source implies but doesn't say directly that voting is not legally required in Nicaragua, and this murky statement-the closest Kinzer ever comes
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEA:-JINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTlOr-:S 125
to acknowledging the absence of a voting requirement-is counter- balanced by his respondent's suggestion that voting may be based on some kind of threat.
Both the Irish and LASA delegations stressed the superior protection of secrecy in the balloting, which, in LASA's words, was "meticulously designed to minimize the potential for abuses" (p. 15). They also em- phasized the fact that voting was not required by law, and that, contrary to the U. S. government propaganda expounded by Time and other media entities, the coercive elements in getting out the vote were small. Human-rights abuses by the government that contribute to an environ- ment of fear, LASA pointed out, were "on a very small scale" when "compared to other nations in the region . . . " (p. 28). In fact, they note that fear in Nicaragua is directed more to the United States and the contras than to the government in Managua.
3. 6. 5. The "main opposition" to the fore
As we saw, in El Salvador and Guatemala, the fact that the insurgents were off the ballot did not faze the U. S. media one bit. Neither did Duarte's acknowledgment in 1981 that "the masses were with the guer- rillas" when he joined the junta a year earlier (which would clearly make them a "main opposition"). 99 Nor were the media affected by the army's murder of the opposition leadership in both El Salvador and Guatemala. In ? 1 Salvador, the exclusion of the rebels was part of the U. S. government's electoral plan; they were, therefore, not a "main opposition," and the debarment and even murder of their leaders did not compromise election quality. In the Nicaraguan case, in sharp contrast, the U. S. government worked with a different frame-the exclusion of its sponsored rebels and any other candidates was a serious matter that threatened the quality of the election. The media followed like good little doggies (lap- rather than watch-).
The central dramatic propaganda line for the Nicaraguan election pressed by U. S. officials was the alleged struggle of Arturo Cruz to induce the Sandinistas to create an open system in which he would be able to compete fairly, the failure of the "Marxists-Leninists" to make adequate concessions, Cruz's refusal to compete, and the subsequent "exclusion" of the "main opposition. " Cruz, however, was a "main opposition" only in the propaganda construct of the U. S. government and mass media. A longtime expatriate (who now concedes that he was
126 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
on the CIA payroll), with no mass base in Nicaragua, Cruz would
almost certainly have done poorly in a free election. lOo There is good
reason to believe that Cruz never intended to run, but that he and his
sponsors had held out this possibility precisely to allow the propaganda 1 frame to be used effectively. IOI
The mass media focused on the Cruz drama heavily and uncritically. ' Cruz was given enormous play: he was continually referred to as the . . . "main opposition" or "leading opponent" of the ruling party (without
any supporting evidence), and his candidacy was made "an acid test of
the Sandinistas' democratic intentions" (Time, Oct. 29, 1984). For the Times, the election would be a "sham" without Cruz (editorial, Oct. 7, 1984), and its news columns placed "main opposition" Cruz on center stage, from which vantage point he could regularly denounce the pro- ceedings as a "farce" or sham. l02 The Times did have one good back- page article that provided evidence that Cruz had not intended to run or would not have been allowed to run by his closest Nicaraguan allies and U. S. officials, and that his function was, as we stated, to discredit
the election by pretending to be interested, thus capturing press atten- tion. 103 But this low-keyed article stood alone and did not alter the unremitting focus on the alleged exclusion of this alleged main opposi- tion as the centerpiece of the Nicaraguan election drama.
In focusing on an alleged "main opposition" in Nicaragua, which voluntarily chose not to run, while ignoring a real main opposition in El Salvador, excluded by force and plan, the mass media simply adopted without question the government's propaganda framework. Sources that would speak to the condition of the "main opposition" in El Salvador and the significance ofits exclusion-both Salvadorans and foreign observers-were simply ignored. I04 In the case of the Nicara- guan election, in contrast, Cruz and U. S. government officials were given the floor to present their themes, which were transmitted on a daily basis with no accompanying notice of their possible falsity and manipulative intent, in perfect accord with the expectations of a propa-
ganda model.
The Reagan administration not only dangled Cruz before the media,
it tried hard to induce or bribe other candidates in the Nicaraguan election to withdraw in order to fulfil the prophecy of a meaningless election. The brazenness of this intervention by a great power was remarkable, but the U. S. media gave it minimal attention. They never denounced it as antidemocratic, they failed to link it to Cruz's campaign (with its suggestion of a larger effort to discredit by boycott), and they never suggested that voter "turnout" was more meaningful given the active U. S. campaign to discredit the election. On October 31, 1984,
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEA:>IIl<iGLESS THIRD WORLD ELI! CTIOl<iS 127
Stephen Kinzer noted that senior U. S. officials confirmed accouncs of "regular contacts" with the Nicaraguan parties. Kinzer's article is head- lined "Nicaraguan Parties Cite Sandinista and U. S. Pressure," the headline and article itself equating the government's aid to, and agree- ments with, its own political parties with U. S. intervention to get the Nicaraguan parties to boycott the election! CBS, Newsweek, and Time ignored the U. S. bribe program entirely. Time gave great emphasis to the number of candidates and the withdrawal of several, but it never once mentioned that this was helped along by V. S. connivance, bribes, and pressure. It even quotes without comment the State Department fabrication that "it did not try to influence the outcome of the election" (Nov. 19, 1984). All substantive evidence is placed in the black hole. In the same article, Time asserts that "the V. 5. had pushed hard for elections in which all parties felt free to participate," a fabrication of considerable audacity.
As regards the scope of electoral options in Nicaragua, the Irish delegation noted that "The [political parties] law guarantees participa- tion to political parties of all ideologies," an interesting point validated by a range of political opinion in the contesting parties far wider than that found in ? 1 Salvador and Guatemala (or the United States).
LASA states that "No major political tendency in Nicaragua was denied access to the electoral process in 1984" (p. 18). This, of course, could not be said of ? 1 Salvador and Guatemala. These important features of the Nicaraguan law and practice were not mentioned in the U. S. media or compared with those of the client states.
The Irish delegation stressed two facts about Cruz as the "main opposition. " First,
The delegation found no evidence that these parties [the three small Cruz-related parties that boycotted the election] had wide support within the country. Speaking with many political figures, including representatives of the legitimate opposition parties. it became clear that the intention of Arturo Cruz to stand for elec- tion was dubious from the start. . . . While considerable coverage was given to these parties in the international press, members of the delegation found that their impact among the population was scant and few people supported their policies (p. 7).
Second, the Irish delegation stressed the fact that the populace was free not to vote or to spoil votes, and the low level of both. "despite the abstentionism promoted by" the Cruz parties, deflated their claims to any serious support (p. 7). The LASA report reached similar conclu-
u8 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
sions, based on an extensive review of the evidence, namely: (I) that "circumstantial evidence" indicates the strong probability that Cruz had no intention ofrunning, and (2) that he had no mass base and would have been badly beaten.
In retrospect, Kinzer concedes the fact, although with the customary propaganda twist. He writes that "Ortega's landslide victory was never in doubt," because "the opposition was splintered" (and, as he fails to observe, had no popular base, in contrast to the well-organized San- dinista party), and "because the Sandinistas controlled the electoral machinery.
" Neither he nor anyone else has offered a particle of evi- dence that Sandinista control over the electoral machinery made the elections a sham, or to contest the conclusion of the LASA delegation that "the FSLN did little more to take advantage of its incumbency than incumbent parties everywhere (including the United States) rou- tinely do. " A few days earlier, Kinzer had quoted Arturo Cruz as observing that the Sandinistas deserve credit for having overthrown Somoza and "having broken barriers in Nicaragua that had to be bro- ken, and that is irreversible," because "the Sandinistas were working in the catacombs while we in the traditional opposition were out of touch with the rising expectations of the masses. " As Kinzer knows, but will not write, the same was true at the time of the 1984 elections, which is why the Sandinisu victory was never in doubt. This deceitful dismis- sal of the 1984 elections is one of Kinzer's many contributions to the media campaign to contrast the "elected presidents" ofthe four Central American "democracies" with the Sandinista dictator Ortega, not an
elected president by U. S. government imprimatur. The specific context was the massive media campaign to attribute the failures of the Guatemala City peace agreement of August 1987 to the Sandinistas, in accordance with Reagan administration priorities, on the eve of the crucial congressional vote on renewed contra aid. lo~
LASA also stresses the fact that Cruz--effectively representing the contras, a segment of the local business community, and the United States---eould have run in the Nicaraguan electioD, with excellent funding, ample media access, and without fear of being murdered. Even without Cruz the contras had an electoral voice. LASA notes that
We know of no election in Latin America (or elsewhere) in which groups advocating the violent overthrow of an incumbent govern- ment have themselves been incorporated into the electoral pro- cess, particularly when these groups have been openly supported by a foreign power. The contras nevertheless had a voice in the 1984 election campaign. Two of the Coordinadora-affiliated par-
l. EGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGl. ESS tHIRD WORl. D ELECTIONS 129
ties, the PSD and the PLC, supported their inclusion in the elec- tions. And while denying that they represented the conn? as, Arturo Cruz and the Coordinadora seemed to endorse and promote their cause, both within Nicaragua and abroad (p. 18).
LASA also discusses in some detail the U. S. intervention in the elec- tion, noting the terrorizing overflights by U. S. planes during the elec- tion campaign, and considering at some length the U. S. efforts to induce the withdrawal ofcandidates. LASA reported the claims by both Liberal and Conservative party figures that the United States offered specific and large sums of money to get candidates to withdraw from the election.
3. 6. 6. The concern over freedom of the press and assembly
Not only the rights of any and all candidates to run for public office, but other basic conditions that had been off the agenda in EI Salvador and Guatemala were of deep concern to the U. S. government and mass media in reference to Nicaragua. The New York Times, Time, Newswee~ and CBS News all put great stress on the trials and tribulations of La Prensa,106 although during the Salvadoran election none of them had even mentioned the destruction by physical violence and murder ofLa Cr6nica and Ellndependieme, or the toll of murdered journalists. Mob violence allegedly organized by the government, and the threat of the neighborhood defense committees, were featured by Time in Nicara- gua, whereas ORDEN and the death squads in El Salvador and Guatemala it had never mentioned as pertinent to election quality. Basic conditions of a free election were not only back on the media agenda, but there were strong suggestions that Nicaragua was failing to meet these conditioZlS. These suggestions were based almost entirely on quotes from U. S. officials and Cruz and his allies in Nicaragua. The media never gave evidence of having actually looked into these matters for themselves or tapped independent sources of evidence.
Richard Wagner, on CBS News (Nov. 3, 1984), citing as usual Ar- turo Cruz as the "strongest opposition," also mobilizes a single Nica- raguan citizen (no doubt selected at random) who says: "How can this be free elections (sic J when we don't have freedom of speech, free- dom of the press? " Wagner says that "In addition to censorship" there were food shortages, a deteriorated transportation system, an
130 MA:-JUFACTURING CONSENT
unpopular draft, and church opposition, so that "it becomes apparent why a free and open election is not in the cards. " The cynicism in failing to raise the question of why there are food shortages and a deteriorated transportation system in Nicaragua is remarkable. Wag- ner also misses another distinction between Nicaragua and ? 1 Salva- dor; the former has an "unpopular draft," whereas in the terror state of El Salvador there is no draft-instead there is press-ganging of young men into the army from the slums, refugee camps, and rural areas, while the young sons of the wealthy live the high life in San Salvador and Miami (much the same is true in Guatemala and Hon- duras). Wagner's double standard is also remarkable. In ? 1 Salvador in 1982 and 1984 there was far more severe censorship (including out- right murder), food shortages, a deteriorating transport system, and
church opposition-and more pertinent, a complete exclusion of the "main opposition" and massive state terror-but these didn't make it apparent to CBS News that a free and open election was not in the cards in that U. S. -sponsored election. 107
The Irish delegation and LASA, especially the latter, addressed these
issues, gave evidence of having examined them seriously, and came up
with conclusions sharply at odds with the U. S. government-media portrayals. LASA provided an extensive discussion of the Sandinista
defense committees and the scope of the turbo. violence and interfer-
ence with freedom of assembly, concluding that the total number of disruptive incidents reported was "quite small," and that the most
serious occurred before the official campaign began. "In spite of Daniel Ortega's unfortunate statement on these disruptions, there is no evi-
dence that the FSLN had a coherent strategy of stimulating or orches-
trating them" (p. 24). As regards the defense committees, LASA ~ concluded that they did not seem to be functioning as a spying network
and that there was no serious evidence that they were a force making for intimidation (p. 27). LASA makes two additional points ignored by the free press. One is that the electoral commission "placed paid adver- tisements in the press urging citizens to respect the rights of all political parties to hold rallies without interference" (p. 24). The second is that the Cruz rallies that were disrupted were held in violation of the elec- toral law, which requires permits for campaign rallies and promises police protection. "In other words, given their decision not to register, Cruz and the Coordinadora were deliberately campaigning outside of the legal framework of protections which had been created by the electoral law" (p. 25). LASA also compares the violence in the Nicarag- uan election with that elsewhere in the area and in the Nicaraguan context, concluding that "compared to other nations in the region and
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 131
in the face of a war against the contras, such abuses are on a very small scale" (p. 28).
LASA also discussed freedom of the press, which it regards as one of the election's most troublesome features. It considers the imposition of press censorship to have been damaging to the election's quality and credibility, even though the argument ofthe Sandinistas, that a country at war "can't allow a newspaper which is the instrument of the enemy to publish its opinions freely" (Sergio Ramirez), is viewed as not wholly unreasonable. Nevertheless, while the censorship was also somewhat arbitrary and legalistic, LASA concluded that "The opposition could and did get its message out" (p. 26). And the finding overall was that the Nicaraguan election "by Latin American standards was a model of probity and fairness" (p. 32).
The U. S. mass media did not concur, but it is striking how they avoid comparisons and data. The way in which the media can denounce restrictions on freedom of the press in Nicaragua after having totally ignored the question in El Salvador, where restrictions were far more severe, is remarkable. This process ofdichotomization is so internalized that the writers use the double standard within the same article, appar- ently unaware of their own bias. In an article in the New York Times of March 12, 1984, "Clear Choices in Salvador, Murky Plans in Nicara- gua," Hedrick Smith regards the choices as "clear" in El Salvador, whereas in Nicaragua the problem is whether in an election the San- dinistas will "give up significant power and control. " Multiple parties from the fa. r right to the center-right in El Salvador demonstrate clear choices, but a variety of parties from right to far left in Nicaragua didn't cause Smith to perceive real choices there, although he didn't explain why. It apparently never occurs to Smith that there is an issue of whether the army and United States "will give up power and control" (and their determination to fight to victory) by the electoral route in El Salvador.
Are there essential freedoms and absence of coercion in El Salvador that are necessary for a truly free election? Hedrick Smith talks about substantive electoral conditions only in Nicaragua. He provides exten- sive detail on the trials of La Prensa, press censorship, the Sandinista monopoly of power, and limits allegedly imposed on opposition candi- dates in Nicaragua. Not a word, however, on death-squad and army murders of civilians in El Salvador or the Draconian laws of the state of siege. How many journalists have been killed in El Salvador? Papers closed? Radio stations blown up? Union leaders and political figures murdered? These questions are off the agenda in U. S. -staged elections, and Hedrick Smith ignores them. As a de facto spokesman for his
J32 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
government, the Times commentator uses doublethink with as much insouciance as Reagan and Shultz.
3. 7. QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMATIC MEDIA BIAS
To demonstrate more rigorously the structural bias in media coverage of Third World elections, tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 compare the topics mentioned in the New York Times in its articles on the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran elections of 1984. The tables are organized according to the U. S. government agenda described earlier. The elements in the upper part of the tables are the approved issues-rebel disruption, personali- ties, election mechanics, etc. -that the government wishes to stress in its sponsored elections. Below the line are the basic conditions and other negative elements that are off the agenda in sponsored elections. Our hypothesis is that the media will follow the agenda, stressing personalities and other elements above the line in sponsored elections and playing down basic conditions, whereas in elections like that in Nicaragua the agenda will be reversed-the stress will be placed on basic conditions.
TABLE 3-1
Topics Included and Excluded in the New York Times's Coverage
of the Salvadoran Election
of March 25, 1984*
TOPICS
Those compatible with the U. s. government's agenda for the Salvadoran election:
1. Democratic purpose and hopes
2. Rebel disruption
WITH TOPIC
6
WITH TOPIC
21. 4
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
53. 6
LeGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS
'll
TOPICS
WITH TOPIC 7
? I.
I.
5
3
2
0
I
WITH TOPIC
25. 0 32. 1 35. 7
35. 7 17. 9
10. 7 7. 1
?
3. 6
1;.
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
l. Turnout
,. Election mechanics
,. Personalities and political
infighting
6. Official reflections on the
election
7. The army as protector of
the election
Those incompatible with the U. S. government's agenda for the Salvadoran election:
8. The public-rdations purpose
9. U. S. investment in the election
10. Fraud in the 1982 dection II. The existence of free
tlpeech and assembly-
legal state of siege 12. Freedom of the press 13. Organizational freedom I'. Limits on the ability of
candidates to qualify
lmd campaign
I'. Prior state terror and
climate of fear
16. Power of armed forces,
links to candidates and parties, as possible negative factor
17. Legal obligation to vote 18. Legal penalties for
nOllvoring
19. Marking of voters' fingers
20. Stamping identification cards
21. Legal requirement that authorities check within
10 days, that voters
? ?
0
? ?
3 10. 7 1 3. .
? 14. 3 2 7. 1
I 3. . 2 7. 1
? ?
have voted
22. Possible nonlegal threat 0 ?
to nonvoters from death squads and security forces
134 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
TOPICS
23. Use of transparent voting
~
24. Legal right of the security forces to an armed
presence at voting stations
WITH TOPIC
1
o
WITH TOPIC 3. 6
o
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
* Based on a study ofthe 28 articles on the EI Salvador election that appeared in the New York TimeJ between Feb. I and Mar. 30, 1984.
TABLE 3-2
Topics Included and Excluded in the New York Times's Coverage of the Nicaraguan Election Planned for November 4, 1984*
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
TOPICS WITH TOPIC
Those compatible with the u. s. government's agenda for the Nicaraguan election: (Of the 7 items in table 3-1, all are blanks except one. )
I. Election mechanics 3
Those incompatible with the U. s. government's agenda for the Nica. raguau election:**
2. The public-relations purpose 3
3. Free speecl1 2 . . 4. Freedom of the press ?
5. Organizational freedom ? >li
WITH TOPIC
315
375 2S. O 75. 0 50. 0
?
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEA~INGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 135
TOPICS
6. Ability of candidates to qualify and run
7. Power of the armed forces, link to state, as negative factor
WITH TOPIC 5
3
WITH TOPIC 62. 5
37. 5
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES DEALING ARTICLES DEALING
* Based on a study of the 8 articles on the forthl;oming Nicaraguan election that appeared in the New York Times between Feb. I and Mar. 30, 1984.
,. . ,. . Many of the topics listed in. Table 3-1 under this subheading are not relevant to the Nicaraguan election-all that are covered in the articles examined are listed here.
