No More Learning

Therefore in its essence the human mind is
potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to
understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual. For
even the Platonists asserted than an order of intelligible beings
existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect
understands only by participation of the intelligible; for they said
that the participator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the
human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual by participating
separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such
participation of incorporeal beings. But as in this life our intellect
has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as
stated above ([705]Q[84], A[7]), it understands itself according as it
is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through
the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the
intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality,
actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself
not by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the
first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he
has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In
the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the
human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however,
that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know the
nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our
intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the types of
all things as above stated ([706]Q[84], A[5]). Hence Augustine says (De
Trin. ix, 6): "We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as
perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind is, but what it
ought to be in the light of the eternal types. " There is, however, a
difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in
this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the
mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself,
and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards
the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not
suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry.
Hence many are ignorant of the soul's nature, and many have erred about
it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry:
"Let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to
discern itself as present"---i. e. to know how it differs from other
things; which is to know its essence and nature.

Reply to Objection 1: The mind knows itself by means of itself, because
at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its
own act: because it is itself that it knows since it loves itself, as
he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in
two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself,
as first principles are called self-evident; or because it is not
accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, whereas substance
is visible by its accident.

Reply to Objection 2: The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of
intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing
understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself:
not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to
intelligible things---as is the passive intellect---or is the act of
intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms---as is the active
intellect.

Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Philosopher is universally
true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in
act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in
act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act,
by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of
the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by
the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the same
species as by its own form. Now to say that in "things without matter
the intellect and what is understood are the same," is equal to saying
that "as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is
understood are the same. " For a thing is actually understood in that it
is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn: since the essences of
some things are immaterial---as the separate substances called angels,
each of which is understood and understands, whereas there are other
things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract
likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the
proposition quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a
sense it is verified in their regard, and not in regard of other
substances, as already stated (Reply OBJ 2).
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Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the
soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith is
not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be
seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most
certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence";
and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul.
Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by
themselves.

Objection 2: Further, material things outside the soul are known by
their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be
known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their
essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by
their essence.

Objection 3: Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such is
still more so. " But habits and intelligible species cause things to be
known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in
themselves.

On the contrary, Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as
is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically prior to
powers. " Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus
habits, like the powers, are known by their acts.

I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere
act. Now, it has been said [707](A[1]) that nothing is known but as it
is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it
falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known only by its
act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that
he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the
nature and idea of the habit by considering the act. The first kind of
knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact
of its presence causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of
knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained
above of the mind [708](A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Although faith is not known by external movement
of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the
interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he
knows that he believes.

Reply to Objection 2: Habits are present in our intellect, not as its
object since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is
the nature of a material thing as stated above ([709]Q[84], A[7]), but
as that by which it understands.

Reply to Objection 3: The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a thing
being such, is still more so," is true of things that are of the same
order, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say
that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life is more
desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is
not true: for we may say that health is caused by medicine, but it does
not follow that medicine is more desirable than health, for health
belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the
order of efficient causes. So of two things belonging essentially to
the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of
the other being known, is the more known, as principles are more known
than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of
objects of knowledge; nor are things known on account of the habit, as
on account of an object known, but as on account of a disposition or
form whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument does not
prove.
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Whether our intellect knows its own act?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not know its own
act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the
act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its
own act.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then,
the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again it
knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely,
which seems impossible.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as
sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act,
for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2.
Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I
understand. "

I answer that, As stated above ([710]AA[1],2) a thing is intelligible
according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect
consists in its own operation: for this is not an act tending to
something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished,
as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the
agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8.
Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of
understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects.
For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of
intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, and
the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His
Essence is His act of understanding. But there is another intellect,
the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said
above ([711]Q[79], A[1]), and yet the first object of that act is the
angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction
between the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that
whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and
the same act; because to understand his own essence is the proper
perfection of his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing,
together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another,
namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act of
understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of
understanding, for this object is the nature of a material thing. And
therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object
of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which
that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is
known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this
reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts,
and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).

Reply to Objection 1: The object of the intellect is something
universal, namely, "being" and "the true," in which the act also of
understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its
own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in
this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but "being"
and "true," as considered in material things, as we have said above
([712]Q[84], A[7]), from which it acquires knowledge of all other
things.

Reply to Objection 2: The intelligent act of the human intellect is not
the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the
nature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by
one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act.
Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct
from the act whereby it understands that it understands a stone; and so
on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being thus potentially
infinite, as explained above ([713]Q[86], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: The proper sense feels by reason of the
immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A
material object, however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by
another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the
common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act
of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there
is no comparison.
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Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect does not understand the
act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be in
some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in
the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct. Therefore
the act of the will is not known by the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, the act is specified by the object. But the
object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect.
Therefore the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object
of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the
intellect.

Objection 3: Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections
that "they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by
their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions. " Now it does not
seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but
either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof.
Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known such
affections of the soul as the acts of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I
will. "

I answer that, As stated above ([714]Q[59], A[1]), the act of the will
is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just
as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural
form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its
mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a
natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible
appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the
intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the
intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper
subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii,
9)---that "the will is in the reason. " Now whatever is intelligibly in
an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the
act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one
knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act,
and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or
power.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold good if the will and the
intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for
then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as
both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is in
a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the
will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: The "good" and the "true" which are the objects
of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is
contained in the other, as we have said above ([715]Q[82], A[4], ad 1;
[716]Q[16], A[4], ad 1); for the true is good and the good is true.
Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those
of the intellect can fall under the will.

Reply to Objection 3: The affections of the soul are in the intellect
not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their
subject, as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle,
which contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says
that the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions.
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HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself,
viz. immaterial substances. Under this head there are three points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand
the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?

(2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of
material things?

(3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?
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Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand
immaterial substances in themselves?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul in the present state of
life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine
(De Trin. ix, 3) says: "As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of
corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from
itself the knowledge of incorporeal things. " But these are the
immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind understands immaterial
substances.

Objection 2: Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more
akin to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature is
immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above ([717]Q[76],
A[1]). Since then our mind understands material things, much more is it
able to understand immaterial things.

Objection 3: Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves
most sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted
by their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a
corrupting influence from its object, as is stated De Anima iii, 4.
Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of
intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As material
things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them actually
so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear that those
substances are more intelligible in themselves whose nature is
immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than are material
things.

Objection 4: Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii) that "nature
would be frustrated in its end" were we unable to understand abstract
substances, "because it would have made what in itself is naturally
intelligible not to be understood at all. " But in nature nothing is
idle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood
by us.

Objection 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to
the intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether
superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our
intellect can understand all intelligible substances, even the superior
and immaterial.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 9:16): "The things that are in
heaven, who shall search out? " But these substances are said to be in
heaven, according to Mat. 18:10, "Their angels in heaven," etc.
Therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human investigation.

I answer that, In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not
only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of all.
For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he called
"Ideas," are the proper objects of our intellect, and thus first and
"per se" understood by us; and, further, that material objects are
known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up with the
mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the more clearly does
it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things.

But in Aristotle's opinion, which experience corroborates, our
intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to
the natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand by
turning to the phantasms, as we have said above ([718]Q[84], A[7]).
Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall
under sense and imagination, cannot first and "per se" be known by us,
according to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have.

Nevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) teaches that in this
present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate
substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance, which
he calls the "active intellect," and which, being a separate substance
itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence, when it is
perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to understand
perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate substances, as
in the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united
to us, we can understand material things. Now he said that the active
intellect is united to us, thus. For since we understand by means of
both the active intellect and intelligible objects, as, for instance,
we understand conclusions by principles understood; it is clear that
the active intellect must be compared to the objects understood, either
as the principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to matter. For
an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways; to a
principal agent and to an instrument, as cutting to the workman and the
saw; to a form and its subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both
these ways the active intellect can be compared to the intelligible
object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to
potentiality. Now a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection
at one and the same time, as the reception of what is actually visible
synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye. Therefore the
passive intellect receives the intelligible object and the active
intellect together; and the more numerous the intelligible objects
received, so much the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union
between ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that when we
understand all the intelligible objects, the active intellect becomes
one with us, and by its instrumentality we can understand all things
material and immaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man
to consist. Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether
the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate
substances by the instrumentality of the active intellect, as he
himself maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive
intellect can never understand separate substances (because according
to him it is corruptible), but man understands separate substances by
means of the active intellect.

This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, supposing the active
intellect to be a separate substance, we could not formally understand
by its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent's formal action
consists in its form and act, since every agent acts according to its
actuality, as was said of the passive intellect ([719]Q[70], A[1]).
Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation, the
active intellect, supposing it to be a separate substance, would not be
joined to us in its substance, but only in its light, as participated
in things understood; and would not extend to the other acts of the
active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial
substances; just as when we see colors set off by the sun, we are not
united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun, but its
light only is united to us, that we may see the colors. Thirdly, this
opinion is untrue, because granted that, as above explained, the active
intellect were united to us in substance, still it is not said that it
is wholly so united in regard to one intelligible object, or two; but
rather in regard to all intelligible objects. But all such objects
together do not equal the force of the active intellect, as it is a
much greater thing to understand separate substances than to understand
all material things. Hence it clearly follows that the knowledge of all
material things would not make the active intellect to be so united to
us as to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate
substances.

Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for
anyone in this world to understand all material things: and thus no
one, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against
what the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9), that happiness is a "kind of
common good, communicable to all capable of virtue. " Further, it is
unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to the end of the
species.

Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, 10), that happiness
is "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and after enumerating
many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (Ethic. i, 7) that
ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest things
intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in the
sixth chapter he had named as the chief of speculative sciences. Hence
Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge
of separate substances, obtainable by speculative science; and not by
being united to the active intellect as some imagined.

Sixthly, as was shown above ([720]Q[79], A[4]), the active intellect is
not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself
actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends
receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive
intellect is "all things potentially," and the active intellect is "all
things in act. " Therefore both intellects, according to the present
state of life, extend to material things only, which are made actually
intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive
intellect. Hence in the present state of life we cannot understand
separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by the passive or
by the active intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge
of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself.
This is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge
concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate
substances. For by knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of
incorporeal substances, such as is within its compass; not that the
knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause
of knowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true ---that the
soul needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But
knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the
knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the
present state of life, is such that it can be informed with similitudes
abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it knows material things
rather than immaterial substances.

Reply to Objection 3: There must needs be some proportion between the
object and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the
passive, and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible
objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely
to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being
improportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that immaterial
substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our present state
of life, so that it cannot understand them.

Reply to Objection 4: This argument of the Commentator fails in several
ways. First, because if separate substances are not understood by us,
it does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for
they are understood by themselves, and by one another.

Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate substances:
while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails to attain its end.
It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial substances are
purposeless, even if they are not understood by us at all.

Reply to Objection 5: Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior,
in the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we
do not understand material and immaterial substances in the same way.
The former we understand by a process of abstraction, which is
impossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of
what is immaterial.
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Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its
knowledge of material things?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial
substances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. i) that "the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial
contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is led thereto by
material guidance according to its own nature. " Therefore we can be led
by material things to know immaterial substances.

Objection 2: Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are
sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene
defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find angels treated of
both in theology and philosophy.
Therefore immaterial substances can be
understood by us.

Objection 3: Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial
substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by which it
understands material things. Therefore also other material substances
can be understood by us, through their material effects.

Objection 4: Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended
through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and
this belongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial
substances can be understood by us through material things.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "intelligible things
cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite things
through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal. "

I answer that, Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a philosopher named
Avempace [*Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183] taught that by the
understanding of natural substances we can be led, according to true
philosophical principles, to the knowledge of immaterial substances.
For since the nature of our intellect is to abstract the quiddity of
material things from matter, anything material residing in that
abstracted quiddity can again be made subject to abstraction; and as
the process of abstraction cannot go on forever, it must arrive at
length at some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without matter; and this
would be the understanding of immaterial substance.

Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms
and species of these material things; as the Platonists supposed. But
supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ
altogether from the quiddity of material things, it follows that
however much our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things
from matter, it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial
substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand immaterial
substances through material substances.

Reply to Objection 1: From material things we can rise to some kind of
knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge
thereof; for there is no proper and adequate proportion between
material and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from material
things for the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar
therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).

Reply to Objection 2: Science treats of higher things principally by
way of negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. i, 3) explains the heavenly
bodies by denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it
follows that much less can immaterial substances be known by us in such
a way as to make us know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific
knowledge of them by way of negation and by their relation to material
things.

Reply to Objection 3: The human soul understands itself through its own
act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its
power and nature. But the power and nature of immaterial substances
cannot be perfectly known through such act, nor through any other
material thing, because there is no proportion between the latter and
the power of the former.

Reply to Objection 4: Created immaterial substances are not in the same
natural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power or
in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even
immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, as their
essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection
with material things, as regards either natural genus or logical genus;
because God is in no genus, as stated above ([721]Q[3], A[5]). Hence
through the likeness derived from material things we can know something
positive concerning the angels, according to some common notion, though
not according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any
such knowledge at all about God.
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Whether God is the first object known by the human mind?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is the first object known by the
human mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by which
we judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to the
eye, and first principles to the intellect. But we know all things in
the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De Vera Relig. xxxi; [*Confess. xii,
25]). Therefore God is the first object known to us.

Objection 2: Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so.
But God is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is "the true light
which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world" (Jn. 1:9).
Therefore God is our first and most known object.

Objection 3: Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar
to which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine
says (De Trin. xii, 4,7). Therefore God is the first object known to
our mind.

On the contrary, "No man hath seen God at any time" (Jn. 1:18).

I answer that, Since the human intellect in the present state of life
cannot understand even immaterial created substances [722](A[1]), much
less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it
must be said simply that God is not the first object of our knowledge.
Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle (Rom.
1:20), "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made": while the first object of our knowledge
in this life is the "quiddity of a material thing," which is the proper
object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages ([723]Q[84],
A[7]; [724]Q[85], A[8]; [725]Q[87], A[2], ad 2)

Reply to Objection 1: We see and judge of all things in the light of
the first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether
natural or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the first
truth upon it, as stated above ([726]Q[12], A[2]). Hence, as the light
itself of our intellect is not the object it understands, much less can
it be said that God is the first object known by our intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: The axiom, "Whatever causes a thing to be such is
more so," must be understood of things belonging to one and the same
order, as explained above ([727]Q[81], A[2], ad 3). Other things than
God are known because of God; not as if He were the first known object,
but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge.

Reply to Objection 3: If there existed in our souls a perfect image of
God, as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know
God at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the argument
does not prove.
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OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this
head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand?

(2) Whether it understands separate substances?

(3) Whether it understands all natural things?

(4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars?

(5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?

(6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired?

(7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge?

(8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?
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Whether the separated soul can understand anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul separated from the body can
understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4)
that "the understanding is corrupted together with its interior
principle. " But by death all human interior principles are corrupted.
Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted.

Objection 2: Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding
when the senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained
above ([728]Q[84], AA[7],8). But death destroys the senses and
imagination, as we have shown above ([729]Q[77], A[8]). Therefore after
death the soul understands nothing.

Objection 3: Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must
be by means of some species. But it does not understand by means of
innate species, because it has none such; being at first "like a tablet
on which nothing is written": nor does it understand by species
abstracted from things, for it does not then possess organs of sense
and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of species: nor
does it understand by means of species, formerly abstracted and
retained in the soul; for if that were so, a child's soul would have no
means of understanding at all: nor does it understand by means of
intelligible species divinely infused, for such knowledge would not be
natural, such as we treat of now, but the effect of grace. Therefore
the soul apart from the body understands nothing.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1), "If the soul had
no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body. " But the
soul is separated from the body; therefore it has a proper operation
and above all, that which consists in intelligence. Therefore the soul
can understand when it is apart from the body.

I answer that, The difficulty in solving this question arises from the
fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to
the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed from the
soul's very nature, but accidentally through its being bound up with
the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would vanish; for in
that case when the body was once removed, the soul would at once return
to its own nature, and would understand intelligible things simply,
without turning to the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of
other separate substances. In that case, however, the union of soul and
body would not be for the soul's good, for evidently it would
understand worse in the body than out of it; but for the good of the
body, which would be unreasonable, since matter exists on account of
the form, and not the form for the sake of matter. But if we admit that
the nature of the soul requires it to understand by turning to the
phantasms, it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that
it can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms are wanting
to which it may turn.

To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except
so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from
its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the
body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the
same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an
accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very
nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when it is
in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper
place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, when united to
the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of
understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in
corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode
of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as is
proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the
soul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be
joined to the body; but to be separated from the body is not in
accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning
to the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united to the
body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable
to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is
always ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand by
turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the
phantasms; God should have ordered the soul's nature so that the nobler
way of understanding would have been natural to it, and it would not
have needed the body for that purpose.

In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is
true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something
higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a
mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible
to the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual
substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the Divine
light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther
off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the
more is the light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines
radiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one
Essence understands all things; while the superior intellectual
substances understand by means of a number of species, which
nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper
comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the
intellectual power of such natures: whereas the inferior intellectual
natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal,
and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they
recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If,
therefore, the inferior substances received species in the same degree
of universality as the superior substances, since they are not so
strong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive through
them would be imperfect, and of a general and confused nature. We can
see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker
intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal
conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things are
explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in the
natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual
substances. But the perfection of the universe required various grades
of being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in the same
way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so
far from being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to
make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper
knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be
joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge
of sensible things from the sensible things themselves; thus we see in
the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible
examples.

It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to
a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms.
Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and
also to understand in another way.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher's words carefully examined will
show that he said this on the previous supposition that understanding
is a movement of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he
had not as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense. We
may also say that he is referring to the way of understanding by
turning to phantasms. This is also the meaning of the second objection.

Reply to Objection 3: The separated soul does not understand by way of
innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species
retained, and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state
understands by means of participated species arising from the influence
of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate
substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to
act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once to the
superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the
author of the influx of both of the light of grace and of the light of
nature.
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Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not understand
separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the
body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human
nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in
that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate
substances as shown above ([730]Q[88], A[1]). Therefore much less is it
able to do so when apart from the body.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence
or by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul
by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means
of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more
simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all
understand separate substances.

Objection 3: Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate
happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If,
therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its
happiness would be secured by its separation alone; which cannot be
reasonably be said.

On the contrary, Souls apart from the body know other separated souls;
as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus and
Abraham (Lk. 16:23). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the
angels.

I answer that, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), "our mind acquires the
knowledge of incorporeal things by itself"---i. e. by knowing itself
([731]Q[88], A[1], ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the
separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate
things. Now it was said above [732](A[1]), that as long as it is united
to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore
it does not understand itself save through becoming actually
intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it
understands itself through its own act, as shown above ([733]Q[87],
A[1]). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no
longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible
objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now,
every separate substance "understands what is above itself and what is
below itself, according to the mode of its substance" (De Causis viii):
for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who
understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of
that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a separated soul is
inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other
separated souls. Therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect
knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and
defective knowledge of the angels so far as its natural knowledge is
concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise.

Reply to Objection 1: The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect
considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the
body: but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight
and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence
in the present life.

Reply to Objection 2: The separated soul understands the angels by
means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect
knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to
that of an angel.

Reply to Objection 3: Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the
knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who
is seen only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if
perfectly understood gives great happiness---not final and ultimate
happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly,
as was shown above in this article.
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Whether the separated soul knows all natural things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural
things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate
substances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances,
they also know all natural things.

Objection 2: Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible,
will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the
separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the
highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it
understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of
intelligibility.

On the contrary, The devils have greater natural knowledge than the
separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to
learn many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono
i). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things.

I answer that, As stated above [734](A[1]), the separated soul, like
the angels, understands by means of species, received from the
influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is
inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the
soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect
knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated
souls, therefore, have the same relation through such species to
imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have
to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such species know
all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the
respective natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the
angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it
follows that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain
and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused manner.

Reply to Objection 1: Even an angel does not understand all natural
things through his substance, but through certain species, as stated
above ([735]Q[87], A[1]). So it does not follow that the soul knows all
natural things because it knows separate substances after a fashion.

Reply to Objection 2: As the soul separated from the body does not
perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all
natural things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above
explained in this article.

Reply to Objection 3: Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future
which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so
far as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine
revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural
things.

Reply to Objection 4: Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and
perfect; the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not
follow that to study in order to learn is useless.
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Whether the separated soul knows singulars?

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not know
singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the
separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above ([736]Q[77],
A[8]). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown
([737]Q[86], A[1]). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.

Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate
than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no
determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much
less can it know singulars.

Objection 3: Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for
the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all
singulars. Therefore it knows none.

On the contrary, The rich man in hell said: "I have five brethren" (Lk.
16:28).

I answer that, Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not
even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that
there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction
from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by
the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above ([738]Q[86], A[1]).
The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God,
and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For
as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the
cause of universal and individual principles ([739]Q[14], A[2]), so
likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a
kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence. There is a
difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact
that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper
knowledge of things; whereas separated have only a confused knowledge.
Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these
species, know not only the specific natures of things, but also the
singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these
species know only those singulars to which they are determined by
former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural
aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever
is received into anything is conditioned according to the mode of the
recipient.

Reply to Objection 1: The intellect does not know the singular by way
of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as
explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of the separated soul is confined
to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of
determinate relation, as we have said.

Reply to Objection 3: The separated soul has not the same relation to
all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others.
Therefore there is not the same reason why it should know all
singulars.
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Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this
life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for the
Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" (1 Cor. 13:8).

Objection 2: Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy
knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of
knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some
who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are
better; which seems unreasonable.

Objection 3: Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by
influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge
here acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two
forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject which
cannot be.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4,5), that "a
habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed
by sickness or the like. " But in this life there is no change so
thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is
destroyed by death.

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let us learn on
earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven. "

I answer that, Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the
intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative,
cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not
kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it would follow that
when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also
be entirely destroyed.

But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode of
species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of
knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive
powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the
very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the
actions whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of
the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by
the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers.
Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain
facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid
sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of
the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible
object. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the
intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the
inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit.

Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in
the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers;
but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain;
because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev.